Sunday, November 24, 2024

The Seed of the Sacred Fig: enlightening dissident cinema from Leeds Film Festival

Exiled director Mohammad Rasoulof offers a harrowing and poignant response to the all-consuming repression of Iran’s revolutionary court



bySam Quarton
23-11-2024 

Missagh Zareh (left) as the haunted investigative judge, courtesy of Leedsfilm.com


Cinema is a dangerous business in Iran. Filmmakers who dare expose the engulfing control of the Islamic republic’s state repression are often crushed by the very evil they hope to capture. Travel bans, passport seizures, lengthy prison sentences and intimidation become part and parcel of the job. The Seed of the Sacred Fig – Mohammad Rasoulof’s secret picture about a criminal investigator whose careerist motives, state fanaticism and missing gun drive an iron wedge between him and his young daughters – should be a permanent reminder of the risks Iranian filmmakers take for their art. This is yet more essential viewing from Leeds International Film Festival.

In September 2022, tired and harried protesters took to the streets of Tehran under the banner of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, burning their headdresses as a symbol of disgust towards a state that had allowed 22-year-old Mahsa Amini to die in police custody. Amini was another victim of the Iranian Revolutionary Court’s Hijab and Chastity restrictions, theocratic laws recently strengthened by the state’s new power to subject women who breach the dress codes to ’treatment clinics’.

But Rasoulof could do nothing but respect his compatriots’ resolve from the isolation of his cell: the director, along with fellow filmmakers Jafar Panahi and Mostafa Al-Ahmad, was already serving a year-long prison sentence. His crime? Imploring security services to lay down their weapons during the deadly Abadan protests earlier that year.

The horrors of such violent state repression would in fact mutate into one of the bloodiest moments in Iran’s recent history, with security services bringing about the death of over 100 protesters in a single day on September 30th, known today as ’Bloody Friday’. Those who survived the ball bearings passed off as non-lethal rounds – protesters were often shot in the neck, stomach and genitals, but particularly the eyes, as the UN’s Fact Finding Mission Chair reports – would bear the ’dissidents’ mark for life.


Debshishu and Smita Patil: Leeds International Film Festival’s spotlight success
bySam Quarton
14 November 2024


A sympathetic jailer

It was this nightmarish reality that Rasoulof would enter as a free man, in February 2023, while armed forces were still imprisoning, torturing and executing those deemed part of an international conspiracy to undermine national security. Those living with whatever freedoms they could salvage must have wondered if the harbingers of state violence have a conscience.

After a clandestine conversation with a sympathetic jailer, Rasoulof knew the answer: the guard, suicidal at the prospect of enforcing more cruelty on others, could not bear tell his family what he does for a living. One need not squint to see how this harrowing and enlightening encounter would form the basis for The Seed of the Sacred Fig, Rasoulof’s study of a family torn apart by their father’s unthinkable, state-ordered actions.
The Seed of the Sacred Fig germinates

Iman – played with haunted vacancy by Missagh Zareh – had thought himself a just lawman, always fair in his 20 years as an ’expert’. But when promoted as an investigating judge, an essential stepping stone to the bench of the revolutionary court, the father of two finds himself tipping the scales of justice at the state’s will. Hundreds of death warrants begin to cross Iman’s desk, though his workload is easier than ever: things work differently here; don’t ask questions; just sign.

Yes, the times are a-changin’. Not just for Iman, who is learning the true weight of Azrael’s scythe. But also Najmeh, the materialist wife living in secret fear of her husband’s wrath, not merely for herself but their two children, Sana and Zervan (Mahsa Rostami), whose feminist views, longing for nail polish and educated friends are viewed as an imminent threat to the family’s survival.

It is here the seed of the fig that can engulf entire trees begins to germinate. Through Rasoulof’s patient and calculated authorship, we see Iman’s fanatical devotion calcify into an unmovable object, with the family’s civil liberties being rolled back inch by inch: friends are banned from coming over; neighbours are to be treated with suspicion; ’leaks’ must be stopped at all costs. There’s a horror film kineticism that stalks the hallways of the tiny apartment, a feeling some unseen enemy must be evaded, best observed through Najmeh’s attempts to hide their daughter’s friend from Iman’s paranoid gaze.


