The most difficult question about stopping the war in Sudan
December 18, 2024
by MEMO
A stuffed panda and a Sudanese flag are placed at a military checkpoint in Khartoum North on November 3, 2024.
A stuffed panda and a Sudanese flag are placed at a military checkpoint in Khartoum North on November 3, 2024.
[AMAURY FALT-BROWN/AFP via Getty Images]
by Shafie Khader Saeed
Defining and understanding the nature of the civil war in Sudan which started on 15 April, 2023 is important if we are to develop the essence of the vision required for negotiating its end. Formulating this vision is at the core of the efforts of Sudanese civil society and political groupings.
Arguably the most important and most difficult question is related to the future of the Sudan Army and its leadership and the options available for its post-war role. The armed forces need to be reformed, and modernised, as do the police and security agencies in such a way that recognises and accepts their nationalism, professionalism and monopoly over the military’s regular role in Sudan, subject to democratic standards and under civilian supervision.
There is also a need to address this along with a decision on the future of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and other militias. The options possible need to be explored for them to accept the principle of Sudan having a single, professional army as above.
Of course, a ceasefire and an end to hostilities require both parties, the army and the RSF, to be at the negotiating table, in the Jeddah forum or any other agreed-upon format. This is not only for the purpose of discussing the mechanisms provided by regional and international experts for a ceasefire and redeployment of forces, but also for negotiations to be based on the national vision that includes answers to the difficult question I have referred to, and which are presented by Sudanese civil society and political groupings as a main project for a permanent ceasefire.
READ: RSF attacks main hospital in Sudan’s Al-Fasher, says health official
As for the future of the army and RSF, I believe it is necessary to begin by discussing the legal responsibility for the war as a crime against the country and its citizens. Those responsible for igniting it should be held to account, as should those guilty of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity, as well as other horrific violations of the laws of war.
A commission of inquiry should be established
With this in mind, a commission of inquiry should be established, possibly with local, national regional and international members examining the evidence of all that has taken place, including the massacres in Darfur, and then making recommendations for legal action, similar to what was done with the Serbian leaders in the Bosnian war. Any talk of amnesty or transitional justice must remain governed by international law, which stipulates justice for the victims and preventing impunity for war crimes. This process should be followed by discussions about the future role of the leaders of both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the RSF.
There are many options for the armed forces, ranging from an exit strategy to contributions to national solutions through the Defence and Security Council or National Security Council. This should be led by the head of the civilian authority, the Prime Minister, according to a law that defines its tasks and powers, including the preparation of national security policies and coordinating them in a way that serves the unity of Sudan and the safety and security of its sovereign territories. It would also supervise the integration and demobilisation processes and related steps agreed upon with the armed movements.
As noted above, this would plan and implement programmes to reform and modernise the Sudanese Armed Forces, as well as the police and security agencies, and secure their resources. I believe that there is no choice but to dissolve the RSF, though, disarm and demobilise its members and develop reintegration procedures for them below the leadership levels. These individuals can be absorbed by the armed and other regular forces, as well as civil service institutions in strict accordance with the law and the normal conditions for joining the state security forces and civil service. Comprehensive security arrangements should be put in place for other armed movements to govern their transition to civilian life, including allowing those who wish to become political organisations to do so.
As far as the investments and economic resources of the Sudanese Armed Forces and the RSF are concerned, they should be handed over to the civilian executive authority and invested in the reconstruction of what was destroyed by the war. Compensation can be paid from these resources to the victims of the war and those affected by it, and to develop and modernise the Sudanese Armed Forces, the police and security agencies.
These are just a few initial ideas which are open to discussion and development. There is no doubt that there are many other options that can be put on the table, but they must be presented with a genuine desire to find a way out of the incessant fighting which is damaging Sudan.
All involved must remember that accountability is important, especially for those guilty of war crimes.
No options come without a price to pay.
To sum up, the main goal of the process should be to reconcile the security and military sector with civil society and restore the lost trust between them. Also, it is not just a matter of dismantling and replacing, but rather developing and modernising the sector to keep pace with the concepts of civilian transformation.
Moreover, this cannot be done overnight. It requires a series of complex operations to be initiated during the transitional period, and its completion and the adoption of its results must be carried out by elected institutions. Reforms of the armed forces, police and security agencies have to be linked to the comprehensive reform of all other state institutions.
The decisions to be taken are not merely political, administrative or technical, and are not subject to political and media input. Rather, they should be based on internationally-agreed concepts and guided by successful experiences in other countries.
