Wednesday, August 07, 2024

How Will Israel’s Recent Assassinations Affect War in Gaza?

Netanyahu will undoubtedly claim the killings show victory is still achievable in Gaza. But is that true?



August 6, 2024
Source: Open Democracy

Image Creative Commons 4.0

A move by Israeli police units to enter the Sde Teiman army base to investigate ten reservists on suspicion of torturing a Palestinian prisoner sparked fury among those on Israel’s far right last week.

Many felt that even investigating the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) was utterly unacceptable, and a substantial number of protesters tried to occupy the base.

By coincidence, the next day the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights published the results of its investigation into reports of abuse of thousands of Palestinian prisoners detained by Israel.

Commissioner Volker Türk said: “The testimonies gathered by my office and other entities indicate a range of appalling acts, such as waterboarding and the release of dogs on detainees, amongst other acts, in flagrant violation of international human rights law and international humanitarian law.”

This will come as no surprise to many – Palestinian sources have long said torture, abuse and sexual assault are rife in Israeli prisons and other detention centres, especially since Hamas’ 7 October attacks on Israel.

Yet across Israel’s political spectrum, many take the view that the IDF should be left to do what it believes necessary; an attitude reminiscent of many Americans’ defence of US troops’ post-9/11 behaviour in Iraq, Afghanistan and at the so-called ‘black sites’ used by the CIA to detain enemy combatants across the world.

Given Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu leads an unstable coalition that depends on two far-right parties for its survival, support for the IDF will remain a priority for his government. It is at least partly in this context that Israel’s three recent assassinations should be seen.

Fuad Shukr, who was killed in an Israeli airstrike on Beirut on 30 July, was the least prominent of the three but was still an important figure within Hezbollah in Lebanon. Commander Shukr had more than 40 years of experience fighting against Israel, and had been accused by the US of being heavily involved in the bomb attack that killed 241 Marines during their attempted stabilisation deployment in the Lebanese capital back in 1983.

More significant still was the death of Hamas paramilitary commander Mohammed Deif in Gaza on 13 July. From an Israeli perspective, thought, most significant of all was the death of Hamas’s prominent political leader, Ismail Haniyeh, who was killed in Tehran on 31 July, where he was attending the inauguration of Iran’s new president.

Haniyeh was regarded by Qatari and Egyptian mediators as a key person in any negotiations towards even a short pause in the fighting. By killing him, Netanyahu has done much to ensure the war continues.

The Israeli prime minister will undoubtedly tell his domestic critics that all three assassinations show that his aim of overall victory in Gaza is still achievable. But is that accurate?

The deaths of Haniyeh and Deif will certainly damage Hamas in the short term, but past experience with Hamas and other Palestinian paramilitary movements shows that such killings are usually expected and planned for; any disruption will likely be short-term.

Of greater concern for Hamas leaders will be the death toll among paramilitaries. While they have not said how many fighters have been killed, it is likely to be at least in the low thousands, given the Palestinian health authorities have reported 39,000 casualties in Gaza (most of whom are civilians).

Yet after nearly ten months of war, thousands more paramilitaries will now be highly experienced in urban combat. They, in turn, will be encouraging others to join, many of them young men who have seen family and friends killed since last October.

There is also abundant evidence that Palestinians remain remarkably resilient, not least across the occupied West Bank, where Hamas retains much of its support, according to a poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in June. The alleged torture of the man at the Sde Teiman base is just one small example of the Palestinian experience – yet resistance remains, no doubt much enhanced by the support Palestinians are getting across much of the world.

But even more relevant for Netanyahu’s war aims are the sudden political developments in the United States. Less than a fortnight ago, he could look forward to the US presidential election in November with reasonable confidence. Donald Trump seemed the likely winner, which was likely to benefit Netanyahu, especially with the support of tens of millions of pro-Israeli evangelical Christians.

In the unlikely event that Joe Biden had won, his half-century of personal support for Israel might well have been enough to safeguard US support for Israel for at least a few months more, even with the antagonism to Netanyahu among many Democrats.

Instead, Biden has gone, and Kamala Harris has come in as the likely Democratic hopeful with a veritable avalanche of support that already appears to have created some movement away from a surefire Republican victory, according to recent opinion polls.

Harris’ attitude to Gaza is far from certain but two things are clear, her team is far more cognisant of the mood among Democrats and she does not have Biden’s personal commitment to Israel.

The chances of a lasting ceasefire in Gaza before November are minimal but after that, it will depend very much on who is in the White House. That is most likely Netanyahu’s primary concern and will remain so for the next three months.

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