Mutual Aid: An Indirect Evolution Analysis
Tarik Tazdaït, Alejandro Caparros, Jean-Chrsitophe Péreau

To cite this version:
Tarik Tazdaït, Alejandro Caparros, Jean-Chrsitophe Péreau. Mutual Aid: An Indirect Evolution
Analysis. 2008. ffhalshs-00275386ff

Alejandro CAPARRÓS
Spanish Council for Scientific Research (CSIC), Institute for Public Goods and Policies (IPP).Albasanz 26, 3E4. 28037 Madrid.

Jean-Christophe PEREAU
University of Marne-la-Vallée - O.E.P, Cité Descartes, 5 boulevard Descartes, Champs Sur
Marne, 77454 Marne-la-Vallée cedex 2, France. E-mail: pereau@univ-mlv.fr. Tel:
+3360957058. Fax: +33160957050. And C.N.R.S- E.H.E.S.S - CIRED

Tarik TAZDAÏT
C.N.R.S - E.H.E.S.S - CIRED, Jardin Tropical - 45 bis, avenue de la Belle Gabrielle, 94736
Nogent Sur Marne cedex, France.

Abstract.
This paper studies the concept of “mutual aid” developed by Kropotkin, which implies
cooperation as a strategic choice. We study this concept in a Sequential Prisoners’ Dilemma
in a non-cooperative framework and in an indirect evolution framework (with complete and
incomplete information). We systematically compare this game with one that models Kant’s
moral. In the non-cooperative framework both moral concepts imply multiple equilibria. In
the indirect evolution framework with complete information Kropotkin´s moral concept leads
to generalized cooperation, while Kant’s rules lead towards general defection. In the indirect
evolution framework with incomplete information both moral approaches favor selfishness.
However, if some agents have an imperfect detection technology cooperative behavior will
not disappear in Kropotkin’s case, while it will vanish with Kant’s morality