Bottled up in the Black Sea: Russia is having a dreadful naval war, hindering its great power ambitions

Colin Flint, Utah State University
Thu, October 3, 2024

THE CONVERSATION

The ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine has played out largely on land and in the air. It is a bitterly contested, grueling ground war, accompanied by brutal Russian aerial attacks on civilian infrastructure and a slow but increasing Ukrainian response.

But a less appreciated but vital focus of the war is happening on water, too. There, a contest for control of the Black Sea has seen Russia stunningly defeated.

And this loss has potentially far-reaching consequences. Not only does it constrain Moscow’s ability to project power across the globe through naval means, it has also resulted in Russia’s growing cooperation with China, where Moscow is emerging as a junior party to Beijing on the high seas.

Battle over the Black Sea

The tradition of geopolitical theory has tended to paint an oversimplification of global politics. Theories harkening back to the late 19th century categorized countries as either land powers or maritime powers.

Thinkers such as the British geopolitician Sir Halford Mackinder or the U.S. theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan characterized maritime powers as countries that possessed traits of democratic liberalism and free trade. In contrast, land powers were often portrayed as despotic and militaristic.

While such generalizations have historically been used to demonize enemies, there is still a contrived tendency to divide the world into land and sea powers. An accompanying view that naval and army warfare is somewhat separate has continued.

And this division gives us a false impression of Russia’s progress in the war with Ukraine. While Moscow has certainly seen some successes on land and in the air, that should not draw attention away from Russia’s stunning defeat in the Black Sea that has seen Russia have to retreat from the Ukrainian shoreline and keep its ships far away from the battlefront.

As I describe in my recent book, “Near and Far Waters: The Geopolitics of Seapower,” maritime countries have two concerns: They must attempt to control the parts of the sea relatively close to their coastlines, or their “near waters”; meanwhile, those with the ability and desire to do so try to project power and influence into “far waters” across oceans, which are the near waters of other countries.

The Black Sea is a tightly enclosed and relatively small sea comprising the near waters of the countries that surround it: Turkey to the south, Bulgaria and Romania to the east, Georgia to the west, and Ukraine and Russia to the north.

Control of the Black Sea’s near waters has been contested throughout the centuries and has played a role in the current Russian-Ukraine war.

Russia’s seizure of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 allowed it to control the naval port of Sevastopol. What were near waters of Ukraine became de facto near waters for Russia.

Controlling these near waters allowed Russia to disrupt Ukraine’s trade, especially the export of grain to African far waters.

But Russia’s actions were thwarted through the collaboration of Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey to allow passage of cargo ships through their near waters, then through the Bosporus into the Mediterranean Sea.

Ukraine’s use of these other countries’ near waters allowed it to export between 5.2 million and 5.8 million tons of grain per month in the first quarter of 2024. To be sure, this was a decline from Ukraine’s exports of about 6.5 million tons per month prior to the war, which then dropped to just 2 million tons in the summer of 2023 because of Russian attacks and threats.

But efforts to constrain Russia’s control of Ukraine’s near waters in the Black Sea, and Russia’s unwillingness to face the consequences of attacking ships in NATO countries’ near waters, meant Ukraine was still able to access far waters for economic gain and keep the Ukrainian economy afloat.
For Putin, that sinking feeling

Alongside being thwarted in its ability to disrupt Ukrainian exports, Russia has also come under direct naval attack from Ukraine. Since February 2022, using unmanned attack drones, Ukraine has successfully sunk or damaged Russian ships and whittled away at Russia’s Black sea fleet, sinking about 15 of its prewar fleet of about 36 warships and damaging many others.

Russia has been forced to limit its use of Sevastopol and station its ships in the eastern part of the Black Sea. It cannot effectively function in the near waters it gained through the seizure of Crimea.

Russia’s naval setbacks against Ukraine are only the latest in its historical difficulties in projecting sea power and its resulting tendency to mainly focus on the defense of near waters.

In 1905, Russia was shocked by a dramatic naval loss to Japan. Yet even in cases where it was not outright defeated, Russian sea power has been continually constrained historically. In World War I, Russia cooperated with the British Royal Navy to limit German merchant activity in the Baltic Sea and Turkish trade and military reach in the Black Sea.

In World War II, Russia relied on material support from the Allies and was largely blockaded within its Baltic Sea and Black Sea ports. Many ships were brought close to home or stripped of their guns as artillery or offshore support for the territorial struggle with Germany.

During the Cold War, meanwhile, though the Soviet Union built fast-moving missile boats and some aircraft carriers, its reach into far waters relied on submarines. The main purpose of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet was to prevent NATO penetration into the Black Sea.

