With Assad in Moscow and armed rebels taking control of Latakia governorate, what will become of Russia’s military bases in Syria?
The Tartus naval base
Located 160 kilometers (99 miles) northwest of Damascus, Russia’s naval base in the port city of Tartus is officially called the 720th Material-Technical Support Point of the Russian Navy. According to Russian law, it’s the only naval facility located outside of the country (the Sevastopol Naval Base is located on internationally recognized Ukrainian territory, though Moscow hasn’t acknowledged this since its illegal annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014).
The naval facility in Tartus was established in 1971, after Bashar al-Assad’s father, Hafez al-Assad, came to power. The base was meant to support the Soviet Navy’s 5th Operational Squadron in the Mediterranean, serving as a repair and replenishment point. In the 1980s, it included three floating piers, a floating workshop, storage facilities, barracks, and other amenities. After the Soviet Union’s collapse, the 5th Operational Squadron ceased to exist, but the Russian Navy retained the base at Tartus.
The bitter truth is that events in Russia affect your life, too. Help Meduza continue to bring news from Russia to readers around the world by setting up a monthly donation.
Until 2007, Russia used the base to refuel and replenish food supplies for its ships that occasionally passed through the Mediterranean Sea. Then, shortly after the Russo-Georgian War in August 2008, the naval base became the subject of talks between then-President Dmitry Medvedev and Bashar al-Assad. Soon after, the Russian Navy installed another floating pier and, in the years that followed, the base underwent planned infrastructure repairs.
After the Syrian civil war broke out in 2011, the Tartus naval base became a “window” for Russian military aid to Assad’s forces. In 2013, the Russian Navy command formed a new squadron in the Mediterranean Sea and decided to further modernize the facility at Tartus to service and repair its ships. After Russia launched its intervention in the Syrian civil war in September 2015, Tartus became a logistics center in its supply chain — the final stop for the dozens of military and civilian ships delivering cargo from Black Sea ports (also known as the “Syrian Express”).
In 2016–2017, Russia deployed S-300 and S-400 air defense missile systems and Pantsir-S1 air defence missile-gun systems to the Tartus naval base, expanded the facility’s pier, and built canteens, bathhouses, warehouses, and a helipad.
In January 2017, Russia and Syria signed a treaty allowing Moscow to expand the facility and use the Tartus base free-of-charge for 49 years. The agreement allowed Russia to keep up to 11 ships at Tartus.
The Khmeimim airfield
Russia’s other key base in Syria is the airfield at Khmeimim, located southeast of the port city of Latakia, the administrative center of the Latakia governorate. The Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) built the base adjacent to the Bassel Al-Assad International Airport following Russia’s military intervention in Syria in 2015.
In the less than 10 years since, Khmeimim has become a Russian stronghold in Syria. In addition to housing some fifty planes and helicopters, thousands of troops (including Wagner Group mercenaries), and their family members, robust infrastructure has grown up around the base, including a Russian Orthodox Church, a sports complex, and a concert hall. The airfield’s two runways can even accommodate strategic bombers and heavy-class military transport aircraft.
During the active fighting in the Syrian civil war in 2015–2016, Russian fighter jets and bombers carried out tens of thousands of combat sorties from the facility, largely ensuring the Syrian government’s victory over opposition forces. Even on December 7, the eve of the al-Assad regime’s fall, Russian Aerospace Forces carried out airstrikes on rebel positions, allegedly killing more than 300 “terrorists” (the Russian authorities stopped using this term to refer to anti-government forces in Syria the very next day).
From ‘terrorists’ and ‘militants’ to ‘opposition’ and ‘new authorities’ How Russian propaganda’s rhetoric evolved as the Assad regime fell 18 hours ago
What will happen to these bases now?
The situation in Syria is evolving rapidly, so neither experts nor the Russian authorities have a clear answer to this question at the moment.
