No, Kim Jong Un Did Not Close the Door to Diplomacy With the US

by Joseph D. Terwilliger Posted onDecember 03, 2024

On November 22, DPRK leader Kim Jong Un gave a speech at the opening ceremony of a military hardware exhibition called “Defense Development -2024.” The New Republic’s spin on this speech went so far as to claim that “North Korea’s Kim Jong Un tells Trump to screw off – The North Korean leader has no interest in anything Donald Trump has to say.” But there is nothing substantively new in the content of this speech (official English translation here).

Earlier this summer, in response to the deployment of FA-18s to South Korea, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) published a commentary entitled “Whether the confrontation between the US and the DPRK stops will depend on the actions of the US.” This commentary appeared just after the Republican National Convention, where Trump said, in his speech accepting the nomination for the presidency, “I got along very well with [Kim Jong Un] … and it is nice to get along with someone who has a lot of nuclear weapons and otherwise.” In the KCNA commentary, it was acknowledged that “It is true that Trump, when he was president, tried to reflect the special personal relations between the heads of states in interstate relations, but he did not bring about any substantial positive change,” adding that “The foreign policy of a state and personal feelings between individuals must be strictly distinguished.”

They outlined numerous reasons why the DPRK does not trust any agreement they might make with the US. “Throughout our decades-long relationship with the United States, we have felt deeply and fully what dialogue has brought us and what has caused us to lose.” The article continues, “Watching the entire process of the Korea-US dialogue, the fair international community has already concluded that the US is a country that does not carry out its promises.”

They cited the example that “During the Clinton administration, the US-DPRK Agreed Framework was adopted as a result of dialogue, but the Bush administration put the brakes on its implementation under various pretexts, and eventually it was completely destroyed… The facts show that the United States is a ‘politically backward country’ and a ‘political rogue state’ that does not hesitate to overturn treaties or agreements between countries [when the domestic partisan political climate changes].”

After extensive discussion of why they distrust dialogue with the US, they concluded, “The US would do well to think carefully about the costs and benefits of continued DPRK-US confrontation and make the right choice about how to deal with us in the future. It is entirely up to the United States actions whether or not the confrontation between US and DPRK will stop.”  The implication is that they are indeed waiting for changes in US policy and action, not that they have shut the door to conversations – though based on the track record, they have little faith it will lead anywhere constructive.

If there is anything remarkable about the text of last week’s speech, it is how little has changed from July. Kim reiterated why he feels that a strong national defense capability is essential to the survival of their country in the face of existential threats emanating from Washington – the heart of the strongest military power on the face of the Earth.

Kim describes the tightening of the alliance between Washington, Seoul and Tokyo in recent years, especially with respect to nuclear sharing. Further, the increases in joint military exercises and deployment of sophisticated weapons systems against them were presented as evidence of the need for further development of their national defense capability through technological development and innovation.

In what appears to be an indirect nod to the fate of Ukraine, Kim added, “In today’s world, which is overheated by military clashes, a country that has given up self-defense cannot be called a truly sovereign state, and a weak country will inevitably be trampled by tyranny and will not be able to avoid the catastrophe of invasion.” Clearly, Kim Jong Un is not willing to negotiate away the nuclear deterrent that he believes to be the only guarantor of his regime’s continued survival.

Their sole statement about the potential for US – DPRK dialog is the following, which is entirely consistent with the July commentary, “We have already gone as far as we could go in negotiations with the United States, and what we were eventually convinced of was not the will of the superpower to coexist with us, but rather that their position of domineering force and their aggressive and hostile policy towards the DPRK will never change.” In other words, they are open to discussions and negotiations about peaceful coexistence and mutual recognition and respect, but not about nukes. This is an olive branch to the incoming Trump administration, laying out the parameters of potential future engagement.

The DPRK firmly believes the US is the primary threat to their sovereignty and to the continued existence of their regime, and they are not wrong about that.  They have tried dialogue with the Clinton administration and the first Trump administration and were left with nothing to show for their efforts despite making significant concessions that were rejected by the US, who insisted upon unilateral CVID (complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization). Of course, nothing the US offered them in return has ever been complete, verifiable or irreversible.

But the DPRK sees its nuclear deterrent as the only defense they have against the consistent bipartisan American desire for regime change in Pyongyang: Bush labeled the DPRK as part of an “Axis of Evil,”  Obama openly advocated for regime collapse, Trump’s National Security Advisor John Bolton promoted the “Libya model” for North Korean denuclearization, and Biden’s 2022 National Defense Plan specifically threatened regime change. To top this off, the United States has consistently refused to take the first use of nuclear weapons off the table in the event of conflict with the DPRK. Of course, they won’t give up their nuclear lifeline.

