ANALYSIS
A look at AUKUS – The Indo-Pacific quasi-alliance
By J. Vitor Tossini
- January 13, 2024
AUKUS is a tripartite security initiative of the United States, the UK, and Australia that seeks to reinforce its members’ interests and position in the Indo-Pacific.
The message is threefold.Firstly, the United States is deeply committed to the region despite its setbacks in the Middle East, and the pivot to the Indo-Pacific is marching on.
Secondly, the UK is putting some substance into Global Britain and remains a European actor not locked to Europe, capable of pursuing its interests beyond its immediate strategic neighbourhood.
Thirdly, Australia has chosen to deepen its traditionally close ties with the United States and the UK due to an increased sense of isolation and years of strained diplomatic and commercial with China.
Given the already special relationship among its members, the AUKUS initiative might be regarded as a quasi-alliance even if it does not aim to be one.
This article is the opinion of the author and not necessarily that of the UK Defence Journal. If you would like to submit your own article on this topic or any other, please see our submission guidelines.
On 15 September 2021, the governments of Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States jointly announced the creation of AUKUS, a new tripartite security partnership focused on the Indo-Pacific. AUKUS conception occurred as a framework for the UK and the US to provide nuclear-powered submarines to Australia.
However, beyond nuclear-powered submarines, the overreaching objective of AUKUS is to function as a dipositive for cooperation in military technology between its three members with the ultimate long-term purpose of strengthening their relative position in an increasingly competitive international system. Within this context, the partnership also covers cooperation on electronic and cyber-warfare, quantum technologies, artificial intelligence, hypersonic weapons, undersea capabilities, and innovation.
Although Washington, London and Canberra reiterated that AUKUS is focused on military capabilities, its scope even advances into information-sharing on military-related issues, complementing a field that all three members already have a high-rate quality of exchange through the intelligence-sharing alliance, the Five-Eyes, alongside Canada and New Zealand.
Since its announcement in 2021, AUKUS has been divided into two tiers or pillars covering different cooperation features among the three members. Tier I focuses on providing Australia with a fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), replacing the current Australian Collin-class diesel-electric submarine with the SSN-AUKUS. The United States agreed to sell up to five of its Virginia-class to avoid capability gaps until the British-designed SSN-AUKUS enters the Royal Australian Navy service.
Hence, Tier I also includes investments in the three countries to enhance the availability of naval workforce and expand infrastructure. In Britain and Australia, those investments aim to achieve the commissioning dates of the SSN-AUKUS within the late 2030s and early 2040s timeframe. In the United States, their purpose is to provide the promised Virgina-class submarines in the early 2030s without leaving gaps within the US Navy.
Tier I also covers the agreements that will allow the Royal Navy and the US Navy to start in 2027 a rotational submarine force based in HMAS Stirling, the so-called “Submarine Rotational Force-West”. In short, Tier I includes most efforts concerning the submarines, training Australian crews in Britain, and deployment of British and American vessels to Australian naval bases.
Tier II is an emerging component that includes technology and information sharing. Tier II aims to deepen cooperation on critical capabilities, maintaining the traditional technological edge of the AUKUS members over its competitors in the Indo-Pacific. In addition, improving interoperability and joint deployment of forces are the primary rationale underlying AUKUS.
Hence, there is a need for further cooperation in the areas that will enable the future military assets of Britain, the United States and Australia to be amongst the most interchangeable and interoperable in the world. Concerning this issue, the initiative aims to improve exchange and joint research on the already mentioned hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities, radars – including the Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC) programme –, artificial intelligence, and quantum technologies.
The underlying geopolitical message sent through the announcement of AUKUS is that most of the “Anglosphere” nations are reinforcing their alliance to improve their relative standing and counter the efforts of emerging threats to gain naval and, later, geostrategic dominance in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, for Australia, the tripartite initiative is a call back to the idea of retaining close links to its “two great friends” – Britain and the United States – in times of resurgence of the notion of isolation derived from a geographically close power that might block the lanes between the country and its allies.
In Australia, the question of China’s rising influence over the nation has seen increased questioning. Since the late 2000s and early 2010s, the strategic environment surrounding Australia has changed significantly. Once, Canberra – like London’s golden era of UK-China relations (2010-2016) – rode on the wave of the growing Chinese market. By 2020, within the context of an already strained bilateral relationship, the Lowy Institute indicated that Australia had the most “China-dependent economy” of the Group of 20 (G20).
