Tuesday, February 27, 2024


The cause of Labour? Why Ireland should matter to the British Labour Movement



27th February 2024


“I have spent a great portion of my life alternating between interpreting Socialism to the Irish and interpreting the Irish to the Socialists. Of the two tasks, I confess, that while I am convinced that the former has been attended with a considerable degree of success, the latter has not.” 
James Connolly, 1913

By Joe Dwyer, Sinn Féin Political Organiser (Britain)

It is no exaggeration to say that Ireland has often proven to be a blind spot for the left in Britain. But arguably this is particularly true today. Besides some notable exceptions, Ireland is seldom found on the agenda at gatherings of the ‘British left’.

Very often, socialists in Britain will have a far greater awareness and knowledge of events in the Middle East, or Central Asia, or Latin America than they do for their nearest neighbour. A neighbour where the British State still maintains a presence.

Today, advocates for Irish unity face a two-fold challenge when appealing for solidarity from the British left. Chiefly, an older generation of activists who consider the cause of Ireland to be (by-and-large) resolved; partnered with a younger generation of activists who do not even consider ‘the cause of Ireland’ to be a live issue.

Both trends are understandable. For more seasoned comrades the attainment of the Good Friday Agreement, and the establishment of a political process in the North of Ireland, marked a comfortable endpoint. As a generation who had spent decades campaigning against miscarriages of justice, detentions without trial, strip-searching, Diplock courts, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, and allegations of British State collusion and shoot-to-kill; they could finally celebrate ‘a win’. The violence ended. Prisoners were released. The Army was off the streets and a democratic pathway forward was established.

For this generation, the politics of the North became gradually less pressing. Indeed, the politics of the North became more pedestrian and ‘normal’. And thankfully so.

Equally, as Ireland receded from the headlines, other international concerns and causes, understandably, took precedence. This new terrain produced the second trend. As this older generation disengaged from the politics of Ireland, a new generation of activists arose that has only ever known an Ireland at peace.

For these activists, the conflict in Ireland is a feature of history books and television shows. Gerry Adams is better known for his twitter account, than overdubbed media appearances. They are aware that there was violence. They know that it ended twenty-five years ago, during their childhood, with a peace agreement. But many understand it as a religious or sectarian conflict. The part of the British State as an active participant and instigator is rarely considered.

For younger comrades, the role played by Tony Blair, Alastair Campbell, and others, has led them to conclude that the Good Friday Agreement is not something to be endorsed. In many instances, they have not meaningfully engaged with the majority opinion of Irish republicanism in the North. Instead, in search for radical politics, they take a steer from unrepresentative groups that shout loudest online. Groups who repackage political obscurity as political purity.

Many make the mistake of assessing the Good Friday Agreement as a final settlement. When the agreement was never a settlement. It was always a process.

The 1998 Agreement is essentially a political apparatus for managing change within a contested space. It is a product of Britain’s inability to militarily defeat Irish republicanism. It provides agreed structures and mechanisms for navigating shifting sands.

Despite the document’s admitted shortcomings, it has afforded a new means of struggle and the advancement of Irish self-determination. It has reduced Britain’s territorial claim over the North of Ireland to a single hinge.

The Agreement has also compelled political unionism to accept fundamental changes. Changes that have entirely undermined the sectarian basis that underpinned the ‘Northern Ireland’ statelet. From mandatory coalition to parity of esteem, to all-Ireland institutions, and the equality agenda. To this day, we are seeing the ramifications of this new dispensation play-out before us.

The North, as it stands, is a long way from being “as British as Finchley.” It is a long way from being the Orange State that it once was. The North, like the rest of the island, is now a modern and outward-looking space. It is progressive and forward looking. It is removed from the ‘Little Englander’ mentality that has captured national politics in Britain.

In spite of this, on occasion we still hear voices from the British left, from certain quarters, suggesting that Irish nationalism is inherently reactionary. As ever, there is a chauvinist presumption that British socialists are better equipped to direct the struggle for a united Ireland than those that are actually conducting it.

Such analysis ignores the political reality that the antithesis of internationalism is not nationalism, but rather imperialism. The struggle for national liberation is inherently anti-imperialist. Advocates for Irish unification require no lectures on the perils of nationalism. They have lived with the consequences of imperialist British nationalism for centuries.

However, rather than pick over the past, as often happens when Ireland is discussed in Britain, we should examine the present and realistically look to the future.

Ireland, both North and South, has undergone momentous change over recent years and this process of change shows little sign of abating. The nature of such change is slow, and it is cautious. But the signposts for it are there for those paying attention.

Perhaps most notable sign is that Sinn Féin, a party that once occupied the political fringe, is now the largest party across the island. Sinn Féin is the leading party in the North and, once the Northern Assembly is restored, its Vice President, Michelle O’Neill, will become First Minister. An Irish republican First Minister in a statelet deliberately designed to prevent republicans from ever holding high-office.

Meanwhile, in the South, Sinn Féin is leading the opposition. It is routinely polling at a high of thirty per-cent in opinion polls. The party is widely tipped to lead the next government in Dublin, with its leader, Mary Lou McDonald, as the first woman Taoiseach.

