India ‘over-invested in Hasina and under-invested in Bangladesh’ – and is now panicking
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Bangladesh’s Sheikh Hasina long ignored the democratic backsliding in each other’s countries to forge close ties. With Hasina ousted from power, India’s warnings over the safety of Bangladesh’s Hindu minority smacks of hypocrisy.
By: Leela JACINTO
Issued on: 15/08/2024 -
When Agontuk*, a 21-year-old architecture student in Dhaka, first saw the social media posts of attacks against Bangladesh’s Hindu minority community, his immediate response was to check on a building in his neighbourhood of the Bangladeshi capital that has mostly Hindu residents.
Agontuk had joined the student movement that drove out Sheikh Hasina, Bangladesh’s longest-serving prime minister. But following a brutal crackdown that killed more than 300 people, the young student avoided street protests. Instead he joined a team of student volunteers using their tech skills to dodge the online surveillance and overcome internet blackouts to get international media attention for their cause.
Targeting Bangladeshi Hindus was never the message nor the intent of the student movement, noted Agontuk. And the allegations of “pogroms” – some even claimed a “genocide” – against the minority community were alarming.
“I was surprised because the people of our country, we live in harmony. We don't want any chaos or anarchy between us. As soon as we heard the reports, we tried to figure out if they were authentic or not,” said the architecture student in a phone interview from the Bangladeshi capital.
Hours after Hasina’s ouster on August 5, when Agontuk checked in on the Hindu residential building in Dhaka’s Nobinbag neighbourhood, everything was mercifully quiet. “There had not been a single attack in the area,” he recounted. “Over the next few days, I was monitoring that place, I spoke to residents and to shopkeepers in the area, everything was okay.”
As reports of attacks on Hindu temples and businesses circulated, largely on social media sites and on mainstream Indian TV channels, Agontuk kept in touch with his friends and contacts across the city and country. “I get to communicate with them every day. They have also said that they are trying to monitor the temples in their areas and they have told me there have been no violations,” he said.
Shortly after Hasina fled to India, celebrations descended into mob violence as rioters targeted members of her Awami League party as well as symbols of her family’s political legacy, including statues and a museum dedicated Hasina’s father, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman.
Hindus, Muslim-majority Bangladesh’s largest religious minority, comprise around 8% of the country’s nearly 170 million population. They have traditionally supported the Awami League, putting them in the crosshairs of rioters.
In the week after Hasina’s ouster, there have been at least 200 attacks against Hindus and other religious minorities across the country, according to the Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council, a minority rights group.
But the exact figures and motivations for the deadly violence have been hard to ascertain. The police, loathed by the students for spearheading the crackdown on protesters, had also sustained casualties in their ranks and went on a weeklong strike after Hasina fled.
In the chaotic days that followed, rumours and online misinformation turbocharged minority fears. Social media added to the confusion, especially after fact-checkers found several posts circulating old images and unsubstantiated claims, with much of the fake news traced to bots and trolls from neighbouring India.
Religion – an old fault line on the Indian subcontinent and the cause of the bloody dissection of colonial British India into modern South Asian nation states – had reared its head again.
But between the very real fears of Bangladeshi Hindus and the flood of misinformation emanating from Hindu-majority Indialies a diplomatic hustle for power, influence, resources and access.
The fall of Hasina has put the spotlight on a ruthless geopolitical game in South Asia that the international community was content to overlook, but must now address since the Bangladeshi uprising, dubbed the “Gen Z revolution”, has shuffled the diplomatic deck.
‘Monsoon revolution’ for all
The gravity of the social unrest was immediately grasped by Muhammad Yunus, a Nobel Laureate who accepted the post of chief adviser in a transitional government until elections are held.
Shortly after landing in Dhaka from Paris, where he was attending the Olympic Games, Yunus told reporters that the restoration of order was his top priority.
On Monday, Yunus met with Hindu community members at the Dhakeshwari National Temple, the country’s largest Hindu shrine, where he called for patience and assistance in his government’s bid to ensure equal rights and protections for all Bangladeshi citizens.
Many Bangladeshi students and civil society members have been doing their bit to maintain order and protect minority rights. Social media sites, such as Instagram, are crammed with photographs of students protecting temples across Bangladesh.
Shafqat Munir, senior fellow at the Dhaka-based Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies, believes inclusivity and plurality are important principles as Bangladesh navigates a post-Hasina era.
“First of all, we have had some unfortunate attacks on minority groups and people, but I must flag that there is an awful lot of disinformation out there,” he noted. “I want to say that for Bangladesh, for the people of Bangladesh, even one incident is too many. This revolution, which I term the Monsoon Revolution, is a revolution for all Bangladeshis, irrespective of whatever faiths they profess. So it is absolutely critical for us to ensure that no particular group or no particular individual is targeted for his or her faith. That's very important.”
Hasina vs. a ‘destabilised, Islamist Bangladesh’
But across Bangladesh’s 4,000-kilometre border with India, many news anchors, editors and commentators are not convinced by the reassurances.