Economic dependence can quickly become a source of political leverage. Reports of interference from China’s interference in Australian politics are signals that Beijing is willing to exploit the dependence of those that do not fall in line. Thus, in part, the debate in Australia is one between establishing a balance of having China as an economic partner without significant economic dependence. In this case, AUKUS might be seen as a result of the effort of those worried about China’s increased assertive position in the region and the place of Australia within a Chinese sphere of influence.
For the United States, although not explicitly, AUKUS is a standpoint of a long-term strategy to contain China while reinforcing the position of Australia within the American security umbrella. Additionally, there are clear benefits to the American military-industrial complex through selling three to five Virginia-class submarines beginning in the early 2030s as a gap-filler before the five SSN-AUKUS enter Australian service and even closer cooperation with Australia and Britain.
For example, the American Government is investing in the industrial base to increase construction and maintenance capacity within this context. With AUKUS, the United States will have a unified submarine posture in the Indo-Pacific and an unprecedented level of interoperability with British and Australian submarines. In other words, Washington is counting on London and Canberra to play a part in the Indo-Pacific, and the tripartite initiative enhances the position of its British and Australian allies in the region. Starting in 2027, up to four American and one British submarine will be on rotational deployments to HMAS Stirling naval base near Perth. In the late 2030s and early 2040s, the RAN will be capable of supporting its two allies in acute submarine operations while performing deployments made by American and British submarines.
In Washington, AUKUS might be regarded as cementing Canberra as its most reliable regional “middle power”, a vital ally within America’s grand strategy that mostly aligns with the White House and Downing Street views. In an international system with growing numbers of middle powers claiming neutrality or gravitating toward China, AUKUS is a symbol that Australia still looks for the United States and Britain to a lesser extent. Beyond that, considering the United States’ long-term strategy in the region, the rotational deployments to Stirling are often overlooked.
The “Submarine Rotational Force-West” (SRF-West) is a near-term endeavour resulting from AUKUS that will be put into action at least a decade before Australia gets its first nuclear-powered submarine. Aiming to achieve full force in 2031, the SRF-West will considerably increase the allied undersea capabilities. If Washington deploys its four submarines from homeports outside the region, it will double the number of such vessels operated by the UK, Australia, and the United States in the area (excluding American forces based in Hawaii). Thus, AUKUS represents the fulfilment of the US Indo-Pacific Command’s objective since the 2010s to double the number of submarines operating in the area. Perth, alongside Guam and Hawaii, will be one of the pillars of the American submarine force in the Indo-Pacific. Strategically, the agreement helps forward-basing allied assets in the region, easing the logistical pressure put on the United States to operate and, if necessary, to wage war.
It is a reminder for Britain that the country is already in a new post-Brexit phase, even though it remains a recurrent topic in British politics. Beyond an apparent victory for the overused label of “Global Britain”, the British participation in the AUKUS agreement has the potential to strengthen Britain’s relative position in the Indo-Pacific through formal basing of submarines and access to naval facilities and the elevation of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) to a force capable of complementing activities of a stretched British submarine force. Not only Global Britain would have concrete results, but also the British “tilt” to the Indo-Pacific.
It is worth mentioning that Britain’s tilt to the Indo-Pacific had been ongoing since the mid-2010s, years before it became an official government policy and that AUKUS – at least from a British perspective – builds on previous defence agreements with Australia that allowed for the transfer of military technology between the two countries, mainly the 2013 Treaty for Defence and Security Cooperation.
In addition, for the British economy, particularly its defence industry, the AUKUS is a welcomed deal, even at the expense of partners in France. Demonstrating the quality of British submarines, the chosen future submarines for Australia are the SSN-AUKUS, initially British-designed but also incorporating American technology. Replacing the Astute-class of the Royal Navy and the Collins-class of the RAN, London and Canberra will operate similar vessels in the late 2030 and early 2040s. Britain has a central role beyond the hull design of SSN-AUKUS because strategic concerns led to Australia first approaching Britain for assistance in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines.
As the British position is one of close cooperation with the Americans since the 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement, Britain directly helped to negotiate the terms that resulted in the deal. Australia knew that its interests aligned with the British and that London had the influence to approach Washington cordially, which could result in the first share of nuclear propulsion in American history to a third party since 1958.
Although a country that has experienced a relative decline, the UK still gathers assets to avoid the role of a “second-rate European nation” with European-only interests. Much of the debate on stretching the country’s resources with the “Indo-Pacific tilt” – of which AUKUS is part – is the consequence of successive governments in London, influenced by the Treasury, presuming that the Defence of the Realm is obtainable on the cheap.
