FOCUS: Hong Kong remains largely indifferent to China's zero-COVID protests
By Caroline Tam, KYODO NEWS - 11 hours ago - 09:48 | World, All, Coronavirus
Despite an unprecedented show of civil disobedience in mainland China over its stringent "zero-COVID" measures, people in Hong Kong have so far demonstrated a notable lack of sympathy and support toward the situation across the border.
Over the past week, Hong Kong has seen a series of small-scale solidarity protests at local universities and on the streets, with individuals lighting candles and holding white placards in support of the demonstrations across China.
But despite this apparent show of solidarity, there was little participation from local Hong Kong citizens, as exchange students and immigrants from the mainland mainly attended the protests.
Part of this indifference could stem from a fear of legal repercussions under the national security law, sweeping legislation imposed by Beijing amid its crackdown on dissent in the city in 2020 following the sometimes violent anti-government protests of the previous year that saw thousands take to the streets.
The law, which criminalizes acts of secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion with foreign forces, has sparked concerns about freedom of expression -- a fundamental right protected within the city's Basic Law -- as hundreds of demonstrators continue to be arrested and jailed for their involvement in the 2019 protests.
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On Thursday, a Hong Kong man who had sustained a gunshot wound after being shot by police at close range during the 2019 unrest was sentenced to six years behind bars.
The legal repercussions are further exacerbated by the city's current social distancing measures, prohibiting public gatherings of more than 12 people.
Hong Kong has already seen the use of these measures to block major events in the past. In 2020, police arrested 24 pro-democracy figures on suspicion of illegal assembly after an annual vigil for the Tiananmen Square protests was banned due to public health concerns.
But also perhaps at the center of Hong Kong's lack of sympathy toward their mainland Chinese counterparts is Beijing's "one country, two systems" principle, which sought to integrate the former British colony into sovereign China while promising to preserve an array of political freedoms even after the city's handover in 1997.
In recent years, though, China has increasingly moved to undermine Hong Kong's autonomy and democracy, including the arrests of activists, lawmakers and journalists, crackdowns on pro-democracy organizations and curbed freedoms.
In 2021, Hong Kong saw a string of Beijing-imposed electoral reforms to ensure that only "patriots" govern the city, with only one opposition-leaning figure elected to the city's Legislative Council last December.
On Monday, Hong Kong leader John Lee called on Beijing to intervene in a high-profile national security case, which critics say further erodes the city's judicial independence guaranteed under the "one country, two systems" policy.
A graduate student at the University of Hong Kong, who wished to remain anonymous, told Kyodo News that people in Hong Kong and mainland China have different goals in mind, making it difficult for their aspirations to be aligned with each other.
While the demonstrators in China are fighting for individual rights, the people of Hong Kong are fighting for civil liberties, she said. "What they are after is far from what we are after."
She said the cause is still worthy of support and that she may join future protests, though she is skeptical of the movement's longevity.
"They are inherently afraid to talk about politics...As soon as China relaxes its measures, I think the event will end."
Nathan Law, a Hong Kong activist, currently exiled in London, said on Twitter that while it was important for mainland Chinese protestors to stand united in their cause, there was a deeper need for ideological transformation in order to effect real change.
"A mass movement cannot exist before a change in consciousness," he wrote. "I think the more profound question is...how to recognize that the right to decide the future of the country should be in your own hands."
How China spends more on quashing dissent than on defence
China’s public safety spending reached $210 billion in 2020. It was also as much as 7 per cent higher than its national defence spending in 2020.
Tirtho Banerjee
New Delhi,
Protests erupted in China recently against Covid lockdowns after an apartment fire killed 11 (Photo: India Today)
By Tirtho Banerjee: The recent protests in China go beyond a shrill cry to lift Covid restrictions. They are adamant appeals to give people the freedom to express and change political policies that muffle dissent.
Fervent calls like ‘Step down Xi (Jinping)’ and ‘We don’t want dictators’ had resonated across Chinese cities as public took to streets in an unprecedented show of defiance against the Communist regime. It was bottled-up frustration and anger not just against the snap lockdowns, relentless testing, strict travel caps and prolonged quarantines, but at the root was a graver issue: Chinese government’s inhuman measures to crack down on anti-government narrative.
At many places, mobile phones of people were checked for photos and messages, along with their IDs. The police ensured that banned apps that might show sympathy for the protests were nowhere there. Even as people held marches in a peaceful manner, the cops detained many of them, adding fuel to the unrest.
