The EU's foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas has warned that the bloc is bearing an increasingly heavy and lonely burden in sustaining support for Ukraine, even as Brussels moves urgently to unlock a €90bn EU loan that Kyiv's government desperately needs to stave off a macroeconomic collapse in the coming months if no fresh funding is found.
Speaking on the margins of an EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting in Luxembourg on April 21, Kallas acknowledged that Europe's position as Ukraine's principal backer was becoming harder to sustain.
"We have a problem, namely Ukraine: we are there largely on our own, and we are the biggest supporters there. Not completely alone, that would not be true, but we also have our own concerns," she told reporters.
Kallas has been among Ukraine's most vocal and unwavering defenders in Brussels, but as IntelliNews has reported, disunity in the EU has been growing as the strains of the cost of the war and the pain of the boomerang effect of sanctions on Russia increasingly take their toll.
At the same meeting, EU foreign ministers could not agree to suspend a free trade agreement with Israel for the mounting atrocities the IDF is committing in Gaza and now Lebanon, championed by Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez who is calling for the arrest of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on war crime charges. Despite the extreme sanctions imposed on Russia in the first week of the war in Ukraine, the motion to condemn Israel, which has committed many of the same offenses, was shot down by Germany and Italy.
Kallas, a former Estonian prime minister who took office as the EU's high representative for foreign affairs in late 2024, has consistently argued that Russian aggression poses an existential threat to European security and that Europe must do more, not less, to ensure Ukraine prevails. However, both Kallas and her boss, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, have offered only muted criticism of Israel.
Her Luxembourg remarks reflect the reality confronting Brussels as the US has pulled back from support of the Ukrainian cause and the Iran war consumes Washington's strategic bandwidth. Ukraine fatigue has been growing slowly as the war entered a stalemate following the failure of the 2023 summer offensive, but is now gathering momentum.
In general, the EU project is facing increasing problems as recession looms across the whole region that is fuelling the “rise of the right”. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban loss of last weekend’s election was welcomed in Brussels as the most pro-Russia and illiberal government in the EU, but his replacement, Hungarian Prime Minister Peter Magyar, is not as pro-EU as billed. A similar election in Bulgaria also returned a pro-Russia populist and now Romania faces a political crisis. The leaders coming as a result of these election upsets are generally not so much illiberal pro-Kremlin politicians, but, as IntelliNews reported, euroscepticism-lite governments, many of which would like to end the support of Ukraine.
The €90bn loan: a window opens
Against that backdrop, the meeting in Luxembourg was dominated by efforts to unblock the €90bn loan package originally agreed by all 27 EU member states in December but subsequently stalled by Hungary's veto.
"We expect some positive decisions tomorrow on the €90bn loan," Kallas told reporters, as EU foreign ministers gathered. Orban has been the sticking point for the release of the loan, but Magyar has promised to drop Budapest’s objections provided Russian oil deliveries via the Druzhba pipeline resume – which is due to happen on April 22. A European Commission delegation has been in Budapest to discuss implementation with Magyar's incoming team, which formally takes office on May 9.
On April 21, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy confirmed that Ukraine had completed repairs to the pipeline. Slovak opposition to the twentieth sanctions package against Russia has also been caught up in the diplomatic spat and follows a similar logic.
Sanctions, accession and weapons
Kallas also told ministers that the EU "must continue to give Ukraine what it needs to hold its own until Putin understands that this war leads nowhere," and called for a rapid advance on multiple fronts simultaneously.
She urged foreign ministers to "rapidly move forward with the twentieth sanctions package" against Russia and called for a revisiting of "long-blocked decisions, including opening negotiation clusters with Ukraine" on EU accession. In December as part of the 27-point peace plan (27PPP) the Trump administration proposed to accelerate Ukraine’s accession to the EU, joining in 2027. However, the EU member states have shot that idea down and Ukraine is unlikely to become a member for a decade.
On April 22, Zelenskiy compromised and suggested that Ukraine might accept a temporary diminished “observer” status that would allow it to participate in EU meetings, but would not have access to EU funds that come with full membership – in particular, it would have no access to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) funding that makes up a third of the EU budget spending. In theory, as a full member, Ukraine would be entitled to massive €186bn a year of subsidies.