Mahsa Rostami (centre) staring down her on-screen father as the fearless Zervan, courtesy of Leedsfilm.com


The chants penetrate the walls

To his family, Iman has become a feared supreme leader of the household, a god among men whose word is final and whose presence is rare. The service pistol the father foolishly hides in a drawer acts as a physical testament to his divine right – although it will be stolen in a sudden, dizzying coup de théâtre. But when images of bloodied protesters and terrorising security forces are emblazoned on the daughters’ phones, real footage taken from the Amini demonstrations, Iman watches his regime begin to wobble.

Dissident slogans transcend screens and penetrate the walls; residents from the same apartment block chant “death to theocracy”; women in public without hijabs become an increasingly visible presence.

But it is at the dinner table – a sacrosanct space for the father’s patriarchal authority, when Iman denigrates the protesters as “sluts who want to walk naked in the street” – where we see judges too aren’t immune from the power of dissenting voices. Zervan, with gladiatorial furor, beats away talk of enemy plots, conspiracy theories and misogyny to ask her father something simple and poignant: “A girl my age was killed for her hijab. Why?” If Rostami’s anger feels lived-in and real, I would bet the farm it is.


Cinema or secret military operation?

Cinematographer Pooyan Aghababaei achieves in the film’s alleyways and bustling urban scenes a near-tangible paranoia that is also reflective of the incredibly dangerous risks undertaken by the cast and crew.

Rasoulof, who had already served a prison term for shooting without a permit, knew before making his latest picture it would resemble a covert military operation rather than a film production. And that’s exactly what it became: 70 days of exhausting shoots; small groups operating with very limited resources; no cellphones; anxieties running through the roof. Even the director himself would not be present when the clapperboard hit: liaisons between tech, design and cast members were essential in communicating the film’s intended image. The threat to life and liberty was always lurking in the shadows.

Z
ervan receiving the brunt of her mother’s fear, courtesy of Leedsfilm.com


Final Thoughts

And now, just over six months after the film was announced as a contender at Cannes, most of those who worked on it are experiencing legal reprisals. Both Rostami and her on-screen sister, Saterah Maleki, have left the country in fear of state retribution, and are joined by Rasoulof, who fled to Germany shortly after receiving a draconian eight year sentence and flogging in May this year.

So as Rasoulof vows to return to Iran and accept his persecution, let us appreciate the price of admission the director and his peers pay for the sake of free expression in an art form we are lucky enough to take for granted. The Seed of the Sacred Fig will live on as a testament to their sacrifice.





Sam Quarton is a Sheffield-based writer, video journalist and content creator who has covered everything from health and technology, politics and communities all the way through to music and the arts. Whether he’s sinking his teeth into news stories, interviews, or long-form copy, he approaches each piece with a clear focus: to gain a deeper perspective on the world and always move the conversation forward.

Priests suspended after review into Church of England's abuse failings

Staff writer 
CHRISTIANITY TODAY
23 November 2024


Four priests have had their licence to practise suspended by the Church of England as it continues to deal with the fallout from a damning review into safeguarding failings.

The Diocese of London has withdrawn permission to officiate (PTO) pending investigation from Hugh Palmer, former rector at All Soul's Church, Langham Place in London, and Christianity Explored founder Rico Tice, The Telegraph reports.

Sue Colman, associate minister at St Leonard's Church in Oakley, Hampshire, has also had her PTO suspended pending investigation, while in the Diocese of Gloucester the licence of Cheltenham-based pastor Nick Stott has been withdrawn.

The measures have been taken following the publication of the Makin Review which accused the Church of England of carrying out a "cover-up" of horrific abuse perpetrated by John Smyth, the late organiser of Iwerne Christian youth camps.



The report led to the resignation of the Archbishop of Canterbury, but there have been calls for more clergy to go over their failure to act.

Palmer was cited in the report as having met with a badly beaten Smyth victim in 1982 the day after he had attempted to take his own life. Palmer said he did not realise at the time that the suicide attempt was linked to abuse by Smyth.



The report said: "Hugh Palmer visits victim [and] tells victim he was extremely sympathetic to abuse suffered at [the] hands of John Smyth."

During the review, victims cast doubt over the motives behind such visits by clergy.

"Victims have told us that this contact was not requested by them, but that it was proactively made by the individual clergy, by letter or phone, at the time feeling surprised by this and recalled how this was an unusual step, not something they had previously experienced, except in terms of John Smyth's approach to their grooming," the report said.

"At the time they felt it was offered in a supportive way but with hindsight, they reflected this may have been offered more for reasons of oversight and monitoring."

