WWIII WMD
Military technology: The quest for power and world hegemony -Israel’s military advancements
A lacking conventional capability results in three different options for states: Arms race, Alliances formation, and nuclear weapons.
BYAIMAN NADEEM
DECEMBER 5, 2023
IDF Air Defense personnel operate the Iron Dome. Image source: Wikipedia
The above quote states the obvious fact of the realpolitik world, which is that nuclear weapons determine power games in today’s world. “Power can be defined as the ability to force or persuade others to follow a preferred course of action they would not have otherwise chosen. At its most basic level, the components of a nation’s power derive from its economic strength, military capabilities, and political influence. Better technology affects all these elements. Hence, we can say that high-tech nations are more powerful than low-tech nations.” (Lewis, 2022) Consequently, states in order to survive not only fight for economic hegemony and crucial resources, but they also indulge in arms race, military build-ups and the acquisition of nuclear weapons in order to protect the very resources they own. Any state that does not have a capable military force with a substantive quantity, good quality weapons, and if possible nuclear weapons, will fail to guard its resources. Like Panama failed to guard the sovereignty of its Panama canal from the hands of the America’s profit organizations. Like, Indonesia, Ecuador, and many other states became vulnerable to USA’s domination through its economic firms and institutions. Thus, we can say that economic power is very much related to military power. States with weak conventional power will ultimately try to build up nuclear weapons, such states are even willing to starve their own citizens in order to make their place in the world’s political system. For instance, North Korea’s quest for military dominance. In a scenario, where states feel threatened by another states’ arms race, that state would respond with a similar arm buildup. However, when states are unable to do so because of financial constraints, they would try to form alliances. Alliances can be a difficult option because they are neither easy to establish nor easy to maintain. In such a scenario, states would try to have the bigger hand by the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons and gunboat diplomacy are some of those effective instruments that can help states not only to pursue the offensive way but also the defensive.
Henceforth, a lacking conventional capability results in three different options for states: Arms race, Alliances formation, and nuclear weapons. All three can be useful but all three can be exploitative and detrimental to positive peace at the same time.
In other words, technological in the military sphere determine the balance of power. Today, Israel and USA are hell-bent on preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. This is so because they do not want the balance of power to be endangered. The objective is not to allow any single actor to dominate. And this objective lies in the hands of the powerful. It is to be noted, that technological advances are not the ONLY EFFECTIVE determinant of power. Besides this, good governance, effective leadership, and practical strategies also play an equally important role. However, not every country is able to transform this potential into national power.
It is equally important to understand who benefits from such technological advances, and arms races? We can include two perspectives here. The interstate perspective claims that when states observe their adversaries growing their military might. They will be compelled to do the same. This is because of the insecurity complex and fear of dominance that they feel. Organizations like IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) and other global nuclear watchdog organizations benefit from such an arms race because they get funding to observe and evaluate nuclear developments around the globe. Meanwhile, the intrastate perspective is more complex and broad. It claims that when a state calls for technological development, increases in military force, weaponry, or call for the acquisition of nuclear weapons, these states will start by passing laws that call for an increase in the military budget. The increase will be supported by the legislature of that state, will be promoted and emphasized by that country’s army, and will be carried out practically by that country’s weapons industry. Hence, this is an iron triangle, with all three corners empowering each other in order to maintain a hegemony inside the state and over the state’s other institutions. The ultimate benefactors from this will be the weapons industry and those who invest in such industries. Example: Military Industrial Complex in various states such as; the USA.
Now, if we take a look at some of the most prominent military technological advancements in history, we have many examples. The first is the invention of the Machine Gun in 1884, by Hiram Maxim. He invented world’s first automatic portable machine-gun. The British’s version of the machine gun was called the Maxim. The German version was ‘Maschinengewehr’. The Russian version was ‘Pulemyot’. Another prominent example of advances in aeronautical engineering is the 1903 Wright Flyer. The Wright brothers established the aerial age with the world’s first successful flights of a powered flying machine. Later on, this flying invention was converted into commercial airplanes and military fighter jets. Today, we have many such durable and faster military fighter jets like F16, F17 Thunder, etc. In addition to this, let us not forget one of the most crucial, yet the jeopardous invention of the 19th century, and that is the atomic Bomb of 1945. This time, the Americans were thinking of using the N-bomb to contain Japan. The Soviets on the other hand lacked the knowledge, capability, and raw sources of developing an atomic bomb. Hence, on August 6, 1945, the US became the first country to create nuclear weapons, and the only one to use them in combat. The USA dropped the first bomb named “Litte Boy” over the city of Hiroshima resulting in the immediate death of some 80,000 people. When the US saw that the Japanese forces were not surrendering, it dropped a second bomb named “Fat Man” on the city of Nagasaki resulting in the immediate death of some 40,000 people. With that realistic display of power, the Soviet Union become conscious and dwelled onto the development of a nuclear program. They acquired nuclear weapons later on in 1949 by discovering Uranium enriched sites in Eastern Europe. Over the next time period, other states like Britain, France, and China too developed their own set of nuclear weapons. Hence, these inventions, although some of them were useful, however, the invention of nuclear weapons has always been a debatable and controversial topic.
Today, the world has developed from the basic inventions of the machine gun, airplanes, and atomic bomb to the newest, and latest inventions in the forms of short-range tactical weapons, nuclear-powered attack submarines, etc. Among all the states, the US, and Israel seem to be the most advanced in terms of nuclear technology. Let us look into the example of Israel. Israel’s army relied on a number of high-tech weapons designed and manufactured in the state itself. It is known to possess nuclear weapons though undeclared. It has also not signed the Non-proliferation Treaty NPT. It spends at least 30% of its GDP on defense, and the USA is the biggest contributor of military assistance to Israel. One of the most eminent technological advancement Israel owns is the Iron dome anti-missile system. In the occupation of Palestine, the situation has worsened with more than 3000 rocket fired from the Palestinian side by Hamas. Though, only 5% of these rockets met their target. The others were detected and intercepted by Israeli Iron dome system.
Another economic and military game changer for Israel is the Iron Beam system. It cannot only intercept more rockets than the Iron Dome system but also do it in a cost-efficient manner. “The system is most effective against short-range threats such as rockets, mortars, drones, and anti-tank missiles. It can engage such threats from up to 2,000 meters away. The first variant of the system is ground-based. And, the official also disclosed that there will also be air and even space-based Iron Beam systems in the future.” (Iddon, 2022) It seems like Israel has a treasure of advanced high-tech arsenals. Another addition to the treasure is Israel’s David’s Sling, launched in 2018, which aims to protect Israeli skies against large-caliber rockets and short-range ballistic missiles. This has been developed to counter the oncoming rocket threats from Hamas and Iran. This enhances the already bold power of the Iron dome system, which is able to work 24 hours a day and 7 days a week, with the capability of intercepting a missile within 15 seconds. Henceforth, all these inventions have been developed by Israeli defense contractor RAFAEL Advanced Defense Systems in collaboration with USA’s defense contractors. Today, as the Ukraine war continues, the tectonic changes in defense and power realities in the United States, Europe, and other countries have created a new focus on Israel’s defense industry as RAFAEL plays its role as suppliers to various countries out there. Example: Israel sells its SPIKE missiles to many other states in Europe.
Israel tries to overcome its lack of skilled military personnel through its advanced state-of-the-art military technology. All of these states are in a constant arms race and it is due to several reasons. Why states acquire and build nuclear weapons? Because they fear domination at the hands of other states and because they want to overpower other states. When states see their adversaries increasing their military budget, military personnel, number of tanks and submarines, this instills a fear in the inferior states to produce more weapons and introduce a larger budget than those of their enemies. However, not everyone can afford to do so. Such states point out the importance of traditional security threats rather than non-traditional security issues. As a result, a question arises, Who runs the world?