Recent history tells us that when the US threatens regime change, it often delivers when the military balance of power makes that a feasible option. Saddam Hussein and Moammar Qaddafi would testify to that if we hadn’t killed them.

The DPRK is right to suggest they have tried diplomacy over and over again with the United States, and nothing ever changes. Whether or not the Koreans comply with the terms of the agreement, as soon as the American administration changes, these agreements get broken by the US side. Attempts to prevent North Korea from developing a nuclear weapons program through military pressure and economic sanctions have failed spectacularly, and it is obvious to anyone that continued sanctions pressure and military provocations are not going to alter that calculus.

In last week’s speech, Kim Jong Un laid out the problem. “Never before have the two belligerents on the Korean Peninsula faced such a dangerously sharp confrontation that could any day escalate into a most destructive thermonuclear war,” he stated explicitly. “The extreme situation that has developed on the Korean Peninsula is in no way caused by a misunderstanding of the objectives of the other side.”

This is an accurate statement – the North Koreans feel that their country faces an existential threat, both from the military danger posed by the increased military buildup through the Seoul-Tokyo-Washington alliance, as well as what Kim characterizes as “unprecedentedly cruel sanctions and blockade against us.”

They are also unambiguously correct about the objectives of the other side – this summer, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol laid out his “unification doctrine” to pursue a “통일 대한민국” (Unified Republic of Korea – using the official name of South Korea), living under freedom and democracy, removing any ambiguity about his goal of unification by absorption, like Germany.

In such a tense environment, what could be accomplished by further negotiations in President Trump’s second term?

If denuclearization and unification are off the table, what is there to discuss? I might suggest peaceful coexistence and tension reduction on the peninsula might be the most important short-term goals worthy of pursuit at the moment. There is an urgent need for small steps to build trust and make both sides feel secure to reduce the risk of military miscalculation in such a tense environment.

If President Trump wants to try and resume any negotiations with the DPRK in his second term, he needs to think carefully about what he could possibly give the DPRK in any negotiation that would be seen as complete, verifiable and irreversible when the next American administration takes over the reins. Short of denuclearization, what could Trump and Kim agree about that would be as irreversible as possible?

One thing that would be hard to reverse would be signing a peace treaty to finally end the Korean War in lieu of the currently active “armistice agreement.” There is some momentum for such actions on Capitol Hill, where the Peace on the Korean Peninsula Act has been garnering increasingly bipartisan support. President Trump and Kim Jong Un agreed to work towards a stable and lasting peace regime on the Korean Peninsula in their joint statement at the Singapore Summit in 2018, and the ROK and DPRK leaders likewise pursued an end to the war in the Panmunjom Declaration in 2018. Clearly, this would be in the interests of both the US and DPRK and would also lead to an improved security environment for the ROK as well, and this would be irreversible unless or until a new war were to break out on the peninsula.

While CVID is completely off the table, the fact that it is even up for discussion implies an acknowledgment that the DPRK is a nuclear weapons state. That this has been written into their constitution makes it clear how important it is for them to be recognized as such. Only in political “science” is it considered rational to insist something is false when it is evidently true. We may not like that they have nuclear weapons, but they do, and President Trump should recognize this fact formally. The counterargument is that “If the US approves North Korea as a nuclear state in any form, that would be really traumatic for South Korea” and might encourage them to develop their nuclear arsenal, even though it would be of questionable value against an enemy whose capital is only 120 miles away.

Nevertheless, this argument for continuing to deny reality makes as little sense as suggesting that a physician should not tell a patient they have pancreatic cancer, because it might traumatize them. Failure to acknowledge reality does not make it any less real. The DPRK wants to be recognized as a nuclear state, and it costs nothing (outside of the non-scientific world of political “science”) to recognize the world as it is rather than as we wish it was.

The exchange of ambassadors between Washington and Pyongyang would be another step towards lasting peace that could be agreed to with minimal cost from either side. At present, the DPRK has diplomatic representation in the USA through its Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York City, which serves as the main point of contact between the US and DPRK when both sides want to communicate. But, the USA has no representative in Pyongyang at the moment.  It would benefit both sides to establish embassies in each other’s capital to provide a release valve when tensions erupt and to have real-time engagement with each other.

The purpose of diplomacy is to talk to each other to prevent military conflicts. We need diplomatic channels to be open in DPRK and Iran so that we can build a relationship and communicate more effectively with one another. While the DPRK has a physical office in the US, it is in New York, and their diplomats need special permission to travel more than 25 miles from Columbus Circle, making direct on-demand engagement with the US government or thinking in Washington less straightforward than it would be if they had an embassy there. This is another win-win proposal that would benefit both sides, but it is difficult to reverse.

In August 2017, President Trump’s State Department banned the use of American passports for travel to the DPRK. This ban has been renewed every year since then because of the perceived risk to Americans of “arbitrary detention.” The fact is that this ban removed all opportunities for interaction between Americans and North Koreans, and thus any possibility of engagement in cultural, scientific, academic, or sports interactions.