Palmer, a former chaplain to Queen Elizabeth II, told the review his visit had been motivated by "genuine concern".

Tice left the Church of England earlier this year over its introduction of same-sex blessings but retained his PTO so that he could continue to speak in Church of England churches.

He told The Times that after becoming aware of the abuse in 1987, he made his concerns known "soon afterwards" and "reported what I knew to senior people in the Iwerne camp more than once".

He said: "As a university student in the spring of 1987, I was told that boys at Iwerne camps had been beaten. At that time I was not aware of the dreadful severity of those beatings, certainly not that they amounted to criminal assault."

Of Colman, the Makin Review said it was likely that she and her husband Jamie had "significant knowledge" of Smyth's abuse in the UK and Africa as they were trustees of a ministry that funded his work in Africa.

Concerning Stott, he was described as among the first on the scene when a young boy died in suspicious circumstances at one of Smyth's camps in Zimbabwe. Stott told the review he had had "a confidence that any matters would have been investigated and dealt with by people he trusted".
UK

Rail enthusiasts bid to restore historic steam train back to its former glory

Locomotive No29 was built in 1908 for the Fife Coal Company's Mary Pit in Lochore.



The train is in the care of the Shed47 Railway Restoration Group.


Laura Piper
SKY NEWS
News / Edinburgh & East


A group of rail enthusiasts in Lathalmond are fundraising in a bid to restore a piece of Fife history.

Locomotive No29 was built in 1908 for the Fife Coal Company’s Mary Pit in Lochore.

After being out of service for half a century, it’s now under the care of the Shed47 Railway Restoration Group, who are hoping to restore the train to its former glory and get it back on the tracks.

For the volunteers it’s a labour of love, grinding back the years piece-by-piece.

Alexander Briggs from the Shed47 Railway Restoration Group said the team love the work they do.

He said: “Well, you get a sense of achievement actually when you get a load of basically junk coming and it gradually manifests itself into a working item, that’s really where you get the kicks from.”

The train is an Andrew Barclay steam locomotive affectionately known as No. 29.

At the peak of its working life it hauled coal for many of the collieries across Fife, operating at the Mary pit in Lochore, the Lindsay Colliery in Kelty, Cowdenbeath Central Workshops, Bogside Mine and Frances in Dysart.

Grant Robertson from Shed47 said: “It was then put into a playpark in Danderhall originally, stayed there for a few years and then it was rescued by the guys at Prestongrange Railway Society.

“They took it into their safekeeping and then seven years ago it made its way across to us and we started work on it and getting it to the stage it’s at now.”

Steam engines like No29 were fondly known as “Pugs” and were used around Scotland’s coal mines until as late as 1981.

The team has already managed to raise enough funds to get the boiler sent away for expert repair, which means that within the next few months it will be lit by fire for the first time in 50 years.

The last part of the journey will involve a fresh lick of paint before it returns to service, hopefully next year.

But for it to make a complete return to the track, the team are hoping for local support to get it through its final phase. Anyone willing to make a donation to the project can do so on the group’s campaign page.

“It will be a fantastic feeling when it launches ready to take passengers,” added Robertson. “And that will free up space in the workshop for our next big project.”




UK

Bid to protect world's first ice cream cone factory

Nick Jackson
Local Democracy Reporting Service
BBC
LDRS
The site in Old Trafford is believed to be the world's first purpose-built ice cream cone factory.


The world’s first purpose-built ice cream cone factory could become a registered building after town hall bosses moved to safeguard for the future.

Progress Works on Ayres Road in Old Trafford is where the Antonelli Brothers began manufacturing the sugar cone ice cream more than a century ago.

Trafford Council has included the factory on a draft list of buildings judged to have historical value.

Councillor Liz Patel said the sites on the list would be given "special protection" in the planning process if future development takes place.

LDRS
The Quaker Meeting House and burial ground in Sale has also been included on the list


Other sites on the list include a former prisoner of war camp on Charcoal Road in Dunham and the Manchester Carriage and Tramway Company’s Depot.

Among the others included are the Quaker Meeting House and Burial Ground where George Bradshaw, who developed the first widely-used railway timetable guide, is interred.

Raglan House, the home of John Brogden, who built the Manchester to Altrincham Railway, also features.

The list includes so-called "non designated heritage assets" in conservation areas and is intended to influence future decisions on planning applications.

Ms Patel said a final consultation would be held before the list was fully adopted.

