The Revolution in Myanmar

World, Sep 18th

An American currently fighting for the revolution in Myanmar discusses the avoidance of ethnic and political schisms, the decentralisation of guerilla combat, the confusions generated by counter-insurrection, and the complex geopolitical dynamics at play

~ Azad, intrerviewed by Ill Will ~

LONG READ

Ill Will: How did a civil protest movement using the tactics and strategies of the black bloc and rock throwing evolve to become a domestic insurgency? How does this process compare to the 1988 civil war which, at first glance, seemed to proceed along similar lines?

Azad: Before responding to the questions of the comrades, I would like to first address certain realities about the revolution in Myanmar that I believe are important for the full understanding of the situation. The current revolution, spurred from a nationwide rebuke of the sudden assumption of power by the military, has proceeded along many separate and contradictory lines. I think it is important to frame these developments in the language of diversity and flowering, rather than of fracturing or inconsistency. 

Myanmar is a state formed within colonial boundaries. As a result, it is the common nation of a dozen-plus ethnicities in addition to the Burmese people. The progression from independence to ‘Burmese Socialism’ has long been complicated, and democratic rule here has always stood on shaky ground.

As I write this, the state is now confronted by over a hundred different armed groups. Some of them are as small as a township, while others rival the junta’s army in capability. I have spent 7 months in Chin State with two militias; the PDF Zoland and the Chin National Defense Force (CNDF). These two groups are members of the Chin Brotherhood alliance, itself one of two military blocs within Chin state. In this short 7 months, I have only just begun to understand the local dynamics and conditions of the revolution, to say nothing of regional and national differences. As such, I hope any inaccuracies can be forgiven, and that any insight I can give will be considered a fragment of a more complete analysis of the situation in Myanmar.

Following the Juntas usurpation of power, protests from all sections of society began immediately: not only in the Burmese heartland, but in the urban centers of the ethnic regions as well. In Instagram and Facebook story collections of those who resisted, you can find a progression of the protests reminiscent of a slideshow: at first, reactions of disbelief and outrage at the coup;  then, of horror at the  use of violence and massacres to repress dissent, followed finally by calls for armed resistance. While initially peaceful, favoring mass marches and general strikes, the dissident movement underwent rapid evolution when faced with bullets and massacres in the streets. Realizing they were confronting an enemy that recognized only violence, armed resistance began in the first month with homemade air-cannons, slingshots, and traditional muzzle-loading hunting rifles. It soon became clear that there were only two choices: between revolution, or surrender to dictatorship. At this point, thousands flocked to the countryside, either joining existing “Ethnic Armed Organizations” (EAOs) that had already been resisting the central Burmese government for decades, or forming their own new resistance organizations.

As resistance swelled in the streets, the now-deposed elected government worked to retain its legitimacy. Only days after the coup, legislators from the National League for Democracy (NLD) — the political party that secured majority control of both houses of the legislature, with help from politicians from other ousted parties, — formed the CRPH, or “Committee representing [the legislature].”  The CRPH refused to recognize the authority of the military coup. One month later, the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) was formed, a coalition that gathered elements from the nationwide protest movement, the opposition government, and — significantly — eight ethnic armed organizations. The NUCC went on to form the National Unity Government (NUG), widely recognized as the legitimate de jure government of Myanmar. 

To return to your question, I think it is a mistake to see this as “1988 but different.”  The current moment is the result of a historical current that cannot be explained without the 1988 uprising. The NLD, for example, had its roots in this uprising. Since its inception as a state, there has always been a “pro-democracy” element of Burmese politics and ethnic armed organizations vying for independence or autonomy. However, never have these two elements joined forces like we are seeing today. The 1988 uprising was catalyzed in urban centers and failed to evolve into a national resistance, while today almost all liberated territory is held by the EAOs. Symbolized in the inclusion of EAO representatives in the NUCC and later NUG, the alliance between ethnic fighters seeking autonomy and pro-democracy Burmese society marks a major point of departure from previous cycles of struggle.

It seems like the tables have turned in favor of the revolution? To what do you attribute this? What would winning look like militarily and politically?

For the first time in the revolutionary history of Myanmar, the military is indeed on the backfoot. The Tatmadaw (the armed forces of Myanmar) was historically organized exclusively for the purposes of counter-insurgency, modeled after the brutal colonial repression strategy of the British empire. Through the clever use of ceasefires and autonomy agreements, it has pursued a divide and conquer strategy, isolating EAOs one at a time and destroying them with concentrated force. Before the outbreak of the “Spring revolution” against the dictatorship, the government of Myanmar was party to the NCA or “National Ceasefire Agreement” alongside signatories from ten EAOs.

