THE RUSSIAN VIEW

Jimmy Carter as the Symbol of a Vanished Era

Roman Reinhardt
01.10.2024

https://valdaiclub.com/

© Sputnik/Vladimir Akimov

On October 1, the 39th US President Jimmy Carter celebrated his 100th birthday. In our opinion, this ex-president personifies a very interesting and, judging by some details, irretrievable bygone era. An era from which lessons can be learned. Especially if we look back at the turning point, the year 1979, writes Roman Reinhardt.

Then, forty-five years ago, a number of events occurred that determined the development of international relations along several important vectors. Carter, as the head of one of the two superpowers, was not just a participant in them, but a protagonist in the full sense. His actions and the steps he took have received and continue to receive different assessments, but amid the current conditions even a brief review of them seems important and timely, and provides the key, if not to a solution, then at least to a better understanding of current problems.

Despite the fact that foreign policy, as we know, is a continuation of domestic policy, we will not dwell on the analysis of the latter. We will leave the review of Carter's activities as governor of Georgia, his election campaign, education reform, energy policy and other things, right down to piquant details like the incident with the floating rabbit, to biographers and specialists in the relevant fields. We will focus on the image of Carter in world politics and on certain key events.

The first of these is the Camp David Accords of 1978. They served as the basis for the signing of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in Washington on March 26, 1979. Yes, there were other figures present, perhaps even of the same calibre: Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. However, it is unknown how history would have turned out and whether such a result would have been achieved without Carter. After all, politics is not only the art of the possible, but also often about cooperation with inevitability. And yet, it seems that Carter’s presence as a witness at the signing of the peace treaty, which became one of the pillars of regional security, sent an important signal to the world community. The role of the United States as a sponsor of the aforementioned treaty should not be underestimated either. Hawks do not often lay dove eggs, but this was probably one of those rare cases. However, it would have been difficult to do without an incubator. Given the current situation in the Middle East, the plot, it seems, is not only interesting in itself. At that time, the American administration proved in practice that it was capable of acting, albeit with certain limitations, as one of the guarantors of peace in that region, which is exceptionally difficult from all points of view. Thus, the assertion that the US is taking a chosen position a priori in the current escalation does not seem entirely convincing. Of course, the situation was different in many ways back then. And yet, its outcome demonstrates that Washington can act differently. There is a precedent.

The second was the signing of SALT II in Vienna on June 18, 1979:a formal ceremony that ended with Mr. Carter kissing Comrade Brezhnev. Six months later, the USSR sent a limited contingent of troops to Afghanistan, which is why the US Senate never ratified the treaty. This, however, did not prevent both parties from adhering to its main provisions. It is clear that reaching this agreement, as in the case of Egypt and Israel, was preceded by many years of painstaking work. Negotiations with the Soviet side were conducted by previous administrations starting in 1972. So, in a sense, Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford also had a hand in this treaty. However, the final point, or rather, the personal signature, was put on it by Carter. Slowing down the nuclear race (its stop, then or now, let's be realistic, is only possible in mental constructs) is another topic that hasn’t lost its relevance. In turn, this precedent demonstrates the ability of the parties to adhere to the old principle of pacta sunt servanda, even despite the fact that the legal consolidation of the pact was not finalized. And it turns out that this is also possible.

Third, the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China on January 1, 1979, and Deng Xiaoping's subsequent visit to the United States. Of course, this also had a "prequel" - Nixon's trip to China seven years earlier. Nevertheless, the institutionalisation of rapprochement occurred in the late 1970s. In addition to security issues, a bilateral agreement on scientific and technical cooperation and an agreement on cultural cooperation were signed during the Chinese statesman's visit. Thus, it can be considered the starting point for scientific diplomacy and cultural interaction between Washington and Beijing. This is also something to remember, given the current course of American politicians towards Chinese scientists, and not only. Just look at the increase in spending on military aid to Taiwan announced by President Biden.