Finally, changes must be implemented from within the military and security institutions and their members, subject to the supervision of civilian institutions, including the government and the legislative council.
READ: Erdogan offers to mediate between UAE, Sudan
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.
by Shafie Khader Saeed
Defining and understanding the nature of the civil war in Sudan which started on 15 April, 2023 is important if we are to develop the essence of the vision required for negotiating its end. Formulating this vision is at the core of the efforts of Sudanese civil society and political groupings.
Arguably the most important and most difficult question is related to the future of the Sudan Army and its leadership and the options available for its post-war role. The armed forces need to be reformed, and modernised, as do the police and security agencies in such a way that recognises and accepts their nationalism, professionalism and monopoly over the military’s regular role in Sudan, subject to democratic standards and under civilian supervision.
There is also a need to address this along with a decision on the future of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and other militias. The options possible need to be explored for them to accept the principle of Sudan having a single, professional army as above.
Of course, a ceasefire and an end to hostilities require both parties, the army and the RSF, to be at the negotiating table, in the Jeddah forum or any other agreed-upon format. This is not only for the purpose of discussing the mechanisms provided by regional and international experts for a ceasefire and redeployment of forces, but also for negotiations to be based on the national vision that includes answers to the difficult question I have referred to, and which are presented by Sudanese civil society and political groupings as a main project for a permanent ceasefire.
READ: RSF attacks main hospital in Sudan’s Al-Fasher, says health official
As for the future of the army and RSF, I believe it is necessary to begin by discussing the legal responsibility for the war as a crime against the country and its citizens. Those responsible for igniting it should be held to account, as should those guilty of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity, as well as other horrific violations of the laws of war.
A commission of inquiry should be established
With this in mind, a commission of inquiry should be established, possibly with local, national regional and international members examining the evidence of all that has taken place, including the massacres in Darfur, and then making recommendations for legal action, similar to what was done with the Serbian leaders in the Bosnian war. Any talk of amnesty or transitional justice must remain governed by international law, which stipulates justice for the victims and preventing impunity for war crimes. This process should be followed by discussions about the future role of the leaders of both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the RSF.
There are many options for the armed forces, ranging from an exit strategy to contributions to national solutions through the Defence and Security Council or National Security Council. This should be led by the head of the civilian authority, the Prime Minister, according to a law that defines its tasks and powers, including the preparation of national security policies and coordinating them in a way that serves the unity of Sudan and the safety and security of its sovereign territories. It would also supervise the integration and demobilisation processes and related steps agreed upon with the armed movements.
As noted above, this would plan and implement programmes to reform and modernise the Sudanese Armed Forces, as well as the police and security agencies, and secure their resources. I believe that there is no choice but to dissolve the RSF, though, disarm and demobilise its members and develop reintegration procedures for them below the leadership levels. These individuals can be absorbed by the armed and other regular forces, as well as civil service institutions in strict accordance with the law and the normal conditions for joining the state security forces and civil service. Comprehensive security arrangements should be put in place for other armed movements to govern their transition to civilian life, including allowing those who wish to become political organisations to do so.
As far as the investments and economic resources of the Sudanese Armed Forces and the RSF are concerned, they should be handed over to the civilian executive authority and invested in the reconstruction of what was destroyed by the war. Compensation can be paid from these resources to the victims of the war and those affected by it, and to develop and modernise the Sudanese Armed Forces, the police and security agencies.
These are just a few initial ideas which are open to discussion and development. There is no doubt that there are many other options that can be put on the table, but they must be presented with a genuine desire to find a way out of the incessant fighting which is damaging Sudan.
All involved must remember that accountability is important, especially for those guilty of war crimes.
No options come without a price to pay.
To sum up, the main goal of the process should be to reconcile the security and military sector with civil society and restore the lost trust between them. Also, it is not just a matter of dismantling and replacing, but rather developing and modernising the sector to keep pace with the concepts of civilian transformation.
Moreover, this cannot be done overnight. It requires a series of complex operations to be initiated during the transitional period, and its completion and the adoption of its results must be carried out by elected institutions. Reforms of the armed forces, police and security agencies have to be linked to the comprehensive reform of all other state institutions.
The decisions to be taken are not merely political, administrative or technical, and are not subject to political and media input. Rather, they should be based on internationally-agreed concepts and guided by successful experiences in other countries.
Finally, changes must be implemented from within the military and security institutions and their members, subject to the supervision of civilian institutions, including the government and the legislative council.
READ: Erdogan offers to mediate between UAE, Sudan
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.
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