Canada And India Have Many Good Reasons To Move Past The Issues – Interview

April 22, 2026 
By A. Jathindra


Yves Goulet is a retired civil servant who worked in the Canadian intelligence community for three decades. Beginning his career in 1994 with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, he worked on counterintelligence and counterterrorism investigations before joining the Canadian Forces Intelligence Command as a senior analyst on international terrorism and later leading a team on hybrid threats.


He went on to hold senior leadership roles, including Director of National Security Operations at Public Safety Canada, Director of Strategic Analysis at the Department of National Defence, and Director of the National Fisheries Intelligence Service at Fisheries and Oceans Canada.

Since retiring, Yves has continued to advance the field of intelligence. He teaches an intelligence course at the University of Ottawa and serves as advisor on intelligence, law enforcement, and special operations with Earth League International.

In conversation with the Trinco Centre for Strategic Studies (TCSS), Yves Goulet offered his reflections on intelligence and security.

With Prime Minister Mark Carney now leading Canada, many observers view this as the beginning of a new chapter in India–Canada relations. How do you interpret the dismissal of earlier allegations against India—charges firmly rejected by New Delhi and subsequently set aside by a commission under Prime Minister Trudeau’s government? What signals might this send regarding the future trajectory of bilateral trust?


Indo-Canadian diplomatic relations have worsened significantly after the Canadian Security Intelligence Service reported that Indian operatives were involved in electoral interference, violence—including accusations of involvement in the killing of Canadian Sikh activist Hardeep Singh Nijjar—intimidation, and organized crime targeting Indian, especially Sikh, communities in Canada. While these allegations were taken seriously, no conclusive legal action was taken against Indian officials, who could not be questioned due to diplomatic immunity. Therefore, the allegations were not dismissed.

Both Canada and India have many good reasons to move past these issues. India is a major country, with a large population and economy, that Canada—a much smaller nation—cannot ignore, especially given the current unstable global environment. It is also important to note that 1.8 million Canadians are of Indian origin, and over 390,000 Indians hold study permits in Canada. However, Canada will not forget the past allegations of serious Indian interference in its domestic affairs. Similar to its approach with China, Canada will continue to balance trust and security concerns while maintaining formal diplomatic relations with India. Canadian intelligence agencies will keep a close watch on Indian diplomatic activities, particularly those that may threaten national security or influence Canadian political processes.


Recent visits by Canada’s National Security and Intelligence Adviser Nathalie Drouin to New Delhi and India’s National Security Adviser Ajit Doval to Ottawa resulted in a shared plan for cooperation on security and law enforcement. In your assessment, does this framework provide a meaningful foundation for addressing the Khalistan issue, particularly in light of India’s expectation that Canada adopts a more resolute stance toward groups it designates as terrorist threats?

Canada clearly wants to improve relations with India, including cooperation on national security issues, for some of the reasons mentioned above. The shared plan for security and law enforcement cooperation is a concrete step toward closer collaboration with India, including addressing the Khalistan issue.

Canada’s security agencies have long monitored Sikh extremism, especially since the 1985 Air India bombing. Canada has conducted thorough investigations into these groups and will likely continue to do so. The Canadian government has not ignored or downplayed this issue for domestic political reasons. Canada takes any potential terrorist threats against India, including those from Khalistani extremists, very seriously. Still, there are limits to how much Canada can accommodate India’s demands.

Indian authorities need to understand that Canadian supporters of a Khalistani state have a constitutional right to express their views, as long as they do not promote violence. Free speech is a fundamental Canadian value that the government cannot violate. It is a core part of Canadian political life. Unlike India, Canada does not have laws like the colonial-era sedition law that criminalize speech or actions undermining sovereignty or promoting secession. Canada even allows strong secessionist movements, such as those in Quebec and Alberta.

