Price of peace
Muhammad Amir Rana
PAKISTAN is not alone in confronting armed opposition. Many nations grapple with persistent violence, often resorting to force over peace negotiations. This hesitation stems from the fear of concessions, neglecting the heavy price paid for prolonged conflict.
Colombia offers a compelling example. In 2016, it opted for peace, establishing a ceasefire with major rebel groups — primarily factions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which has been active since 1964. Despite initial setbacks, Colombia recently enacted a Total Peace Bill to forge agreements with remaining armed groups.
Colombia’s peace process has been arduous, with the government determined to achieve an end to the conflict, even if it necessitates meeting some of the armed groups’ demands. This dilemma resonates with states facing insurgencies, who fear internationalising their conflicts. While Colombia’s UN involvement, prompted by resistance demands, ultimately aided negotiations, core issues like land reform, victim justice, and political participation remain unresolved.
The success stories of other peace processes offer valuable lessons. Notably, many successful agreements involved compromises across the table. In some cases, these have caused major amendments in social contracts of the states, the autonomy of a region, the separation of a territory, or agreement on resource distribution. The Good Friday Agreement in 1998 in Northern Ireland helped end the violent conflict known as ‘The Troubles’, leading to power-sharing in the Northern Ireland Assembly and disarmament of paramilitary groups.
Colombians took 50 years to assess the strength of the resistance movement.
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 ended the Second Sudanese Civil War, granted southern Sudan autonomy, and led to a referendum in 2011, after which South Sudan gained independence.
The Peace Accords (1996) in Guatemala ended 36 years of civil war, leading to the demobilisation and integration of guerrilla fighters into society, and significant political reforms. The Mindanao Peace Process (2014) in the Philippines and the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro established the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region, granting greater autonomy and addressing the grievances of the Moro people.
Finally, the Final Agreement (2016) between the Colombian government and the FARC was signed. The agreement ended over 50 years of armed conflict. These peace processes typically involved lengthy negotiations, international mediation, and the establishment of frameworks for disarmament, political integration, and socioeconomic development to address the root causes of the conflicts.
A multifaceted armed resistance stretched out for 50 years in Colombia because it had roots in socioeconomic factors, took time to pick momentum, and once it picked momentum, it became more lethal compared with movements triggered by religion and ideologies. A mix of socioeconomic, political, and ideological factors can nurture a separatist solid resistance against the states. The FARC emerged as a response to deep-rooted social and economic inequalities in rural Colombia. Vast land ownership disparities and peasant communities’ marginalisation provided fertile ground for the group’s initial support and recruitment.
Colombians took 50 years just to assess the strength of the resistance movement, which resulted in thousands of deaths, political instability, a poor economy, and a constant state of fear. Ungoverned and poorly governed spaces have always provided fertile ground for resistance movements, and Colombia was no different in this respect.
A similar situation was witnessed in the Federally Administrative Tribal Areas — now the Newly Merged Tribal Districts — where the state is still facing armed and unarmed resistance against its approach to governing these areas. The banned TTP wants to revoke the status of these areas to regain the strength it enjoyed before the military operations and under tribal arrangements.
Balochistan is facing the worst governance crisis; a hybrid governance system has failed to stop the power elites’ misuse of the province’s resources. It cannot deliver services to the people and needs help to conceive a development plan. The securitisation of the province fuels anger among the people, including those who have experienced urban life in other parts of the country.
A comparison between the Baloch and FARC armed resistance can be drawn as both movements are deeply rooted in socioeconomic disparities. Another common feature that creates a conducive environment for the armed resistance movement lies in the structure of the parallel economies in the areas, which include illicit trade, smuggling, drug trafficking, etc. Both state and non-state actors become the beneficiaries of this parallel economy. The resolution of the problem can hurt their economic benefits, and they resist any attempt at this.
In Colombia, the FARC survived so long because of parallel economic structures, which significantly funded its operations through the cultivation, production, and trafficking of cocaine. Kidnapping for ransom and extortion of local businesses and individuals were also significant sources of income for the FARC, further sustaining the resistance.