Depleting the budget of the British Armed Forces through short-sighted policies, with the 2010 Defence Review as one example, has left Britain with the necessity to spend more only to achieve the already cut capability levels seen in the early 2000s. As shown through AUKUS, the British Government can put some substance into Global Britain and the tilt to the Indo-Pacific. However, remains in London the lack of willingness to advance towards a long-term geostrategic approach that recognises the end of the post-Cold War “Peace Dividend”.
Rebuilding lost or reduced capabilities must occur domestically while strengthening trusted and reliable allies abroad. Britain is doing the latter through AUKUS but acts reluctantly in strengthening its own material capabilities. While Britain designs a new generation of submarines for the Royal Navy and the RAN, the debate about the fleet size of the British submarine emerged. Navy chiefs campaigning for an increase argue that seven attack submarines are below the requirements of the increasingly competitive and assertive international arena. The idea was – for the time being – rejected by Downing Street. In short, successive governments in London have the ambition to seek a role for Britain as one of the major powers internationally, which can be seen as a reasonable assumption for any country that is part of the top six largest economies in the world. However, going global demands a willingness to adequately support hard power, which is most respected by the main challengers to Britain’s position and security.
Beyond the specific and shared geostrategic benefits that its members might have when AUKUS reaches maturity in the 2030s and 2040s, the tripartite security initiative has attracted concerns and criticism. Above all, the topics raised since September 2021 concern nuclear proliferation. Through AUKUS, Australia will access the highly enriched uranium used on the Anglo-American SSN propulsion designs. Although the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty does not forbid non-nuclear-weapon states to produce highly enriched uranium for naval reactor fuel, the transfer and elevation of Australia as an operator of nuclear-powered submarines have been heavily criticised. Much of the criticism on the topic is due to the lack of international safeguards on nuclear materials used for naval military purposes. Australia will be exploring a loophole that allows nuclear material to be removed from the International Atomic Energy. Until the case of Australia, critics argue, the “loophole” within the Non-Proliferation Treaty was not a severe problem due to only Nuclear-Weapon-States (NWS) operating nuclear-powered submarines and exercising the right to remove from inspection nuclear material for military purposes.
Therefore, the argument goes, AUKUS established a precedent that other NWS might explore, transferring nuclear submarine technology and material to less-than-reliable countries. Consequently, through a political discourse citing the AUKUS precedent, others could facilitate the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Thus, the question is not only about Australia seeking the status of a Nuclear-Weapon-State but others using the loophole to have access to the material and technology.
Nevertheless, Australia is not the first NWS to seek a nuclear-powered submarine capability. For decades, Brazil has expressed varying degrees of interest in that possibility. Since 2008, the South American country has been developing its “Submarine Development Programme” (also known as “PROSUB”). Considerably less ambitious than AUKUS, PROSUB has a few characteristics in common with its Indo-Pacific or Anglospheric counterpart. Firstly, it involves the development of nuclear-powered submarines by a non-nuclear weapon state. Secondly, the programme involves a nuclear-armed state, in this case, France, assisting the country in the development process. It is worth noting that Brazil is not acquiring a French propulsion design but elaborating its own based on exchanges and experience acquired from French support.
Thirdly, Brazil and Australia will be exploiting the legal loophole of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Despite that, PROSUB has slipped under the radar of most criticism. This is the case, in part, because Brazil has reassured the international community that the reactor will use low-enriched uranium at 7% concentration and the minimum to make a nuclear weapon is 20%, although the Brazilian Navy cites the possibility of the level reaching around 15%. Therefore, Australia’s position is not unique, and AUKUS might be seen as just a step further than PROSUB.
Criticism is countered by the AUKUS leaders, who point out that when Australia, the UK, and the United States announced the initiative in 2021, the three members committed to their respective non-proliferation obligations. An additional list of commitments was laid out by AUKUS that includes the Australian commitment that it does not – and will not – seek nuclear weapons.
In March 2023, the White House issued a statement reaffirming that (1) Australia will not enrich uranium or reprocess fuel spent as part of AUKUS; (2) Australia will not produce nuclear fuel for its submarine fleet; (3) the UK and the United States aim to provide Australia with nuclear material “in complete, welded power units” that will not require refuelling during their operational lifetime; (4) nuclear material that Australia receives cannot be employed in nuclear weapons without additional chemical processing, and the country does not have and will not seek to build up such processing infrastructure; and (5) the programme will occur in line with Australia’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Washington also stated that all members maintained regular consultation with the IAEA throughout 2022, aiming to uphold the safeguards regime. Lastly, according to the United States briefing, “The Director General of the IAEA has reported to the IAEA Member States that he believes the AUKUS partners ‘are committed to ensuring the highest non-proliferation and safeguards standards are met,’ and noted his ‘satisfaction with the engagement and transparency shown by the three countries thus far.’”
