Moscow Likely To Trigger Outrage If It Forces Protesters To Fight In Ukraine – Analysis

Russians protest war in Ukraine. Photo Credit: Владислав Постников, Wikipedia Commons

 November 6, 2024

By Paul Goble

Moscow has used a variety of measures to fill the ever-depleting ranks of its army in Ukraine to avoid the declaration of a new mobilization (see EDM, July 30, August 7, October 10). Many in Russia fear that a new mobilization could spark massive protests and even threaten the current regime, given what happened after Russian President Vladimir Putin declared a partial mobilization in September 2022.

These measures range from paying enormous bonuses to pardoning violent prisoners and even releasing those charged but not yet convicted of crimes (see EDM, September 18, 2023; Verstka, July 24). Now, it appears set to take another step in this direction by forcing protesters into the Russian military, regardless of the issues animating their demonstrations. The Kremlin has compelling reasons to send protesters to fight. While protests against the war have been small and scattered, protests regarding other issues have been growing despite the rising tide of repression, especially in non-Russian republics.

The risks, however, of taking such a step are significant, including a dramatic increase in anti-war attitudes and larger and more impassioned demonstrations. Most importantly for the Kremlin, it could also lead to a decline in support for Putin himself, potentially prompting a move against him and his regime (see EDM, March 8, 2021, April 13, 2023, July 30;TRTRussian, February 10).

The first indication that the Kremlin may soon draft protesters comes from Dagestan, one of the poorest, most Islamic, and most restive regions in the Russian Federation. Dagestan, however, also has the potential to be the region where such a change in policy is most likely. The North Caucasian republic was the site of some of the most dramatic protests against Putin’s partial mobilization two years ago and has often been considered a bellwether for policies Moscow frequently goes on to extend to the Russian Federation as a whole (Vedomosti; RBC, February 8, 2018; see EDM, September 29, 2022).

Recently, a group of Dagestani veterans of Putin’s war in Ukraine called on the republic’s leadership to send those protesting land transfers to veterans to fight in Ukraine (Kavkaz Realii, November 4). This issue could easily intertwine with complaints about the war, especially where regional leaders have been forced to use more forceful means to meet the state-imposed recruitment quotas because they lack the funds to pay the bonuses other, better-off regions can afford (Sibir Realii, April 27; Window on Eurasia, April 29). As the war continues, this fundamental reality is likely to intensify in Dagestan and spread to other poorer republics and predominantly non-ethnic Russian regions as well—precisely the places where Putin has drawn for the soldiers to fight in Ukraine (Window On Eurasia, September 29, 2022).

Despite this, two other issues Dagestan faces attract more attention and obscure this reality even as they exacerbate it. These include the growing land shortages due to the republic’s burgeoning population and unresolved conflicts arising from Soviet leader Joseph Stalin’s deportation of nationalities and their return. Both of these problems are behind the call by Dagestani and ethnic Avar veterans of Putin’s war in Ukraine for the impressment of ethnic Chechens resisting the transfer of land to said Avars. The Chechens are opposed to this because they believe—with support from Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov—that the territory is theirs and should become the nucleus of a restored Chechen district in Dagestan or even transferred en bloc from Dagestan to Chechnya. (On this complicated history and its current manifestations, see EDM, February 27, 2020; Window on Eurasia, March 8, March 13).

The Avar veterans are outraged by this Chechen resistance, which has taken the form of challenges to the deeds given to the Avar veterans last summer and the removal of border markers between the two republics. The former forced the Dagestani authorities in Makhachkala to meet with the Avars at the end of October to reassure the veterans that their rights will be respected (RIA Dagaestan, August 6; Administration of the Municipality of Kazbekovsky Region, October 31).

The ethnic Chechens in Dagestan, for their part, show no signs of backing down and insist that the land transfers to the Avar veterans are a violation of Makhachkala’s program to restore the Chechen Aukh district in Dagestan by 2025, claiming that they will continue to engage in protests against any moves by the Avars or anyone else that threatens that goal (Kavkaz Realii, March 4; VK.com/che_fighters, August 15; Window on Eurasia, October 20). The Avars, however, insist that the land Moscow and Makhachkala have given them is beyond the borders of the promised Chechen district (Kavkaz Realii, April 27). Neither the Chechens in Dagestan nor the Chechens in Grozny accept this, and more protests are likely in the coming weeks and months.

Given Moscow’s concerns about an explosion in the most Islamic republic of the Russian Federation, as well as about Chechnya’s increasing support for ethnic Chechens in Dagestan, the Kremlin has been drawn into the disagreement. Most commentators have focused on the ethnic and religious aspects of the situation, but as important as these are, Moscow is more focused on the needs of the army for Putin’s war in Ukraine.

Any question of dragooning protesters into the Russian army, even from a single republic, is likely to cast a far larger shadow in the short term. Forcing protesters in Dagestan to serve in the army will raise the specter that something similar will soon happen elsewhere, intimidating many and outraging others, creating new problems for Moscow. Kremlin officials understand that, but they also know that if Moscow fails to compel demonstrators to serve, it will not be able to maintain, let alone grow, the size of its military force in Ukraine.

Putin certainly believes that he can keep things quiet by increasing repression to focus on his immediate goal. That likely means he will give the green light to drafting protesters first in Dagestan and then elsewhere. This may be a good bet in the short term, but it looks to be a losing one in the longer term. Consequently, what appears to be on the verge of taking place in Dagestan now could soon cast a large, dark, and fateful shadow on the Putin regime. 

• This article was published at The Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 21 Issue