I used to teach at the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology, where I had the chance to live in the country and engage constructively with North Korean students. This was a great way to get to know these Koreans as human beings and to change how we see each other. That ended with the travel ban. In 2017, we also received funding for an exchange program between Columbia University and Kim Il Sung University in the DPRK, which was halted by this passport ban.

A chamber music group I am a member of, FilmHarmonic Brass, had a grant to visit the DPRK in 2018 to play some concerts and teach some masterclasses at the music conservatory, but this was also prevented by the passport ban. Additional plans we had for sports diplomacy with Dennis Rodman and others also fell apart when we were denied the right to travel there.

These forms of engagement were the only ways that average North Koreans and Americans had the chance to get to know each other as human beings rather than as caricatured enemies who are trying to kill them.  As part of the effort to repair the damaged relationships between the people of the US and the DPRK, President Trump should immediately discontinue this policy and allow regular American citizens like myself to get back to building relationships with their people.

Sanctions relief is inherently reversible when imposed unilaterally by the US, as we have seen many times in the past three decades, as are temporary pauses in military exercises and weapons tests. However, UN sanctions are a different story, as the reimposition of sanctions at the UN would require buy-in from Russia and China. These nine rounds of UN sanctions are the most crippling sanctions imposed on the DPRK.

Earlier this year, the Russian Federation vetoed the resolution to extend the mandate of the United Nations Panel of Experts, who were charged with enforcing these sanctions. The Russians argued that “recent years have made clear that sanctions have neither achieved the international community’s stated aims nor normalized the situation on the Peninsula. They have also not encouraged dialogue and yet impose a heavy burden on the population of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”

In the vote on this resolution, China abstained while Russia used its veto power. China and Russia have likewise proposed amending the sanctions resolutions such that they should be reviewed annually rather than continued indefinitely, as currently worded. Chinese UN Ambassador Geng Shuang stated, “China supports the comprehensive and accurate implementation of the Security Council’s sanctions against North Korea but has always advocated that sanctions should not be imposed for the sake of sanctions. It has always been believed that sanctions should not be immutable and should not be unlimited.”

To this end, rather than eliminating UN sanctions on the DPRK, subjecting these sanctions to annual review would be an irreversible change (at least without the agreement of China and Russia) that would give the DPRK hope of gradual sanctions relief at the UN, and effectively removing the US veto power over-relaxation of sanctions.

The US need not vote in favor of this resolution to make sanctions subject to annual review but merely abstain from vetoing said resolution. The US would be free to reimplement sanctions at any future time in a unilateral manner and would be free to try and convince the rest of the world to join them if the DPRK did anything sufficiently egregious. At the current moment, after signing the DPRK-Russia Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in June, the new full-scale alliance between Russia and the DPRK makes UN sanctions increasingly irrelevant anyway.

So there is room for negotiations, and there is much that needs to be talked about – capitalizing on the cordial personal relationship between Trump and Kim – despite the pessimism expressed by Kim Jong Un and his government over the past year. To avoid continual disappointment, however, we must focus on deliverables that are complete, verifiable, and irreversible from both sides.

Step-by-step trust-building can potentially set the stage for a return to conversations about denuclearization and Korean unification in the distant future, but the most urgent task for President Trump and Chairman Kim is to create an environment on the Korean Peninsula where the DPRK and ROK can coexist peacefully, without existential fears dominating the concerns of both sides. To this end, they should consider starting by signing a treaty to end the Korean War, exchanging ambassadors (or at least permanent liaison offices) in each other’s capital, ending the ban on the use of US passports for travel to the DPRK, recognizing the fact that they are a nuclear state and paving the way for incremental UN sanctions relief for the DPRK.

Although Einstein never said it, it is nevertheless accurate to say that “The definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.” Half a century of crippling economic sanctions, military provocations and disingenuous half-hearted negotiations did nothing to prevent the DPRK from becoming a nuclear state. Doubling down on the same failed policies will do nothing to prevent Iran and others from following suit, especially given the fates of Saddam and Qaddafi after they played ball with the US. Continuing to ostracize regimes we don’t like by labeling them as “rogue states” will be a self-fulfilling prophecy, forcing them to go “rogue” and pursue nuclear deterrents to survive. Perhaps it is time for the political “scientists” to accept that their strategy failed and that a new approach to the problem is necessary.

Joseph D. Terwilliger is Professor of Neurobiology at Columbia University Irving Medical Center, where his research focuses on natural experiments in human genetic epidemiology.  He is also active in science and sports diplomacy, having taught genetics at the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology, and accompanied Dennis Rodman on six “basketball diplomacy” trips to Asia since 2013.