License to Muzzle: Taking Offence at Flag Wavers for Hezbollah
It was done for the Viet Cong in numerous countries during the US involvement in Vietnam. It was done for the African National Congress (ANC). It was done for the Irish Revolutionary Army (IRA). Across the United States, Europe and Australasia, all three organisations, demonised as terrorist outfits, received tacit, symbolic support from protestors. In some cases, support was genuine and pecuniary. Now, the Lebanese Shia militant and political group Hezbollah, designated a terrorist organisation in a number of Western states, has inspired flag holders to appear at protests against the expanding conflict in Gaza and Lebanon.
In the previous first three instances, all outfits were integrated into the political fold of their countries, revealing the flimsy nature of badging organisations as terrorist entities. War makers and practitioners of violence can become peacemakers and creatures of paper pushing officialdom. Such transformations take time and an acid bath of reality.
That backdrop offers context in understanding, and sternly critiquing, the hysteria of critics keen to press charges against those sporting Hezbollah symbols. At the very least, it should consider the mockery that is free speech in a country such as Australia, awash with authoritarians concerned about the watery concept of social cohesion. Down under, the skimpy protections for free speech are being whittled away year by year. The Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Prohibited Hate Symbols and Other Measures) Bill 2023, passed in December last year, makes it an offence to publicly display and trade in prohibited symbols, along with the Nazi salute. Prohibited symbols are defined as prohibited Nazi symbols or “a prohibited terrorist organisation symbol.”
The Criminal Code Act 1995 as amended, offers a number of glutinous elements that must be made out in such a charge. They are thickly unclear and, it follows, difficult to apply. To be charged with a prohibited symbol offence, a reasonable person (drafters can never resist this feeble term) would have to consider that any public display would involve dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority, hatred or constitute incitement “to offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate”. That same inscrutable reasonable person would also consider the display to involve “advocacy of hatred of a group of persons distinguished by race, religion or nationality or a member of the targeted group” with the incitement element also present. Thirdly, such conduct must be “likely to offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate a reasonable person who is a member of a group distinguished by race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion or national or social origin.”
These elements are nonsensical, attempting to impose unmeasurable standards about feelings that are rarely reasonable and always almost subjective. Subjectively, people are constantly offended by what they disagree with. The whole field of political opinion is one lengthy record of taking offence. It quickly follows that some might also be intimidated, insulted, or humiliated by an opponent’s contrary view, notably when it comes to discrediting a position. Freedom of speech, axiomatically, requires the exclusion of the offended from consideration. But the concept is fragile in Australia’s regulation-crazed environment.
Arrests have already been made. On October 2, a 19-year-old woman was arrested and charged for publicly displaying the symbol of a prohibited organisation at a Sydney demonstration. The question, however, is whether did so with the requisite intention, absurdly determined by the hypothetical reasonable person, to incite offence, insult, humiliation and intimidation. Ahead of protests scheduled for October 6 and 7, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, not wishing to find himself in a messy quagmire of prosecution and confusion, warned that they should not take place. “It would not advance any cause. It would cause a great deal of distress.” Again, free speech, felled by the concept of hurt feelings.
The Australian Federal Police (AFP) has created a dedicated taskforce to investigate nine allegations of prohibited symbols being displayed in Victoria, demonstrating how vagueness in legislation is always good for creating work for idle authorities. Operation Ardana will consider the display of such symbols “while potentially inciting or advocating violence, or hatred, based on race and religion.”
AFP Deputy Commissioner Krissy Barrett offers her view about what behaviour would satisfy the test. “The context around the conduct is extremely important … If they’re holding the flag, what are they saying? What are they chanting? What are they wearing? What sort of physical behaviour are they demonstrating?”
The Home Minister Tony Burke is only too grateful to leave it to Barrett and her colleagues, given his own muddle about how such laws are to apply. Instead of offering any clarifications, he has warned mischievous Hezbollah flag wavers that they risk losing their visas. “We don’t know whether they are actually on visas … [but] we do have a higher standard if you’re on a visa.”
Opposition Leader, Peter Dutton, all sledgehammer and no grace, senses room for political exploitation, ostensibly calling for legal improvements to an already shabby law. “The laws already exist, and if the laws are inadequate then the Australian Federal Commissioner should advise the minister and the parliament should deal with it as a matter of urgency.”
In addition to the Commonwealth law, states laws also exist to layer the prosecution case. The Victorian Premier Jacinta Allan, for instance, is convinced that Victoria police had the relevant powers to deal with those who “may be displaying terrorist flags”.
With the paranoid authoritarians in charge, the very concept of valid protest has been reduced to a hint, a suggestion. Keep it anodyne and any relevant arguments humbly polite. Avoid the inherent brutality of a broadening bloody conflict hostile to international law. Most of all, make social cohesion a license to muzzle.
Why Hezbollah’s still standing despite Israel assassinating Hassan Nasrallah
Israel’s bloody escalation of violence against Lebanon in the past few weeks has dealt a huge blow to Hezbollah, especially following the killing of Hassan Nasrallah. This started with the explosion of communication devices used by Hezbollah members, including civilians and soldiers, which killed 39 people and wounded several thousands. The attack was followed by a catastrophic bombing campaign which led to the assassination of the party’s high military and political personalities, as well as killing of nearly two thousand civilians and displacing over a million people.
Cult of personality
In the past decades, a cult of personality had developed in the party’s propaganda around Hassan Nasrallah. This was notably reflected in the aftermath of Israel’s war on Lebanon in 2006 when their initial slogan “Al-Nasr al-îlâhi” was changed to “Nasr(un) min Allâh” (A Victory from God), which was an instrumentalization of Hassan Nasrallah’s name. This was part of the cultivation of the leader’s image in the Party’s media campaigns.
