Friday, July 07, 2023

Wagner Group shooting down a Russian command plane may be gift that keeps on giving for Ukraine's beleaguered air defenses

Michael Peck
Thu, July 6, 2023

A Russian Il-22 seen by British Royal Air Force Typhoons along the Baltic coast in May 2019.Royal Air Force

Wagner Group mercenaries shot down several Russian military aircraft during the revolt in June.


Among them was an Il-22M, which is designed to control and coordinate ground and air forces.


The loss of one of Russia's few Il-22M could hinder its air force's ability to operate over Ukraine.


Under normal circumstances, the Wagner Group mercenaries who shot down a flying command post would have received medals. Instead, they may end up in jail — or worse.

Wagner Group's abortive revolt last month didn't just end with its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, fleeing the country and its troops being absorbed into the Russian military. It also saw Russian forces fire on each other, destroying several helicopters and, most crucially, an irreplaceable Il-22M (codenamed "Coot-B" by NATO), a Cold War-era Il-18 transport modified for use as a command center and radio relay to control air and ground forces.

"The loss of this aircraft is likely to have a negative impact on Russian air and land operations," the British Ministry of Defense said in an update published on June 29.

Russia is estimated to have only 12 Il-22Ms. Russia also has 19 Il-20M and Il-22 electronic signals-intelligence aircraft — also based on the Il-18 — but losing an Il-22M is particularly costly.


A Russian Il-20M landing in July 2006.NIKITA SHCHYUKIN/AFP via Getty Images

"These special mission aircraft have played a key role in orchestrating Russian forces in their war against Ukraine," the Ministry of Defense said. "As high value assets they have operated within the safety of Russian airspace, far beyond the range of Ukrainian air defense systems."

The Il-22M or its US counterpart, the E8-C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System, a Boeing 707 airliner converted into a command post and surveillance aircraft, are airborne hubs for the integration of forces on and over the battlefield. Tight coordination between disparate capabilities — jets and missiles or electronic warfare and satellite communications — is the glue that provides cohesion to modern military operations.

Russia still has 10 A-50 airborne warning and control system aircraft similar to the US E-3 Sentry, but with only a dozen Il-22Ms to start — and all of them in heavy use — even the loss of one could have an impact, especially if Russia wants to increase its air operations over Ukraine.

"There is a realistic possibility that current tasking levels may have to be reduced to safely manage the remaining fleet," the Ministry of Defense said. "This will likely undermine Russia's ability to command and coordinate its forces, particularly during periods of high tempo operations."

An E-8C Joint STARS aircraft flying in September 2017.US Air Force/Greg L. Davis

Russian air force command-and-control difficulties could benefit Ukrainian forces, which have at times struggled to keep up with Russian aerial attacks. Not that Russia has always made good use of its command-and-control aircraft.

In the first week of its invasion, low-flying Ukrainian fighters were able to pop up and ambush high-flying Russian jets, according to a report published last year by Britain's Royal United Services Institute think tank. A possible reason for that was "poor dissemination of surveillance information from the radar to the Il-20M 'Coot' airborne command post and relay aircraft passing information from ground networks to patrolling Russian fighters," the report said.

The airborne command posts couldn't even communicate directly with air-defense units or with Russian fighters on combat air patrols.

"Because the Russian air operation is subordinated to the Ground Forces, surveillance information is not typically relayed directly between A-50M and fighters on CAP or to long-range GBAD [ground-based air defense] units such as S-400 batteries," the report said. "Instead, information is normally relayed via the military district command post or a combined arms army command post, then either directly or via an Il-20M relay aircraft to the GBAD units and fighter patrols."


A Russian Il-22 and a Su-27 were intercepted by RAF Typhoons along the Baltic coast in May 2019.Royal Air Force

Indeed, command and control is the Achilles heel of the Russian military, which inherited the rigid command structure of its Soviet predecessor. In Ukraine, Russian airpower has been unable to form the complex air packages used by Western air forces, which use AWACS aircraft to coordinate fighters, strike aircraft, and electronic-warfare planes, Justin Bronk, an airpower expert at RUSI, said.