Russia reduced its military presence in Syria after its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Whereas at the peak of Russia’s military intervention there were likely as many as several tens of thousands of Russian servicemen and Wagner Group mercenaries in Syria, by the fall of 2024, their number was estimated at 7,500. And it’s hard to tell how much the contingent’s technical arsenal has been reduced.
Everything that can be said with any degree of certainty was summarized in this thread on X by Dara Massicot, a senior fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Citing OSINT-analyst Frederik Van Lokeren, Massicot notes that as of December 7, most of Russia’s ships were still in or near the port at Tartus. (Following earlier reports that Russian ships had begun evacuating the base, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov claimed that this maneuver was connected to Russian naval exercises in the Mediterranean Sea.) Massicot also recalls that these vessels wouldn’t be able to return to the Black Sea, since Ankara has closed off the Turkish straits to warships amid the Russia-Ukraine war. “[T]hey would have to attempt a very long journey to the Baltic Fleet, or try to find a temporary accommodation nearby at a limited number of ports (Libya, Sudan, Algeria),” she explains.
The prospects for evacuating the Khmeimim Air Base are even less clear. “An air evacuation would take hundreds of sorties of Il-76 and An-124,” Massicot writes, referring to two types of heavy transport planes. “When Russian forces deployed to Syria in 2015, they flew almost 300 sorties in two weeks, and that was before base expansion.” That said, a significant portion of the base’s equipment and supplies were delivered by sea in due time.
RUSSIA’S HAWKS REACT TO ASSAD’S FALL
Russian z-bloggers process their shock and outrage over Assad’s overthrow in Syria
a day ago
So far, OSINT analysts have observed some signs of a possible evacuation. On December 7, satellite imagery showed that three Il-76s and one An-124 arrived at the base, and then flew to Russia via Turkish airspace. According to Massicot, these aircraft were likely taking cargo and people out of Syria, but they could have also brought in mercenaries or weapons to defend Russian bases. “Il-76s (and less often An-124) land at Khmeimim as a major transport hub, sporadic arrivals were part of normal patterns. A change signifying a major evacuation will be clear,” she says.
“What happens to the fighter aircraft will also be very telling,” Massicot continues. “If Russia thinks they are going to be attacked, they can fly out the way they got them in. They can also pack up helicopters and air defense in An-124s, too.”
The fate of the Khmeimim Air Base is also important for Moscow in terms of supplying the Africa Corps, an entity the Russian Defense Ministry created to absorb and replace Wagner Group structures on the continent. Russian military transport aircraft traveled to countries in Africa via an air corridor through the Caspian Sea, Iran, and Iraq, and then refueled at the base in Syria. The Russian military command doesn’t have any other facilities at its disposal that could replace the Khmeimim airfield in this role.
It’s worth noting that there are also separate pockets of Russian military presence at other Syrian facilities. According to pro-Kremlin war correspondents, some Russian servicemen are literally stranded at airfields and bases deep inside the country that are now surrounded by rebel forces. The amount of troops and equipment at these facilities remains unclear.
The task of evacuating Russia’s bases in Syria is objectively complicated by the situation on the ground. Rebel forces have come very close to these locations, which means transport and the bases themselves will be within range of even small arms. Without security guarantees from the supporters of the new Syrian government, any routes for evacuating personnel and assets by land, air, or sea will be unavailable.
December 9, 2024
Source: Meduza
Following the rapid overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Moscow is now facing the prospect of losing its naval and air bases in Syria. Russia’s two key bases are located in the Latakia governorate, which is already under the control of rebel groups. Syrian opposition forces have yet to take an official stance on their relationship with the Russian military contingent currently stationed in Syria. And Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has deemed it “too early” to talk about preserving the Russian bases at Khmeimim and Tartus. “This is a subject for discussion with those who will lead Syria,” he said on Monday. By all appearances, however, this “discussion” is already underway. Citing diplomats involved in talks between Russia, Iran, Turkey, and “leading Arab nations,” the Wall Street Journal reports that Moscow has “likely received commitments” that it could maintain its bases in Syria as “part of a transition.” But to what extent the Syrian rebels will honor those commitments remains unknown. Meduza breaks down what facilities Russia has in Syria and why their future is so uncertain.