Now, the situation has changed. Following the overwhelming popular opposition to the Junta and the collaboration of the NUG with the EAOs, almost every organization either withdrew from the ceasefire agreement or was otherwise attacked by the Tatmadaw (in violation of the ceasefire). Instead of having the freedom to amass forces in one section of the country, with no complaints from a largely apathetic Burmese public, the Tatmadaw was now forced to fight everywhere at once against an enemy with virtually unlimited popular support. While clashes began almost immediately following the coup, the junta suffered its first major defeat as a result of Operation 1027, which took its name from the coordinated strike on October 27 2023 by the Three Brotherhood Alliance, an alliance of three major EAOs. In just the first month of the offensive, over 220 junta positions were overrun, triggering a shockwave across the country. This was the first signal that the military regime was too overstretched to defend itself, and gave many around the country the confidence needed to begin their own offensives. As operation 1027 continues, so too do the many regional campaigns that it inspired. Since then, as you have seen, the junta has suffered defeat after defeat.

It seems that the trend will continue. Militarily, each EAO is nearing the liberation of their home states, and as PDF militias under the ostensible command of the NUG fight alongside them, slowly the Tatmadaw is losing its footing in the ethnic regions, all the while facing a guerrilla campaign around the outskirts of cities in the Bamar regions. Plain and simple, the military is losing. The ethnic areas will soon be liberated, the only remaining question being how much of that momentum will carry over into Bamar-majority regions. Many EAOs have stated plainly that in addition to their demands for autonomy, they will continue fighting until the unconditional defeat of the military dictatorship.

At a political level the goal is a bit less defined. Whoever you ask will tell you that we are all fighting for a “Federal Democracy.” What that means in practice has yet to be clearly defined and universally agreed upon, but this is understandable given the nature of the conflict and doesn’t necessarily detract from its validity as a goal.

Have you had support from other countries or international forces? Have the fighters drawn upon connections with insurgents elsewhere? 

So far, support from foreign governments has been mostly marginal: recognition of the NUG as the legitimate representative of Myanmar, as well as economic sanctions against those affiliated with the junta. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been largely non-committal, and the efforts of neighboring nations to mediate the conflict have been mostly ignored. India and China have been incredibly calculating in their relationship to the regime and rebels, overtly continuing their support of the regime while turning a blind eye to the activities of resistance groups conducting business in their own countries. This is especially true when we consider the rate at which the junta has been suffering defeats — it seems many are waiting to see how the conflict will develop before fully committing to a position.

In December 2022, the United States Congress passed the “BURMA Act,” which recognizes the NUG as the legitimate representative of Myanmar and authorizes the use of funds to support “democratic elements.” So far, this is all going through humanitarian avenues. While it isn’t guns and ammo, armed groups who are now ousting the junta from their towns are having to foot the bill for the services provided. NGOs such as USAID are able to cover a portion of that cost, which understandably reduces administrative burden significantly.

I have yet to see serious indications of meaningful connections or examples drawn from other insurgent groups. In the span of a few years, entire armies have been made out of students, teachers, workers, and the former professional class, so the focus has been on the rapid emergency armament of a people and less on the strategic analysis of methods. Many ethnicities in Myanmar have a significant diaspora in the West, and especially in the United States, where participation in the military is more common. As a result, I have seen multiple ethnic Chin from the US with a military background give trainings, and anecdotally I’m told this has happened in other regions as well.

I am aware of various communist and Maoist groups such as the Burmese Communist Party, but am not knowledgeable enough about them to comment as to their inspirations.

What lessons can be taken from the sequence of insurgency, then civil war with guerilla features? How portable is the model that has been adopted? What limits are there to translating the situation to elsewhere?

I don’t think there actually is a model that has been adopted, but rather a progression of developments that are still very much unfolding. The lessons from these are nevertheless tangible. One of the most striking is that unorganized popular resistance can only be so effective in the face of bullets. As we saw in Syria in 2011, unrest can provide the inertia necessary to begin revolution, but it cannot become the revolution in and of itself. In the case of Rojava, it was the People’s Democratic Union (PYD), dormant but organized since 2003, which was able to put the spear into the heart of the Syrian  occupation, and subsequently to defend the revolution from attacks by Al-Nusra and ISIS, as well as the fascist Turkish state. Here in Burma, it was the ethnic organizations that have been resisting in the mountains for decades which were able to fight with renewed spirit and support of the people, alongside a shadow government which still holds serious claims to legitimacy.