The blaze in Anyang city, in the central Henan Province, which claimed more than 10 lives, and the clashes between security personnel and workers at Apple’s i-Phone making-plant in Zhengzhou, catalyzed the protests. Many experts said that the Covid restrictions were a ploy to quash the outcry against larger issues like pay disparity, and poor working conditions.
READ | Unprecedented protests in China: Key questions answered
SPENDING ON “PUBLIC SAFETY”
China has always had a zero-tolerance policy against dissent. And when it comes to quelling dissidence, the Communist government leaves no stone unturned. In fact, it spends more on controlling or combating internal disturbances than on its defence.
China calls it “public safety” or internal security. And its public safety spending reached $210 billion (approximately 1.39 trillion yuan) in 2020. This was a threefold increase in the past decade. It was also as much as 7 per cent higher than its national defense spending in 2020.
Reports indicate that since 2010, the allocation for “public safety” has surpassed the country’s military spending, with a difference of roughly 166 million yuan in 2019.
The “public safety” expenditure includes state security, police, domestic surveillance, armed civil militia, and other measures to deal with public disturbances. Guangdong, Jiangsu, and Xinjiang were the top three provinces in terms of “public security” spending.
The increased allocation for “public safety” is also indicative of the fact that the Chinese are piling more pressure on the government, which continues to try to control free speech at home.
If we go by the present protests, there are signs that even though the demonstrations have thinned out, the demands would stay. Wouldn’t this drive up the government spending on “public safety” further?
FROM TIANANMEN SQUARE TILL NOW
It was after the Tiananmen Square protests in June 1989 – in which hundreds were killed -- that the Chinese government realized how grave was the public angst centered around demands for more political freedom and less censorship. The internal security was ramped up, and a strategy focusing on controlling the unrest rather than using immediate force was put into place.
Ten years later, the changed strategy became apparent when more than 10,000 Chinese followers of Falun Gong meditation sect gathered on the streets outside the Communist Party headquarters in April 1999, posing a challenge to the Communist government. The government, then headed by president of China Jiang Zemin, took swift action against the demonstrators but spilled little blood.
In 2008, there was a Tibet uprising as anti-government riots rocked Lhasa and its ripples were felt in western China. Following the protests, there was a massive crackdown on dissidents. However, the situation was brought under control quickly, and without much violent action.
As many as 197 people – mostly Han Chinese civilians - were killed in Ãœrümqi riots in July 2009. Members of the Uyghur Muslim minority, who were involved in the clashes with the Han people, were sentenced to heavy jail terms and the tension defused. It was through the massive “public safety” spending that the Chinese government was able to bring about a semblance of calm and take control over the disturbance.
Following the recent protests against Covid restrictions, the shift from use of direct force to monitoring online content for anti-government messages, banned news and apps is quite discernible. China’s security mechanism has a digital challenge to face ahead. And it’s equipping itself for it. But the pertinent question is how far it’s justified and sustainable?
READ | From Shanghai to Hong Kong: Protests in China for 'freedom' from Covid lockdowns in pics and videos
WATCH | Can protests against China's zero-Covid policy pose a threat to Xi Jinping regime?
How China got in its zero-COVID trap
Authors: Dustin Lo and Yves Tiberghien, UBC
On November 27 and 28 2022, tens of thousands of citizens took part in unprecedented protests in major cities and 75 university campuses across China, demanding freedom and an end to zero-COVID policies. This followed violent clashes in Zhengzhou between fed-up iPhone workers and the police. How did it come to this?
After local prevarication in Wuhan in December 2019 and January 2020 about the seriousness of COVID-19, China resorted to an intense national mobilisation campaign to keep the virus under control. This response enabled an economic rebound in late 2020 and 2021.
But China’s zero-COVID response to the Omicron variant after March 2022 has become all-encompassing, unpredictable and economically ruinous. A logic of political control has pushed aside pragmatic health and economic policy. China’s urban public is frustrated.
The nature of the Omicron variant and the political calendar played a role in the intensification of technocratic and digital zero-COVID controls. Upholding zero-COVID policies became a performance indicator for officials in China’s political system as they jockeyed for positions before the 20th National Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held from 16–22 October 2022.