Russia’s military bases in Syria
Source: Meduza
Following the rapid overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Moscow is now facing the prospect of losing its naval and air bases in Syria. Russia’s two key bases are located in the Latakia governorate, which is already under the control of rebel groups. Syrian opposition forces have yet to take an official stance on their relationship with the Russian military contingent currently stationed in Syria. And Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has deemed it “too early” to talk about preserving the Russian bases at Khmeimim and Tartus. “This is a subject for discussion with those who will lead Syria,” he said on Monday. By all appearances, however, this “discussion” is already underway. Citing diplomats involved in talks between Russia, Iran, Turkey, and “leading Arab nations,” the Wall Street Journal reports that Moscow has “likely received commitments” that it could maintain its bases in Syria as “part of a transition.” But to what extent the Syrian rebels will honor those commitments remains unknown. Meduza breaks down what facilities Russia has in Syria and why their future is so uncertain.
Russia’s military bases in Syria
The Tartus naval base
Located 160 kilometers (99 miles) northwest of Damascus, Russia’s naval base in the port city of Tartus is officially called the 720th Material-Technical Support Point of the Russian Navy. According to Russian law, it’s the only naval facility located outside of the country (the Sevastopol Naval Base is located on internationally recognized Ukrainian territory, though Moscow hasn’t acknowledged this since its illegal annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014).
The naval facility in Tartus was established in 1971, after Bashar al-Assad’s father, Hafez al-Assad, came to power. The base was meant to support the Soviet Navy’s 5th Operational Squadron in the Mediterranean, serving as a repair and replenishment point. In the 1980s, it included three floating piers, a floating workshop, storage facilities, barracks, and other amenities. After the Soviet Union’s collapse, the 5th Operational Squadron ceased to exist, but the Russian Navy retained the base at Tartus.
The bitter truth is that events in Russia affect your life, too. Help Meduza continue to bring news from Russia to readers around the world by setting up a monthly donation.
Until 2007, Russia used the base to refuel and replenish food supplies for its ships that occasionally passed through the Mediterranean Sea. Then, shortly after the Russo-Georgian War in August 2008, the naval base became the subject of talks between then-President Dmitry Medvedev and Bashar al-Assad. Soon after, the Russian Navy installed another floating pier and, in the years that followed, the base underwent planned infrastructure repairs.
After the Syrian civil war broke out in 2011, the Tartus naval base became a “window” for Russian military aid to Assad’s forces. In 2013, the Russian Navy command formed a new squadron in the Mediterranean Sea and decided to further modernize the facility at Tartus to service and repair its ships. After Russia launched its intervention in the Syrian civil war in September 2015, Tartus became a logistics center in its supply chain — the final stop for the dozens of military and civilian ships delivering cargo from Black Sea ports (also known as the “Syrian Express”).
In 2016–2017, Russia deployed S-300 and S-400 air defense missile systems and Pantsir-S1 air defence missile-gun systems to the Tartus naval base, expanded the facility’s pier, and built canteens, bathhouses, warehouses, and a helipad.
In January 2017, Russia and Syria signed a treaty allowing Moscow to expand the facility and use the Tartus base free-of-charge for 49 years. The agreement allowed Russia to keep up to 11 ships at Tartus.
The Khmeimim airfield
Russia’s other key base in Syria is the airfield at Khmeimim, located southeast of the port city of Latakia, the administrative center of the Latakia governorate. The Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) built the base adjacent to the Bassel Al-Assad International Airport following Russia’s military intervention in Syria in 2015.