After analyzing Israel’s case, we should ask a very vital question that has been under debate since the Obama administration. It is whether the concept of a global nuclear zero is possible? We know that nuclear weapons threaten every single human life, infrastructure and animals on this planet. The most hazardous effects it has is on the environment. The production of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and their usage cause long-term damage to the environment. Let us not forget the deaths of those people who died due to the radiation effect of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bomb attacks. Efforts by the Global Nuclear zero campaign includes the “No first use campaign”, which tries to convince the 9 nuclear power states not to use nuclear weapons first and to reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons for security purposes. More efforts include encouraging states to spend money from defense to social and economic projects. Is global nuclear zero the best option? For third-world countries like Pakistan and Iran, the only biggest achievement for them in history are their nuclear weapons, which states like North Korea will never abandon. An equal commitment from Israel and the USA is also not expected in the short or long term. Though, there are many disarmament and non-proliferation attempts made by all these states, which cannot be neglected, however, the nuclear non-proliferation regime including the NPT and IAEA is full of loopholes and flaws which makes the concept of global nuclear zero very difficult to achieve and calls for active reformation. Is the concept of global nuclear zero possible? No, not in the short term, not without equal commitments by the US, not without the reformation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and not without successful confidence-building measures.
In conclusion, it is stated that no doubt military advancements are very beneficial for each state. Hence, every state has the right to weapons proliferation to a certain limit. It is crucial to promote military and technological advancements for defense purposes, and it is also equally important to ensure the implication of the “No first use” policy. Further recommendations include ensuring the success of confidence-building measures CBMs between adversarial states, bringing conflict resolution methods to the forefront, and giving special Confidence Avoiding Measures CAMs training to world leaders and military strategists. Though, nuclear weapons can be detrimental to world peace, military technological advancements have always been crucial for balance of power.
Aiman Nadeem is a Youth Activist and independent researcher of peace studies and conflict resolution. She has acquired her Bachelor’s degree in International Relations, from BUITEMS University, Quetta, Pakistan.
A lacking conventional capability results in three different options for states: Arms race, Alliances formation, and nuclear weapons.
BYAIMAN NADEEM
DECEMBER 5, 2023
IDF Air Defense personnel operate the Iron Dome. Image source: Wikipedia“What is the only provocation that could bring about the use of nuclear weapons? Nuclear weapons. What is the priority target for nuclear weapons? Nuclear weapons. What is the only established defense against nuclear weapons? Nuclear weapons. How do we prevent the use of nuclear weapons? By threatening the use of nuclear weapons. And we can’t get rid of nuclear weapons, because of nuclear weapons. The intransigence, it seems, is a function of the weapons themselves.”
― (Amis, Einstein’s Monsters, n.d.)
The above quote states the obvious fact of the realpolitik world, which is that nuclear weapons determine power games in today’s world. “Power can be defined as the ability to force or persuade others to follow a preferred course of action they would not have otherwise chosen. At its most basic level, the components of a nation’s power derive from its economic strength, military capabilities, and political influence. Better technology affects all these elements. Hence, we can say that high-tech nations are more powerful than low-tech nations.” (Lewis, 2022) Consequently, states in order to survive not only fight for economic hegemony and crucial resources, but they also indulge in arms race, military build-ups and the acquisition of nuclear weapons in order to protect the very resources they own. Any state that does not have a capable military force with a substantive quantity, good quality weapons, and if possible nuclear weapons, will fail to guard its resources. Like Panama failed to guard the sovereignty of its Panama canal from the hands of the America’s profit organizations. Like, Indonesia, Ecuador, and many other states became vulnerable to USA’s domination through its economic firms and institutions. Thus, we can say that economic power is very much related to military power. States with weak conventional power will ultimately try to build up nuclear weapons, such states are even willing to starve their own citizens in order to make their place in the world’s political system. For instance, North Korea’s quest for military dominance. In a scenario, where states feel threatened by another states’ arms race, that state would respond with a similar arm buildup. However, when states are unable to do so because of financial constraints, they would try to form alliances. Alliances can be a difficult option because they are neither easy to establish nor easy to maintain. In such a scenario, states would try to have the bigger hand by the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons and gunboat diplomacy are some of those effective instruments that can help states not only to pursue the offensive way but also the defensive.
Henceforth, a lacking conventional capability results in three different options for states: Arms race, Alliances formation, and nuclear weapons. All three can be useful but all three can be exploitative and detrimental to positive peace at the same time.
In other words, technological in the military sphere determine the balance of power. Today, Israel and USA are hell-bent on preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. This is so because they do not want the balance of power to be endangered. The objective is not to allow any single actor to dominate. And this objective lies in the hands of the powerful. It is to be noted, that technological advances are not the ONLY EFFECTIVE determinant of power. Besides this, good governance, effective leadership, and practical strategies also play an equally important role. However, not every country is able to transform this potential into national power.
It is equally important to understand who benefits from such technological advances, and arms races? We can include two perspectives here. The interstate perspective claims that when states observe their adversaries growing their military might. They will be compelled to do the same. This is because of the insecurity complex and fear of dominance that they feel. Organizations like IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) and other global nuclear watchdog organizations benefit from such an arms race because they get funding to observe and evaluate nuclear developments around the globe. Meanwhile, the intrastate perspective is more complex and broad. It claims that when a state calls for technological development, increases in military force, weaponry, or call for the acquisition of nuclear weapons, these states will start by passing laws that call for an increase in the military budget. The increase will be supported by the legislature of that state, will be promoted and emphasized by that country’s army, and will be carried out practically by that country’s weapons industry. Hence, this is an iron triangle, with all three corners empowering each other in order to maintain a hegemony inside the state and over the state’s other institutions. The ultimate benefactors from this will be the weapons industry and those who invest in such industries. Example: Military Industrial Complex in various states such as; the USA.
Now, if we take a look at some of the most prominent military technological advancements in history, we have many examples. The first is the invention of the Machine Gun in 1884, by Hiram Maxim. He invented world’s first automatic portable machine-gun. The British’s version of the machine gun was called the Maxim. The German version was ‘Maschinengewehr’. The Russian version was ‘Pulemyot’. Another prominent example of advances in aeronautical engineering is the 1903 Wright Flyer. The Wright brothers established the aerial age with the world’s first successful flights of a powered flying machine. Later on, this flying invention was converted into commercial airplanes and military fighter jets. Today, we have many such durable and faster military fighter jets like F16, F17 Thunder, etc. In addition to this, let us not forget one of the most crucial, yet the jeopardous invention of the 19th century, and that is the atomic Bomb of 1945. This time, the Americans were thinking of using the N-bomb to contain Japan. The Soviets on the other hand lacked the knowledge, capability, and raw sources of developing an atomic bomb. Hence, on August 6, 1945, the US became the first country to create nuclear weapons, and the only one to use them in combat. The USA dropped the first bomb named “Litte Boy” over the city of Hiroshima resulting in the immediate death of some 80,000 people. When the US saw that the Japanese forces were not surrendering, it dropped a second bomb named “Fat Man” on the city of Nagasaki resulting in the immediate death of some 40,000 people. With that realistic display of power, the Soviet Union become conscious and dwelled onto the development of a nuclear program. They acquired nuclear weapons later on in 1949 by discovering Uranium enriched sites in Eastern Europe. Over the next time period, other states like Britain, France, and China too developed their own set of nuclear weapons. Hence, these inventions, although some of them were useful, however, the invention of nuclear weapons has always been a debatable and controversial topic.
Today, the world has developed from the basic inventions of the machine gun, airplanes, and atomic bomb to the newest, and latest inventions in the forms of short-range tactical weapons, nuclear-powered attack submarines, etc. Among all the states, the US, and Israel seem to be the most advanced in terms of nuclear technology. Let us look into the example of Israel. Israel’s army relied on a number of high-tech weapons designed and manufactured in the state itself. It is known to possess nuclear weapons though undeclared. It has also not signed the Non-proliferation Treaty NPT. It spends at least 30% of its GDP on defense, and the USA is the biggest contributor of military assistance to Israel. One of the most eminent technological advancement Israel owns is the Iron dome anti-missile system. In the occupation of Palestine, the situation has worsened with more than 3000 rocket fired from the Palestinian side by Hamas. Though, only 5% of these rockets met their target. The others were detected and intercepted by Israeli Iron dome system.