And now, Russia has lost control of the Black Sea. It cannot operate in these once secure near waters. These losses reduce its ability to project naval power from the Black Sea and into the Mediterranean Sea.
Ceding captaincy to China

Faced with a glaring loss in its backyard and put in a weak position in its near waters, Russia as a result can project power to far waters only through cooperation with a China that is itself investing heavily in a far-water naval capacity.

Joint naval exercises in the South China Sea in July 2024 are evidence of this cooperation. Wang Guangzheng of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy’s Southern Theater said of the drill that “the China-Russia joint patrol has promoted the deepening and practical cooperation between the two in multiple directions and fields.” And looking forward, he claimed the exercise “effectively enhanced the ability to the two sides to jointly respond to maritime security threats.”

Warships of the Chinese and Russian navies take part in a joint naval exercise in the East China Sea. Li Yun/Xinhua via Getty Images

This cooperation makes sense in purely military terms for Russia, a mutually beneficial project of sea power projection. But it is largely to China’s benefit.

Russia can help China’s defense of its northern near waters and secure access to far waters through the Arctic Ocean – an increasingly important arena as global climate change reduces the hindrance posed by sea ice. But Russia remains very much the junior partner.

Moscow’s strategic interests will be supported only if they match Chinese interests. More to the point, sea power is about power projection for economic gain. China will likely use Russia to help protect its ongoing economic reach into African, Pacific, European and South American far waters. But it is unlikely to jeopardize these interests for Russian goals.

To be sure, Russia has far-water economic interests, especially in the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa. And securing Russian interests in Africa complements China’s growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean to secure its own, and greater, global economic interests. But cooperation will still be at China’s behest.

Bottled up in Black Sea near waters as a result of its war in Ukraine, Russia’s only current avenue for projecting its naval power is access to Africa and Indian Ocean far waters as a junior partner with China, which will dictate the terms and conditions. Even if Russia achieves victory on land in its war against Ukraine, it will not compensate for its ongoing inability to project power across the oceans on its own.

This article is republished from The Conversation, a nonprofit, independent news organization bringing you facts and trustworthy analysis to help you make sense of our complex world. It was written by: Colin Flint, Utah State University

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Russia's strike on a merchant ship in the Black Sea was likely down to poor targeting and aged ammo: UK intel

Mia Jankowicz
Thu, October 3, 2024 



A missile hit the MV Aya, which was carrying grain from Ukraine to Egypt, on September 11.


The strike led to fears of a potential escalation in Russian attacks on the Black Sea grain corridor.


But according to the UK MOD, it was likely an error caused by poor procedures and aging munition.

A strike last month on a merchant ship in the Black Sea was almost certainly the result of a bungled Russian bomber attack using outdated ammunition, according to the UK Ministry of Defence.

On September 11, the Saint Kitts and Nevis-flagged vessel MV Aya was loaded with grain bound for Egypt from Ukraine's port of Odesa when it was struck by what was widely assumed to be a Russian missile.

There were no casualties reported at the time.

The ship was damaged, but managed to reach Romania's coast under its own steam, where it received help, according to Ambrey, a marine insurer.

The strike led to fears of a potential escalation in Russian attacks on the Black Sea grain corridor. But according to UK intelligence, it was likely not meant for the Aya at all but happened "due to poor targeting procedures from Russian pilots using an aging munition."

According to its assessment, the strike was almost certainly an AS-4 anti-ship missile fired from a Russian Tu-22M3 bomber.

It's possible that the bomber misidentified the Aya, it said, fired "in haste," and then rushed away from the scene "for fear of being targeted by a Ukrainian surface-to-air missile."

"It is a realistic possibility a detonation failure avoided catastrophic damage," the UK MOD added.

It also said that Ukraine shot down a Russian Tu-22, also known as a BACKFIRE, in April this year, which would explain why Russian pilots have been "more wary with their strike operations in the Black Sea."

Using long-range missile strikes and naval drones, Ukraine has managed to push much of Russia's Black Sea Fleet from its base at Sevastopol, in occupied Crimea, to the safer Russian waters of Novorossiysk.

Since its exit from the Black Sea grain initiative, Russia's attacks on Ukrainian naval export abilities have been largely limited to striking ports, and — it's widely believed — dropping naval mines.

The September 11 incident was the first direct strike on a merchant ship in the grain corridor since November 2023.

"A direct attack" like this would mark "a significant escalation," Ambrey said, adding: "Until Russian officials provide an explanation, the threat to vessels calling Ukraine remains high."

Ukraine's economy is heavily dependent on maritime exports. Before 2022, it accounted for 10% of the global grain market, with 90% of that heading out to the world via the Black Sea, according to the Council on Foreign Relations.

Despite the potential for economic warfare, Russia has good reason to avoid escalating the threat to shipping in the Black Sea, Ambrey wrote.

Any escalation would have a knock-on effect on naval insurance premiums, which "would make trade with both Russia and Ukraine significantly more costly," it said.