COVID-19 was portrayed as a huge threat despite Omicron’s relatively lower pathogenicity compared to earlier variants. Public health measures ramped up, while prominent medical experts and critics of the response were silenced, including former president of China’s Medical Association Zhong Nanshan. COVID-controls became vectors for political control, no matter the mental health or economic costs. When local officials resort to full social control to gain political currency within the Party, as China’s State Council called out in the case of Zhengzhou, it results in policy overreaction, anxiety and uncertainty for the public.
People are repeatedly locked down without prior notice or end dates in sight, as has been the case in cities like Sanya and Guangzhou. Buildings are fenced. People obsess about the colour of their electronic health code. And close contacts (mijie) or digitally-determined potential contacts (shikongbansuizhe) are taken to remote quarantine centres (fancang) for 7–10 days under potentially harsh conditions.
Tragedies are multiplying, prominently in the cities of Lanzhou, Guiyang, Sichuan province, and, most notoriously, in Urumqi, with the death of 10 people trapped in a burning high-rise on 24 November. Individuals’ loss of control over their daily lives proliferates the tang ping (lying flat) attitude. People’s mobility on China’s National Day holiday was disrupted. Businesses cannot plan and China’s youth struggle to find jobs, with youth unemployment sitting at 19 per cent.
Former CCP Secretary of Shanghai Li Qiang presided over the city’s poorly administered lockdown in April. Instead of the policy failures tarnishing Li’s reputation, he was promoted to the second highest position on the CCP’s Politburo Standing Committee and is in line to become China’s premier in March 2023.
Omicron’s relatively greater transmissibility but lower pathogenicity ostensibly increased the costs of zero-COVID closures. Yet to local Party bureaucrats, the opportunity costs of zero-COVID measures may be lower than opening-up, and may be given different weights than they are under democratic political systems. This is because they need to follow the Party’s campaign-style implementation of zero-COVID measures to survive politically.
Other Asian neighbours turned to vaccinations and normalised life during 2022. There was a real cost to this, but one that was seen as lower than the cost of staying closed. For example, between 1 January and 8 November, cumulative deaths per million in Singapore went from 147 to 300. This happened despite a capable medical system and relatively high double vaccination and booster rates with mostly mRNA vaccines of around 90 and 79 per cent respectively.
In contrast, China’s mortality rate is 3.7 deaths per million. Its double vaccination rate (with non-mRNA vaccines) was 89 per cent in November, but booster vaccine doses have only been given to 57 per cent of the eligible population, leaving China vulnerable to future virus waves. The low public trust in China’s vaccines and an unwillingness to import foreign mRNA vaccines leaves China stuck in an Omicron trap.
Six further observations can be made about the politics of China’s pandemic management in 2022. First, the COVID-19 pandemic has become a justification for movement away from China’s past era of reform and opening. Second, COVID-19 controls were not materially relaxed following the CPC’s 20th National Party Congress. Although China’s National Health Commission released a memo on optimising COVID-19 response measures, there have been few major changes in COVID-19 management so far.
Third, 2022 has exposed China’s deficits in healthcare, welfare and mental health supports. It has also demonstrated China’s capacity in surveillance, digital control and policing. Fourth, the international appeal of China’s human security discourse that emphasises human life over individual freedom remains doubtful considering the painful human experiences China’s people endure.
Fifth, 2022 has seen a fragmentation and localisation of China’s economy, as local officials implement zero-COVID measures in an ‘overly-firm manner’ (zuofeng guoying) to signal political loyalty towards China’s President Xi Jinping. Human exchanges have been reduced between China and the world (despite a slight loosening in quarantine policies for people entering China), and within China. Local languages are making a resurgence. Sixth and overall, export-oriented cities like Shenzhen have faced lighter restrictions than financial centres like Shanghai and Hong Kong.
At the close of 2022, despite the zero-COVID measures, Omicron is spreading across China. The Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party’s Politburo reaffirmed its policy approach, but citizens are exhausted. Their anger finally spilled over on November 27–28 in an outburst of social medial rebellion and protests across China, taking the party leadership by surprise. China’s economy is underperforming compared to the rest of Asia for the first time since 1990. Whether China can find a pragmatic and peaceful way out of its zero-COVID approach remains an open question.
Dustin Lo is a MA candidate in political science and research assistant at the University of British Columbia.
Yves Tiberghien is Professor of Political Science and Director Emeritus of the Institute of Asian Research at the University of British Columbia. He is also a Distinguished Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada.
This article is part of an EAF special feature series on 2022 in review and the year ahead.
This article, was first published by East Asia Forum, which is based out of the Crawford School of Public Policy within the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University.
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