Another economic and military game changer for Israel is the Iron Beam system. It cannot only intercept more rockets than the Iron Dome system but also do it in a cost-efficient manner. “The system is most effective against short-range threats such as rockets, mortars, drones, and anti-tank missiles. It can engage such threats from up to 2,000 meters away. The first variant of the system is ground-based. And, the official also disclosed that there will also be air and even space-based Iron Beam systems in the future.” (Iddon, 2022) It seems like Israel has a treasure of advanced high-tech arsenals. Another addition to the treasure is Israel’s David’s Sling, launched in 2018, which aims to protect Israeli skies against large-caliber rockets and short-range ballistic missiles. This has been developed to counter the oncoming rocket threats from Hamas and Iran. This enhances the already bold power of the Iron dome system, which is able to work 24 hours a day and 7 days a week, with the capability of intercepting a missile within 15 seconds. Henceforth, all these inventions have been developed by Israeli defense contractor RAFAEL Advanced Defense Systems in collaboration with USA’s defense contractors. Today, as the Ukraine war continues, the tectonic changes in defense and power realities in the United States, Europe, and other countries have created a new focus on Israel’s defense industry as RAFAEL plays its role as suppliers to various countries out there. Example: Israel sells its SPIKE missiles to many other states in Europe.
Israel tries to overcome its lack of skilled military personnel through its advanced state-of-the-art military technology. All of these states are in a constant arms race and it is due to several reasons. Why states acquire and build nuclear weapons? Because they fear domination at the hands of other states and because they want to overpower other states. When states see their adversaries increasing their military budget, military personnel, number of tanks and submarines, this instills a fear in the inferior states to produce more weapons and introduce a larger budget than those of their enemies. However, not everyone can afford to do so. Such states point out the importance of traditional security threats rather than non-traditional security issues. As a result, a question arises, Who runs the world?
After analyzing Israel’s case, we should ask a very vital question that has been under debate since the Obama administration. It is whether the concept of a global nuclear zero is possible? We know that nuclear weapons threaten every single human life, infrastructure and animals on this planet. The most hazardous effects it has is on the environment. The production of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and their usage cause long-term damage to the environment. Let us not forget the deaths of those people who died due to the radiation effect of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bomb attacks. Efforts by the Global Nuclear zero campaign includes the “No first use campaign”, which tries to convince the 9 nuclear power states not to use nuclear weapons first and to reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons for security purposes. More efforts include encouraging states to spend money from defense to social and economic projects. Is global nuclear zero the best option? For third-world countries like Pakistan and Iran, the only biggest achievement for them in history are their nuclear weapons, which states like North Korea will never abandon. An equal commitment from Israel and the USA is also not expected in the short or long term. Though, there are many disarmament and non-proliferation attempts made by all these states, which cannot be neglected, however, the nuclear non-proliferation regime including the NPT and IAEA is full of loopholes and flaws which makes the concept of global nuclear zero very difficult to achieve and calls for active reformation. Is the concept of global nuclear zero possible? No, not in the short term, not without equal commitments by the US, not without the reformation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and not without successful confidence-building measures.
In conclusion, it is stated that no doubt military advancements are very beneficial for each state. Hence, every state has the right to weapons proliferation to a certain limit. It is crucial to promote military and technological advancements for defense purposes, and it is also equally important to ensure the implication of the “No first use” policy. Further recommendations include ensuring the success of confidence-building measures CBMs between adversarial states, bringing conflict resolution methods to the forefront, and giving special Confidence Avoiding Measures CAMs training to world leaders and military strategists. Though, nuclear weapons can be detrimental to world peace, military technological advancements have always been crucial for balance of power.
Aiman Nadeem is a Youth Activist and independent researcher of peace studies and conflict resolution. She has acquired her Bachelor’s degree in International Relations, from BUITEMS University, Quetta, Pakistan.
Though generally acclaimed, the recent film Oppenheimer did little to highlight any long-term implications of nuclear weapons and nuclear warfare.
BYPROF. LOUIS RENÉ BERES
NOVEMBER 26, 2023
Oppenheimer in 1946 with his ever-present cigarette.
Image source: Wikipedia
LONG READ
Abstract: Though generally acclaimed, the recent film Oppenheimer did little to highlight any long-term implications of nuclear weapons and nuclear warfare. This is not an intended criticism of the film’s producers or directors, but merely a suggestion to commence much broader kinds of nuclear-related inquiry. Since that first test explosion in the New Mexico desert in 1945, there has never been a more compelling time to take seriously Oppenheimer’s illuminating reference to Bahgavad Gita, the sacred book of the Hindus. The following essay, written during the 2023 Gaza War and the ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine, is offered as a systematic expression of such urgently needed seriousness.
“I am become death, the destroyer of worlds.” -J. Robert Oppenheimer citing to Bahgavad Gita at first atomic test on July 16, 1945
A first thought dawns. Nuclear weapons are unique in the history of warfare. Even a single instance of nuclear warfighting would signify unprecedented and irremediable failure. In essence, nuclear weapons can succeed only though non-use.[1] The most obvious example of such a more-or-less plausible “success” would be system-wide and stable conditions of nuclear deterrence.
There are many relevant details, both military and legal. Not all nuclear wars would have the same conceptual origin. Should nuclear deterrence fail, a core distinction would concern variously probabilistic differences between deliberate or intentional nuclear war and a nuclear war that would be unintentional or inadvertent. In all cases, this would represent an especially vital distinction.[2]
Should nuclear deterrence fail, it could be on account of antecedent arms control failures or shortcomings and assorted misunderstandings or decisional miscalculations. Here, inherently complex intersections between strategy and law could prove determinative. Though durable foundations of nuclear war avoidance should always include comprehensive elements of treaty-based nuclear arms control, no such inclusion could ever be adequate.
Regarding interrelated strategic elements of nuclear war avoidance, there will be multi-layered problems for science-based calculation. In this connection, because there has never been an authentic nuclear war(Hiroshima and Nagasaki don’t “count”),[3] determining relevant probabilities would be literally impossible. To clarify, in logic and mathematics, true probabilities must always derive from the determinable frequency of pertinent past events. Ipso facto, when there are no such past events, nothing could be determined with any predictive reliability.
Still, impediments notwithstanding, intellect-directed analysts will have to devise optimal strategies for averting nuclear war.[4] Such indispensable calculations will vary, among other things, according to (1) presumed enemy intention; (2) presumed plausibility of accident or hacking intrusion; and/or (3) presumed likelihood of decisional miscalculation. When considered together as cumulative categories of nuclear war threat, all three component risks of an unintentional nuclear war would be “inadvertent.”Any particular case of an accidental nuclear war would be inadvertent, but not every case of inadvertent nuclear war would be the result of an accident.
All listed examples represent potentially intersecting elements of nuclear war avoidance. This bewildering problem should never be approached by American national security policy-makers or by the US president as a narrowly political or tactical issue. Rather, informed by in-depth historical understanding and by carefully refined analytic capacities, US military planners should prepare to deal with a large variety of overlapping explanatory factors/norms, including jurisprudential[5] or legal ones.[6]
There is more. At times, studied intersections under could be determinably synergistic. At such intellect-challenging times, the “whole” of any injurious effect would be greater than the sum of its “parts. Going forward, focused attention on pertinent synergies should remain a primary analytic objective.[7]
In dealing with certain still-growing nuclear war risks involving North Korea, Ukraine, Russia or Iran, no single concept could prove more important than synergy.[8] Unless such interactions are reliably and correctly evaluated, an American president could sometime sorely underestimate the total impact of any considered nuclear engagement. The manifestly tangible flesh and blood consequences of any such underestimations would likely be very high. They could defy both analytic imaginations and any post-war legal justifications.
Looking ahead, in any complex strategic risk assessments regarding adversarial military nuclear intentions, the concept ofsynergy should be assigned appropriate pride of place.[9] The only conceivable argument for an American president willfully choosing to ignore the effects of synergy would be that the associated US defense policy considerations appear “too complex.” When fundamental US national security issues are at stake, however, any such viscerally dismissive argument would be unacceptable.
