The costs of this impending conflict are high for the subcontinent but also for those ruling it
Published May 6, 2025
DAWN
The writer is a journalist.
A WEEK later, the uncertainty continues, even as there are observations galore that temperatures have come down a bit. There have been calls and advice from allies and friends, to both Islamabad and New Delhi, suggesting talking instead of issuing threats and banging war drums. And not all advice can be ignored, as South Asians well know, especially from the Americans, who have a history of hand-holding South Asians through their stand-offs.
This is not all. On the Pakistani side, government officials are no longer publicly providing a countdown of when an attack is suspected, while the info minister is also boasting of victory of the bayania (a word which has made a smooth transition from the PTI-PML-N stage to the international one) in the tensions between the two neighbouring countries.
On the Indian side, too, some events suggest a de-escalation, or is being interpreted as such. The cabinet security committee meeting ended with the prime minister authorising freedom to the military to decide on the response. This was followed by another meeting which announced a caste survey, something the BJP had been resisting and the opposition party, the Congress had been asking for. Why the government would yield on such a key opposition demand, at this time, is intriguing. But this is still not reason enough to crack open the Rooh Afza on our side of the border.
The domestic fallout will prove important in the near future as the crisis plays out.
Those noticing these subtle changes still think New Delhi will respond, even though it is increasingly recognised that the decision will not be an easy one, for there is the ever-present risk of escalation as well as the peril of it ending as it did during Pulwama with the downing of an Indian plane and the capture of a pilot. And while India did spin the release of the pilot as a victory, the incident was an embarrassing one for New Delhi. But despite this, there is domestic pressure to act — and such pressure means not just kinetic action but also action which is perceived as bigger and better than Pulwama.
And this is what Pakistan expects also. Balakot plus.
At the same time, the calculus for Pakistan is no less rigorous. Whatever India does, Pakistan has to respond to it, plus more, whatever that may be. After all, this is the objective the country has set for itself after Balakot, when its plan was to strike near a military target on the other side, illustrating that it had the capacity to cause damage and didn’t. But to its good luck, it downed a plane and captured a pilot.
However, in this war of ‘retaliation’ and more, neither side wants an escalation, which is not just possible but also capable of causing great destruction. Still, the one-upmanship the two sides have prepared their domestic audiences for has bound them in varying degrees.
And this aspect — the domestic fallout — will prove important in the near future as the crisis plays out. After all, one can safely say that compared to 2019, both Islamabad and New Delhi have weaker governments. And in case of a fallout, there will be a price to pay domestically.
It is worth noting that for many analysts, Pulwama provided the then BJP government with an edge in the coming election, as national security became an important issue, even sidelining economic issues. Of course, such ‘success’ creates its own expectations which is at play this time around with the media and public opinion expecting an equally strong response. In addition, even most of the Indian opposition has asked for it, promising to back Narendra Modi. But what if the response doesn’t prove to be enough? That the Indian government is aware of this is also clear from the ‘aggressive’ steps it is taking vis-à-vis the Indus Waters Treaty, for it is something which can successfully be marketed as an act of war. But whether this will prove enough to stave off the opposition’s criticism as the elections in Bihar approach remains to be seen. As it is, a Congress leader has criticised the government by brandishing a toy jet that had lemon and green chilies attached to it, as he commented that the Rafales were in the hangers with lemon and chilies hanging off them, rather than being used.
The situation in Pakistan is no different. Pulwama ended better for Pakistan than it did for India. Indeed, few remember the public mood once Balakot had been struck. There were considerable questions about how and why enemy planes had been able to enter Pakistan. It was seen as particularly provocative because it revived memories of the Osama bin Laden raid. The resentment mitigated only when the Indian plane was downed, turning the public mood to one of jubilation, so much so that few asked if the strike by Pakistan would have proved enough domestically had the planes not engaged with each other and ended in the capture of Abhinandan.