Mainstream Indian news outlets, which often serve as mouthpieces for Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Hindu nationalist government, have been focused on a Bangladeshi Islamist party. “What is Jamaat-e-Islami? The Pakistan-backed political party that brought down Sheikh Hasina’s govt,” read one headline. “Jamaat may take control in Bangladesh,” read another, quoting a senior member of Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).
The Jamaat--Islami has never won a parliamentary majority in Bangladesh’s 53-year history, but it has periodically allied with the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Jamaat, as the party is widely known, was banned on August 1, when Hasina blamed the two opposition parties for the deaths during the anti-quota protests.
The BNP and Jamaat deny responsibility for the lethal violence in the lead-up to Hasina’s ouster. On Tuesday, a Bangladeshi court opened a murder investigation into Hasina and six figures in her administration over the killing of a man during the civil unrest.
Bangladeshi student leaders have repeatedly told reporters that they were seeking fundamental change. Many voiced distrust of the country’s mainstream political parties, including the Awami League, BNP and Jamaat.
Their decision to ask Yunus, a respected economist, to lead an interim administration reflected their desire for a break from a political past dominated either by the Awami League or the BNP.
But their message has failed to reassure Indian commentators. “I think that many Indians have bought into the narrative that Hasina and the Awami League had long put out, that Hasina was really the only thing standing between a secular, moderate Bangladesh and a Bangladesh destabilised by Islamist forces,” explained Michael Kugelman, director of the South Asia Institute at the Washington DC-based Wilson Center.
All eggs in the Hasina basket
Hasina’s domestic fall from grace was years in the making. While protests against a controversial government quota system provided the catalyst for her exit, public discontent had increased after Bangladesh’s “Iron Lady” won her fourth consecutive term in the January 7 elections.
The US State Department characterised the parliamentary elections as “not free or fair”. But regional rivals India and China rushed to congratulate the 76-year-old incumbent yet again.
The Indian prime minister’s praise for Hasina’s victory was particularly fulsome. Ignoring the reams of think-tank reports on a “banned and boycotted” election, Modi congratulated the Bangladeshi prime minister – and people.
“I also congratulate the people of Bangladesh for the successful conduct of elections. We are committed to further strengthen our enduring and people-centric partnership with Bangladesh,” Modi said in a post on X.
The rhetoric was far removed from reality. “India over-invested in Hasina and under-invested in Bangladesh,” explained Salil Tripathi, author of the book, The Colonel Who Would Not Repent: The Bangladesh War and Its Unquiet Legacy.
“So New Delhi put all its eggs in one basket, and that, geostrategically, does not seem like a very smart thing to do at all,” said Tripathi.
Managing the China-India diplomatic dance
Hasina, on the other hand, managed to whip up a foreign policy omelette that was palatable enough in regional capitals, according to Kugelman.
“Say what you will about Sheikh Hasina, but I actually think she did a pretty good job balancing Bangladesh's relations with regional powers. She had a special relationship with India, but she also increased economic and defence ties with China in a big way,” said Kugelman.
In March 2023, Hasina inaugurated a $1.21 billion China-built submarine based at Bangladesh’s Cox Bazaar off the Bay of Bengal coast. It was a crown in what the Washington, DC-based Center for Strategic and International Studies calls China’s “submarine diplomacy”.
But managing the China-India diplomatic dance also takes finesse, and after 14 years of nearly absolute power in Bangladesh, Hasina appeared to be losing her footing.
Her visit to China last month was a washout, according to gleeful Indian media reports. Beijing had failed to extend Hasina the requisite diplomatic niceties and, more importantly, appeared non-committal about a water management project on the Teesta River.
Hasina cut short her China visit and returned home to tell reporters she favoured the Indian bid for the Teesta water project.
‘Selling’ Bangladesh
New Delhi and Dhaka have long enjoyed good relations born out of historic ties. Bangladesh was formerly East Pakistan, becoming a part of Pakistan in 1947, when British India was divided into Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan.
Bangladesh was founded in 1971 after it won a war of independence against Pakistan with the help of an Indian military intervention.
Since the 1970s, India could rely on tiny, impoverished Bangladesh as New Delhi fixated on Pakistan and China, waging wars and engaging in border skirmishes with her two neighbours.
With linguistic ties linking Bangladesh and the Indian state of West Bengal, India enjoyed a considerable soft power advantage with its eastern neighbour.
But things got complicated after Modi’s Hindu nationalist BJP party came to power in 2014.
In 2019, the Modi government passed controversial citizenship laws that were criticised as anti-Muslim. The BJP’s strident anti-migrant rhetoric sees hardline party members often railing against Muslim “infiltrators” with Indian Home Minister Amit Shah infamously calling Bangladeshi migrants “termites” during an election rally in West Bengal.
When the Indian prime minister arrived in Dhaka in March 2021 to mark the country’s 50th anniversary, 12 people were killed in anti-Modi protests in an embarrassment for the Hasina administration.