For the present writer, such reasoning has long represented familiar intellectual terrain. In brief, I have been publishing about difficult and related strategic-legal issues for more than fifty years. After four years of doctoral study at Princeton in the late 1960s, historically a prominent center of American nuclear strategic thought (recall especially Albert Einstein and J. Robert Oppenheimer), I began to consider adding a modest personal contribution to a then-evolving nuclear literature. By the late 1970s, I was cautiously preparing a new manuscript on US nuclear strategy,[10] and, by variously disciplined processes of correct inference, on the corresponding risks of a nuclear war.[11]
At that early stage of an emerging discipline, I was most interested in US presidential authority to order the use of American nuclear weapons.
Almost immediately, after spending time at SAC (Strategic Air Command) headquarters,[12] I learned that allegedly reliable safeguards had been incorporated into all operational nuclear command/control decisions, but also that these same safeguards could not be applied at the presidential level. To a young scholar searching optimistically for meaningful nuclear war avoidance opportunities, this ironic disjunction didn’t make any sense. So, what next?
It was a time for gathering suitable clarifications. I reached out to retired General Maxwell D. Taylor, a former Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. In reassuringly rapid response to my query, General Taylor sent a comprehensive handwritten reply. Dated 14 March 1976, the distinguished General’s detailed letter concluded ominously: “As to those dangers arising from an irrational American president, the only protection is not to elect one.”[13]
Until recently, I had never given any extended thought to this authoritative response. Today, following the incoherent presidency of Donald J. Trump (and the possible coming of Trump II in 2024) General Taylor’s 1976 warning takes on more urgent meanings. Based on variously ascertainable facts and extrapolations (called “entailments” in formal philosophy of science terminology) rather than wishful thinking, we ought now to assume that if Donald J. Trump were to return to the White House and exhibit accessible signs of emotional instability, irrationality or delusional behavior, he could still order the use of American nuclear weapons. He could do this officially, legally[14] and without compelling expectations of any nuclear chain-of-command “disobedience.”[15]
Still more worrisome, any US president could become emotionally unstable, irrational or delusional, but not exhibit such grave liabilities conspicuously.
What then?
A corollary question should quickly come to mind:
What precise stance should be assumed by the National Command Authority (Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and several others) if it should ever decide to oppose an “inappropriate” presidential order to launch American nuclear weapons?
Could the National Command Authority (NCA) “save the day,” informally, by acting in an impromptu or creatively ad hoc fashion? Or should refined preparatory steps already have been taken in advance, “preemptively”? That is, should there already be in place certain credible and effective statutory measures to (1) assess the ordering president’s reason and judgment; and (2) countermand any inappropriate or wrongful nuclear order?
Presumptively, in US law, Article 1 (Congressional) war-declaring expectations of the Constitution aside, any presidential order to use nuclear weapons, whether issued by an apparently irrational president or by an otherwise incapacitated one, would have to be obeyed. To do otherwise in such circumstances would be illegal on its face. Any chain-of-command disobedience would be impermissible prima facie.[16]
There is more. In principle, at least, any US president could order the first use of American nuclear weapons even if this country were not under a nuclear attack. Further strategic and legal distinctions would need to be made between a nuclear “first use” and a nuclear “first strike.” These would not be minor distinctions.[17]
While there exists an elementary yet substantive difference between these two options, it is an operational distinction that candidate Donald Trump failed to understand during the 2016 presidential campaign debates. As this former and now re-aspiring president reads nothing about such weighty matters – literally nothing at all – there remains good reason for task-appropriate US nuclear policy refinements.
What next? Where exactly should the American polity and government go from here on these overriding national security decision-making issues?[18] To begin, a coherent and comprehensive answer will need to be prepared for the following basic question:
If faced with any presidential order to use nuclear weapons, and not offered sufficiently appropriate corroborative evidence of any actually impending existential threat, would the National Command Authority be: (1) be willing to disobey, and (2) be capable of enforcing such needed expressions of disobedience?
In any such unprecedented crisis-decision circumstances, all authoritative judgments could have to be made in a compressively time-urgent matter of minutes, not of hours or days. As far as any useful policy guidance from the past might be concerned, there could exist no scientifically valid way to assess the true probabilities of possible outcomes. This is because all scientific judgments of probability – whatever the salient issue or subject – must be based upon recognizably pertinent past events.
On matters of a nuclear war, there are no pertinent past events. This is a fortunate absence, of course, but one that would still stand in the way of rendering reliable decision-making predictions. The dangerous irony here should be obvious.
Whatever the determinable scientific obstacles, the optimal time to prepare for any such vital US national security difficulties is now. Once we were already embroiled in extremis atomicum, it would be too late.
Regarding the specific problem areas of an already nuclear North Korea and a nearly-nuclear Iran, an American president will need to avoid any seat-of-the-pants calculations. For example, faced with dramatic uncertainties about counterpart Kim Jung Un’s expected willingness to push the escalatory envelope, an American president could suddenly and unexpectedly find himself faced with a fearfully stark choice between outright capitulation and nuclear war. For even an intellectually gifted US president (hardly a plausible present-day expectation), any such choice could be “paralyzing.”
To avoid being placed in such a limited choice strategic environment, a US president should understand that having a larger national nuclear force might not bestow any critical bargaining or crisis-outcome advantages. On the contrary, this seeming advantage could generate unwarranted US presidential overconfidence and/or various resultant forms of decisional miscalculation. In any such wholly unfamiliar, many-sided and unprecedented matters, arsenal size could actually matter, but perhaps counter-intuitively, inversely, or in various ways not yet fully understood.
More than likely, any prosaic analogies would be misconceived. Nuclear war avoidance is not a matter resembling commercial marketplace negotiations.[19] While the search for some sort of “escalation dominance” (successful competition in risk-taking) may be common to many sorts of commercial deal-making, the cumulative costs of any related nuclear security policy losses would always be sui generis or one-of-a-kind.
There is more. In certain fragile matters of world politics, even an inadvertent decisional outcome could include a nuclear war. Here, whether occasioned by accident, hacking or “mere” miscalculation, there could be no meaningful “winner.” At a conceptual level, any US president ought to understand this as an elementary sort of understanding.
In the paroxysmal aftermath of any unintended nuclear conflict, those authoritative American decision-makers who had once accepted former President Donald J. Trump’s oft-stated preference for “attitude” over “preparation” would likely reconsider their earlier error. By then, however, it would be too late. As survivors of a once-preventable nuclear conflagration, now-stunned officials might only envy the dead. This is the case, moreover, whether the nuclear conflict had been intentional or unintentional, and whether it had been occasioned by base motives, miscalculation, computer error, hacking intrusion or by weapon-system/infrastructure accident.
Today, more than 78 years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear war remains an incurable “disease.” To ensure credible deterrence, a US president would no longer need to respond to a nuclear attack immediately. Because the triad of strategic weaponry includes cumulatively invulnerable submarine forces, this country no longer needs to rely upon a destabilizing “launch on warning” nuclear posture. This means, among other things, that a president of the United States need no longer be granted sole decisional authority over America’s nuclear weapons.
Any continuing failure of United States law and practice to acknowledge this sobering transformation could lead to an adversarial use of nuclear weapons – by this country, by its then-evident adversary, or by both. In any such scenario, the atomic conflagration would almost certainly dwarf the 1945 effects of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It follows, above all else, that nuclear war avoidance is mandated by the conjunction of human survival and human reason.[20]
Physicist and Manhattan Project director J. Robert Oppenheimer, subject of the film released in July 2023, clung fixedly to the hope that nuclear weapons could become peace-maximizing rather than destabilizing. In a lecture delivered before the George Westinghouse Centennial Forum on May 16, 1946, the celebrated physicist commented: “The development of nuclear weapons can make, if wisely handled, the problem of preventing war not more hopeless, but more hopeful than it would otherwise have been….” Back in 1946, Oppenheimer did not anticipate a broad variety of troublesome issues, including the proliferation of nuclear weapons (“vertical” and “horizontal”) to states and sub states; risks of an unintentional nuclear war; failure of law-based nuclear arms control; and the inextinguishable irrationality of human decision-makers seeking “escalation dominance” in the midst of chaotic crises.