The European Peace Facility weapons fund — another vehicle for channelling military assistance to Kyiv — was also flagged as requiring renewed momentum by Kallas, who remains one of Europe’s most prominent Russia hawks.
Kallas presented the fourth pillar of the EU's evolving security guarantee framework for Ukraine to ministers at the same meeting, as discussions continue on what binding commitments the bloc can offer Kyiv in the absence of the full Nato membership that Ukraine has long sought and Washington has not endorsed.
The burden question
Kallas’ frank admission that the EU is "largely on its own" reflects a change of tone in Europe where leaders appear to have largely given up on keeping the “special transatlantic relation” alive that has dominated international politics since the end of WWII. For much of Trump’s first year in office the tactics have been to flatter the US president and attempt to manipulate his ego. Those efforts appear to have stopped now as various EU leaders have become more openly critical of the White House. The issue of condemning Israel’s actions in its military campaign in the Middle East is the most obvious break with US foreign policy and Europe’s. To add injury to insult, the Trump administration announced on April 21 that it was diverting more weapons originally intended for Ukraine to the Middle East.
Kallas acknowledged as recently as September 2025 that "Europe cannot support Kyiv on its own without Washington's involvement," telling Politico that Trump "was the one who promised to stop the killing — so it can't be on us." Her remarks this week suggest her calculus has also shifted since then and she has also given up on new US support. Brussels is now faced with managing a situation it had hoped to avoid: acting as Ukraine's primary backer not by choice but by default.
Ukraine needs more money
The unlocking of the €90bn loan — expected to receive formal approval from ambassadors on April 23 — would provide Kyiv with critical budget support across 2026 and 2027, covering military salaries, social payments and weapons procurement. However, it is insufficient to completely fund Ukraine until the end of 2027 as Ukraine needs a total of some €140bn over the coming two years. Additional money will have to be raised from other G7 partners like Japan and Canada to reach that goal. During the meeting in Luxembourg, Kallas admitted there are no guarantees of financing for the final third of Ukraine's needs in 2027.
The European Union plans to cover two-thirds of Ukraine's external financing needs in 2026-2027 with the €90bn loan, but Ukraine's other international partners have only confirmed the availability of funds to cover the remainder of Kyiv's needs for 2026, said European Commissioner for Economic Affairs Valdis Dombrovskis at the meeting. Ukraine's other international partners have not yet confirmed plans for its 2027 financing.
"I would say that now [in 2026] we are more than provided [with funds to finance Ukraine]. This year, the financing deficit for 2027 is a much more acute issue," Dombrovskis said.
Dombrovskis outlined that in 2026 and 2027, the EU will provide Ukraine with €45bn, covering two-thirds of Ukraine's budgetary and military requirements for those years.
Kyiv has warned that without additional funding, it faces a cash shortage within months that would threaten its ability to sustain the war effort.
Hungary’s political landscape has been reshaped by the electoral defeat of longtime Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, but expectations that the country will now pivot sharply away from Russia and toward a more assertive European Union policy on Ukraine may prove misplaced, says a commentary by Carnegie Politika.
The opposition Tisza party, led by Péter Magyar, swept to victory in parliamentary elections on April 12, ending Orbán’s two-decade dominance. While Magyar is widely expected to soften Hungary’s combative tone within the EU, analysts say structural constraints will limit how far he can go.
Orbán had cultivated a reputation as the EU’s chief spoiler on Ukraine policy, positioning himself as a lone dissenter. However, this image was somewhat misleading. “Orbán created an image for himself as virtually the only opponent of aid to Ukraine in the entire EU,” writes Maksim Samorukov, fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. However, he adds, “in reality, he was simply willing to use his veto to absorb all the backlash, allowing other opponents to remain in the shadows.”
Hungary’s deep-rooted ties with Russia, particularly in the energy sector, predate Orbán and will continue to shape policy under his successor, according to Samorukov. Even during the Cold War, Budapest relied heavily on Soviet energy supplies, and diversification efforts since the 1990s have only partially reduced that dependence.