"The benefits of such a list are significant and will have a positive impact on our borough’s street scene, securing attractive and distinctive aspects of our local heritage and built environment," she said.

What happens when China puts boots on the ground in Myanmar?


The move represents direct intervention by China, whose troops will have to conduct offensive operations.


Images by AP (Amanda Weisbrod/RFA)

It now appears to be a question of “when, not if” Chinese security personnel will arrive in Myanmar, with Beijing looking to secure its strategic interests in the war-torn country and those of its ally, the military junta that has lost large chunks of the country since the 2021 coup.

The Irrawaddy online news outlet reported that the junta formed a 13-member working committee on October 22 to prepare the groundwork to establish a “joint security company” with China.

According to the report, the committee, chaired by Major-General Toe Yi, the junta’s deputy home affairs minister, is currently tasked with “scrutinizing the importing and regulating of weapons and special equipment” until Beijing signs a drafted MOU on forming a “security company.”

After that, according to the narrative from Beijing and Naypyidaw, Chinese personnel would join a “company” — more like a militia — alongside junta troops, which would be tasked with defending Chinese strategic and economic interests in the country.

I’m told that China will send troops from the military and police in a “private” capacity, giving the fiction of detachment.

Yet this would not be a joint venture in anything but name.

Soldiers of Chinese People's Liberation Army fire a mortar during a live-fire military exercise in Anhui province, China May 22, 2021. (Reuters)
Soldiers of Chinese People's Liberation Army fire a mortar during a live-fire military exercise in Anhui province, China May 22, 2021. (Reuters) (Reuters)

Does one seriously think that Chinese troops or police are going to listen to the Myanmar generals who have lost battle after battle to ethnic armies and ill-trained civilian militias over the past four years?

Moreover, there is no reason to think that the China-junta “militia” will stick to merely protecting Chinese nationals and Chinese-owned businesses in Myanmar.

Chinese projects delayed

It is true that Chinese assets have come under increased levels of attack from anti-junta forces in recent months.

There is some logic, if you’re sitting in Beijing and Naypyidaw, in wanting to allow Chinese forces to help command most of northern Myanmar, giving junta forces a better chance of mopping up rebel forces elsewhere.

The civil war has delayed key Chinese projects in the country, such as the long-planned China-Myanmar Economic Corridor between China’s Yunnan province and Myanmar’s Indian Ocean coast.

Strategically key for Beijing is a port it wants to build in Rakhine state, allowing China to import oil and gas from the Middle East without ships needing to pass through the Malacca Strait, a potential chokepoint.

This would be essential in the event of a conflict in the South China Sea, during which the Philippines or Taiwan could try to blockade Chinese trade, including oil and gas imports on which China’s economy depends.

My sources say that the majority of the PLA contingent will be deployed to Rakhine state.

According to statements released by Beijing, almost certainly intended to construct a peace narrative ahead of the deployment, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told junta leader Min Aung Hlaing in August that he hoped “Myanmar will earnestly safeguard the safety of Chinese personnel and projects.”

When Min Aung Hlaing visited China earlier this month, his first visit since the coup, Chinese Premier Li Qiang instructed him to “take effective measures to ensure the safety of Chinese nationals, institutions, and projects in the country.”

The reality, as Beijing knows well, is that the junta cannot ensure these things.

That’s the entire reason why the “security companies” are deemed necessary by the Chinese government.

Offensive operations

Once Chinese security personnel are on the ground in Myanmar, the fiction that they’re just standing guard outside a few industrial compounds or pipelines will become difficult to maintain.

Indeed, they’re likely to have no choice but to mount offensive operations.

The most obvious reason to expect this is that many Chinese-run enterprises are in territory currently controlled by resistance groups that will presumably need to be taken by Chinese forces.


If not, why would Beijing make a u-turn on its existing policy, which had been to cajole and pay the ethnic militias to leave Chinese entities out of their fight with the junta?


Secondly, after years of dallying, Beijing now clearly thinks that it cannot trust the anti-junta National Unity Government (NUG), presumably because it’s too pro-Western, nor most of the anti-junta ethnic militias – even those who have taken money from Beijing.

Chinese authorities reportedly detained Peng Daxun, the leader of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), a militia that has inflicted heavy casualties on the junta, after he was summoned to Yunnan for a parlay last month.

This may be a temporary detention pour encourager les autres, or it may be Beijing trying to dismantle disloyal militias more permanently.