Two factors that the state emphasises are regional dynamics and external support for the armed resistance. These are essential factors, but to deal with armed resistance, it must concentrate on other aspects too. For instance, the state underestimates the armed group’s ability to adapt its tactics and strategy to changing circumstances, as well as the local support network it has built up over time.
There is nothing new about the dynamics of armed resistance — a vast amount of literature is available on the subject. However, the peace process is challenging. First, realising that the chain of violence cannot be broken without a dialogue takes time, as the state evaluates strength in terms of resources, and not in terms of the local support that is available to resistance movements. The ceasefire between the Colombian government and FARC dissidents has been mixed, with both positive outcomes and significant challenges. However, spoilers continue to provoke both the state and non-state actors, which causes violations of agreements and inconsistencies in the implementation of peace agreements, often extending the peace process.
While a good takeaway from the Colombian peace process is that it has not caused the country’s disintegration, it is also true that had the peace process been started 40 years ago, the results would not have been very different. The state took 50 years just to prove it is strong, but real strength comes through dialogue.
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn, June 9th, 2024
Muhammad Amir Rana
Published June 9, 2024
DAWN
PAKISTAN is not alone in confronting armed opposition. Many nations grapple with persistent violence, often resorting to force over peace negotiations. This hesitation stems from the fear of concessions, neglecting the heavy price paid for prolonged conflict.
Colombia offers a compelling example. In 2016, it opted for peace, establishing a ceasefire with major rebel groups — primarily factions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which has been active since 1964. Despite initial setbacks, Colombia recently enacted a Total Peace Bill to forge agreements with remaining armed groups.
Colombia’s peace process has been arduous, with the government determined to achieve an end to the conflict, even if it necessitates meeting some of the armed groups’ demands. This dilemma resonates with states facing insurgencies, who fear internationalising their conflicts. While Colombia’s UN involvement, prompted by resistance demands, ultimately aided negotiations, core issues like land reform, victim justice, and political participation remain unresolved.
The success stories of other peace processes offer valuable lessons. Notably, many successful agreements involved compromises across the table. In some cases, these have caused major amendments in social contracts of the states, the autonomy of a region, the separation of a territory, or agreement on resource distribution. The Good Friday Agreement in 1998 in Northern Ireland helped end the violent conflict known as ‘The Troubles’, leading to power-sharing in the Northern Ireland Assembly and disarmament of paramilitary groups.
Colombians took 50 years to assess the strength of the resistance movement.
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 ended the Second Sudanese Civil War, granted southern Sudan autonomy, and led to a referendum in 2011, after which South Sudan gained independence.
The Peace Accords (1996) in Guatemala ended 36 years of civil war, leading to the demobilisation and integration of guerrilla fighters into society, and significant political reforms. The Mindanao Peace Process (2014) in the Philippines and the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro established the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region, granting greater autonomy and addressing the grievances of the Moro people.
Finally, the Final Agreement (2016) between the Colombian government and the FARC was signed. The agreement ended over 50 years of armed conflict. These peace processes typically involved lengthy negotiations, international mediation, and the establishment of frameworks for disarmament, political integration, and socioeconomic development to address the root causes of the conflicts.
A multifaceted armed resistance stretched out for 50 years in Colombia because it had roots in socioeconomic factors, took time to pick momentum, and once it picked momentum, it became more lethal compared with movements triggered by religion and ideologies. A mix of socioeconomic, political, and ideological factors can nurture a separatist solid resistance against the states. The FARC emerged as a response to deep-rooted social and economic inequalities in rural Colombia. Vast land ownership disparities and peasant communities’ marginalisation provided fertile ground for the group’s initial support and recruitment.
Colombians took 50 years just to assess the strength of the resistance movement, which resulted in thousands of deaths, political instability, a poor economy, and a constant state of fear. Ungoverned and poorly governed spaces have always provided fertile ground for resistance movements, and Colombia was no different in this respect.
A similar situation was witnessed in the Federally Administrative Tribal Areas — now the Newly Merged Tribal Districts — where the state is still facing armed and unarmed resistance against its approach to governing these areas. The banned TTP wants to revoke the status of these areas to regain the strength it enjoyed before the military operations and under tribal arrangements.