Canada could address India’s concerns about the Khalistani issue by updating its list of terrorist entities. Currently, Canada lists two Sikh groups as terrorist entities: Babbar Khalsa International and the International Sikh Youth Federation. India’s list includes these two groups plus four others: Khalistan Commando Force, Khalistan Zindabad Force, Khalistan Liberation Force, and Khalistan Tiger Force. To add any of these four groups, Canada must determine if they meet the criteria set by its Criminal Code. Indian authorities would need to provide credible intelligence showing reasonable grounds to believe these groups have participated in or supported terrorist activities.


Adding these four groups to Canada’s terrorist list might ease India’s concerns, but being listed in Canada has limited consequences. Surprisingly, it is not a crime simply to be listed. However, it is illegal to knowingly participate in or support any activities that help a terrorist group carry out terrorist acts. Property belonging to terrorist entities can be seized or forfeited, and Canadian financial institutions must report and block access to such property.

Prime Minister Carney’s recent visit to Beijing, where he announced alongside President Xi Jinping that “Canada is forging a new strategic partnership with China,” has been noted by some observers as reminiscent of Cold War-era strategies, when China sought to leverage Canada’s position in its rivalry with the United States. From your perspective, how might Canada’s engagement with China be interpreted within this broader historical and geopolitical context?

The arrival of the Trump administration brought a strong political stance against a value-based international order and multilateralism. Its use of punitive tariffs had a significant impact on the Canadian economy, and its frequent calls to absorb Canada into the United States has significantly changed the situation. Americano-Canadian diplomatic relationships are on all time low, and Canadian authorities understand that there is a need to reshuffle the deck. On April 19, Prime Minister Mark Carney released a short YouTube video stating that Canada’s close partnership with the United States is now a weakness that needs to be addressed. Canada is actively working to reduce its dependence on the United States by strengthening economic and political ties, especially in the growing Indo-Pacific region and with the European Union.

Currently, Canada is using its relationship with China to counterbalance the United States rather than the other way around. Strengthening political and trade relations with China is seen as a way to lessen American pressure and show Washington that Canada has alternatives. However, Canada’s policy is shaped by geography, and China will never replace the United States. About 76% of Canadian exports go to the United States, supporting 2.3 million Canadian jobs, while only around 4% of exports go to China. Canada also shares language, democratic values (though recently tested), and decades of close military partnerships with the United States. China cannot replace the United States, and Canadians fully understand this.

At the same time, recent studies—such as Dragon at the Door—have raised concerns about potential risks to Canadian democracy from Chinese influence. As a former intelligence analyst, how would you evaluate the espionage challenges posed by China, and what broader strategic considerations—both opportunities and risks—do you see shaping Canada’s relationship with China in the years ahead?

China presents both economic opportunities and national security challenges for Canada. Canada is carefully balancing these factors while avoiding conflicts with the United States, which views China as a peer competitor and often pushes for stricter, coordinated restrictions against it.

With 1.4 billion consumers, China offers a significant commercial opportunity that Canadian companies can hardly ignore, especially as Canada seeks to diversify its trade away from the United States. Diplomatically, Canada must engage with China due to its global influence. There are also opportunities for collaboration on environmental sustainability and clean energy technologies, such as solar power and electric vehicles, where China leads, benefiting both countries economically and environmentally.

However, the threat of Chinese interference in Canadian domestic affairs is serious and well documented. A 2025 public inquiry and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service have identified China as the main source of foreign interference in Canada. China targets Canadian democratic institutions through election meddling, targeting politicians, and spreading disinformation. It is considered Canada’s top national security threat due to extensive economic and political espionage, aggressive cyber activities, and influence operations. This threat is expected to continue.

While economic incentives encourage closer ties with China, Canada also faces risks such as unpredictable market access restrictions, due to its authoritarian regime, if it challenges China on human rights or geopolitical issues. Therefore, despite wanting to reduce its dependence on the United States, Canada remains cautious about supply chain vulnerabilities and intellectual property theft.

This article was published at TCSS

A. Jathindra

A. Jathindra is the head of the think tank Trinco Centre for Strategic Studies (TCSS) and a Sri Lankan-based independent political analyst.