In the less than 10 years since, Khmeimim has become a Russian stronghold in Syria. In addition to housing some fifty planes and helicopters, thousands of troops (including Wagner Group mercenaries), and their family members, robust infrastructure has grown up around the base, including a Russian Orthodox Church, a sports complex, and a concert hall. The airfield’s two runways can even accommodate strategic bombers and heavy-class military transport aircraft.
During the active fighting in the Syrian civil war in 2015–2016, Russian fighter jets and bombers carried out tens of thousands of combat sorties from the facility, largely ensuring the Syrian government’s victory over opposition forces. Even on December 7, the eve of the al-Assad regime’s fall, Russian Aerospace Forces carried out airstrikes on rebel positions, allegedly killing more than 300 “terrorists” (the Russian authorities stopped using this term to refer to anti-government forces in Syria the very next day).
From ‘terrorists’ and ‘militants’ to ‘opposition’ and ‘new authorities’ How Russian propaganda’s rhetoric evolved as the Assad regime fell 18 hours ago
What will happen to these bases now?
The situation in Syria is evolving rapidly, so neither experts nor the Russian authorities have a clear answer to this question at the moment.
Russia reduced its military presence in Syria after its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Whereas at the peak of Russia’s military intervention there were likely as many as several tens of thousands of Russian servicemen and Wagner Group mercenaries in Syria, by the fall of 2024, their number was estimated at 7,500. And it’s hard to tell how much the contingent’s technical arsenal has been reduced.
Everything that can be said with any degree of certainty was summarized in this thread on X by Dara Massicot, a senior fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Citing OSINT-analyst Frederik Van Lokeren, Massicot notes that as of December 7, most of Russia’s ships were still in or near the port at Tartus. (Following earlier reports that Russian ships had begun evacuating the base, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov claimed that this maneuver was connected to Russian naval exercises in the Mediterranean Sea.) Massicot also recalls that these vessels wouldn’t be able to return to the Black Sea, since Ankara has closed off the Turkish straits to warships amid the Russia-Ukraine war. “[T]hey would have to attempt a very long journey to the Baltic Fleet, or try to find a temporary accommodation nearby at a limited number of ports (Libya, Sudan, Algeria),” she explains.
The prospects for evacuating the Khmeimim Air Base are even less clear. “An air evacuation would take hundreds of sorties of Il-76 and An-124,” Massicot writes, referring to two types of heavy transport planes. “When Russian forces deployed to Syria in 2015, they flew almost 300 sorties in two weeks, and that was before base expansion.” That said, a significant portion of the base’s equipment and supplies were delivered by sea in due time.
RUSSIA’S HAWKS REACT TO ASSAD’S FALL
Russian z-bloggers process their shock and outrage over Assad’s overthrow in Syria
a day ago
So far, OSINT analysts have observed some signs of a possible evacuation. On December 7, satellite imagery showed that three Il-76s and one An-124 arrived at the base, and then flew to Russia via Turkish airspace. According to Massicot, these aircraft were likely taking cargo and people out of Syria, but they could have also brought in mercenaries or weapons to defend Russian bases. “Il-76s (and less often An-124) land at Khmeimim as a major transport hub, sporadic arrivals were part of normal patterns. A change signifying a major evacuation will be clear,” she says.
“What happens to the fighter aircraft will also be very telling,” Massicot continues. “If Russia thinks they are going to be attacked, they can fly out the way they got them in. They can also pack up helicopters and air defense in An-124s, too.”
The fate of the Khmeimim Air Base is also important for Moscow in terms of supplying the Africa Corps, an entity the Russian Defense Ministry created to absorb and replace Wagner Group structures on the continent. Russian military transport aircraft traveled to countries in Africa via an air corridor through the Caspian Sea, Iran, and Iraq, and then refueled at the base in Syria. The Russian military command doesn’t have any other facilities at its disposal that could replace the Khmeimim airfield in this role.