On the other hand, Russian pilots aren't trained to take the initiative, as Western pilots are. "Instead, Russian pilots are trained to perform narrower mission profiles under tighter command and control arrangements in smaller formations," Bronk said in a report published in April by the US-based research organization CNA.

All of which puts a premium on Russia's flying command posts. If losing just one of a dozen Il-22Ms puts a crimp in Russian ground and air operations, then the underlying problem isn't a lack of airborne control centers but rather a rigid and fragile command system — and losing one of those valuable airborne control centers to ostensibly friendly forces only makes things worse.

"In the short term the psychological shock of losing a large number of aircrew in this manner will almost certainly damage morale within the Russian Aerospace Force," the British Ministry of Defense concluded.

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds a master's in political science. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.

Wagner troops leave Central African Republic after 'refusing contracts with Russia'

Sky News
Fri, July 7, 2023

High-level officials in Bangui have confirmed the departure of Wagner personnel from the Central African Republic (CAR).

Senior sources from CAR's ministry of defence and an official from the Russian embassy have revealed around 400 Wagner employees left the capital on two planes on Wednesday, confirming local reports of Wagner disengagement.

One ministry of defence official said the Wagner Group personnel who left refused to sign new contracts with Russia's ministry of defence.

He revealed between 1,300 and 1,400 Wagner employees still remained in the country but that around a hundred were packing up to leave Bouar, a key base on the trading route with Cameroon.

Bouar is a critical stronghold against rebels incentivised to take control of the base and disrupt the lucrative timber trade - a massive threat to the country's President Faustin-Archange Touadera, who Wagner is contracted to protect.

CAR's government signed a defence deal with the Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov after a reported meeting in October 2017.

The security and political support offered to President Touadera's regime in exchange for access to mining operations began when the first Wagner mercenaries arrived in January 2018.

During their five years of operation, Wagner has been accused of carrying out mass atrocities against the local population.

Now, in the fallout of Wagner head Yevgeny Prigozhin's failed coup against Russia's armed forces in Moscow, the nature of the group's presence in CAR is vulnerable to change.

A second source from the highest ranks of CAR's ministry of defence confirmed that "hundreds" of Wagner personnel had left and that there was still confusion within government on future dealings with Russian security involvement.

He added there was eagerness to continue security contracts with Russia, and if Moscow wanted to change its relationship with Wagner as an implementing force then the CAR government would accept it.

Shortly after Prigozhin's halted march to Moscow on 25 June, an adviser to President Touadera and former minister Fidele Gouandijika said: "In 2018, CAR signed a defence agreement with Russia and not with Wagner.

"If Russia has no agreement anymore with Wagner it will send us a new contingent.

"Maybe the chef will change but the Wagner soldiers will continue operating for Russia."

Flights to 'unknown destinations'

Reports of Wagner departures have been circulating since Wednesday but a plane carrying personnel out of Bangui was documented as early as Monday.

Africa-focused security analyst Ian Cox has been monitoring aircraft movements in Wagner's areas of operations on the continent since Prigozhin's attempted coup.

"Over the past week there has been a notable increase in Russian-made Ilyushin Il-76 strategic airlifters passing through Entebbe, Uganda, going to and from unknown destinations further into the region," he said.

"A notable exception being a Russian registered Il-76 which arrived in Bangui on July 3 from Russia and departed the same day to Entebbe.

"This aircraft then departed to Dubai on July 6 before flying to Tyumen, Russia on the morning of July 7."

A senior Ugandan military commander told Sky News the aircraft was carrying personnel when it left Entebbe, Uganda's main airport.

Read more:
Wagner 'perfecting blueprint for state capture' in CAR

Wigs, guns and gold found in raid of Prigozhin's palace

The plane's final destination, Tyumen, a city in Russian Siberia, is home to one of the two Wagner recruitment centres that reopened after Prigozhin's failed rebellion.

John Lechner, an independent researcher studying Wagner in CAR, put these findings to a Wagner source in Bangui who dismissed them and said "local guys are unaware".

"Wagner forces are clearly moving both within CAR and out - and everyone in Bangui is trying to figure out whether this reflects rainy season patterns and standard rotations or if it is something different," said Mr Lechner.

"The news that Prigozhin is back in Russia, potentially having his assets returned, is making it even harder to read the tea leaves."



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