Balochistan is facing the worst governance crisis; a hybrid governance system has failed to stop the power elites’ misuse of the province’s resources. It cannot deliver services to the people and needs help to conceive a development plan. The securitisation of the province fuels anger among the people, including those who have experienced urban life in other parts of the country.
A comparison between the Baloch and FARC armed resistance can be drawn as both movements are deeply rooted in socioeconomic disparities. Another common feature that creates a conducive environment for the armed resistance movement lies in the structure of the parallel economies in the areas, which include illicit trade, smuggling, drug trafficking, etc. Both state and non-state actors become the beneficiaries of this parallel economy. The resolution of the problem can hurt their economic benefits, and they resist any attempt at this.
In Colombia, the FARC survived so long because of parallel economic structures, which significantly funded its operations through the cultivation, production, and trafficking of cocaine. Kidnapping for ransom and extortion of local businesses and individuals were also significant sources of income for the FARC, further sustaining the resistance.
Two factors that the state emphasises are regional dynamics and external support for the armed resistance. These are essential factors, but to deal with armed resistance, it must concentrate on other aspects too. For instance, the state underestimates the armed group’s ability to adapt its tactics and strategy to changing circumstances, as well as the local support network it has built up over time.
There is nothing new about the dynamics of armed resistance — a vast amount of literature is available on the subject. However, the peace process is challenging. First, realising that the chain of violence cannot be broken without a dialogue takes time, as the state evaluates strength in terms of resources, and not in terms of the local support that is available to resistance movements. The ceasefire between the Colombian government and FARC dissidents has been mixed, with both positive outcomes and significant challenges. However, spoilers continue to provoke both the state and non-state actors, which causes violations of agreements and inconsistencies in the implementation of peace agreements, often extending the peace process.
While a good takeaway from the Colombian peace process is that it has not caused the country’s disintegration, it is also true that had the peace process been started 40 years ago, the results would not have been very different. The state took 50 years just to prove it is strong, but real strength comes through dialogue.
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn, June 9th, 2024
Chinese advice
Muhammad Amir Rana
PAKISTAN’S law-enforcement agencies have completed the investigation of the Dasu terrorist attack carried out against Chinese nationals in March, in record time.
This is, indeed, a remarkable achievement, but it does not seem to have impressed the Chinese authorities very much, as there have been reports that Beijing wants a large-scale anti-terrorism operation, like Zarb-i-Azb, against the militants.
On March 26, a convoy of Chinese nationals travelling from Islamabad to the Dasu Hydropower Project site in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Kohistan district was attacked by Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) terrorists. The government announced compensation of $2.5 million for the families of the five Chinese nationals who lost their lives in the attack. A joint investigation team comprising police and intelligence agencies’ personnel was immediately formed to address Chinese concerns regarding the capability of Pakistani law enforcers to probe a high-profile terrorist attack.
The reports of China’s demand for a massive counterterrorism operation are reflective of Beijing’s concerns over the escalating threats to Chinese nationals working on CPEC-related and other projects in this country. Pakistan has a history of launching such counterterrorism operations at the request of China. The Lal Masjid operation in Islamabad in 2007 was launched after Chinese President Hu Jintao called Gen Musharraf. Prior to the operation, women students of the Jamia Hafsa madressah had kidnapped Chinese health workers who they believed were commercial sex workers.
One can take precautionary steps against terrorist groups, but what about intolerance?
International pressure, including from the Chinese, also worked in 2014 when the Pakistan military launched Operation Zarb-i-Azb in North Waziristan. China fully supported the Financial Action Task Force’s recommendation that Pakistan comply with its counterterrorism financing and anti-money laundering commitments. The maximum favour the Chinese officials extended to Pakistan in this case was to support the country’s need for more time to fulfil the financial watchdog’s requirements.
However, China’s latest demand regarding a large-scale operation does not seem feasible, as the TTP and its affiliates are hiding in Afghanistan, and cross-border operations would trigger a major conflict in the region. Moreover, there is also the Baloch insurgency, which is a complex issue that needs to be handled delicately. There is already an ongoing encounter between the insurgents and security forces in Balochistan. Any misadventure is likely to incur heavy political and security costs.