Today, looking toward a grievously uncertain national and global future, the only rational course for humankind is to collectively eschew nuclear warfighting as a prospective benefit, and to do whatever is necessary in law and strategy to build more durable foundations of nuclear war avoidance. For the most part, this challenging task must be intellectual rather than political.[21] Moreover, to meet this unique task, nuclear war avoidance can never be accomplished in the explosive context of belligerent nationalism and global chaos. Among other things, this requires the will[22] to acknowledge that entire civilizations can have the same mortality as an individual human being, and that the nuclear weapon states themselves can “become death.”
[1] Says Sun-Tzu in The Art of War: “Subjugating the enemy’s army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence. (Chapter 3, “Planning Offensives”).
[2] For authoritative early accounts by this author of nuclear war effects, see: Louis René Beres, Apocalypse: Nuclear Catastrophe in World Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Louis René Beres, Mimicking Sisyphus: America’s Countervailing Nuclear Strategy (Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1983); Louis René Beres, Reason and Realpolitik: U.S. Foreign Policy and World Order (Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1984); and Louis René Beres, Security or Armageddon: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy (Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1986). Most recently, by Professor Beres, see: Surviving Amid Chaos: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy (New York, Rowman & Littlefield, 2016; 2nd ed. 2018).
[3] The atomic attacks on Japan in August 1945 represented nuclear weapons use in a conventional war.
[4] Reminds Guillaume Apollinaire, “It must not be forgotten that it is perhaps more dangerous for a nation to allow itself to be conquered intellectually than by arms.” (The New Spirit and the Poets (1917)
[5] For the authoritative sources of international law, see art. 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice: STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, Done at San Francisco, June 26, 1945. Entered into force, Oct. 24, 1945; for the United States, Oct. 24, 1945. 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, 1976 Y.B.U.N., 1052.
[6] Regarding these pertinent considerations of law, issues of personal criminal responsibility must be ones of high importance. Significantly, criminal responsibility of leaders under international law is not limited to direct personal action or limited by official position. On this peremptory principle of “command responsibility,” or respondeat superior, see: In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1945); The High Command Case (The Trial of Wilhelm von Leeb), 12 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 1 (United Nations War Crimes Commission Comp., 1949); see Parks, Command Responsibility For War Crimes, 62 MIL.L. REV. 1 (1973); O’Brien, The Law Of War, Command Responsibility And Vietnam, 60 GEO. L.J. 605 (1972); U.S. Dept. Of The Army, Army Subject Schedule No. 27 – 1 (Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Hague Convention No. IV of 1907), 10 (1970). The direct individual responsibility of leaders is also unambiguous in view of the London Agreement, which denies defendants the protection of the act of state defense. See AGREEMENT FOR THE PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS OF THE EUROPEAN AXIS, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, art. 7.
[7] Such focus on synergies could shed a parallel light upon the entire world system’s state of disorder (a view that would reflect what the physicists prefer to call “entropic” conditions), and could themselves be more-or-less dependent upon a pertinent American president’s subjective metaphysics of time. For an early article by this author dealing with linkages between such a subjective metaphysics and national crisis decision-making, see: Louis René Beres, “Time, Consciousness and Decision-Making in Theories of International Relations,” The Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. VIII, No.3., Fall 1974, pp. 175-186.
[8] Prospective problems stemming from synergy also bring to mind the Clausewitzian concept of “friction,” a concept that is not the same as synergy, but that also emphasizes the always-key elements of interaction and unpredictability. See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, especially Chapter VI, “Friction in War.”
[9] See earlier, by this author, at Harvard National Security Journal (Harvard Law School): Louis René Beres, https://harvardnsj.org/2015/06/core-synergies-in-israels-strategic-planning-when-the-adversarial-whole-is-greater-than-the-sum-of-its-parts/
[10] Earlier, by this author, see: Louis René Beres, The Management of World Power: A Theoretical Analysis (University of Denver, 1973) and Louis René Beres, Transforming World Politics: The National Roots of World Peace (University of Denver, 1975).
[11] This book was subsequently published in 1980 by the University of Chicago Press: Louis René Beres, Apocalypse: Nuclear Catastrophe in World Politics. http://www.amazon.com/Apocalypse-Nuclear-Catastrophe-World-Politics/dp/0226043606
[12] Years later, I became a frequent co-author with General (USAF/ret.) John T. Chain, previously Commander-in-Chief, US Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC).
[13] Expressions of decisional irrationality could take different or overlapping forms. These include a disorderly or inconsistent value system; computational errors in calculation; an incapacity to communicate efficiently; random or haphazard influences in the making or transmittal of particular decisions; and the internal dissonance generated by any structure of collective decision-making (i.e., assemblies of pertinent individuals who lack identical value systems and/or whose organizational arrangements impact their willing capacity to act as a single or unitary national decision maker).
[14] Here, meaningful considerations of law would be more-or-less bifurcated between domestic or municipal law and international law. Still, international law is part of United States jurisprudence. In the words of Mr. Justice Gray, delivering the judgment of the US Supreme Court in Paquete Habana (1900): “International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction….” (175 U.S. 677(1900)) See also: Opinion in Tel-Oren vs. Libyan Arab Republic (726 F. 2d 774 (1984)).Moreover, the specific incorporation of treaty law into US municipal law is expressly codified at Art. 6 of the US Constitution, the so-called “Supremacy Clause.”
[15] Still, there could remain certain authoritative considerations of international law, specifically those having to do with strategies of preemption or “anticipatory self-defense.” Such considerations can be found not in conventional law (art. 51 of the UN Charter supports only post-attack expressions of individual or collective self-defense), but rather in customary international law. The precise origins of anticipatory self-defense in such customary law lie in the Caroline, a case that concerned the unsuccessful rebellion of 1837 in Upper Canada against British rule. Following this case, the serious threat of armed attack has generally justified certain militarily defensive actions. In an exchange of diplomatic notes between the governments of the United States and Great Britain, then U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster outlined a framework for self-defense that did not require an antecedent attack. Here, the jurisprudential framework permitted a military response to a threat so long as the danger posed was “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.” See: Beth M. Polebaum, “National Self-defense in International Law: An Emerging Standard for a Nuclear Age,” 59 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 187, 190-91 (1984) (noting that the Caroline case had transformed the right of self-defense from an excuse for armed intervention into a legal doctrine). Still earlier, see: Hugo Grotius, Of the Causes of War, and First of Self-Defense, and Defense of Our Property, reprinted in 2 Classics of International Law, 168-75 (Carnegie Endowment Trust, 1925) (1625); and Emmerich de Vattel, The Right of Self-Protection and the Effects of the Sovereignty and Independence of Nations, reprinted in 3 Classics of International Law, 130 (Carnegie Endowment Trust, 1916) (1758). Also, Samuel Pufendorf, The Two Books on the Duty of Man and Citizen According to Natural Law, 32 (Frank Gardner Moore., tr., 1927 (1682).
[16] Nonetheless, there could arise various contrary expectations of international law, including certain “peremptory” norms that concern both the right to use international force and/or the amount or type of force that may correctly be applied. According to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: “…a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.” See: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Done at Vienna, May 23, 1969. Entered into force, Jan. 27, 1980. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 at 289 (1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
[17] Also, under authoritative terms of international law, there would be coinciding concerns about the egregious crime of “aggression.” See especially: RESOLUTION ON THE DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION, Dec. 14, 1974, U.N.G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631, 1975, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 710, 1974; and CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Art. 51. Done at San Francisco, June 26, 1945. Entered into force for the United States, Oct. 24, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, Bevans 1153, 1976, Y.B.U.N. 1043.
[18] Also worth bearing in mind here are the different ways in which the United States can permissibly adapt international law to these issues. Apropos of this corresponding query, international law remains a “vigilante” or “Westphalian” system of jurisprudence. The Peace of Westphalia created the still-existing decentralized or self-help state system. See: Treaty of Peace of Munster, Oct. 1648, 1 Consol. T.S. 271; and Treaty of Peace of Osnabruck, Oct. 1648, 1, Consol. T.S. 119, Together, these two treaties comprise the Peace of Westphalia.