Still, there is something to be said for the newer groups formed after the coup. These organizations and armies — hewn from nothing but the moral fiber of refusal to live under dictatorship — catalyzed around pre-existing organizational structures that later solidified during the post-coup civil disobedience movement, mostly along regional or ethnic lines.

This is not to say that the role of “the people” isn’t critical, or to imply that the revolution is made by armed vanguards alone. Rather, as revolutionaries of all nations, we should understand the critical role that organization plays. When the moment of intensity and inertia arrives, a prepared revolutionary organization must seize it. If there is no such organization at the time, one must be formed. If one is not formed, the revolution will die.

What is the culture of the fighters? What ties like with locals or other above ground elements of the struggle? Are the guerillas in the jungle isolated, or is there a lot of exchange with civilian elements?

Every ethnic organization has a political and an armed wing. Perhaps in previous times these were of a much more traditional clandestine and “guerilla” nature, but given the current inability of the central government to maintain its grasp on remote areas, these have increasingly become above-ground organizations in and of themselves. The legitimacy gained from affiliation or official relationship with the NUG helps in this regard. While the NUG has a ministry of defense that is doing its best to rally support and raise funds to support the PDFs and various EAOs with whom it has partnered, the fact that it is an exiled government means that local militias are largely responsible for funding their own operations. 

This is done through a very organic relationship with the civil population, combined with a well-organized support element in the diaspora. Although the specific numbers vary group by group, roughly 50% of operational funds come from local donations and taxes, and the other 50% from the diaspora. While taxes are levied primarily on commerce vehicles passing through resistance checkpoints, the overwhelming majority of income of these groups is generated via donations from supporters. This is in part due to the nature from which these groups arose. As mentioned earlier, the civil disobedience movement following the coup commanded huge amounts of social power and organizational capital. Professionals and government workers from villages and entire cities walked off the job to join the resistance. It would be imprecise to say that the relationship with the people is “good”; more accurate would be to say that the various defense forces are themselves the people, and likewise that the people see themselves represented in the guerilla.

As to the culture of the fighters, truth be told there is still much to be desired. Imagine you have given a liberal a gun and now they are fighting fascism. They are ready to fight, but there is still a lack of a deep revolutionary perspective in many of the rank and file, and much adherence to the trappings of civil life. In a way, this is to be expected — after all, this is the story of a people in arms, who had their hopes for a peaceful transition to democratic rule snatched from them after the military coup. They had never dreamed of holding a rifle and yet, forced by circumstance and the dignity of the human spirit, they have become revolutionaries. This lack of depth should be understood but criticized; above all, it must be taken into account as a necessary feature of any successful mobilization of a people towards radical ends.

It cannot be said that every group is revolutionary. Indeed, many opportunists, especially in the border regions, have taken advantage of the chaos and formed “militias” which are little more than crime organizations in order to participate in lucrative smuggling, drug trade, or scamming markets. Groups of this nature are, as a rule, either functionally neutral to the conflict, or are tacitly supporting the junta in exchange for taking up space that the rebels cannot operate in. It should be said that these groups make up a very tiny minority, instead representing the unsavory element on the edges of any revolution.

What is the relationship between the various armed groups? Is there a coordinated command? Does this relation reflect any political distinctions, and if so, of what sort?

In Burma there are over a hundred armed groups. If we were to consider only the most significant, this number can be reduced to about a dozen, falling into one of two blocs — EAO or PDF/Bamar militia. Between these there is a complicated web of relationships, some much more collaborative than others. At scale, most groups fundamentally agree on a set of basic principles: first, that the military regime is the common enemy; second, that the fight should continue until the total defeat of the regime; third,  among EAOs, that their shared goals of autonomy are working towards more or less the same end; and finally, among all groups, that the establishment of a federal system which removes the historic power of the military from government, and grants autonomous regions an equal footing in a new union, is the ultimate goal.

With this in mind, there is no “national alliance” with a coordinated strategy and logistical pipeline. This is not to say that higher-level cooperation doesn’t exist. Between EAOs especially, there is a high degree of material cooperation in the form of soldiers, training, weapons, and ammo. Sometimes entire units pack up and move across the country to take part in a strategic flashpoint which would help another group, and ultimately the progression of the revolution as a whole. In its own way, this collaboration between groups across religious and ethnic lines is itself a shining example of internationalist solidarity.