In terms of comparison and lessons, here, in our opinion, the important message is that the agenda should not be limited to any topic, even very sensitive ones. On the contrary, parallel and coordinated movement along other tracks (in particular, along scientific ones) at least does not hinder progress where the parties' positions diverge radically.


Moreover, this logic works not only in the case of China, although in its case it works especially well.



Of course, there were other achievements, and Carter's America also had its failures. To understand the scale and consequences of the latter, it is enough to name one country - Iran. The sanctions story, which continues to this day, began in 1979 after the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran by local students. Carter failed to cope with that crisis either by military or diplomatic means. The hostages were released under Ronald Reagan.

Relations with the USSR at that time were not cloudless. Let's remember, for example, the Il-62 incident in New York on August 24–27, 1979, which separated Bolshoi Theatre artists Alexander Godunov and Lyudmila Vlasova forever. During the denouement of this family drama, which unexpectedly acquired an international dimension, President Carter showed himself to be quite ambiguous. He simultaneously gave two orders: the first to the Attorney General to use the police in any expedient way, and the second to the US Permanent Representative to the UN, who acted as the main negotiator on the American side, to show restraint. As Joseph Brodsky, who also found himself embroiled in this story by the will of fate, noted, Carter's left hand cancelled what the right hand was doing... A certain indecisiveness was a characteristic of the hero of the day, and this duality of positions was observed more than once. The very fact that he appointed Cyrus Vance as Secretary of State and Zbigniew Brzezinski as National Security Advisor can be interpreted both as a brilliant political move and as a manifestation of inconsistency. Arguments in favour of the first: the principle of divide et impera, multiplied by someone else's experience of the balance of power in similar situations (take at least the Chicherin-Litvinov pair from the history of early Soviet diplomacy). In favour of the second - the actual transfer of the foreign policy reins to Brzezinski in 1980 after Vance resigned without finding an equivalent replacement. The next Secretary of State, Edmund Muskie, did practically nothing during his six months in this position until Reagan came to power.

The Zbigniew Brzezinski I Knew: A Personal Tribute

Toby Trister Gati

Zbigniew Brzezinski’s life serves as an example of the contribution citizens can make to political life – and as an example of how to exit gracefully after a devastating electoral loss, writes Valdai Club expert Toby T. Gati.Opinions

However, the boycott of the Summer Olympics in Moscow, flirting with Soviet dissident émigrés, and finally, the end of the policy of détente are largely the work of the "American Talleyrand" of Polish descent, whose opinions Carter listened to throughout his entire presidential term. Strictly speaking, the so-called Carter Doctrine is more of a Brzezinski concept. The consequences of its adoption and application are described in great detail and clearly in the memoirs of our brilliant ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, who became the dean of the diplomatic corps in Washington on July 17, 1979. Its main result was the paralysis of political communication between the White House and the Kremlin; similar to what we are seeing now, but not in such a harsh vein.

This is by no means a complete and balance sheet of the eventful year 1979. The following year, 1980, marked the decline of Carter's political career. He was only 55 years old. The insightful editor of “The New American” Sergei Dovlatov, while far removed from politics, predicted the election results in the pages of his publication in the summer of 1980. He described Carter as pious, honest and noble, and his opponent Reagan as firm, principled and thrifty. To a large extent, the outcome of that presidential race was predictable. Now we are again in a similar phase of the electoral cycle, but with qualitatively different “input data.”

At one time, the author of this essay read a joke. Nixon, in a conversation with a foreign leader, formulated his foreign policy credo as follows: do to others what they can do to you. Henry Kissinger (who later also crossed the 100-year mark, and before that, like Carter, received the Nobel Peace Prize) allegedly added: and another ten percent. Judging by the actions and later statements of Carter (especially as ex-president), he himself was ready to take away this ten percent. Since then, the categorical imperatives in world politics have changed beyond recognition. At that time, they still adhered to an unspoken rule, close to the biblical maxim, that you should not do to Russia what you do not want it to do to you. Time will tell, whether there is enough wisdom in the Oval Office now, and even after the elections, if there can be a return to this understanding.