Not too long ago all of this would have been considered pie-in-the-sky by most political pundits.

Sinn Féin is arguably the most successful left-wing party operating in Europe at present. A feat that’s even more impressive when one considers that the party is forced to organise across two jurisdictions.

And yet, how rarely does the British left, or the English left to be specific, ever consider Sinn Féin as a template or model for success? Recent electoral trends have demonstrably shown that there is no glass ceiling when it comes to Sinn Féin’s appeal.

In tandem with this growth in support for Sinn Féin, last year’s local elections in the North saw more people voting for avowedly pro-Irish unity parties than pro-union parties.

While the Alliance Party might not take a position on the constitutional question, Alliance voters overwhelmingly transferred their votes to pro-Irish unity parties.

Britain’s decision to exit the European Union has redefined parameters and presumptions surrounding the unity debate in the North. The topic of Irish unification is now routinely heard on the airwaves and in television studios. A plethora of books exploring the topic have been published in recent years. Demonstrating that there a growing market and appetite for such discussion.

Unity is now being considered in parts of the North where it would not have been countenanced before. A conversation is taking place, and it is a live conversation.

So, when Keir Starmer says that a referendum on Irish unity is “not even on the horizon” all he highlights is his own detachment and lack of engagement with the North. A generous reading would be that perhaps people just don’t see what they’re not looking for.

It is little surprise that the public discourse in Britain is so behind the curve. British commentary on politics in the North is littered with outdated cliches and stale analysis.

It is worth recalling that for many British commentators the 1998 Agreement almost appeared as if out of nowhere. Most had not been attentive enough to follow the subtle shifts and moves that had taken place from the late-1980s onwards.

Similarly, during the Brexit process, only once negotiations were well underway did many in the British establishment suddenly wake-up to the reality that the border in Ireland was the principal wedge. If they had paid any attention to the debate in Ireland during the referendum campaign, they might have been better prepared for what was to come.

Hemingway’s observation that things happen ‘slowly, then all at once’ rings true. No less so when it comes to constitutional change.

Those who advocate for a mature discussion on constitutional change between Britain and Ireland today, will ultimately be proven correct tomorrow. Just as those on the British left who first called for dialogue with Irish republicanism, from the early-1980s onwards, were subsequently vindicated by events.

People living in Britain who support the right of the Irish people to determine their own future cannot ignore the smoke signals on the horizon. Any future referendum will necessitate an appropriate response from Britain. It cannot be left for the campaign to be already upon us before such discussions begin. That is the lasting lesson of Brexit.

Consideration of constitutional arrangements have often been sidestepped within the broader British labour movement. Dismissed as a divisive distraction. But ultimately, it will prove far more divisive and disruptive if such matters are not appropriately aired.

It is understandable that there might be hesitancy, from certain quarters, about unsettling the unionist population of the North. But it should be noted that every significant step forward has only ever come about when a British Government moved political unionism further along than political unionism necessarily wanted to go.

So, there is a part to play in Britain. While the ultimate terms and nature of the debate will be shaped and led on the island of Ireland. There is a role for communicating, amplifying, and relaying the debate for a British ear.

While the final word on constitutional change will be exercised by the people of Ireland, North and South. Free from external interference. The people of Britain can assist in opening, encouraging, and platforming the discussion for audiences in Britain.

Without setting the terms of the debate or being proscriptive, it makes sense that British people share an interest in Ireland’s future once Britain has left. There is a pragmatism in exploring what Britain’s future relationship might be with a fully independent Ireland.

Proximity and history necessitate that a mutual interest should be taken.

In previous decades, the conflict made it virtually impossible for British society to reasonably discuss the ending of partition. But we’ve now enjoyed twenty-five years of relative peace and momentous gestures of goodwill between Ireland and Britain.

Those British Labour Party politicians who wish to avoid any mention of Irish unity must recognise the likelihood, in the not-too-distant future, of a Sinn Féin Taoiseach pulling up at 10 Downing Street and asking a Labour Prime Minister what preparation work is being done for navigating potential change.

If, as is expected following the next Westminster election, the British Labour Party does become the leading party of government; there needs to be a broad discussion, within the wider British labour and trade union movement, on the topic of constitutional change in Ireland.

As the largest party in Ireland, Sinn Féin speaks with an authoritative mandate on the issue. However, there are many opinions that should also be heard. No single party or group has a monopoly on the future.

Most British politicians like to pride themselves on their pragmatism. But yet, when it comes to Ireland, British politicians routinely fail to be pragmatic. The British left has the opportunity to stake out a pragmatic and mature case for Irish unification.

There is the potential to, once again, set a tone that others within the labour movement will later echo.

In 1916 James Connolly wrote, “The cause of labour is the cause of Ireland, the cause of Ireland is the cause of labour. They cannot be dissevered.” Well, contrary to some reports, the cause of Ireland hasn’t gone away. It still remains the cause of labour and it is past time that labour treated it as such.

Joe Dwyer is a political organiser for Sinn Féin (Britain). You can follow him on Twitter/X here.

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