The NUG, while officially being the vehicle through which the resistance is coordinated and facilitated, is in practice a power among powers. While the NUG does not officially control as much liberated land as the EAOs by volume, the fact that they retain international legitimacy and the support of the Burmese public is enough to make them a serious unifying element. This balance of power is likely to make itself felt in any federal formation that may occur after the defeat of the dictatorship.

Not to give the skeptics ammunition for their arguments, but of course the sheer number of different groups has given rise to conflict inside and between ethnic groups. This has yet to truly explode into something tragic, but it already has made the fight against the junta more difficult in areas plagued by factionalism. However, these tensions exist mostly along regional or tribal lines, and on the national scale do not pose a threat to the unity of the largest groups who are cooperating to bring down the dictatorship. In general, the political language of every group emphasizes and reinforces the solidarity and friendship between peoples.

We’d like to understand the struggle more historically: what kind of theory or thinkers, past and present, have contributed to the present strategy? Are people reading books or websites?

Among the new wave of groups formed after the 2021 coup — those with which I have the most experience — I cannot say that I have identified any particular tendency. While I have seen individuals in leadership positions reading and studying, this is not in pursuit of a particular line of study rather than a general search for information and solutions, including options that we might not consider to be revolutionary. Social democracy has a particularly strong pull, as the country’s problematic history with “socialism” — in practice, the most absurd dictatorships — has left many sour to the concept. At the same time, the glaring contradictions of dictatorship also causes unease when “capitalism” is mentioned. While there are groups that include a socialist union in their platform, this is not the common tendency of the resistance as a whole. “Federalism” is the only word we can go off of, which includes as varied sources of study as the US and European federal systems and the revolution in Rojava.

The level of political development among the rank and file is low. Especially in the EAOs, many are motivated first of all by feelings of national pride, and only secondarily by an ideological opposition to fascism and dictatorship (though this is not uncommon in even more developed revolutionary movements). Anecdotally, my experience with Bamar comrades has been slightly different: since many come from a student background, it is not uncommon for them to engage in an individual search for more radical methods. Still, I have not noticed any preference towards any particular revolutionary tendency. 

Does the current struggle employ the Maoist concepts of  a protracted people’s war and urban encirclement?

Many legacy EAOs subscribed in whole or in part to a Maoist theory of guerilla war. However, although the present  revolution developed along lines that Mao had identified,  it did not emerge through any actual study and application of this theory. The strongholds of the EAOs in remote and mountainous regions provided the perfect springboard that the newly insurgent population needed to rapidly train, organize, and develop. While some groups may still subscribe to Maoist political and military theory, I do not have enough experience with these groups to comment about them.

What is the relationship of the revolution to the Rohingya and other disenfranchised ethnic groups from before the coup?

While there is no monolithic “revolution,” in general all parties have condemned the genocide committed by the military against the Rohingya and called for greater co-operation between ethnic groups. Given the ongoing nature of a tragedy like this one, it is a touchy subject with many elements. Exacerbating existing religious and ethnic tensions, various Islamist Rohingya organizations have allied with the military which just committed genocide against them, and are fighting against the Arakha Army, one of the largest rebel organizations. Now, Junta disinformation mills are capitalizing on the international recognition of the Rohingya genocide, trying to paint the AA as continuing this persecution. Despite evidence being shaky at best, this narrative has even been picked up by mainstream media outlets, causing confusion as to the reality of the situation.

Each region is fighting its own micro-war, with limited strategic coordination between them. Sometimes it can seem like a battle in a neighboring state might as well be happening in another country. The news that you see is the same news everyone else here is reading, so you will learn about complicated events such as hotly contested battles or tragic massacres of civilians at the same time I do. Nobody in the country wants to see the mistreatment of the Rohingya continue, and as a group they are caught in the crossfire without adequate representation. The fact that several Rohingya groups, with foreign support from private individuals in countries like Turkey, are fighting for the Junta only further complicates the situation and adds salt to an already tense relationship.

As for the relationship of the revolution with “other ethnic groups,” I think its safe to say that the revolution is itself comprised of these ethnic groups and that relations are in general friendly.

What are the politics of the insurgency? Western media describe the rebels as “pro-democracy.” From our vantage point, capitalist democracy is not revolutionary. What do the people there want, and how do they speak of it?

I have encountered this sentiment in the majority of comrades with whom I have spoken at any depth about Myanmar. It is true, there exists no mainstream element of the revolution in Myanmar upon which we can project our hopes and aspirations for revolution against the liberal systems we are faced with in the West. Perhaps even out of the mainstream, you would be hard pressed to zoom in on any particular group and highlight them as the example of a revolutionary alternative. That doesn’t change the validity of the struggle the people here are waging against the dictatorship. 

