Lukashenka’s Bloody Repression Puts Putin in Difficult Position, Shaburov Says

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Sunday, August 16, 2020

Lukashenka’s Bloody Repression Puts Putin in Difficult Position, Shaburov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, August 13 – Aleksandr Lukashenka’s bloody crackdown on post-election protests against him not only are further isolating him internationally but putting Vladimir Putin in an increasingly difficult position in terms of both integration of the two countries and the attitudes of the Russian population, Yekaterinburg commentator Aleksey Shaburov says.

            On the one hand, what Lukashenka is doing will make it ever harder for Putin to push for integration, the editor of Politsovet says. Why should Russians want to integrate with such a country as Belarus has become under Lukashenka? (politsovet.ru/67450-protesty-v-belorussii-kak-problema-dlya-putina.html).

            And on the other, because Lukashenka has extracted an expression of support from Putin, ever more Russians will suspect that the Kremlin leader may very well be preparing to use the same tactics his Minsk counterpart is, using bloody repression in order to suppress any challenge to his rule. That will only further erode support for the Moscow strongman.

            “It is no secret” that relations between Lukashenka and Putin have become increasingly fraught, with the latter pressing for further integration and the former resisting at each step of the way. Shaburov continues. The Belarusian elections and their aftermath have only made this situation worse.

            Lukashenka held these elections not just to get “the necessary result (for him, this was no problem) but also first of all to get Russia to recognize this result and second so that the scenario of ‘deep integration’ Putin is interested in wouldn’t be realized,” the Yekaterinburg commentator suggests.

           

            “And however sad it is to recognize, [Lukashenka] contrived to achieve these goals.” Putin sent him a congratulatory message on the election, not first (China’s Xi had that honor) but second because the Kremlin leader had no choice but to do so: Had he failed to send one, he would have appeared to be behind the protesters, something Putin cannot do.

            Moreover, such a message was needed if Putin was to have any chance to promote the integration of the two countries he seeks. “But the bloody events in Belarus are making this integration extremely difficult for now Lukashenka in the eyes of many on both sides of the border is not simply a weird neighbor but a really harsh dictator.”

            Many Russians have seen the pictures of clashes in Minsk, and few of them remain indifference. Consequently, they are likely to be increasingly skeptical about the value of integrating their country with such a state.  They will now view every Putin call for that through the lens of these pictures of repression.

            “Moreover, calls for integration will give rise to fears within Russia that perhaps the Russian powers that be want to adopt Lukashenka’s approach … And even if they don’t in fact want to, they can hardly afford to openly acknowledge this … [But] if the Belarusian OMON becomes the symbol of integration, it has little chance of gaining support from Russians.”

            Shaburov adds that “it is difficult to say whether Lukashenka is conscious of all this in giving the orders to suppress the protests. In any case, he it appears has passed a certain red line beyond which integration with him will be accompanied by enormous political and image losses for Russia.”

            For Lukashenka, that is a big win, assuming, “of course, that he will be able to suppress the protests and keep power for another few years.”