[19] Here we may recall Nietzsche’s philosophic warning in Zarathustra: “Do not seek the higher man at the marketplace.”
[20]The specific importance of reason to legal judgment was prefigured in ancient Israel, which accommodated reason within its core system of revealed law. Jewish theory of law, insofar as it displays the marks of natural law, offers a transcending order revealed by the divine word as interpreted by human reason. In the striking words of Ecclesiastics 32.23, 37.16, 13-14: “Let reason go before every enterprise and counsel before any action…And let the counsel of thine own heart stand…For a man’s mind is sometimes wont to tell him more than seven watchmen that sit above in a high tower….”
[22] Modern origins of “will” are discoverable in the writings of Arthur Schopenhauer, especially The World as Will and Idea (1818). For his own inspiration, Schopenhauer drew freely upon Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. Later, Nietzsche drew just as freely and perhaps more importantly upon Schopenhauer. Goethe was also a core intellectual source for Spanish existentialist Jose Ortega y’Gasset, author of the singularly prophetic twentieth-century work, The Revolt of the Masses (Le Rebelion de las Masas;1930). See, accordingly, Ortega’s very grand essay, “In Search of Goethe from Within” (1932), written for Die Neue Rundschau of Berlin on the centenary of Goethe’s death. It is reprinted in Ortega’s anthology, The Dehumanization of Art (1948) and is available from Princeton University Press (1968).
LONG READ
Abstract: Though generally acclaimed, the recent film Oppenheimer did little to highlight any long-term implications of nuclear weapons and nuclear warfare. This is not an intended criticism of the film’s producers or directors, but merely a suggestion to commence much broader kinds of nuclear-related inquiry. Since that first test explosion in the New Mexico desert in 1945, there has never been a more compelling time to take seriously Oppenheimer’s illuminating reference to Bahgavad Gita, the sacred book of the Hindus. The following essay, written during the 2023 Gaza War and the ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine, is offered as a systematic expression of such urgently needed seriousness.
“I am become death, the destroyer of worlds.” -J. Robert Oppenheimer citing to Bahgavad Gita at first atomic test on July 16, 1945
A first thought dawns. Nuclear weapons are unique in the history of warfare. Even a single instance of nuclear warfighting would signify unprecedented and irremediable failure. In essence, nuclear weapons can succeed only though non-use.[1] The most obvious example of such a more-or-less plausible “success” would be system-wide and stable conditions of nuclear deterrence.
There are many relevant details, both military and legal. Not all nuclear wars would have the same conceptual origin. Should nuclear deterrence fail, a core distinction would concern variously probabilistic differences between deliberate or intentional nuclear war and a nuclear war that would be unintentional or inadvertent. In all cases, this would represent an especially vital distinction.[2]
Should nuclear deterrence fail, it could be on account of antecedent arms control failures or shortcomings and assorted misunderstandings or decisional miscalculations. Here, inherently complex intersections between strategy and law could prove determinative. Though durable foundations of nuclear war avoidance should always include comprehensive elements of treaty-based nuclear arms control, no such inclusion could ever be adequate.
Regarding interrelated strategic elements of nuclear war avoidance, there will be multi-layered problems for science-based calculation. In this connection, because there has never been an authentic nuclear war(Hiroshima and Nagasaki don’t “count”),[3] determining relevant probabilities would be literally impossible. To clarify, in logic and mathematics, true probabilities must always derive from the determinable frequency of pertinent past events. Ipso facto, when there are no such past events, nothing could be determined with any predictive reliability.
Still, impediments notwithstanding, intellect-directed analysts will have to devise optimal strategies for averting nuclear war.[4] Such indispensable calculations will vary, among other things, according to (1) presumed enemy intention; (2) presumed plausibility of accident or hacking intrusion; and/or (3) presumed likelihood of decisional miscalculation. When considered together as cumulative categories of nuclear war threat, all three component risks of an unintentional nuclear war would be “inadvertent.”Any particular case of an accidental nuclear war would be inadvertent, but not every case of inadvertent nuclear war would be the result of an accident.
All listed examples represent potentially intersecting elements of nuclear war avoidance. This bewildering problem should never be approached by American national security policy-makers or by the US president as a narrowly political or tactical issue. Rather, informed by in-depth historical understanding and by carefully refined analytic capacities, US military planners should prepare to deal with a large variety of overlapping explanatory factors/norms, including jurisprudential[5] or legal ones.[6]
There is more. At times, studied intersections under could be determinably synergistic. At such intellect-challenging times, the “whole” of any injurious effect would be greater than the sum of its “parts. Going forward, focused attention on pertinent synergies should remain a primary analytic objective.[7]
In dealing with certain still-growing nuclear war risks involving North Korea, Ukraine, Russia or Iran, no single concept could prove more important than synergy.[8] Unless such interactions are reliably and correctly evaluated, an American president could sometime sorely underestimate the total impact of any considered nuclear engagement. The manifestly tangible flesh and blood consequences of any such underestimations would likely be very high. They could defy both analytic imaginations and any post-war legal justifications.
Looking ahead, in any complex strategic risk assessments regarding adversarial military nuclear intentions, the concept ofsynergy should be assigned appropriate pride of place.[9] The only conceivable argument for an American president willfully choosing to ignore the effects of synergy would be that the associated US defense policy considerations appear “too complex.” When fundamental US national security issues are at stake, however, any such viscerally dismissive argument would be unacceptable.
For the present writer, such reasoning has long represented familiar intellectual terrain. In brief, I have been publishing about difficult and related strategic-legal issues for more than fifty years. After four years of doctoral study at Princeton in the late 1960s, historically a prominent center of American nuclear strategic thought (recall especially Albert Einstein and J. Robert Oppenheimer), I began to consider adding a modest personal contribution to a then-evolving nuclear literature. By the late 1970s, I was cautiously preparing a new manuscript on US nuclear strategy,[10] and, by variously disciplined processes of correct inference, on the corresponding risks of a nuclear war.[11]
At that early stage of an emerging discipline, I was most interested in US presidential authority to order the use of American nuclear weapons.
Almost immediately, after spending time at SAC (Strategic Air Command) headquarters,[12] I learned that allegedly reliable safeguards had been incorporated into all operational nuclear command/control decisions, but also that these same safeguards could not be applied at the presidential level. To a young scholar searching optimistically for meaningful nuclear war avoidance opportunities, this ironic disjunction didn’t make any sense. So, what next?
It was a time for gathering suitable clarifications. I reached out to retired General Maxwell D. Taylor, a former Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. In reassuringly rapid response to my query, General Taylor sent a comprehensive handwritten reply. Dated 14 March 1976, the distinguished General’s detailed letter concluded ominously: “As to those dangers arising from an irrational American president, the only protection is not to elect one.”[13]
Until recently, I had never given any extended thought to this authoritative response. Today, following the incoherent presidency of Donald J. Trump (and the possible coming of Trump II in 2024) General Taylor’s 1976 warning takes on more urgent meanings. Based on variously ascertainable facts and extrapolations (called “entailments” in formal philosophy of science terminology) rather than wishful thinking, we ought now to assume that if Donald J. Trump were to return to the White House and exhibit accessible signs of emotional instability, irrationality or delusional behavior, he could still order the use of American nuclear weapons. He could do this officially, legally[14] and without compelling expectations of any nuclear chain-of-command “disobedience.”[15]
Still more worrisome, any US president could become emotionally unstable, irrational or delusional, but not exhibit such grave liabilities conspicuously.
What then?
A corollary question should quickly come to mind:
What precise stance should be assumed by the National Command Authority (Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and several others) if it should ever decide to oppose an “inappropriate” presidential order to launch American nuclear weapons?