Pakistan’s economy is in the throes of a deep crisis, and a massive military operation would entail its own costs. At the same time, it seems that the Pakistani leadership is underestimating the demands of its friends for a fully secure environment for their investment. This is not only about China, a major investor in Pakistan, but also other friends of the country, such as Saudi Arabia, which have concerns similar to Beijing’s when it comes to putting their money here. These states are taking security concerns very seriously.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman recently approved a cooperation agreement between the Presidency of State Security in the kingdom and the military intelligence in Pakistan to combat terrorism and its financing. The Pakistani leadership appears overly confident in its assessment that the security challenges at home can be mitigated as before; it wants the states that are looking at investment prospects in the country to trust its capabilities. However, terrorist incidents such as the Dasu attack will only shake the confidence of foreign investors.
No doubt, the Taliban’s Afghanistan has emerged as a major security challenge for the country, but terrorism and extremism have a long history of state institutions using them as tools for political and strategic purposes. One can be aware of the dynamics of terrorist groups and take precautions, but what about intolerance, which can erupt suddenly and result in the lynching of innocent people?
The state has fanned the flames of intolerance in society, and this has eroded the social fabric and made conditions insecure for the minorities and for those who think differently from the state. Intolerance has become a huge hurdle in the way of economic progress, including foreign investment. How will the Chinese forget the incident last year when one of their nationals barely escaped lynching by a mob at the Dasu Hydropower Project site? The Chinese official was simply asking employees to complete their work before going for prayers.
Security firms dealing in risk assessment most often cite the killing of Priyantha Kumara Diyawadana, a Sri Lankan national lynched by a mob on Dec 3, 2021, in Sialkot, to show who controls the environment for investment.
If you were to ask a Pakistani official or leader, they would claim that Pakistanis are moderate in their views and the most tolerant society among Muslim nations. Such a claim was recently made in Beijing. Lynching incidents are dismissed as the actions of a few misguided and emotional youths.
However, defending the indefensible causes more damage and shakes even friendly countries’ confidence in one’s ability to maintain security. The truth is that Pakistan’s social indicators are amongst the poorest anywhere. A major reason for this is substandard education and an extensive network of religious institutions that nurture extremism and intolerance in the country. The establishment has not stopped considering the political utility of religious institutions either.
Extremism and intolerance are thriving with state support, as the power elites are not willing to review their connection with the clergy. Making policies to counter extremism and terrorism satisfies their conscience, and they believe that by simply placing policy drafts in the cupboards of the relevant ministries, they will automatically solve the issue. The maximum effort by the state to solve the problem has been to create institutions to counter extremism. Eventually, these institutions are used to appease the clergy.
China goes by its own model to forcefully ‘harmonise’ its ethnic and religious communities. However, for Pakistan, the first and foremost priority must be to abandon its approach of pacifying the sentiments of the hardliners, and instead, stand with the weak and the victims, regardless of their religion or community.
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn, June 2nd, 2024
Muhammad Amir Rana
PAKISTAN’S law-enforcement agencies have completed the investigation of the Dasu terrorist attack carried out against Chinese nationals in March, in record time.
This is, indeed, a remarkable achievement, but it does not seem to have impressed the Chinese authorities very much, as there have been reports that Beijing wants a large-scale anti-terrorism operation, like Zarb-i-Azb, against the militants.
On March 26, a convoy of Chinese nationals travelling from Islamabad to the Dasu Hydropower Project site in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Kohistan district was attacked by Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) terrorists. The government announced compensation of $2.5 million for the families of the five Chinese nationals who lost their lives in the attack. A joint investigation team comprising police and intelligence agencies’ personnel was immediately formed to address Chinese concerns regarding the capability of Pakistani law enforcers to probe a high-profile terrorist attack.
