Global Population Logic Undergoes A Cognitive Reversal – Analysis

April 10, 2026 
 Anbound
By Zhao Zhijiang

Over the past few decades, the understanding of global population issues has largely been based on a relatively simple framework: developed countries have lower fertility rates, while developing nations experience rapid population growth; wealthier groups tend to have fewer children, while poorer groups are more likely to have larger families. However, new data emerging over the past decade or so is gradually challenging this conventional view. Low fertility rates are no longer confined to developed economies like those in some European countries, Japan, or South Korea. Instead, they are increasingly spreading to regions such as Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Even more striking is that this shift is not only apparent between countries but is also becoming increasingly evident within countries, reflecting deep transformations in economic structures, social norms, and family values.

In a podcast discussing the economics of the baby bust, Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, Professor of Economics at the University of Pennsylvania, cited a series of surprising examples that directly challenge prevailing assumptions about who tends to have more children and who tends to have fewer.

One particularly striking comparison is between the United States and Mexico. Professor Fernández-Villaverde jokingly remarked in the podcast that if one were to randomly ask ten professors on a U.S. university campus which country has a higher fertility rate, most would likely still answer Mexico. However, the reality is the exact opposite. According to registration data from Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), the country’s Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in 2023 is approximately 1.60, while the U.S. rate for the same period is about 1.62. This marks the first time that Mexico’s fertility rate has fallen below that of the United States. It is worth noting that due to differences in statistical methods, the World Bank estimates Mexico’s TFR for the same period at 1.91, which is a significant discrepancy. Nevertheless, regardless of the data source, the sharp decline in Mexico’s fertility rate over the past decade has far exceeded most people’s expectations. From around 2.3 to 2.4 in the early 2010s, it has dropped rapidly, driven by a combination of factors such as accelerated urbanization, higher education levels, increased female labor force participation, and economic structural transformation.

Another transformative case comes from Israel. Over the past few decades, the fertility rate of the Muslim population in Israel has consistently been much higher than that of the Jewish population, a gap that has even sparked political discussions about demographic composition. However, this trend quietly reversed around 2015 to 2016, and since then, the gap has continued to widen. Data from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) clearly illustrates this shift. In 2022, the TFR for Jewish women was approximately 3.03, while for the Muslim population, it had decreased to 2.91. By 2024, in January to October, the Jewish TFR further held steady at 3.07, while the Muslim rate continued to decline to 2.68. This reversal trend is now firmly established and has been strengthening in recent years.


Professor Fernández-Villaverde specifically pointed out that the underlying factors driving this change are complex. The relatively high fertility rate among the Jewish population is largely driven by the ultra-Orthodox Haredi community, whose fertility rate has long remained at a high level of around 6, although there are signs of a gradual decline in recent years. In contrast, the fertility rate among non-Haredi Jewish women, including secular and traditional groups, has remained at a much lower level, around 2.0. Meanwhile, the fertility rate within the Muslim population has seen a significant decline, from over 9 in the 1960s to around 2.75 today. This change has been driven by modernization factors, such as improved female education, increased labor force participation, delayed marriage, accelerated urbanization, and the widespread use of contraception.

This shows how the traditional assumption that “religious societies naturally maintain high fertility rates” is being gradually corrected by reality. The reversal in trends signifies there is a global spread of low fertility rates, that even groups with strong religious or cultural traditions are not immune to the penetrative forces of modernization. What makes Israel unique is that, despite the overall fertility rate of the Jewish population still being among the highest within OECD countries, this is largely due to the contributions of the Haredi community. However, downward pressure on fertility rates is increasingly evident.


Similar changes are accelerating in the Middle East and North Africa. Egypt’s fertility rate, which was previously close to 4, has rapidly decreased in recent years to around 2.3. If the current trend continues, it could fall below the replacement level within just a few years. This would be much sooner than the United Nations’ earlier predictions, which anticipated this would not occur until the end of the century. Similarly, countries like Morocco and Tunisia have already seen their fertility rates drop below the replacement level.

Researchers at ANBOUND have observed that the cases provided by Professor Fernández-Villaverde represent only the tip of the iceberg. More data suggest that population transformation is spreading at an accelerating pace to regions traditionally associated with high fertility rates. For example, Chile’s TFR has recently dropped to around 1.1, putting it on par with countries like Japan, a country typically known for its low fertility rates. Thailand’s fertility rate has also fallen to around 1.0 to 1.2, approaching the range of certain European countries with low fertility. On a regional level, the average fertility rate across Latin America and the Caribbean has dropped to about 1.8, and since 2015, it has consistently remained below the replacement level. When viewed on a more global scale, over half of the world’s countries currently have fertility rates below the replacement level, and this proportion could exceed 90% by the end of this century. The global average fertility rate has dropped from around 5 in the mid-1960s to approximately 2.3 today, a near-halving in just a few decades.

These examples point to a structural shift that is taking place: population transformation is no longer progressing along the traditional linear path of “economic development—gradual fertility decline”. Instead, it is spreading globally at a faster and more concentrated pace.


Professor Fernández-Villaverde argues that the reason why low fertility rates have become a structural issue of concern is not merely because of the decline in population numbers, but because the economic growth, fiscal systems, social security frameworks, and debt repayment capabilities of modern nations are all built upon the foundation of a stable population size and a continuous supply of labor. At the same time, population changes tend to occur unevenly, often exhibiting clear spatial disparities. Core cities continue to attract population, while smaller cities and peripheral regions experience accelerated depopulation. As a result, public services such as schools, hospitals, and commercial facilities shrink, and the operational costs of local communities rise steadily. This spatial imbalance often impacts the daily lives of ordinary people more directly and more quickly than the overall population figures. When a region loses its schools, it means young families are no longer staying. When hospitals close, it forces elderly residents to relocate. The consequences of population decline are never evenly distributed.

All in all, the global population structure is entering a new phase that is fundamentally different from the past. The comparison of fertility rates between Mexico and the United States, the historic reversal of fertility patterns within Israel, and the unexpectedly rapid decline in fertility rates across the Middle East and North Africa, all of these cases point to the fact that traditional frameworks for understanding population trends can no longer fully explain reality. Low fertility rates are shifting from a localized phenomenon to a global structural trend. The pace of transformation in emerging economies may even surpass that of the developed countries of the past, and the eventual stabilization level could be even lower. This shift not only signals a contraction in population size but also points to long-term and profound pressures on labor supply, regional spatial patterns, and social security systems. To truly understand this trend, it is essential to approach it from multiple dimensions, including economic structure, social norms, and family systems, rather than relying on any single explanatory framework.

Final analysis conclusion:

Over the past decade, new data have shown that low fertility rates are no longer a phenomenon confined to developed economies such as those in certain European countries, Japan, or South Korea. Instead, they are rapidly spreading to regions like Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Even more notably, this shift is not only observable between countries but is also becoming increasingly evident within countries, reflecting deeper transformations in economic structures, social norms, and family values.

Zhijiang Zhao is a Research Fellow for Geopolitical Strategy programme at ANBOUND, an independent think tank.

Anbound

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