Opinion

The next gas pipeline strike target in Russia’s war is obvious

Kathryn Porter
Tue, October 17, 2023 

A gas pipeline burns. There is a risk of pipeline sabotage becoming normalised outside the UKraine-Russia war - Alexander Reka/Tass


A colleague of mine is due to speak at a round-table in Berlin later this month on the subject “Is Europe winning the energy war?”

Normally when such questions are asked, the war is metaphorical – the weapons of this war are not munitions but economics. The war is waged in terms of flows of cash and energy as sanctions are applied or supplies withheld. Or wars have been fought over access to oil-rich territories. But the past eighteen months have seen the energy war turn hot in an entirely new way. Of course, within war zones, energy infrastructure along with every other type of infrastructure comes under attack, but this destruction is part of a wider strategy to degrade an enemy’s capabilities. The new energy war has seen acts of sabotage on energy assets within countries not actively engaged in war.

A year ago, the world was shocked by the destruction of three of the four legs of the Nord Stream gas pipeline from Russia to Germany. In the days and weeks after the attack, suspicious drone activity was detected in the vicinity of oil and gas platforms in the North Sea, prompting the Norwegian government to establish military patrols in the area. Several Russian nationals were arrested for flying drones over Norwegian territory. That the Nord Stream attack might have been carried out by a small group of divers, operating from an ordinary yacht creates a major headache for authorities seeking to defend hundreds of miles of sub-sea infrastructure. Norwegian patrol boats have the authority to board and inspect vessels considered a cause for concern, but it is like looking for a needle in a haystack.

Now there has been an attack on a second pipeline, carrying gas between Finland and Estonia.

Nord Stream 1 was opened in 2011, with the intention of bringing Russian gas directly into the heart of the EU. Its transit through the Baltic Sea ensured it did not cross sometimes fractious former Soviet territories, in particular Poland and Ukraine. Indeed, by the time of the Russian invasion of Ukraine the Yamal-Europe pipeline intended to bring gas from Russia to Germany via Poland was largely sending gas from Germany to its eastern neighbour.

Poland had made a strategic decision some years ago to reduce its dependence on Russian gas, building a liquified natural gas (LNG) import terminal, and not renewing Russian supply contracts which were due to expire in 2022. When Russia insisted on changing its gas contract currency to roubles last year, Poland refused and was able to exit its almost expired contracts with little difficulty.

Similarly, Estonia decided after 2014 that it wished to reduce its energy dependence on Russia, which had to that point supplied all of its gas needs. It entered into an agreement with Finland to import gas via the Balticconnector pipeline running 77 km across the Baltic Sea from Inkoo in Finland to Paldiski in Estonia. Before the Inkoo LNG terminal opened in April, gas typically flowed from Estonia to Finland.

Estonia also imports gas from Latvia, which is connected to the wider European gas pipeline system, and from the floating LNG terminal at Klaipeda in Lithuania. Finland stopped importing pipeline gas from Russia in May last year and now imports primarily US LNG at new terminals at Inkoo and Hamina.

On 8 October Finnish gas operator Gasgrid, and its Estonian counterpart, Elering, noticed an unusual drop in pressure in the Balticconnector pipeline, leading them to believe it was leaking. Within days, the Finnish government said the pipeline, which could take months to repair, had been damaged as a result of “outside activity”, while the Norwegian seismology institute, Norsar, said it had identified “a probable explosion” close to the location of the pipeline at around the time of the outage, however, it cautioned that there is significant uncertainty in the data and that more analysis is required.

These attacks and the increase in suspicious drone activity around North Sea oil and gas installations are a significant cause for concern. Norway is a major supplier of gas to both the UK and the EU, supplying over 40 percent of the gas consumed in the UK and 25 percent of the total gas consumed in the EU. Norwegian gas to the UK comes through just two dedicated pipelines: the Langeled pipe from the giant Ormen Lange gas field off the coast of Nyhamna in Norway to Easington in Yorkshire and Vesterled, which runs from the Heimdal field in the North Sea to St Fergus gas plant near Peterhead in Scotland.

Norwegian gas also comes through four of the UK’s own North Sea pipelines which carry gas from the UK’s own producing fields. This means that anything between 85 and 95 percent of the gas consumed in the UK each year has arrived through just half a dozen pipelines. A similar number of pipes carry Norwegian gas to the EU and there are two pipes between the UK and EU which add additional flexibility.

Given this reliance on a small number of key assets, it’s no wonder that concerns are growing over physical security. Two years ago it was unthinkable that anyone would seek to sabotage these expensive and essential pipelines. The destruction of Nord Stream was particularly difficult to understand since it was a significant source of income for Russia, leading fingers to be pointed at Ukraine, and even the US which has increased its gas exports to the EU as Russian flows have fallen. Others suspect a Russian false flag operation. No definitive conclusions have yet been reached.

The attack on the Balticconnector is perhaps easier to explain. This pipeline enabled Estonia to reduce its reliance on Russian gas, and was a source of additional flexibility and energy security for Finland, whose entry into Nato Russia has been determined to punish.

The cat is out of the bag now, and it’s to be hoped that the UK and Norwegian governments are ready.

Kathryn Porter is an independent energy consultant. She holds a Master’s degree in Physics and an MBA, and is an associate member of the All-Party Parliamentary Group for Energy Studies executive council