The reports of China’s demand for a massive counterterrorism operation are reflective of Beijing’s concerns over the escalating threats to Chinese nationals working on CPEC-related and other projects in this country. Pakistan has a history of launching such counterterrorism operations at the request of China. The Lal Masjid operation in Islamabad in 2007 was launched after Chinese President Hu Jintao called Gen Musharraf. Prior to the operation, women students of the Jamia Hafsa madressah had kidnapped Chinese health workers who they believed were commercial sex workers.
One can take precautionary steps against terrorist groups, but what about intolerance?
International pressure, including from the Chinese, also worked in 2014 when the Pakistan military launched Operation Zarb-i-Azb in North Waziristan. China fully supported the Financial Action Task Force’s recommendation that Pakistan comply with its counterterrorism financing and anti-money laundering commitments. The maximum favour the Chinese officials extended to Pakistan in this case was to support the country’s need for more time to fulfil the financial watchdog’s requirements.
However, China’s latest demand regarding a large-scale operation does not seem feasible, as the TTP and its affiliates are hiding in Afghanistan, and cross-border operations would trigger a major conflict in the region. Moreover, there is also the Baloch insurgency, which is a complex issue that needs to be handled delicately. There is already an ongoing encounter between the insurgents and security forces in Balochistan. Any misadventure is likely to incur heavy political and security costs.
Pakistan’s economy is in the throes of a deep crisis, and a massive military operation would entail its own costs. At the same time, it seems that the Pakistani leadership is underestimating the demands of its friends for a fully secure environment for their investment. This is not only about China, a major investor in Pakistan, but also other friends of the country, such as Saudi Arabia, which have concerns similar to Beijing’s when it comes to putting their money here. These states are taking security concerns very seriously.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman recently approved a cooperation agreement between the Presidency of State Security in the kingdom and the military intelligence in Pakistan to combat terrorism and its financing. The Pakistani leadership appears overly confident in its assessment that the security challenges at home can be mitigated as before; it wants the states that are looking at investment prospects in the country to trust its capabilities. However, terrorist incidents such as the Dasu attack will only shake the confidence of foreign investors.
No doubt, the Taliban’s Afghanistan has emerged as a major security challenge for the country, but terrorism and extremism have a long history of state institutions using them as tools for political and strategic purposes. One can be aware of the dynamics of terrorist groups and take precautions, but what about intolerance, which can erupt suddenly and result in the lynching of innocent people?
The state has fanned the flames of intolerance in society, and this has eroded the social fabric and made conditions insecure for the minorities and for those who think differently from the state. Intolerance has become a huge hurdle in the way of economic progress, including foreign investment. How will the Chinese forget the incident last year when one of their nationals barely escaped lynching by a mob at the Dasu Hydropower Project site? The Chinese official was simply asking employees to complete their work before going for prayers.
Security firms dealing in risk assessment most often cite the killing of Priyantha Kumara Diyawadana, a Sri Lankan national lynched by a mob on Dec 3, 2021, in Sialkot, to show who controls the environment for investment.
If you were to ask a Pakistani official or leader, they would claim that Pakistanis are moderate in their views and the most tolerant society among Muslim nations. Such a claim was recently made in Beijing. Lynching incidents are dismissed as the actions of a few misguided and emotional youths.
However, defending the indefensible causes more damage and shakes even friendly countries’ confidence in one’s ability to maintain security. The truth is that Pakistan’s social indicators are amongst the poorest anywhere. A major reason for this is substandard education and an extensive network of religious institutions that nurture extremism and intolerance in the country. The establishment has not stopped considering the political utility of religious institutions either.
Extremism and intolerance are thriving with state support, as the power elites are not willing to review their connection with the clergy. Making policies to counter extremism and terrorism satisfies their conscience, and they believe that by simply placing policy drafts in the cupboards of the relevant ministries, they will automatically solve the issue. The maximum effort by the state to solve the problem has been to create institutions to counter extremism. Eventually, these institutions are used to appease the clergy.
China goes by its own model to forcefully ‘harmonise’ its ethnic and religious communities. However, for Pakistan, the first and foremost priority must be to abandon its approach of pacifying the sentiments of the hardliners, and instead, stand with the weak and the victims, regardless of their religion or community.
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn, June 2nd, 2024
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