Yet, in essence, Beijing has now thrown its weight behind the junta because it presumably believes China’s interests would be best served by an outright junta victory.

So if Beijing thinks the ultimate way of protecting Chinese business interests in Myanmar, for now and in the long term, is for the civil war to be ended and for junta forces to win the conflict decisively, the difference between Chinese security personnel conducting defensive and offensive operations is paper thin.

Why wouldn’t Beijing use its troops to bring about its overarching goal? Why would Beijing overlook the opportunity to end a civil war that it wants over?

Anti-China sentiment

Why would Beijing merely send personnel to defend Chinese factories and pipelines for a few months or years if it thinks there is the possibility that forces hostile to Chinese interests could eventually take power nationally?

Under these circumstances, Chinese personnel would think it justified, under the narrative of “safeguarding the safety of Chinese nationals, institutions and projects in the country,” to wage offensive assaults against anti-junta forces across Myanmar.


Granted, the junta is touchy about being seen as a lackey of Beijing — or about Myanmar becoming a protectorate of China.

That is why Beijing has offered platitudes of a joint “security company,” a fiction to get around Myanmar’s constitution that forbids the deployment of foreign troops.

But what position will the junta be in to dictate what Chinese personnel can do or where they can go once they are in Myanmar?

Lastly, does one imagine that anti-junta forces won’t retaliate against Chinese intervention, especially when that intervention is so clearly on behalf of the regime?

Anti-China sentiment is running high in Myanmar and will boil over once Chinese troops and police step foot in the country.

One can very easily imagine an escalating campaign of attacks by anti-junta forces on Chinese interests – increasing the incentives for Chinese security personnel to launch offensive operations.

Once Chinese boots are on the ground in Myanmar, this means direct intervention by China – not merely an economic peacekeeping effort by joint “security companies.”

And Chinese personnel will have to conduct offensive operations – not just stand guard at Chinese-run factories and pipelines.

David Hutt is a research fellow at the Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS) and the Southeast Asia Columnist at the Diplomat. He writes the Watching Europe In Southeast Asia newsletter. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of RFA.


Are Chinese private armies entering the fray in Myanmar?


Deployment of PMCs demonstrates Chinese unease and junta desperation.

Images by AP, Adobe Stock (Amanda Weisbrod/RFA)

Between the high level visits of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Naypyidaw and Myanmar junta leader Min Aung Hlaing’s trip to China, the neighbors struck one piece of business – a deal to allow the deployment of Chinese private military corporations (PMCs) to operate within Myanmar.

The BBC-Burmese Service, which first broke the story, reported that there are already four Chinese private security companies that are operating in Myanmar, doing static security work.

The deployment of mercenary forces is a telling sign of China’s unease and of the desperation of the State Administrative Council (SAC), as the junta is formally called.

China is obviously very concerned about the junta’s ability to protect Chinese interests in the war-torn country, but a deployment of private Chinese armies is nothing less than a complete humiliation for Min Aung Hlaing.

Despite the military’s bravado, over half of Myanmar is now in opposition hands, and junta forces have failed to retake most of the territory they have lost since the Three Brotherhood Alliance commenced Operation 1027 in October 2023.

The Chinese deployment is a stark admission on the part of the February 2021 coup leader that his forces are spread too thin. Despite the monthly induction of 5,000 conscripts, battlefield losses, and defections are cutting into the regime’s numerical advantage.

The Irrawaddy reported that on October 22, the junta established a 13-member working committee composed of the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Home Affairs and other ministries to draft the memorandum of understanding on the military company’s establishment and import of weaponry and communications devices.

The committee would also determine where and how the Chinese PMC could be deployed.

Chinese PMCs

The new PMC has not been established, but chances are it would be a subsidiary of or a joint venture with one of China’s large existing PMCs, which have proliferated since the 1990s when a set of laws created the framework for their operation. Those laws were amended in 2009.

Today, there are roughly 20 Chinese PMCs operating in 40 countries, mostly in Africa, to provide security for Belt and Road Initiative projects.




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The big players in the market are De Wei Security Group Ltd, Hua Xin China Security, Guan An Security Technology, China Overseas Security Group, and Frontier Services Group.

Chinese PMC do not have the same business model as Russia’s Wagner Group, which really is used more as an expeditionary fighting force that gives the Russian government a fig leaf of plausible deniability, in pursuit of the Kremlin’s broader foreign policy interests.