Six years later, the government is less popular and less secure. The lack of popularity also plagues the establishment. All this will add to the sense of pressure; the government can’t afford to come across as weaker in its military prowess in comparison to a rival government. Indeed, its response, when it comes, will be compared to the previous government and judged accordingly. And if the response appears to be lukewarm, it will have domestic repercussions.
Neither will it be the first time. Conflict and war have always had an impact on domestic politics in Pakistan, shaping the latter in ways that have left a long-lasting impact. And where the wars next doors in Afghanistan have helped military dictators by extending their longevity, those with India have claimed a scalp or two. It was the 1965 war which catapulted Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to a leadership position as he criticised Ayub Khan’s handling of it. And more recently, Kargil eventually set off a series of events which ended with a military coup and later the removal of Musharraf. The costs of this impending conflict are high for the subcontinent but also for those ruling it.
Published in Dawn, May 6th, 2025
A WEEK later, the uncertainty continues, even as there are observations galore that temperatures have come down a bit. There have been calls and advice from allies and friends, to both Islamabad and New Delhi, suggesting talking instead of issuing threats and banging war drums. And not all advice can be ignored, as South Asians well know, especially from the Americans, who have a history of hand-holding South Asians through their stand-offs.
This is not all. On the Pakistani side, government officials are no longer publicly providing a countdown of when an attack is suspected, while the info minister is also boasting of victory of the bayania (a word which has made a smooth transition from the PTI-PML-N stage to the international one) in the tensions between the two neighbouring countries.
On the Indian side, too, some events suggest a de-escalation, or is being interpreted as such. The cabinet security committee meeting ended with the prime minister authorising freedom to the military to decide on the response. This was followed by another meeting which announced a caste survey, something the BJP had been resisting and the opposition party, the Congress had been asking for. Why the government would yield on such a key opposition demand, at this time, is intriguing. But this is still not reason enough to crack open the Rooh Afza on our side of the border.
The domestic fallout will prove important in the near future as the crisis plays out.
Those noticing these subtle changes still think New Delhi will respond, even though it is increasingly recognised that the decision will not be an easy one, for there is the ever-present risk of escalation as well as the peril of it ending as it did during Pulwama with the downing of an Indian plane and the capture of a pilot. And while India did spin the release of the pilot as a victory, the incident was an embarrassing one for New Delhi. But despite this, there is domestic pressure to act — and such pressure means not just kinetic action but also action which is perceived as bigger and better than Pulwama.
And this is what Pakistan expects also. Balakot plus.
At the same time, the calculus for Pakistan is no less rigorous. Whatever India does, Pakistan has to respond to it, plus more, whatever that may be. After all, this is the objective the country has set for itself after Balakot, when its plan was to strike near a military target on the other side, illustrating that it had the capacity to cause damage and didn’t. But to its good luck, it downed a plane and captured a pilot.
However, in this war of ‘retaliation’ and more, neither side wants an escalation, which is not just possible but also capable of causing great destruction. Still, the one-upmanship the two sides have prepared their domestic audiences for has bound them in varying degrees.
And this aspect — the domestic fallout — will prove important in the near future as the crisis plays out. After all, one can safely say that compared to 2019, both Islamabad and New Delhi have weaker governments. And in case of a fallout, there will be a price to pay domestically.
It is worth noting that for many analysts, Pulwama provided the then BJP government with an edge in the coming election, as national security became an important issue, even sidelining economic issues. Of course, such ‘success’ creates its own expectations which is at play this time around with the media and public opinion expecting an equally strong response. In addition, even most of the Indian opposition has asked for it, promising to back Narendra Modi. But what if the response doesn’t prove to be enough? That the Indian government is aware of this is also clear from the ‘aggressive’ steps it is taking vis-à-vis the Indus Waters Treaty, for it is something which can successfully be marketed as an act of war. But whether this will prove enough to stave off the opposition’s criticism as the elections in Bihar approach remains to be seen. As it is, a Congress leader has criticised the government by brandishing a toy jet that had lemon and green chilies attached to it, as he commented that the Rafales were in the hangers with lemon and chilies hanging off them, rather than being used.