Today, Russian involvement remains embedded in key sectors of the Hungarian economy. Multibillion-dollar loans tied to the expansion of the Paks nuclear power plant, gas imports routed through the TurkStream pipeline, and oil supplies via the Druzhba pipeline all underpin economic stability. “No leader could afford to sacrifice all that overnight,” Samorukov said.
Magyar has acknowledged these realities. During the campaign, he avoided bold pledges on Russia, offering instead cautious proposals to review existing agreements for corruption and “gradually reduce dependence on Russian supplies by the mid-2030s”, as pointed out by Samorukov. Such timelines fall well short of EU targets to eliminate Russian energy imports by 2027.
Domestic political constraints further complicate any rapid shift. Although Tisza has taken power, much of the state apparatus remains staffed by Orbán-era appointees, including senior judicial figures and prosecutors. Efforts to overhaul these institutions quickly would risk destabilising governance and provoking resistance from entrenched interests.
As a result, Magyar faces a difficult choice: pursue incremental reforms within the existing system or engage in a prolonged struggle against the old guard, Samorukov writes. He suggests the former is more likely, pointing to the risk of political and economic disruption.
Orbán’s downfall itself had little to do with foreign policy. Instead, it stemmed from domestic concerns, particularly economic stagnation and perceptions that the prime minister had grown detached from everyday governance. After years in power, critics said he was “far more interested in meeting with global leaders and facilitating ultra-right parties around Europe than in attempting an economic recovery at home,” the commentary said.
Magyar’s Tisza movement capitalised on this fatigue, presenting itself as a generational alternative rather than an ideological break. Many of its leaders, including Magyar, emerged from the same political elite as Orbán’s Fidesz party, highlighting the continuity underlying Hungary’s political transition.
The new government is expected to repair relations with Brussels, particularly to unlock billions of euros in frozen EU funds withheld over rule-of-law concerns, says Samorukov. There is growing speculation that the EU may release a substantial portion of these funds without demanding sweeping concessions, partly as a reward for Orbán’s removal.
“Reducing the share of Russian energy supplies in the Hungarian economy can take a back seat for now,” Samorukov suggests, as Brussels prioritises political normalisation over immediate structural change.
Relations with Ukraine are also likely to improve in tone but not necessarily in substance, Samorukov forecasts. Magyar is expected to adopt a less confrontational approach than Orbán, whose disputes with Kyiv often spilled into EU forums. However, policy differences remain significant.
Magyar has indicated that Ukraine’s potential EU membership should be subject to a referendum in Hungary, opposes arms deliveries, and has raised concerns about the treatment of ethnic Hungarians in western Ukraine. Public opinion reflects this ambivalence: even among Tisza supporters, more respondents view Ukraine as a threat than as a partner.
These attitudes are not unique to Hungary. Across Central and Eastern Europe, enthusiasm for Ukraine’s integration into the EU has waned, driven by concerns over competition for subsidies, labor markets, and agricultural exports.
In this broader context, Hungary’s leadership change is unlikely to transform EU policy. While Orbán’s departure removes a consistent veto player, it does not eliminate underlying divisions within the bloc.
“In his absence, someone else is likely to step up and call for second thoughts on providing extra help to Kyiv or imposing new sanctions on Moscow,” Samorukov noted, highlighting the persistence of dissenting voices.
For Russia, the loss of a reliable ally in Budapest presents challenges. The Kremlin had cultivated close ties with Orbán, relying on his support to blunt EU initiatives. Establishing a similar relationship with Magyar will be more difficult, particularly given the current geopolitical climate.
Nevertheless, expectations of a dramatic shift may be overstated. Hungary’s economic ties to Russia, combined with broader European uncertainties, will continue to constrain policy.
The EU itself faces mounting pressures, including internal political divisions, strained relations with the United States, and the economic impact of global conflicts and high energy prices. These factors complicate efforts to maintain a unified and robust stance on Russia.
For now, Hungary appears set to adopt a more cooperative tone within the EU while maintaining many of the underlying policies shaped by geography, economics, and public opinion—suggesting continuity rather than transformation in Europe’s approach to Russia and Ukraine.
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