I think the question of what a transition to a democratic system would look like was up in the air even before the coup. In any case, the party spearheading the push for democracy, the NLD (itself born in the aftermath of the 1988 uprisings) commands the absolute popular support of the people of Myanmar, across all ethnic and religious lines. The intent was to bloodlessly remove the stranglehold of the military from the government. When the military seized power to stop these proposed changes, the only option left on the table was revolution. It can then be understood why there is not necessarily a universally accepted revolutionary platform, especially when many EAOs had already been resisting the government for decades under a variety of motives. 

I cannot speak for the people of Burma, but with their near-unanimous support of the NLD (78% of seats in the lower house, 82% in the upper house), there was a clear base for the uprising against the dictatorship. In such a case, while the future may not be as clear as we’d like it to be, I cannot envision the struggle of an entire people against dictatorship and towards a democratic system described in any way except as revolution. Whether observers will support such a perspective depends largely on their moral facilities. The people certainly perceive themselves as revolutionaries.

Take the example of Palestine. In the current struggle against Israeli occupation, the actual politics of most of the organizations waging the resistance are unquestionably bad. Yet this doesn’t change the fact that their struggle against settler colonialism grants them a certain moral authority and legitimacy. This is what explains the tension many experience in supporting Islamic fascists against occupation, or receiving US support while defending oneself against Turkish imperialism in Rojava. A similar contradiction is at issue here, just as it was in Hong Kong five years ago, where we find would-be neoliberals fighting tooth and nail against dictatorship. In my view — and perhaps this is controversial, who knows —  those doing so are deserving of our revolutionary solidarity.

We’re reminded of a text that comrades in France wrote in 2016, where their message to the liberals in the Nuit debout movement was something like, “okay so, how about instead of drafting constitutions now, what if we focus on achieving the insurrection first, then sort this out later?”

Exactly.1 

What is at stake geopolitically? How could we map the struggle in Myanmar to what is happening to places like Palestine, Ukraine, Haiti, Rojava, or Sudan? Has there been a circulation of ideas or practices between these places? How might a victory there resonate elsewhere?

China, Russia, and the US are all certainly keeping a very close eye on the developments in Burma. Most tangibly, Russia and the military regime have a two-way transfer of arms and munitions, and Russia forms a very serious component of Tatmadaw military capability in the form of training and equipment repair services. As China tries to improve its naval power, having Myanmar as a close ally allows it an important access point to the sea, avoiding strategic chokepoints. Conversely, the US is looking for any opportunity to create a friendly power on China’s doorstep. 

Russia is the only power that will suffer from the defeat of the Junta. Ammunition manufactured in Myanmar is used on the frontlines in Ukraine. China is much more calculating, refusing to take steps necessary to cement the control of the Junta but without yet throwing its weight behind any resistance groups. It keeps its ties to the SAC warm, but turns a blind eye to cross-border resistance activity and mediates ceasefires to protect Chinese interests in areas under insurgent control.

The resistance, the diaspora, and the exiled government have strong roots in the West and especially in the US. However, the official position of the NUG has not been anti-China, and a controversial January 2024 statement pledged to safeguard Chinese interests, including recognizing Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. While the NUG doesn’t represent every revolutionary group, this balancing act nevertheless gives context to the situation the rebels find themselves in.

Messages of support and solidarity are common both from armed resistance groups as well as civil protestors, especially in politically organized sections of the diaspora. The common throughlines run through Palestine, Rojava, Ukraine, Hong Kong, Taiwan, recently Bangladesh, and elsewhere in the similar vein. As is common in revolutionary movements with a strong diaspora component, there is lots of collaboration and intermingling in the diaspora, but I don’t have the impression that in-country there has been any serious exchange of lessons or practices yet. 

A victory in Myanmar would be a victory for resisting peoples everywhere. It sends a simple yet powerful message: a rebellious people with a unified will can overthrow the systems that oppress them. In the first days of the uprising, the common analysis was that the Tatmadaw was so strong as to be militarily undefeatable; yet the people took up arms regardless, if for nothing else than a life lived with dignity. When they did rise up, they found that the giant was not as invulnerable as everyone assumed, and the façade began to crumble rapidly. Victory in Myanmar would be a victory for hope itself, for the idea that victory is possible but not inevitable, depending only on our commitment to struggle and the degree to which we are willing to organize and sacrifice for freedom.