Another criticism of the “quasi-alliance” is its apparent exclusivist nature. The UK, the United States, and Australia are unilaterally establishing a new vision for the Indo-Pacific. In other words, AUKUS might overshadow regional initiatives and establish a clear divide between the West and China for the decades to come. Concerning this topic, the American Government declared that the “door is open” to other partners, mentioning the desire for a future New Zealand membership. In the UK, a Parliamentary Committee argued for inviting Japan and Korea. Other possible members include Canada, which would further join the vision of AUKUS and the Five-Eyes as a unified “Anglosphere” stance in the region.
Within this context lies the critics derived from the AUKUS reverberations in Europe, mainly in France. Considering that France lost its €56 billion procurement for conventional submarines when Australia cancelled the deal and opted for a British design with American technology, the French Government considered the act “a stab in the back”. Paris recalled its ambassadors from Washington and Canberra while attempting to belittle London, stating that the ambassador in London was not recalled due to Britain’s small role in the affair, labelling the country as opportunistic and an accomplice of the other two. Despite that, cooperation with France proceeded through NATO and bilateral agreements. In June 2022, Australia agreed to pay €555 million to the French contractor as a settlement, paving the way for a normalised bilateral relationship.
In conclusion, the strategic driver of AUKUS is mainly the perceived need to reinforce a Western front against an increasingly revisionist China to secure its three members’ geopolitical interests. Although China remains Australia’s leading trading partner, it has become clear that it is willing to channel commercial dependence into political leverage. Within this context, it is possible to argue that China’s blunt outlining of its “14 Grievances” against Australia in 2020 was, from the point of view of Canberra, a glimpse of the behaviour that the Commonwealth member could expect in an Indo-Pacific under a Chinese sphere of influence. Thus, for Australia, AUKUS is the pathway to enhanced military capabilities while bringing the UK and the United States even closer to supporting Australian national security. It also tackles the recurring sense of isolation felt by successive Governments in Canberra, particularly in times of Great Power rivalry.
Concerning the United States, AUKUS is a tool to maintain an international order under American auspices. Countering China might also mean sustaining the status quo that has the United States on the top, followed by other G7 countries. Beyond that, AUKUS brings and possibly entangles two of Washington’s closest allies to the strategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific, easing the pressure on American assets deployed to the region.
For the UK, the tripartite initiative puts some substance into Global Britain and the maintenance of an open and rules-based international order. Moreover, through AUKUS, Britain continues the pursuit of the objective formulated in the 2021 Integrated Review to become “the European partner with the broadest, most integrated presence in support of mutually beneficial trade, shared security and values”. Becoming the leading European power in the Indo-Pacific means supplanting France’s position, which might be considered the main European actor in that region since the British Handover of Hong Kong in 1997. Achieving that position demands the desire of the British Government to invest in Britain’s defence capabilities and security and economic ties with regional partners.
Anglo-Australian security and defence cooperation already occurred through the Five Eyes, the Five Power Defence Arrangements, and bilateral agreements, and the AUKUS crowns Australia as a central long-term part of the British tilt to the region. Lastly, Britain’s participation means that the Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific are becoming strategically integrated within the considerations of British defence policy.
In other words, the regions East of Suez might no longer be detachable from the core interests of London in the Atlantic-Europe axis. Instead, despite the shortcomings of more than two decades of capability cuts, British policy is leaning towards binding the Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific as one, just like the United States.
Even though AUKUS does not aim to function as a “NATO of the Indo-Pacific”, Australia, the UK, and the United States might already have in practice a “quasi-alliance” in the region.
There is no Article V of the Indo-Pacific. Still, the level of entanglement of British, American, and Australian interests coupled with bilateral arrangements between the three actors leads to a geostrategic scenario that AUKUS does not only represent facets of the American pivot, Global Britain, and Australian search for renewed security, but a joint front of three different kinds of powers that seek similar objectives, sharing the same view of what kind of world order must prevail in the coming decades.
However, AUKUS offers Britain and Australia the notion that it is not a collective security system, alluding to the fact that – just as in the case of the British position on the Vietnam War – the Anglosphere in the Indo-Pacific is not binding but a quasi-alliance that accommodates its members for a relatively united position in a region that witness increased Great Power competition.
J. Vitor Tossini
Vitor is a doctoral student of International Relations at the Sao Paulo State University. He also explores British imperial and military history, and its legacies to the modern world.