Could the National Command Authority (NCA) “save the day,” informally, by acting in an impromptu or creatively ad hoc fashion? Or should refined preparatory steps already have been taken in advance, “preemptively”? That is, should there already be in place certain credible and effective statutory measures to (1) assess the ordering president’s reason and judgment; and (2) countermand any inappropriate or wrongful nuclear order?
Presumptively, in US law, Article 1 (Congressional) war-declaring expectations of the Constitution aside, any presidential order to use nuclear weapons, whether issued by an apparently irrational president or by an otherwise incapacitated one, would have to be obeyed. To do otherwise in such circumstances would be illegal on its face. Any chain-of-command disobedience would be impermissible prima facie.[16]
There is more. In principle, at least, any US president could order the first use of American nuclear weapons even if this country were not under a nuclear attack. Further strategic and legal distinctions would need to be made between a nuclear “first use” and a nuclear “first strike.” These would not be minor distinctions.[17]
While there exists an elementary yet substantive difference between these two options, it is an operational distinction that candidate Donald Trump failed to understand during the 2016 presidential campaign debates. As this former and now re-aspiring president reads nothing about such weighty matters – literally nothing at all – there remains good reason for task-appropriate US nuclear policy refinements.
What next? Where exactly should the American polity and government go from here on these overriding national security decision-making issues?[18] To begin, a coherent and comprehensive answer will need to be prepared for the following basic question:
If faced with any presidential order to use nuclear weapons, and not offered sufficiently appropriate corroborative evidence of any actually impending existential threat, would the National Command Authority be: (1) be willing to disobey, and (2) be capable of enforcing such needed expressions of disobedience?
In any such unprecedented crisis-decision circumstances, all authoritative judgments could have to be made in a compressively time-urgent matter of minutes, not of hours or days. As far as any useful policy guidance from the past might be concerned, there could exist no scientifically valid way to assess the true probabilities of possible outcomes. This is because all scientific judgments of probability – whatever the salient issue or subject – must be based upon recognizably pertinent past events.
On matters of a nuclear war, there are no pertinent past events. This is a fortunate absence, of course, but one that would still stand in the way of rendering reliable decision-making predictions. The dangerous irony here should be obvious.
Whatever the determinable scientific obstacles, the optimal time to prepare for any such vital US national security difficulties is now. Once we were already embroiled in extremis atomicum, it would be too late.
Regarding the specific problem areas of an already nuclear North Korea and a nearly-nuclear Iran, an American president will need to avoid any seat-of-the-pants calculations. For example, faced with dramatic uncertainties about counterpart Kim Jung Un’s expected willingness to push the escalatory envelope, an American president could suddenly and unexpectedly find himself faced with a fearfully stark choice between outright capitulation and nuclear war. For even an intellectually gifted US president (hardly a plausible present-day expectation), any such choice could be “paralyzing.”
To avoid being placed in such a limited choice strategic environment, a US president should understand that having a larger national nuclear force might not bestow any critical bargaining or crisis-outcome advantages. On the contrary, this seeming advantage could generate unwarranted US presidential overconfidence and/or various resultant forms of decisional miscalculation. In any such wholly unfamiliar, many-sided and unprecedented matters, arsenal size could actually matter, but perhaps counter-intuitively, inversely, or in various ways not yet fully understood.
More than likely, any prosaic analogies would be misconceived. Nuclear war avoidance is not a matter resembling commercial marketplace negotiations.[19] While the search for some sort of “escalation dominance” (successful competition in risk-taking) may be common to many sorts of commercial deal-making, the cumulative costs of any related nuclear security policy losses would always be sui generis or one-of-a-kind.
There is more. In certain fragile matters of world politics, even an inadvertent decisional outcome could include a nuclear war. Here, whether occasioned by accident, hacking or “mere” miscalculation, there could be no meaningful “winner.” At a conceptual level, any US president ought to understand this as an elementary sort of understanding.
In the paroxysmal aftermath of any unintended nuclear conflict, those authoritative American decision-makers who had once accepted former President Donald J. Trump’s oft-stated preference for “attitude” over “preparation” would likely reconsider their earlier error. By then, however, it would be too late. As survivors of a once-preventable nuclear conflagration, now-stunned officials might only envy the dead. This is the case, moreover, whether the nuclear conflict had been intentional or unintentional, and whether it had been occasioned by base motives, miscalculation, computer error, hacking intrusion or by weapon-system/infrastructure accident.
Today, more than 78 years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear war remains an incurable “disease.” To ensure credible deterrence, a US president would no longer need to respond to a nuclear attack immediately. Because the triad of strategic weaponry includes cumulatively invulnerable submarine forces, this country no longer needs to rely upon a destabilizing “launch on warning” nuclear posture. This means, among other things, that a president of the United States need no longer be granted sole decisional authority over America’s nuclear weapons.
Any continuing failure of United States law and practice to acknowledge this sobering transformation could lead to an adversarial use of nuclear weapons – by this country, by its then-evident adversary, or by both. In any such scenario, the atomic conflagration would almost certainly dwarf the 1945 effects of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It follows, above all else, that nuclear war avoidance is mandated by the conjunction of human survival and human reason.[20]
Physicist and Manhattan Project director J. Robert Oppenheimer, subject of the film released in July 2023, clung fixedly to the hope that nuclear weapons could become peace-maximizing rather than destabilizing. In a lecture delivered before the George Westinghouse Centennial Forum on May 16, 1946, the celebrated physicist commented: “The development of nuclear weapons can make, if wisely handled, the problem of preventing war not more hopeless, but more hopeful than it would otherwise have been….” Back in 1946, Oppenheimer did not anticipate a broad variety of troublesome issues, including the proliferation of nuclear weapons (“vertical” and “horizontal”) to states and sub states; risks of an unintentional nuclear war; failure of law-based nuclear arms control; and the inextinguishable irrationality of human decision-makers seeking “escalation dominance” in the midst of chaotic crises.
Today, looking toward a grievously uncertain national and global future, the only rational course for humankind is to collectively eschew nuclear warfighting as a prospective benefit, and to do whatever is necessary in law and strategy to build more durable foundations of nuclear war avoidance. For the most part, this challenging task must be intellectual rather than political.[21] Moreover, to meet this unique task, nuclear war avoidance can never be accomplished in the explosive context of belligerent nationalism and global chaos. Among other things, this requires the will[22] to acknowledge that entire civilizations can have the same mortality as an individual human being, and that the nuclear weapon states themselves can “become death.”
[1] Says Sun-Tzu in The Art of War: “Subjugating the enemy’s army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence. (Chapter 3, “Planning Offensives”).
[2] For authoritative early accounts by this author of nuclear war effects, see: Louis René Beres, Apocalypse: Nuclear Catastrophe in World Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Louis René Beres, Mimicking Sisyphus: America’s Countervailing Nuclear Strategy (Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1983); Louis René Beres, Reason and Realpolitik: U.S. Foreign Policy and World Order (Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1984); and Louis René Beres, Security or Armageddon: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy (Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1986). Most recently, by Professor Beres, see: Surviving Amid Chaos: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy (New York, Rowman & Littlefield, 2016; 2nd ed. 2018).
[3] The atomic attacks on Japan in August 1945 represented nuclear weapons use in a conventional war.
[4] Reminds Guillaume Apollinaire, “It must not be forgotten that it is perhaps more dangerous for a nation to allow itself to be conquered intellectually than by arms.” (The New Spirit and the Poets (1917)
[5] For the authoritative sources of international law, see art. 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice: STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, Done at San Francisco, June 26, 1945. Entered into force, Oct. 24, 1945; for the United States, Oct. 24, 1945. 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, 1976 Y.B.U.N., 1052.
[6] Regarding these pertinent considerations of law, issues of personal criminal responsibility must be ones of high importance. Significantly, criminal responsibility of leaders under international law is not limited to direct personal action or limited by official position. On this peremptory principle of “command responsibility,” or respondeat superior, see: In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1945); The High Command Case (The Trial of Wilhelm von Leeb), 12 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 1 (United Nations War Crimes Commission Comp., 1949); see Parks, Command Responsibility For War Crimes, 62 MIL.L. REV. 1 (1973); O’Brien, The Law Of War, Command Responsibility And Vietnam, 60 GEO. L.J. 605 (1972); U.S. Dept. Of The Army, Army Subject Schedule No. 27 – 1 (Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Hague Convention No. IV of 1907), 10 (1970). The direct individual responsibility of leaders is also unambiguous in view of the London Agreement, which denies defendants the protection of the act of state defense. See AGREEMENT FOR THE PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS OF THE EUROPEAN AXIS, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, art. 7.
