Central Asian countries, which have a rather limited historical experience of independent statehood, find themselves in a difficult geopolitical situation.
ByGeorgi Asatrian
August 11, 2024
MODERN DIPLOMACY
Central Asian countries, which have a rather limited historical experience of independent statehood, find themselves in a difficult geopolitical situation. It is worth noting that some republics have demonstrated excellent abilities to build states and nations. At least some republics, such as Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan, demonstrate very good economic growth rates, demographic development and political stability. Yes, this development lies more in the plane of authoritarian governance, but this is the method that is most characteristic of this region. As we know from the classics of political science authored by Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, political order is primary.
Historically linked to Russia and geographically close to China and South Asia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan have maintained balanced interactions with external players since gaining independence. While remaining under Russian political influence in some respects, the Central Asian republics also intensified economic interaction with China and sought Western investment. At the same time, communication with Afghanistan by South Asian countries and Iran was very limited. Although modern Central Asia is geographically close to the region, in many respects it still remains distant from the subcontinent.
The situation began to change after 2021. The reincarnation of the Islamic Emirate and the return of the Taliban to power transformed the geopolitical and economic situation in the region. Active processes of regionalization have begun. The US withdrawal from the region led to the activation of regional players who felt the opportunity to strengthen their positions. At the same time, faced with an acute financial crisis, sanctions, freezing of sovereign funds, lack of foreign aid, and water shortages, the Taliban became concerned about stability. Realizing a qualitatively different state of affairs and their responsibility, the Taliban began to look for new partners and ways out of political isolation and the economic crisis.
China became the first major state to grant the Taliban regime some semblance of partial diplomatic recognition. In February 2024, the ambassador of the unrecognized Islamic Emirate was received at a high level in Beijing. By and large, the Taliban regime has not yet been officially recognized by anyone, but this does not stop major players from contacting the new leadership of Afghanistan. Russia, despite the lack of official recognition, also hosted Taliban delegations to discuss regional threats and potential areas of interaction. And Russia is walking a cautious line between cooperating with the fundamentalist Taliban regime and containing radical Islamist movements on its territories.
Although the Taliban are receptive to Chinese investment, the movement’s leadership is still wary of its expansionism. In general, the Taliban are suspicious and wary of the Chinese. The Taliban’s desire to accept Beijing’s financial investments is obvious, but at the same time, the Afghans do not like the Chinese desire to exert political pressure. An even more difficult situation after the Taliban victory paradoxically arose with the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Islamabad, being the main sponsor, mentor, and creator of the Pashtun student movement, supported the Taliban throughout the entire time. American officials, who have been waging war against the Taliban for nearly a quarter century, have repeatedly noted the Pakistani military’s support for Afghan anti-government forces. It is worth remembering only the fact that, according to the official version, the leader of Al Qaeda was killed on Pakistani territory, not far from a military base. In addition, the Pakistani military and its intelligence agency ISI supported other radical Islamist groups, in particular the Haqqani Network. Moreover, after the victory of the Taliban, relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan began to deteriorate. Afghans do not trust the Pakistanis and seek to reduce their political and economic influence. In late 2023, Pakistan increased pressure on the Taliban to root out the terrorist organization Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, a Pakistan-aligned splinter group that the Afghan Taliban are keen to make politically legitimate. In addition, unstable relations between Iran and Pakistan prevent them from coordinating cooperation with Afghanistan.
At the same time, the Central Asian states bordering Afghanistan are looking for additional opportunities to establish constructive interaction with the Taliban not only in the security sphere but also in other areas. Thus, the lack of diplomatic recognition from Uzbekistan did not prevent the countries from increasing trade volumes. The uneasy relationship between Tajikistan and the Taliban is exacerbated by factors such as organized crime, drug smuggling, and attempted illegal border crossings.
Emomali Rahmon’s government regularly cites the ongoing threat from Taliban militants. In January 2024, Afghan Defense Minister Mohammad Yaqub made a harsh statement about the killing and arrests of dozens of ethnic Tajiks and Pakistanis by Taliban forces as alleged accomplices in smuggling. The Taliban leadership accuses Dushanbe of allegedly invading Tajik intelligence agencies in border areas, challenging the current Afghan regime, but there is no factual confirmation of this. During the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) meeting in 2023, the Taliban rejected the Tajik government’s proposal to create a security belt around Afghanistan. Thus, stabilizing Tajik-Afghan relations is perhaps the biggest challenge to increasing engagement with Afghanistan through the Central Asian region.
Thus, the geopolitical situation in Central and South Asia is developing very actively. Some Central Asian countries will seek to deepen relations with the Taliban. These contacts will be based on economic cooperation and security issues. The Taliban and Pakistan will never be able to reach an agreement. Relations between the two countries will remain tense and conflictual. The political influence of the Pakistani military on various clans and factions of the Taliban will decrease.
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