A look at AUKUS – The Indo-Pacific quasi-alliance
By J. Vitor Tossini
- January 13, 2024
AUKUS is a tripartite security initiative of the United States, the UK, and Australia that seeks to reinforce its members’ interests and position in the Indo-Pacific.
The message is threefold.Firstly, the United States is deeply committed to the region despite its setbacks in the Middle East, and the pivot to the Indo-Pacific is marching on.
Secondly, the UK is putting some substance into Global Britain and remains a European actor not locked to Europe, capable of pursuing its interests beyond its immediate strategic neighbourhood.
Thirdly, Australia has chosen to deepen its traditionally close ties with the United States and the UK due to an increased sense of isolation and years of strained diplomatic and commercial with China.
Given the already special relationship among its members, the AUKUS initiative might be regarded as a quasi-alliance even if it does not aim to be one.
This article is the opinion of the author and not necessarily that of the UK Defence Journal. If you would like to submit your own article on this topic or any other, please see our submission guidelines.
On 15 September 2021, the governments of Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States jointly announced the creation of AUKUS, a new tripartite security partnership focused on the Indo-Pacific. AUKUS conception occurred as a framework for the UK and the US to provide nuclear-powered submarines to Australia.
However, beyond nuclear-powered submarines, the overreaching objective of AUKUS is to function as a dipositive for cooperation in military technology between its three members with the ultimate long-term purpose of strengthening their relative position in an increasingly competitive international system. Within this context, the partnership also covers cooperation on electronic and cyber-warfare, quantum technologies, artificial intelligence, hypersonic weapons, undersea capabilities, and innovation.
Although Washington, London and Canberra reiterated that AUKUS is focused on military capabilities, its scope even advances into information-sharing on military-related issues, complementing a field that all three members already have a high-rate quality of exchange through the intelligence-sharing alliance, the Five-Eyes, alongside Canada and New Zealand.
Since its announcement in 2021, AUKUS has been divided into two tiers or pillars covering different cooperation features among the three members. Tier I focuses on providing Australia with a fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), replacing the current Australian Collin-class diesel-electric submarine with the SSN-AUKUS. The United States agreed to sell up to five of its Virginia-class to avoid capability gaps until the British-designed SSN-AUKUS enters the Royal Australian Navy service.
Hence, Tier I also includes investments in the three countries to enhance the availability of naval workforce and expand infrastructure. In Britain and Australia, those investments aim to achieve the commissioning dates of the SSN-AUKUS within the late 2030s and early 2040s timeframe. In the United States, their purpose is to provide the promised Virgina-class submarines in the early 2030s without leaving gaps within the US Navy.
Tier I also covers the agreements that will allow the Royal Navy and the US Navy to start in 2027 a rotational submarine force based in HMAS Stirling, the so-called “Submarine Rotational Force-West”. In short, Tier I includes most efforts concerning the submarines, training Australian crews in Britain, and deployment of British and American vessels to Australian naval bases.
Tier II is an emerging component that includes technology and information sharing. Tier II aims to deepen cooperation on critical capabilities, maintaining the traditional technological edge of the AUKUS members over its competitors in the Indo-Pacific. In addition, improving interoperability and joint deployment of forces are the primary rationale underlying AUKUS.
Hence, there is a need for further cooperation in the areas that will enable the future military assets of Britain, the United States and Australia to be amongst the most interchangeable and interoperable in the world. Concerning this issue, the initiative aims to improve exchange and joint research on the already mentioned hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities, radars – including the Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC) programme –, artificial intelligence, and quantum technologies.
The underlying geopolitical message sent through the announcement of AUKUS is that most of the “Anglosphere” nations are reinforcing their alliance to improve their relative standing and counter the efforts of emerging threats to gain naval and, later, geostrategic dominance in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, for Australia, the tripartite initiative is a call back to the idea of retaining close links to its “two great friends” – Britain and the United States – in times of resurgence of the notion of isolation derived from a geographically close power that might block the lanes between the country and its allies.
In Australia, the question of China’s rising influence over the nation has seen increased questioning. Since the late 2000s and early 2010s, the strategic environment surrounding Australia has changed significantly. Once, Canberra – like London’s golden era of UK-China relations (2010-2016) – rode on the wave of the growing Chinese market. By 2020, within the context of an already strained bilateral relationship, the Lowy Institute indicated that Australia had the most “China-dependent economy” of the Group of 20 (G20).