Whilst Hezbollah enjoyed significant popularity among other Lebanese religious sects and even across the Middle East and North Africa, Nasrallah’s popularity outside of the party’s base had considerably reduced after the 2006 war. There were a number of reasons for this, including Hezbollah using its military capacities against other national actors. For example, in 2008 the party invaded particular neighbourhoods in West Beirut and military confrontations occurred in other regions, notably in the Chouf, after the Lebanese government announced that it wanted to dismantle the party’s communications network.
In addition to this, the Party later participated in the bloody repression of the Syrian uprising alongside the despotic Syrian regime, which also created sectarian tensions in Lebanon.
Hezbollah has also been amongst the parties considered responsible for the economic and financial crisis of 2019 as it has been part of every national unity government since 2005. Nasrallah vehemently opposed the protest movement that year, and went as far as accusing those taking to the streets of being financed by foreign embassies. Hezbollah members were even sent to attack the demonstrators.
Over the past few years Hezbollah members have been involved in several sectarian tensions with members of other religious sects, and has been accused of being one of the main actors obstructing the investigation into the explosions at the port of Beirut in August 2020.
For all of these reasons, Hezbollah has grown more and more politically and socially isolated outside its Shi’a popular base. Rather than being seen as a national resistance figure, Nasrallah was also increasingly perceived as a sectarian “Zaim” defending his party’s own political interests and those of authoritarian regimes, like Syria and Iran.
It is this isolation that has contributed to the party wanting to avoid a total war with Israel following 7 October. By adopting calculated and moderate action against Israeli military targets, Hezbollah has attempted to prevent the conflict from being exploited by internal political enemies within Lebanon, as this would in turn make the party the main actor responsible for all the country’s misfortunes. However, Israel’s current war on Lebanon, with the support of the USA, has severely undermined this plan.
What now?
In this context, Hezbollah’s officials are trying to demonstrate that the party is continuing in the former party secretary general’s path following his assassination and that of a number of high military and political cadres. The interim leader Naim Qassem stressed this to supporters and members in his speech, when he declared: "We continue Hassan Nasrallah’s footsteps".
For Hezbollah, the priorities are now to firstly protect its internal structures and chain of commands, including by filling the void at the top of the party regarding the various political and military responsibilities, and electing a new secretary general.
Secondly, the Party seeks to maintain its objectives regarding the war with Israel: no separation of the Gaza and Lebanese fronts until a ceasefire in the Gaza strip, and to maintain and protect its military infrastructures and capacities, including long range missiles and rockets, from Israel’s attacks and ground offensives.
It is important to note that despite the considerable blows, the Party still currently remains the most important political actor in Lebanon. It also maintains an influence exceeding its national borders, particularly in Syria, also representing Teheran’s political regional interests.
Indeed Hezbollah’s military capacities remain as their key assets, despite Israeli infiltration, a weakening of internal communication, and a large number of their military experienced commanders having been assassinated. Notably, it has a vast arsenal of rockets and missiles. For the first time since 7 October, the Party recently used various Fadi missiles (middle-range missiles), to strike military sites in the outskirts of the cities of Haifa and Tel Aviv. Furthermore, during the Israeli army’s initial attempts to infiltrate Lebanese territories, Hezbollah’s soldiers destroyed their Merkava tanks, injuring and killing some of their soldiers.
Alongside its armed movement, the party has a large network of institutions providing key and essential services, though this has partially been undermined by the war and consequently the ever-increasing needs of the population. In this context, Hezbollah’s popular base will most probably remain – especially in the absence of an inclusive political alternative and in the midst of a continuous economic crisis with a non-functioning state.
On the regional level, Hezbollah still benefits from the support of Iran, even if the strength of this has been undermined amongst sections of the party following Israel’s recent assassinations and destruction. Indeed, Teheran’s strategic objectives, particularly since 7 October, have been to improve its regional geopolitical position in order to strengthen their future negotiating power with the US on nuclear issues and sanctions. They also see this as a way of guaranteeing political and security interests, whilst preventing a direct regional conflict with Israel and the US.
Iran’s latest retaliation against Israel, which has not resulted in significant damages, should be seen in this framework. Of course through this they have also attempted to reaffirm a form of deterrence, although it’s been unequal compared to the superiority of Israeli military capacities and the support provided by Washington. Moreover, this won’t stop Israel’s war on Lebanon.
It is fair to say that Hezbollah is in the most dangerous situation since its foundation, which is unlikely to improve soon given Israel’s continued attacks, and the party’s isolation within Lebanon.
While the main strengths of the movement has been to build a strong and disciplined organisation, and not a “one man show” - despite the cult-like support for Nasrallah, the party’s ability to widen its base is very much restricted by its political strategy and orientation. Hezbollah has not been engaged in building a counterhegemonic project that challenges the Lebanese sectarian and neoliberal system. In fact, it has actively sustained it by becoming one of its main defenders.
Moreover, the party has been acting as the leading nexus of Iranian influence and interests in the region, particularly following the eruption of uprisings in Syria and across the Middle East and North Africa since 2011, which also promotes a neoliberal authoritarian order opposed to the emancipation and liberation of the popular classes.
In other words, Hezbollah, like other regional political actors involved in the resistance against Israel, is incapable of building a large movement linking democratic and social issues, opposing all imperialist and sub-imperialist forces, while promoting social transformation from below through the construction of movements in which the popular classes are the real actors of their emancipation.
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