The UK MOD was scathing about the apparent accidental attack on the Aya.

"Launching a supersonic cruise missile on an incorrect heading against a likely erroneous target in international waters demonstrates extremely poor and irresponsible aviation practice," it said.


Russian bomber pilots hit Black Sea grain ship 'by mistake' as they raced off to avoid air defences, says UK

Nicholas Cecil
Thu, October 3, 2024 

Russian bomber pilots hit Black Sea grain ship 'by mistake' as they raced off to avoid air defences, says UK


Russian bomber pilots hit a grain ship in the Black Sea by mistake as they “targeted it in haste” and wanted to fly away quickly to avoid Ukrainian air defences, say British defence chiefs.

The Ministry of Defence in London believes that the merchant vessel Aya may only have escaped catastrophic damage because of a “detonation failure” in the “aging munition” fired at it.

In its latest intelligence update, the MoD said: “On 11 September 2024, the merchant vessel Aya was struck by a missile in the Black Sea as it transited south from the Ukrainian port of Odesa having been loaded with more than 26 thousand tons of grain bound for Egypt.

“It is almost certain that the missile was an AS-4 KITCHEN anti-ship missile launched by a Tu-22M3 BACKFIRE Russian bomber that was operating in the area at the time. It is a realistic possibility that a detonation failure avoided catastrophic damage.”

Russian and Ukrainian forces have fought a series of battles along the Black Sea coastline, and out at sea, including over Snake Island, which was captured by Vladimir Putin’s forces before being seized back, and the sinking of the flagship Moskva warship.

The Russian navy was forced to retreat from the Black Sea after the port of Sevastopol in Crimea was targeted.

But the British military chiefs do not believe that the grain vessel was hit on purpose and instead that it was “likely struck due to poor targeting procedures from Russian pilots using an aging munition”.

They added: “Following the loss of a BACKFIRE in April this year, Russia has almost certainly been more wary with their strike operations in the Black Sea.

“It is a realistic possibility this incident occurred due to pilots incorrectly identifying Aya as their target in haste, wanting to depart the area immediately after launch for fear of being targeted by a Ukrainian surface to air missile.

“The KITCHEN missile has consistently underperformed in the Ukraine conflict. Launching a supersonic cruise missile on an incorrect heading against a likely erroneous target in international waters demonstrates extremely poor and irresponsible aviation practice.”

Britain, the US, Ukraine and its allies have been fighting an information war, alongside the battlefield conflict, against Russia so their briefings need to be treated with caution.

However, they are far more believable than the propaganda issued by the Kremlin.

Meanwhile, Ukraine's armed forces commander General Oleksandr Syrskyi said on Thursday he had ordered defences to be strengthened in the eastern Donetsk region, a day after Kyiv forces announced they had withdrawn from the town of Vuhledar.

Russian troops are steadily inching forward in different sectors in eastern Ukraine despite Kyiv's surprise incursion into Russia's western Kursk region in August that it was hoped would slow the advances.

Syrskyi said on social media he was working on "one of the hottest front sectors" with the 25th Sicheslav Airborne Brigade.

He gave no details on the exact location but the brigade operates in the Pokrovsk front, an area of intensified Russian assaults.

"While working in the brigade, I made a number of decisions aimed at strengthening stability and effectiveness of our defence," Syrskyi said.

Russian forces launched a major drone attack overnight on 15 Ukrainian regions, causing damage to commercial and residential buildings, local authorities said on Thursday, though there were no immediate reports of any casualties.

The Ukrainian air force said it had shot down 78 out of 105 Russian drones during the assault, with 23 more likely impacted by active electronic jamming.

Authorities in the Ukrainian capital Kyiv said the air force had downed around 15 drones over the city and its surroundings during an air alert that lasted more than five hours.

A Russian drone targeted a truck delivering gas in Ukraine's northern Chernihiv region on Thursday, killing two adults and a child, police said.

Ukrainian drones attacked the "Borisoglebsk" military airfield and warehouses for fuel and guided bombs in Russia's Voronezh region overnight, according to a Ukrainian security source.

The security source said Ukraine's SBU security service was continuing actions to reduce the ability of Russian troops to use fighter jets with guided bombs to strike Ukrainian cities, and that attacks on Russian airfields would continue.

The drones attacked warehouses, parking lots for Russian Sukhoi Su-35 and Su-34 jets and aviation fuel storage facilities at the Borisoglebsk airfield, the source said.

"From there, the enemy actively bombards Ukrainian territories with guided bombs," he said.

Pictures on the attack and a short video clip showing fires could not be independently verified and the extent of the damage was not immediately clear.

Alexander Gusev, the governor of Russia's Voronezh region, said Russian air defence had shot down 10 drones over the region. He did not report any damage.