Economic dependence can quickly become a source of political leverage. Reports of interference from China’s interference in Australian politics are signals that Beijing is willing to exploit the dependence of those that do not fall in line. Thus, in part, the debate in Australia is one between establishing a balance of having China as an economic partner without significant economic dependence. In this case, AUKUS might be seen as a result of the effort of those worried about China’s increased assertive position in the region and the place of Australia within a Chinese sphere of influence.
For the United States, although not explicitly, AUKUS is a standpoint of a long-term strategy to contain China while reinforcing the position of Australia within the American security umbrella. Additionally, there are clear benefits to the American military-industrial complex through selling three to five Virginia-class submarines beginning in the early 2030s as a gap-filler before the five SSN-AUKUS enter Australian service and even closer cooperation with Australia and Britain.
For example, the American Government is investing in the industrial base to increase construction and maintenance capacity within this context. With AUKUS, the United States will have a unified submarine posture in the Indo-Pacific and an unprecedented level of interoperability with British and Australian submarines. In other words, Washington is counting on London and Canberra to play a part in the Indo-Pacific, and the tripartite initiative enhances the position of its British and Australian allies in the region. Starting in 2027, up to four American and one British submarine will be on rotational deployments to HMAS Stirling naval base near Perth. In the late 2030s and early 2040s, the RAN will be capable of supporting its two allies in acute submarine operations while performing deployments made by American and British submarines.
In Washington, AUKUS might be regarded as cementing Canberra as its most reliable regional “middle power”, a vital ally within America’s grand strategy that mostly aligns with the White House and Downing Street views. In an international system with growing numbers of middle powers claiming neutrality or gravitating toward China, AUKUS is a symbol that Australia still looks for the United States and Britain to a lesser extent. Beyond that, considering the United States’ long-term strategy in the region, the rotational deployments to Stirling are often overlooked.
The “Submarine Rotational Force-West” (SRF-West) is a near-term endeavour resulting from AUKUS that will be put into action at least a decade before Australia gets its first nuclear-powered submarine. Aiming to achieve full force in 2031, the SRF-West will considerably increase the allied undersea capabilities. If Washington deploys its four submarines from homeports outside the region, it will double the number of such vessels operated by the UK, Australia, and the United States in the area (excluding American forces based in Hawaii). Thus, AUKUS represents the fulfilment of the US Indo-Pacific Command’s objective since the 2010s to double the number of submarines operating in the area. Perth, alongside Guam and Hawaii, will be one of the pillars of the American submarine force in the Indo-Pacific. Strategically, the agreement helps forward-basing allied assets in the region, easing the logistical pressure put on the United States to operate and, if necessary, to wage war.
It is a reminder for Britain that the country is already in a new post-Brexit phase, even though it remains a recurrent topic in British politics. Beyond an apparent victory for the overused label of “Global Britain”, the British participation in the AUKUS agreement has the potential to strengthen Britain’s relative position in the Indo-Pacific through formal basing of submarines and access to naval facilities and the elevation of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) to a force capable of complementing activities of a stretched British submarine force. Not only Global Britain would have concrete results, but also the British “tilt” to the Indo-Pacific.
It is worth mentioning that Britain’s tilt to the Indo-Pacific had been ongoing since the mid-2010s, years before it became an official government policy and that AUKUS – at least from a British perspective – builds on previous defence agreements with Australia that allowed for the transfer of military technology between the two countries, mainly the 2013 Treaty for Defence and Security Cooperation.
In addition, for the British economy, particularly its defence industry, the AUKUS is a welcomed deal, even at the expense of partners in France. Demonstrating the quality of British submarines, the chosen future submarines for Australia are the SSN-AUKUS, initially British-designed but also incorporating American technology. Replacing the Astute-class of the Royal Navy and the Collins-class of the RAN, London and Canberra will operate similar vessels in the late 2030 and early 2040s. Britain has a central role beyond the hull design of SSN-AUKUS because strategic concerns led to Australia first approaching Britain for assistance in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines.
As the British position is one of close cooperation with the Americans since the 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement, Britain directly helped to negotiate the terms that resulted in the deal. Australia knew that its interests aligned with the British and that London had the influence to approach Washington cordially, which could result in the first share of nuclear propulsion in American history to a third party since 1958.
Although a country that has experienced a relative decline, the UK still gathers assets to avoid the role of a “second-rate European nation” with European-only interests. Much of the debate on stretching the country’s resources with the “Indo-Pacific tilt” – of which AUKUS is part – is the consequence of successive governments in London, influenced by the Treasury, presuming that the Defence of the Realm is obtainable on the cheap.