The situation in Pakistan is no different. Pulwama ended better for Pakistan than it did for India. Indeed, few remember the public mood once Balakot had been struck. There were considerable questions about how and why enemy planes had been able to enter Pakistan. It was seen as particularly provocative because it revived memories of the Osama bin Laden raid. The resentment mitigated only when the Indian plane was downed, turning the public mood to one of jubilation, so much so that few asked if the strike by Pakistan would have proved enough domestically had the planes not engaged with each other and ended in the capture of Abhinandan.
Six years later, the government is less popular and less secure. The lack of popularity also plagues the establishment. All this will add to the sense of pressure; the government can’t afford to come across as weaker in its military prowess in comparison to a rival government. Indeed, its response, when it comes, will be compared to the previous government and judged accordingly. And if the response appears to be lukewarm, it will have domestic repercussions.
Neither will it be the first time. Conflict and war have always had an impact on domestic politics in Pakistan, shaping the latter in ways that have left a long-lasting impact. And where the wars next doors in Afghanistan have helped military dictators by extending their longevity, those with India have claimed a scalp or two. It was the 1965 war which catapulted Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to a leadership position as he criticised Ayub Khan’s handling of it. And more recently, Kargil eventually set off a series of events which ended with a military coup and later the removal of Musharraf. The costs of this impending conflict are high for the subcontinent but also for those ruling it.
Published in Dawn, May 6th, 2025
Perilous hour
On the brink again?
Abbas Nasir
Published May 5, 2025
DAWN
The writer is a former ambassador to the US, UK and UN.
THE latest crisis in India-Pakistan relations is the fifth in the past 25 years.
Each crisis has been more complex and involved dangerous ramifications, which made it hard even when tensions eased to put ties back on track and return to any ‘normalcy’. Protracted periods of diplomatic disengagement followed these crises. The bilateral impasse only deepened as, when suspended, formal dialogue was difficult to resume. Little wonder that a once promising peace process advanced through what was called the ‘composite dialogue’ was never revived since it was halted over 12 years ago.
The ongoing crisis has already plunged relations between the nuclear neighbours into a vortex of dangerous confrontation. Tit-for-tat diplomatic measures by both sides, initiated by India, have gone much further than actions taken in past crises. India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty weaponises water and has far-reaching implications even if its immediate impact is limited. Exchange of small-arms fire continues along the Line of Control. The Indian Navy has been conducting long-range missile drills in the Arabian Sea, obliging Pakistan to intensify its naval activities.
Pakistani officials claim to have credible intelligence that India is preparing to launch a military strike. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s statements about inflicting harsh punishment on the attackers and their backers has reinforced the possibility of kinetic action. He has given the army “operational freedom” to decide “the mode, targets and timing” of India’s response to the Pahalgam terrorist attack. War hysteria has also taken hold in India.
The danger of an impending military confrontation has evoked growing international concern and prompted calls for restraint. The UN secretary general, China, the US, Saudi Arabia and Iran, among others, have urged de-escalation. Historically, the US has had leverage with both countries — and still does — to play a role in defusing crises. It did so from the 1999 Kargil conflict to the last crisis in 2019. This time, contrary to speculation that Washington is too preoccupied elsewhere with other conflicts, it has engaged swiftly with both Islamabad and New Delhi to urge restraint and ask them to re-establish direct communication channels and work together to maintain peace and security.
Can a full-blown crisis between India and Pakistan be averted?
Secretary of State Marco Rubio conveyed this message in phone calls to Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar. The same message was delivered by former national security adviser Mike Waltz to army chief Gen Asim Munir and Indian National Security Adviser Ajit Doval, days before Waltz was removed from that post. Calls were also made to DG ISI Gen Asim Malik by CIA director John Ratcliff and director of national intelligence Tulsi Gabbard. Malik was recently appointed national security adviser, sparking speculation this was in preparation for talks later with Doval.