Following Hasina’s victory in the January election, an “India Out” campaign calling for the boycott of Indian goods gained traction on social media. Shop owners in Dhaka and other cities told the Voice of America in February that there had been a drop in sales of some Indian products.
Some critics claimed India “covertly” helped Hasina win the election, while others said New Delhi used its influence to tone down US and European criticisms of the Bangladeshi vote. India denied the allegations.
Despite growing anger in Bangladesh over Modi’s anti-Muslim stance, Hasina maintained a close working relationship with her Indian counterpart. While the BJP’s anti-Muslim, anti-Bangladeshi migrant rhetoric mounted ahead of the 2019 and 2024 Indian elections, Bangladesh’s “Iron Lady” remained silent, maintaining it was an Indian “internal” matter.
With both leaders ignoring each other’s human rights violations and democratic backsliding, Hasina-Modi relations grew steadfast and cozy.
Security and defence cooperation increased between Dhaka and New Delhi, particularly in India’s insurgency-hit northeastern states bordering Bangladesh.
Bilateral trade also increased, with Indian corporations striking major deals, such as a coal deal between Hasina’s government and the Adani Group, led by billionaire Indian tycoon Gautam Adani, whose ascent has been closely tied to Modi’s rise.
Just weeks before she was ousted, Hasina was asked to comment on social media posts accusing her of “selling Bangladesh” to New Delhi during her June 21-22 state visit to India. The Bangladeshi prime minister dismissed the allegation. “Sheikh Hasina does not sell this country,” she snapped, using the third person to defend her track record.
Minority rights and wrongs
South Asia experts routinely note that in India’s relations with its neighbours, a longstanding New Delhi position has been the protection of minorities, whether it’s the Tamils of Sri Lanka or in Bangladesh’s case, Hindus.
But Tripathi notes that the Modi administration’s commitment to a Hindu rashtra, or Hindu nation, by turning its back on secularism has undermined a core Indian foreign policy principle.
“Dispassionate experts talk about the Indian red lines on how the Hindu minority is treated in Bangladesh. They talk about it as a legitimate and longstanding New Delhi position. What I do not understand is how does New Delhi gets away with its treatment of its own minorities, its own Muslims,” said Tripathi.
While Bangladeshi experts are well aware of India’s backsliding on minority rights, their focus these days is on the future of their own country, now in a critical transition state.
Munir notes that for Bangladesh to enjoy stability and economic development, a healthy relationship with its giant neighbour is essential.
“A great majority of Bangladeshis want a robust, constructive, productive relationship with India. It is our largest neighbour, and geopolitics and geography demands that we have a pragmatic, productive relationship with India. That relationship cannot be held hostage to the vicissitudes of political change,” he maintained.
But for that to happen, New Delhi must turn the page on its Bangladesh policy, Munir added.
“New Delhi needs to fight a perception that exists in Dhaka that it was aligned with an individual and one regime. It is very important for New Delhi to signal to Dhaka right now … it must acknowledge that a revolution has happened. It needs to acknowledge that Sheikh Hasina is now history,” he said.
Meanwhile, Hasina’s presence in India since her August 5 resignation after weeks of protest poses a challenge to both New Delhi and Bangladesh’s interim authorities.
Analysts say India was not in a position to turn down a Bangladeshi exile request since it would send a message that New Delhi does not stand by its allies.
India and Bangladesh have an extradition agreement, which means that if Dhaka puts in an official extradition request for Hasina, New Delhi must either comply or stand in breach of its international agreements.
The easiest solution would be to send Hasina to a third country, possibly a Gulf state with good relations with New Delhi, some analysts say.
But many Bangladeshi student protesters are afraid Hasina could return to her home country, a prospect Agontuk finds terrifying.
“I have kept my identity anonymous because there is still a security risk,” explained the architecture student from Dhaka. “Sheikh Hasina might have left the country, but her henchmen, many of her politicians, her party’s student wing – they are still in Bangladesh because many of them couldn't escape the country. So they are still monitoring us,” he said.
Bangladesh has a difficult road ahead. Ten days after Hasina’s ouster, the situation in Dhaka was tense on Thursday, the anniversary of an August 15, 1975, military coup when Hasina’s father, Rahman, was assassinated along with most of his family members.
Hundreds of student protesters and political activists, armed with bamboo sticks, iron rods and pipes, assaulted Hasina’s supporters in Dhaka and prevented them from reaching Rahman’s former residence.
Revolutions are often followed by blood-letting and counterrevolutions, and at times the desired outcomes, including democratic rights and civil liberties, are not achieved in the long run.
But Agontuk maintains he’s optimistic about Bangladesh’s future. “The main motive of the protest was to ensure a bright and good future for Bangladeshi students,” he said. “We are optimistic. We will be optimistic for whatever is happening in Bangladesh. And we are looking forward for a brighter and brighter future for all of us.”
*Name changed on request to protect identity.
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