Depleting the budget of the British Armed Forces through short-sighted policies, with the 2010 Defence Review as one example, has left Britain with the necessity to spend more only to achieve the already cut capability levels seen in the early 2000s. As shown through AUKUS, the British Government can put some substance into Global Britain and the tilt to the Indo-Pacific. However, remains in London the lack of willingness to advance towards a long-term geostrategic approach that recognises the end of the post-Cold War “Peace Dividend”.
Rebuilding lost or reduced capabilities must occur domestically while strengthening trusted and reliable allies abroad. Britain is doing the latter through AUKUS but acts reluctantly in strengthening its own material capabilities. While Britain designs a new generation of submarines for the Royal Navy and the RAN, the debate about the fleet size of the British submarine emerged. Navy chiefs campaigning for an increase argue that seven attack submarines are below the requirements of the increasingly competitive and assertive international arena. The idea was – for the time being – rejected by Downing Street. In short, successive governments in London have the ambition to seek a role for Britain as one of the major powers internationally, which can be seen as a reasonable assumption for any country that is part of the top six largest economies in the world. However, going global demands a willingness to adequately support hard power, which is most respected by the main challengers to Britain’s position and security.
Beyond the specific and shared geostrategic benefits that its members might have when AUKUS reaches maturity in the 2030s and 2040s, the tripartite security initiative has attracted concerns and criticism. Above all, the topics raised since September 2021 concern nuclear proliferation. Through AUKUS, Australia will access the highly enriched uranium used on the Anglo-American SSN propulsion designs. Although the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty does not forbid non-nuclear-weapon states to produce highly enriched uranium for naval reactor fuel, the transfer and elevation of Australia as an operator of nuclear-powered submarines have been heavily criticised. Much of the criticism on the topic is due to the lack of international safeguards on nuclear materials used for naval military purposes. Australia will be exploring a loophole that allows nuclear material to be removed from the International Atomic Energy. Until the case of Australia, critics argue, the “loophole” within the Non-Proliferation Treaty was not a severe problem due to only Nuclear-Weapon-States (NWS) operating nuclear-powered submarines and exercising the right to remove from inspection nuclear material for military purposes.
Therefore, the argument goes, AUKUS established a precedent that other NWS might explore, transferring nuclear submarine technology and material to less-than-reliable countries. Consequently, through a political discourse citing the AUKUS precedent, others could facilitate the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Thus, the question is not only about Australia seeking the status of a Nuclear-Weapon-State but others using the loophole to have access to the material and technology.
Nevertheless, Australia is not the first NWS to seek a nuclear-powered submarine capability. For decades, Brazil has expressed varying degrees of interest in that possibility. Since 2008, the South American country has been developing its “Submarine Development Programme” (also known as “PROSUB”). Considerably less ambitious than AUKUS, PROSUB has a few characteristics in common with its Indo-Pacific or Anglospheric counterpart. Firstly, it involves the development of nuclear-powered submarines by a non-nuclear weapon state. Secondly, the programme involves a nuclear-armed state, in this case, France, assisting the country in the development process. It is worth noting that Brazil is not acquiring a French propulsion design but elaborating its own based on exchanges and experience acquired from French support.
Thirdly, Brazil and Australia will be exploiting the legal loophole of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Despite that, PROSUB has slipped under the radar of most criticism. This is the case, in part, because Brazil has reassured the international community that the reactor will use low-enriched uranium at 7% concentration and the minimum to make a nuclear weapon is 20%, although the Brazilian Navy cites the possibility of the level reaching around 15%. Therefore, Australia’s position is not unique, and AUKUS might be seen as just a step further than PROSUB.
Criticism is countered by the AUKUS leaders, who point out that when Australia, the UK, and the United States announced the initiative in 2021, the three members committed to their respective non-proliferation obligations. An additional list of commitments was laid out by AUKUS that includes the Australian commitment that it does not – and will not – seek nuclear weapons.
In March 2023, the White House issued a statement reaffirming that (1) Australia will not enrich uranium or reprocess fuel spent as part of AUKUS; (2) Australia will not produce nuclear fuel for its submarine fleet; (3) the UK and the United States aim to provide Australia with nuclear material “in complete, welded power units” that will not require refuelling during their operational lifetime; (4) nuclear material that Australia receives cannot be employed in nuclear weapons without additional chemical processing, and the country does not have and will not seek to build up such processing infrastructure; and (5) the programme will occur in line with Australia’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Washington also stated that all members maintained regular consultation with the IAEA throughout 2022, aiming to uphold the safeguards regime. Lastly, according to the United States briefing, “The Director General of the IAEA has reported to the IAEA Member States that he believes the AUKUS partners ‘are committed to ensuring the highest non-proliferation and safeguards standards are met,’ and noted his ‘satisfaction with the engagement and transparency shown by the three countries thus far.’”