It’s worth noting that there are also separate pockets of Russian military presence at other Syrian facilities. According to pro-Kremlin war correspondents, some Russian servicemen are literally stranded at airfields and bases deep inside the country that are now surrounded by rebel forces. The amount of troops and equipment at these facilities remains unclear.
The task of evacuating Russia’s bases in Syria is objectively complicated by the situation on the ground. Rebel forces have come very close to these locations, which means transport and the bases themselves will be within range of even small arms. Without security guarantees from the supporters of the new Syrian government, any routes for evacuating personnel and assets by land, air, or sea will be unavailable.
With Syria’s Collapse Russia’s Regional Power Play Disintegrates
By Dan White & Maxim Trudolyubov on December 9, 2024
Damascus, Syria - Poster with Syrian President Bashar Al Assad in May 2023.
Moscow’s unexpected decision not to prop up Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria this time, followed by the regime’s collapse, resonates with Russia’s Cold War–era geopolitical legacy. For decades, Syria was the linchpin of a network of Soviet-backed and Soviet-aligned regimes in the Middle East—a crucial foothold and strategic asset in Moscow’s global rivalry with the West. With Assad’s fall, the last remnant of that Cold War–era network may be on the verge of disappearing.
The future of Russia’s military bases in Syria remains uncertain, but Moscow has already begun efforts to secure some foothold in the region—with or without Assad. If Russia manages to maintain a presence, it will likely be under a new power structure dominated by regional players such as Turkey, significantly diminishing Moscow’s once dominant role. Russia’s naval and airbases in Syria are essential for Moscow’s capacity to assert its influence across the Middle East and Africa, where it is involved in distant conflicts spanning Libya, Sudan, the Central African Republic, Mali, and Niger.
Failed Attempt to Revive the Cold War Playbook
Russia’s military intervention in 2015 was a calculated attempt at a revival of its Cold War strategy, aimed at reasserting influence in the Middle East. Under the pretext of combating terrorism, Moscow deployed its air force, special forces, and military advisers, reshaping the course of the Syrian civil war. This intervention entrenched Russia’s presence in the eastern Mediterranean, securing a naval base in Tartus, leased for forty-nine years in 2017, and the Khmeimim airbase in Latakia—strategic footholds echoing Soviet-era military deployments. The mission to Syria bolstered Russia’s image as a global power, and was for years viewed as a more significant foreign policy issue by the average Russian than the conflict in Eastern Ukraine or relations with the West.
The then U.S. administration, while critical of Russia’s intervention, responded cautiously but acknowledged that both nations shared an interest in defeating ISIS, a stance for which it was criticized at the time. That limited cooperation consisted largely of the establishment of deconfliction channels to prevent accidental clashes and coordinate airspace operations.
In December 2017, Vladimir Putin struck a triumphant tone. Speaking at Khmeimim, he proclaimed that Syria had been preserved as a sovereign and independent state. He also announced the victorious completion of Russia’s main military operation in the country. “If the terrorists raise their heads again, we will deal unprecedented strikes unlike anything they have seen.” In 2024, nothing of the kind happened. In the lead-up to the capture of Damascus, Russian bombers made attempts to slow the rebel advance but fell far short of the intensive bombing campaigns seen in 2016–2017. The United States’s cautious approach seems to have proven strategically sound and ultimately justified.
“Axis of Resistance” Severely Weakened
Official Moscow’s shift on Assad has been striking. In an ironic about-face, Russian officials abruptly stopped labeling the advancing forces “terrorists” and, on the day of Assad’s fall, referred to them as the “opposition” instead. Meanwhile, Russia’s embassy in Damascus has continued to operate. In Moscow, a group of men raised the opposition flag at the Syrian embassy a day after Bashar al-Assad’s government fell. “Today, the [Syrian] embassy opened and is functioning normally under a new flag,” an embassy representative told Russia’s state news agency TASS on Monday.