[7] Such focus on synergies could shed a parallel light upon the entire world system’s state of disorder (a view that would reflect what the physicists prefer to call “entropic” conditions), and could themselves be more-or-less dependent upon a pertinent American president’s subjective metaphysics of time. For an early article by this author dealing with linkages between such a subjective metaphysics and national crisis decision-making, see: Louis René Beres, “Time, Consciousness and Decision-Making in Theories of International Relations,” The Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. VIII, No.3., Fall 1974, pp. 175-186.
[8] Prospective problems stemming from synergy also bring to mind the Clausewitzian concept of “friction,” a concept that is not the same as synergy, but that also emphasizes the always-key elements of interaction and unpredictability. See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, especially Chapter VI, “Friction in War.”
[9] See earlier, by this author, at Harvard National Security Journal (Harvard Law School): Louis René Beres, https://harvardnsj.org/2015/06/core-synergies-in-israels-strategic-planning-when-the-adversarial-whole-is-greater-than-the-sum-of-its-parts/
[10] Earlier, by this author, see: Louis René Beres, The Management of World Power: A Theoretical Analysis (University of Denver, 1973) and Louis René Beres, Transforming World Politics: The National Roots of World Peace (University of Denver, 1975).
[11] This book was subsequently published in 1980 by the University of Chicago Press: Louis René Beres, Apocalypse: Nuclear Catastrophe in World Politics. http://www.amazon.com/Apocalypse-Nuclear-Catastrophe-World-Politics/dp/0226043606
[12] Years later, I became a frequent co-author with General (USAF/ret.) John T. Chain, previously Commander-in-Chief, US Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC).
[13] Expressions of decisional irrationality could take different or overlapping forms. These include a disorderly or inconsistent value system; computational errors in calculation; an incapacity to communicate efficiently; random or haphazard influences in the making or transmittal of particular decisions; and the internal dissonance generated by any structure of collective decision-making (i.e., assemblies of pertinent individuals who lack identical value systems and/or whose organizational arrangements impact their willing capacity to act as a single or unitary national decision maker).
[14] Here, meaningful considerations of law would be more-or-less bifurcated between domestic or municipal law and international law. Still, international law is part of United States jurisprudence. In the words of Mr. Justice Gray, delivering the judgment of the US Supreme Court in Paquete Habana (1900): “International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction….” (175 U.S. 677(1900)) See also: Opinion in Tel-Oren vs. Libyan Arab Republic (726 F. 2d 774 (1984)).Moreover, the specific incorporation of treaty law into US municipal law is expressly codified at Art. 6 of the US Constitution, the so-called “Supremacy Clause.”
[15] Still, there could remain certain authoritative considerations of international law, specifically those having to do with strategies of preemption or “anticipatory self-defense.” Such considerations can be found not in conventional law (art. 51 of the UN Charter supports only post-attack expressions of individual or collective self-defense), but rather in customary international law. The precise origins of anticipatory self-defense in such customary law lie in the Caroline, a case that concerned the unsuccessful rebellion of 1837 in Upper Canada against British rule. Following this case, the serious threat of armed attack has generally justified certain militarily defensive actions. In an exchange of diplomatic notes between the governments of the United States and Great Britain, then U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster outlined a framework for self-defense that did not require an antecedent attack. Here, the jurisprudential framework permitted a military response to a threat so long as the danger posed was “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.” See: Beth M. Polebaum, “National Self-defense in International Law: An Emerging Standard for a Nuclear Age,” 59 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 187, 190-91 (1984) (noting that the Caroline case had transformed the right of self-defense from an excuse for armed intervention into a legal doctrine). Still earlier, see: Hugo Grotius, Of the Causes of War, and First of Self-Defense, and Defense of Our Property, reprinted in 2 Classics of International Law, 168-75 (Carnegie Endowment Trust, 1925) (1625); and Emmerich de Vattel, The Right of Self-Protection and the Effects of the Sovereignty and Independence of Nations, reprinted in 3 Classics of International Law, 130 (Carnegie Endowment Trust, 1916) (1758). Also, Samuel Pufendorf, The Two Books on the Duty of Man and Citizen According to Natural Law, 32 (Frank Gardner Moore., tr., 1927 (1682).
[16] Nonetheless, there could arise various contrary expectations of international law, including certain “peremptory” norms that concern both the right to use international force and/or the amount or type of force that may correctly be applied. According to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: “…a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.” See: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Done at Vienna, May 23, 1969. Entered into force, Jan. 27, 1980. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 at 289 (1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
[17] Also, under authoritative terms of international law, there would be coinciding concerns about the egregious crime of “aggression.” See especially: RESOLUTION ON THE DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION, Dec. 14, 1974, U.N.G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631, 1975, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 710, 1974; and CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Art. 51. Done at San Francisco, June 26, 1945. Entered into force for the United States, Oct. 24, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, Bevans 1153, 1976, Y.B.U.N. 1043.
[18] Also worth bearing in mind here are the different ways in which the United States can permissibly adapt international law to these issues. Apropos of this corresponding query, international law remains a “vigilante” or “Westphalian” system of jurisprudence. The Peace of Westphalia created the still-existing decentralized or self-help state system. See: Treaty of Peace of Munster, Oct. 1648, 1 Consol. T.S. 271; and Treaty of Peace of Osnabruck, Oct. 1648, 1, Consol. T.S. 119, Together, these two treaties comprise the Peace of Westphalia.
[19] Here we may recall Nietzsche’s philosophic warning in Zarathustra: “Do not seek the higher man at the marketplace.”
[20]The specific importance of reason to legal judgment was prefigured in ancient Israel, which accommodated reason within its core system of revealed law. Jewish theory of law, insofar as it displays the marks of natural law, offers a transcending order revealed by the divine word as interpreted by human reason. In the striking words of Ecclesiastics 32.23, 37.16, 13-14: “Let reason go before every enterprise and counsel before any action…And let the counsel of thine own heart stand…For a man’s mind is sometimes wont to tell him more than seven watchmen that sit above in a high tower….”
[22] Modern origins of “will” are discoverable in the writings of Arthur Schopenhauer, especially The World as Will and Idea (1818). For his own inspiration, Schopenhauer drew freely upon Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. Later, Nietzsche drew just as freely and perhaps more importantly upon Schopenhauer. Goethe was also a core intellectual source for Spanish existentialist Jose Ortega y’Gasset, author of the singularly prophetic twentieth-century work, The Revolt of the Masses (Le Rebelion de las Masas;1930). See, accordingly, Ortega’s very grand essay, “In Search of Goethe from Within” (1932), written for Die Neue Rundschau of Berlin on the centenary of Goethe’s death. It is reprinted in Ortega’s anthology, The Dehumanization of Art (1948) and is available from Princeton University Press (1968).
Prof. Louis René Beres (Ph.D., Princeton, 1971) is Emeritus Professor of International Law at Purdue. His twelfth and most recent book is Surviving Amid Chaos: Israel's Nuclear Strategy (2016) (2nd ed., 2018) https://paw.princeton.edu/new-books/surviving-amid-chaos-israel%E2%80%99s-nuclear-strategy Some of his principal strategic writings have appeared in Harvard National Security Journal (Harvard Law School); International Security (Harvard University); Yale Global Online (Yale University); Oxford University Press (Oxford University); Oxford Yearbook of International Law (Oxford University Press); Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College (Pentagon); Special Warfare (Pentagon); Modern War Institute (Pentagon); The War Room (Pentagon); World Politics (Princeton); INSS (The Institute for National Security Studies)(Tel Aviv); Israel Defense (Tel Aviv); BESA Perspectives (Israel); International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; The Atlantic; The New York Times and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
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