Whether US intervention will dissuade India from embarking on a military course remains to be seen. Indian media reports suggest the Modi government is examining several options that can inflict pain on Pakistan but stop short of triggering a broader conflict, especially as it cannot be sure of how Islamabad will react. For its part, Pakistan has said any kinetic action by India will be met by a “strong and decisive response”. This would heighten the risk of an uncontrolled escalatory cycle with uncertain consequences and outcome. The room for miscalculation and inadvertent escalation by either side will be high in the absence of any communication between them. Messaging through an intermediary — the US — might be helpful but will not eliminate that risk.
The past is not a perfect guide, as no two situations are ever the same, but it may be instructive to recall what happened the last time around. The February 2019 crisis erupted after a terrorist attack in occupied Kashmir’s Pulwama district, in which 40 Indian security personnel were killed. Blaming Pakistan for the attack, Indian officials warned of a strong response. Twelve days later, Indian Mirage jets crossed the Line of Control to carry out a bombing raid in Balakot, claiming this destroyed ‘terrorist training camps’ and killed militants. Pakistan was to later show that the site of the bombing was a forested area and there were no casualties or damage. Pakistan retaliated by launching Operation Swift Retort entailing air strikes on a military target in Jammu. That too caused little if any damage.
However, in an aerial combat an Indian Mig-21 was shot down by Pakistan and its pilot captured. His release became the key point in defusing the crisis when tensions were escalating to a dangerous level. The climax came when Pakistan determined India was about to attack having deployed and pointed nine missiles at Pakistan. This was conveyed by Pakistan’s foreign secretary to key foreign envoys including the US along with the warning that Pakistan will be compelled to retaliate. “For every Indian missile readied, three Pakistani missiles would be ready in response,” according to a former official. India therefore had to be stopped. The US was engaged at the working level with both sides, but this led to more senior-level involvement. Washington had in any case started pressing for restraint after the Indian strike in Balakot. Former secretary of state Mike Pompeo claims in his memoir Never Give An Inch that nuclear escalation became a real possibility as each side thought the other was about to deploy nuclear weapons.
Hectic shuttle diplomacy by the US and Pakistan’s effort to de-escalate the situation led to the government’s decision to release the pilot. His release provided an off-ramp from the crisis and helped to defuse it. In his book Anger Management, Ajay Basaria, former Indian high commissioner to Pakistan, claims India’s coercive diplomacy produced this outcome. In a campaign speech later, Modi suggested a ‘qatal ki raat’ (night of murder) was in the offing if the pilot hadn’t been freed. Refuting Basaria’s version, Islamabad attributed the pilot’s release to Pakistan’s “responsible behaviour” in de-escalating the situation while demonstrating its capacity to respond to any security threat.
A combination of fortuitous factors, active third-party intervention and a concrete ‘peace gesture’ in the midst of escalating tensions helped to end that crisis. Luck also played a part, as many experts have pointed out. The question is whether there are any favourable factors in play today that can halt the ongoing escalation and avert a head-on clash.
Published in Dawn, May 5th, 2025
THE latest crisis in India-Pakistan relations is the fifth in the past 25 years.
Each crisis has been more complex and involved dangerous ramifications, which made it hard even when tensions eased to put ties back on track and return to any ‘normalcy’. Protracted periods of diplomatic disengagement followed these crises. The bilateral impasse only deepened as, when suspended, formal dialogue was difficult to resume. Little wonder that a once promising peace process advanced through what was called the ‘composite dialogue’ was never revived since it was halted over 12 years ago.
The ongoing crisis has already plunged relations between the nuclear neighbours into a vortex of dangerous confrontation. Tit-for-tat diplomatic measures by both sides, initiated by India, have gone much further than actions taken in past crises. India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty weaponises water and has far-reaching implications even if its immediate impact is limited. Exchange of small-arms fire continues along the Line of Control. The Indian Navy has been conducting long-range missile drills in the Arabian Sea, obliging Pakistan to intensify its naval activities.