Russia’s state-controlled media have quickly adapted, offering a platform to former Assad officials who have become his fiercest critics overnight. “The shameful and humiliating escape of the head of this system under the cover of night, without any sense of national responsibility to the country, confirms the need for change and awakens hope for a better future,” Syrian Ambassador to Moscow Bashar al-Jaafari said of Assad's flight from Damascus in an exclusive interview with RT Arabic.
Days before Sunday, speculation mounted that Moscow was preparing to abandon Assad. According to a Bloomberg report citing a source close to the Kremlin, by last Friday Russia had no plan to save Assad and saw little chance of one emerging as long as the Syrian president’s army continued retreating from key positions. At the time, the Russian embassy in Damascus advised Russian citizens that commercial flights were still available for those wishing to leave.
That same day, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi declared Tehran’s readiness to support Assad “to the extent necessary,” though he offered no specifics. Previously, Iran had only promised to “consider” requests for troop deployments—a tepid assurance from a nation that considers Syria a central pillar of its so-called axis of resistance against the West. Iran’s restraint may have been influenced by its direct and indirect clashes with U.S.-backed Israeli forces.
Assad’s growing desperation became evident when reports surfaced that he had attempted to reach out to U.S. President-elect Donald Trump, first through the UAE and later through Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, in a last-ditch effort to secure support.
Remembering the Old Soviet Axis
Syria played a central role in the Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the West, particularly through its conflicts with Israel. The Soviet Union provided extensive military aid to Syria during the Six-Day War in 1967, the War of Attrition, and the Yom Kippur War in 1973. Soviet advisers trained Syrian military officers, while Damascus became a key recipient of Soviet-made tanks, fighter jets, and missile systems. For nearly four decades, until the late 1980s, Syria was the greatest Middle East recipient of Soviet economic, military, and political support.
A landmark endeavor was the construction of the Tabqa Dam on the Euphrates River. Initiated in 1968 and completed in 1973, this earth-fill dam created Lake Assad, Syria’s largest reservoir, significantly enhancing the country's hydroelectric capacity and irrigation systems. This combination of military and economic support underscored Syria’s strategic importance to Moscow during the Cold War, particularly as a front-line state in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Apart from Syria, the Soviets—at various times and to varying degrees—were involved with several key states across the Middle East and North Africa. In Egypt, in the late 1950s and 1960s, Moscow had a strategic alliance with Gamal Abdel Nasser, supplying arms, funding major infrastructure projects such as the Aswan Dam, and supporting his pan-Arab socialist agenda. In Iraq, Soviet ties strengthened after the Ba’athist Party seized power, with Moscow providing military and economic aid to successive regimes, including Saddam Hussein’s in its early years.
South Yemen became the only Marxist state in the Arab world, serving as a key ideological outpost with a bonus of privileged access to the port of Aden. In Libya, Muammar Gaddafi’s radical socialist government cultivated close ties with Moscow, receiving advanced weaponry and military training. Algeria, after winning its independence from France, also became a significant Soviet partner, benefiting from arms deals and economic assistance as it pursued a socialist development model.
The remnants of the old Soviet-backed order in the Middle East have now all but disappeared. Egypt pivoted westward after the 1970s; South Yemen ceased to exist as a separate state in 1990; Iraq fell to a U.S.-led invasion in 2003; Libya descended into chaos after Gaddafi’s ouster and assassination in 2011. A cooperation with Algeria does continue.
Assad’s regime, hollowed out by war, economic collapse, and international sanctions, depended increasingly on Russia and Iran, whose interests were never fully aligned. Russia sought geopolitical leverage; Iran pursued regional dominance through its proxy nonstate actors such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Houthis. Unlike the oil-rich monarchies of the Gulf or emerging powers with diversified economies, Assad’s Syria rested on a fragile foundation of military rule, foreign support, and repression—elements that crumbled once its two key backers chose to withdraw their support.
Kennan Institute
The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the authors and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.
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