Another criticism of the “quasi-alliance” is its apparent exclusivist nature. The UK, the United States, and Australia are unilaterally establishing a new vision for the Indo-Pacific. In other words, AUKUS might overshadow regional initiatives and establish a clear divide between the West and China for the decades to come. Concerning this topic, the American Government declared that the “door is open” to other partners, mentioning the desire for a future New Zealand membership. In the UK, a Parliamentary Committee argued for inviting Japan and Korea. Other possible members include Canada, which would further join the vision of AUKUS and the Five-Eyes as a unified “Anglosphere” stance in the region.
Within this context lies the critics derived from the AUKUS reverberations in Europe, mainly in France. Considering that France lost its €56 billion procurement for conventional submarines when Australia cancelled the deal and opted for a British design with American technology, the French Government considered the act “a stab in the back”. Paris recalled its ambassadors from Washington and Canberra while attempting to belittle London, stating that the ambassador in London was not recalled due to Britain’s small role in the affair, labelling the country as opportunistic and an accomplice of the other two. Despite that, cooperation with France proceeded through NATO and bilateral agreements. In June 2022, Australia agreed to pay €555 million to the French contractor as a settlement, paving the way for a normalised bilateral relationship.
In conclusion, the strategic driver of AUKUS is mainly the perceived need to reinforce a Western front against an increasingly revisionist China to secure its three members’ geopolitical interests. Although China remains Australia’s leading trading partner, it has become clear that it is willing to channel commercial dependence into political leverage. Within this context, it is possible to argue that China’s blunt outlining of its “14 Grievances” against Australia in 2020 was, from the point of view of Canberra, a glimpse of the behaviour that the Commonwealth member could expect in an Indo-Pacific under a Chinese sphere of influence. Thus, for Australia, AUKUS is the pathway to enhanced military capabilities while bringing the UK and the United States even closer to supporting Australian national security. It also tackles the recurring sense of isolation felt by successive Governments in Canberra, particularly in times of Great Power rivalry.
Concerning the United States, AUKUS is a tool to maintain an international order under American auspices. Countering China might also mean sustaining the status quo that has the United States on the top, followed by other G7 countries. Beyond that, AUKUS brings and possibly entangles two of Washington’s closest allies to the strategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific, easing the pressure on American assets deployed to the region.
For the UK, the tripartite initiative puts some substance into Global Britain and the maintenance of an open and rules-based international order. Moreover, through AUKUS, Britain continues the pursuit of the objective formulated in the 2021 Integrated Review to become “the European partner with the broadest, most integrated presence in support of mutually beneficial trade, shared security and values”. Becoming the leading European power in the Indo-Pacific means supplanting France’s position, which might be considered the main European actor in that region since the British Handover of Hong Kong in 1997. Achieving that position demands the desire of the British Government to invest in Britain’s defence capabilities and security and economic ties with regional partners.
Anglo-Australian security and defence cooperation already occurred through the Five Eyes, the Five Power Defence Arrangements, and bilateral agreements, and the AUKUS crowns Australia as a central long-term part of the British tilt to the region. Lastly, Britain’s participation means that the Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific are becoming strategically integrated within the considerations of British defence policy.
In other words, the regions East of Suez might no longer be detachable from the core interests of London in the Atlantic-Europe axis. Instead, despite the shortcomings of more than two decades of capability cuts, British policy is leaning towards binding the Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific as one, just like the United States.
Even though AUKUS does not aim to function as a “NATO of the Indo-Pacific”, Australia, the UK, and the United States might already have in practice a “quasi-alliance” in the region.
There is no Article V of the Indo-Pacific. Still, the level of entanglement of British, American, and Australian interests coupled with bilateral arrangements between the three actors leads to a geostrategic scenario that AUKUS does not only represent facets of the American pivot, Global Britain, and Australian search for renewed security, but a joint front of three different kinds of powers that seek similar objectives, sharing the same view of what kind of world order must prevail in the coming decades.
However, AUKUS offers Britain and Australia the notion that it is not a collective security system, alluding to the fact that – just as in the case of the British position on the Vietnam War – the Anglosphere in the Indo-Pacific is not binding but a quasi-alliance that accommodates its members for a relatively united position in a region that witness increased Great Power competition.
J. Vitor Tossini
Vitor is a doctoral student of International Relations at the Sao Paulo State University. He also explores British imperial and military history, and its legacies to the modern world.
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