Pakistani officials claim to have credible intelligence that India is preparing to launch a military strike. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s statements about inflicting harsh punishment on the attackers and their backers has reinforced the possibility of kinetic action. He has given the army “operational freedom” to decide “the mode, targets and timing” of India’s response to the Pahalgam terrorist attack. War hysteria has also taken hold in India.
The danger of an impending military confrontation has evoked growing international concern and prompted calls for restraint. The UN secretary general, China, the US, Saudi Arabia and Iran, among others, have urged de-escalation. Historically, the US has had leverage with both countries — and still does — to play a role in defusing crises. It did so from the 1999 Kargil conflict to the last crisis in 2019. This time, contrary to speculation that Washington is too preoccupied elsewhere with other conflicts, it has engaged swiftly with both Islamabad and New Delhi to urge restraint and ask them to re-establish direct communication channels and work together to maintain peace and security.
Can a full-blown crisis between India and Pakistan be averted?
Secretary of State Marco Rubio conveyed this message in phone calls to Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar. The same message was delivered by former national security adviser Mike Waltz to army chief Gen Asim Munir and Indian National Security Adviser Ajit Doval, days before Waltz was removed from that post. Calls were also made to DG ISI Gen Asim Malik by CIA director John Ratcliff and director of national intelligence Tulsi Gabbard. Malik was recently appointed national security adviser, sparking speculation this was in preparation for talks later with Doval.
Whether US intervention will dissuade India from embarking on a military course remains to be seen. Indian media reports suggest the Modi government is examining several options that can inflict pain on Pakistan but stop short of triggering a broader conflict, especially as it cannot be sure of how Islamabad will react. For its part, Pakistan has said any kinetic action by India will be met by a “strong and decisive response”. This would heighten the risk of an uncontrolled escalatory cycle with uncertain consequences and outcome. The room for miscalculation and inadvertent escalation by either side will be high in the absence of any communication between them. Messaging through an intermediary — the US — might be helpful but will not eliminate that risk.
The past is not a perfect guide, as no two situations are ever the same, but it may be instructive to recall what happened the last time around. The February 2019 crisis erupted after a terrorist attack in occupied Kashmir’s Pulwama district, in which 40 Indian security personnel were killed. Blaming Pakistan for the attack, Indian officials warned of a strong response. Twelve days later, Indian Mirage jets crossed the Line of Control to carry out a bombing raid in Balakot, claiming this destroyed ‘terrorist training camps’ and killed militants. Pakistan was to later show that the site of the bombing was a forested area and there were no casualties or damage. Pakistan retaliated by launching Operation Swift Retort entailing air strikes on a military target in Jammu. That too caused little if any damage.
However, in an aerial combat an Indian Mig-21 was shot down by Pakistan and its pilot captured. His release became the key point in defusing the crisis when tensions were escalating to a dangerous level. The climax came when Pakistan determined India was about to attack having deployed and pointed nine missiles at Pakistan. This was conveyed by Pakistan’s foreign secretary to key foreign envoys including the US along with the warning that Pakistan will be compelled to retaliate. “For every Indian missile readied, three Pakistani missiles would be ready in response,” according to a former official. India therefore had to be stopped. The US was engaged at the working level with both sides, but this led to more senior-level involvement. Washington had in any case started pressing for restraint after the Indian strike in Balakot. Former secretary of state Mike Pompeo claims in his memoir Never Give An Inch that nuclear escalation became a real possibility as each side thought the other was about to deploy nuclear weapons.
Hectic shuttle diplomacy by the US and Pakistan’s effort to de-escalate the situation led to the government’s decision to release the pilot. His release provided an off-ramp from the crisis and helped to defuse it. In his book Anger Management, Ajay Basaria, former Indian high commissioner to Pakistan, claims India’s coercive diplomacy produced this outcome. In a campaign speech later, Modi suggested a ‘qatal ki raat’ (night of murder) was in the offing if the pilot hadn’t been freed. Refuting Basaria’s version, Islamabad attributed the pilot’s release to Pakistan’s “responsible behaviour” in de-escalating the situation while demonstrating its capacity to respond to any security threat.
