ByTuhin Das Mahapatra
Sep 24, 2024
A former OceanGate engineer reported financial pressures led to pay cuts and compromised safety protocols prior to the Titan submersible's implosion in 2023.
This undated image provided by OceanGate Expeditions in June 2021 shows the company's Titan submersible. (OceanGate Expeditions via AP, File)(AP)
A former OceanGate employee has come forward with troubling testimony, revealing that staff at the company were asked to “forgo getting paid for periods of time” leading up to the fatal implosion of the Titan submersible in June 2023.
On June 18, 2023, the Titan made its final dive into the North Atlantic. The implosion killed all five aboard, including OceanGate co-founder Stockton Rush, Titanic expert Paul-Henri Nargeolet, British-Pakistani billionaire Shahzada Dawood and his 19-year-old son Suleman, as well as British explorer Hamish Harding.
A former OceanGate employee has come forward with troubling testimony, revealing that staff at the company were asked to “forgo getting paid for periods of time” leading up to the fatal implosion of the Titan submersible in June 2023.
On June 18, 2023, the Titan made its final dive into the North Atlantic. The implosion killed all five aboard, including OceanGate co-founder Stockton Rush, Titanic expert Paul-Henri Nargeolet, British-Pakistani billionaire Shahzada Dawood and his 19-year-old son Suleman, as well as British explorer Hamish Harding.
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Books left Oceangate because it was ‘just too dangerous’
The Coast Guard launched an investigation in the aftermath of the incident, during which former OceanGate employee Phil Brooks, who joined OceanGate as an embedded Linux engineer in 2019 and was later promoted to director of engineering, shared insights into the company's financial difficulties. Brooks left OceanGate in early 2023, shortly before the Titan tragedy, and now works as a senior hardware engineer in Seattle.
“I don’t know if you heard, there were economic issues with the company asking us to forgo getting paid for periods of time with the promise that they would get us caught up in paychecks after the first of the year,” Brooks revealed.
“They asked for volunteers. I don’t think anybody did it, but it was clear that the company was economically very stressed.”
Brooks expressed that the financial strain was not just an internal matter but directly impacted safety measures. He believed the company was compromising too much on safety in an effort to continue operations. “The safety was being compromised way too much, at least for myself,” he said.
He added that working on the unstable ocean platform presented significant hazards. “At my age, working on a bobbing platform was too dangerous and not something that I wanted to do.”
Submersible safety sacrificed for savings, ex-employee alleges
Brooks recounted how OceanGate decided to switch from using the vessel Horizon Arctic to the Polar Prince, which would tow the Titan submersible behind it. “The main thing was the decision had been made to not use the Horizon Arctic [but] to use the Polar Prince and to tow the sub behind the Polar Prince,” he testified.
Brooks shared details of the gruelling work conditions aboard the ship in 2021 and 2022, explaining that there was “constant work, almost 24/7” as the team attempted to maintain the submersible. “The seas are 1- to 5-meter seas and the platform bobs up and down, and I just did not see that I could do that,” he shared.
Books left Oceangate because it was ‘just too dangerous’
The Coast Guard launched an investigation in the aftermath of the incident, during which former OceanGate employee Phil Brooks, who joined OceanGate as an embedded Linux engineer in 2019 and was later promoted to director of engineering, shared insights into the company's financial difficulties. Brooks left OceanGate in early 2023, shortly before the Titan tragedy, and now works as a senior hardware engineer in Seattle.
“I don’t know if you heard, there were economic issues with the company asking us to forgo getting paid for periods of time with the promise that they would get us caught up in paychecks after the first of the year,” Brooks revealed.
“They asked for volunteers. I don’t think anybody did it, but it was clear that the company was economically very stressed.”
Brooks expressed that the financial strain was not just an internal matter but directly impacted safety measures. He believed the company was compromising too much on safety in an effort to continue operations. “The safety was being compromised way too much, at least for myself,” he said.
He added that working on the unstable ocean platform presented significant hazards. “At my age, working on a bobbing platform was too dangerous and not something that I wanted to do.”
Submersible safety sacrificed for savings, ex-employee alleges
Brooks recounted how OceanGate decided to switch from using the vessel Horizon Arctic to the Polar Prince, which would tow the Titan submersible behind it. “The main thing was the decision had been made to not use the Horizon Arctic [but] to use the Polar Prince and to tow the sub behind the Polar Prince,” he testified.
Brooks shared details of the gruelling work conditions aboard the ship in 2021 and 2022, explaining that there was “constant work, almost 24/7” as the team attempted to maintain the submersible. “The seas are 1- to 5-meter seas and the platform bobs up and down, and I just did not see that I could do that,” he shared.
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