Wagner’s business model is also based on the extraction of natural resources. Chinese firms, to date, have operated more on a contractual basis and have focused much more on the protection of China’s economic interests under the Belt and Road Initiative.

Chinese soldiers of the People's Liberation Army sit on the back of a truck on the highway to Nyingchi, Tibet Autonomous Region, China, October 19, 2020)
Chinese soldiers of the People's Liberation Army sit on the back of a truck on the highway to Nyingchi, Tibet Autonomous Region, China, October 19, 2020) (THOMAS PETER/Reuters)

The attempted mutiny by Wagner’s CEO, Yevgeny Prigozhin in June 2023 has probably shaped Chinese leadership thinking about PMCs, likely prompting the Communist Party and People’s Liberation Army to step up their controls.

The firewall between the PMCs and the People’s Liberation Army has always been thin. Much of the corporate leadership as well as rank and file came out of the PLA, People’s Armed Police, or other Chinese security ministries.

The regular targeting of Chinese citizens and economic interests along the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor by Baluchi militants may be prompting a rethink in how and when Chinese PMCs can use force, and what the rules of engagement are.

Legitimately concerned about Min Aung Hlaing and the military’s competence, Beijing will be pushing hard for robust rules of engagement, and the ability to conduct offensive operations around their key economic interests.

Major Chinese interests

China has a wide range of economic interests in Myanmar.

These include their special economic zone and proposed deep-water intermodal container port in Kyaukphyu, the Wanbao copper mines, hydro electric plants in Kachin and northern Shan states, oil and gas pipelines that extend to Kunming in southwestern China, and jade and rare earth mines in Kachin.

But almost all of those projects are in areas that have come under the control of the opposition National Unity Government and its people’s defense forces, or allied ethnic resistance organizations.

Indeed, 90% of Myanmar’s natural resources are outside junta control, or in contested spaces.

What does that mean for Chinese PMCs?

If they are deployed in contested areas, such as the mines in Mandalay, Magway, or Sagaing, will they be fighting alongside junta forces?

Or will they simply be defending China’s economic interest which would free up regime troops?

Will there be intelligence sharing and targeting information, or tactical-level embedded deployments?

Ethnic rebel group Ta'ang National Liberation Army patrol near Namhsan Township in Myanmar's northern Shan State. (AFP)
Ethnic rebel group Ta'ang National Liberation Army patrol near Namhsan Township in Myanmar's northern Shan State. (AFP)

Given the close relationship between Chinese PMCs and the PLA, one has to look at this as the de facto deployment of PLA forces into Myanmar.

The Burmese language Khit Thit Media reported that a deal to establish a Chinese PMC in Kyaukphyu was signed this month between Gen. Kyaw Shwe Htun, the chairman of the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone management sub-committee, and officials from the Chinese CITIC Group Company.

The Arakan Army has surrounded Kyaukphyu, where construction on a special economic zone and port has stalled, but has made no attempt to enter it.

Would Chinese PMCs be allowed to go outside the perimeter? Could they provide intelligence, signals intercepts or targeting information to junta forces?

Punishing the ethnic armies

It’s hard to imagine that the ethnic armies will allow the deployment of Chinese PMCs in their territory.

China has already made it clear that it is doubling down on the junta, while the opposition NUG and ethnic armies have repeatedly defied Beijing by continuing to fight the military regime and reject calls for nationwide elections under junta terms.

China has tried to punish the ethnic armies by shutting down border trade, which impacts the local communities that are dependent on the flow of commerce. They have shut down the internet and electric power for many border towns.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi attends a meeting with Russia's President in Saint Petersburg on Sept. 12, 2024. (AFP Photo/Kristina Kormilitsyna)
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi attends a meeting with Russia's President in Saint Petersburg on Sept. 12, 2024. (Kristina Kormilitsyna)

The Chinese are now taking their pressure campaign to the next level.

On Nov. 18, Myanmar-Now reported that the Chinese had placed the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) commander, Peng Daxun, under house arrest after summoning him to Kunming for talks.

China later denied Peng was under house arrest, saying he was receiving medical treatment.

This major escalation – coupled with additional support for the junta, including weaponry and drones, and negotiations about the deployment of private armies – should leave no one guessing as to what China’s position on Myanmar is.

Zachary Abuza is a professor at the National War College in Washington and an adjunct at Georgetown University. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of the U.S. Department of Defense, the National War College, Georgetown University or Radio Free Asia.