A combination of fortuitous factors, active third-party intervention and a concrete ‘peace gesture’ in the midst of escalating tensions helped to end that crisis. Luck also played a part, as many experts have pointed out. The question is whether there are any favourable factors in play today that can halt the ongoing escalation and avert a head-on clash.
Published in Dawn, May 5th, 2025
On the brink again?
Abbas Nasir
Published May 4, 2025
The writer is a former editor of Dawn.
SOUTH Asia is on tenterhooks this weekend, as many informed experts are saying that the window of opportunity for India to embark on some ‘kinetic action’ against Pakistan, which it blames without evidence for the Pahalgam incident, is fast closing because the significant global support New Delhi was hoping for is missing.
While the hysteria that the governing Hindu nationalist BJP-dominated media has whipped up makes it impossible to rule out such an eventuality, it is also becoming clear that the international community, most notably the US, is telling India to desist from any action that could ignite a conflict in the region.
Later in the year, India is heading to state elections in key states such as Bihar and, after jumping the gun and blaming Pakistan, as has been its wont, it would be hard-pressed to explain to its Hindu nationalist support base why it failed to take action. In such a scenario, it is not clear what face-saving would suffice for the governing party’s support base.
India’s hard-line prime minister has left it to his military leaders to decide on the target and timing of any action to be taken against Pakistan as he, like his Pakistani counterpart, seems not to buy the argument attributed to French prime minister Georges Clemenceau that “war is too serious a matter to be entrusted to military men”.
The world is not prepared to react as it used to in the past to charges of Pakistani complicity.
In Narendra Modi’s case, at least, it looks like an attempt by the Indian PM to shield himself from any adverse fallout from any such possible adventurism. Or perhaps he could cite the counsel of his military leaders for not plunging the region into a spiralling conflict, the course of which cannot be predicted or controlled.
Why is the aggressive Indian leader — who scrapped occupied Kashmir’s special autonomous status, did not seem to care about the consequences and triggered new tensions between his country and Pakistan — now trying to insulate himself from the repercussions?
There could be a number of factors. Despite the size of the growing Indian market and economy, he must also realise that growth and investment are risk-averse. A rapid climb up the escalation ladder in any conflict in a nuclear-armed region could prove to be the kiss of death for his economy.
Secondly, India’s policy, reportedly developed by National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and endorsed by the Modi government, to assassinate/ seek to eliminate supposed threats to national security abroad from Canada to the US to other Western countries to Pakistan has raised more than one brow, with Canada going public with its evidence where a Sikh citizen was killed and the US filing murder-for-hire and money-laundering charges against an Indian government employee.
While neither has affected its economy nor scared away foreign investors and business interests, the incidents have eroded India’s credibility in the West. So the world is not prepared to react as it used to in the past to charges of Pakistani complicity or instigation in terror attacks on Indian soil or in occupied Kashmir.
This is not to say that India does not remain a strategic ally of the US, especially with respect to containing China. China seems mindful of the Indian hostility towards its presence in Pakistan. Security sources claim Pakistan has shared evidence of some role attributable to India in attacks against Chinese nationals working on CPEC projects in Pakistan.
One is not sure if China found what was shared with it verifiable and credible, but something must explain the change in language Beijing has started using of late. From the foreign minister to state-sponsored think tanks down to social media handles representing official positions, the Chinese seem to have moved from their unequivocal ‘business first’ stance.
Both Pakistan and China have often acknowledged their ‘time-tested’ friendship as being manifest in close Pakistan military-PLA relations but even so, in the past, Beijing has not hesitated to tell Pakistan to step back, as it did during the Kargil confrontation. In the wake of the Pahalgam incident, China has gone on record as saying it would stand by Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
I doubt this level of Chinese support is carte blanche for wild adventurism by Pakistan. But it surely does mirror China’s concerns regarding an outbreak of hostilities between the two nuclear-armed South Asian neighbours, as Beijing may not itself remain immune from devastation in the worst-case scenario.
One strategic blunder committed by India, in blaming Pakistan within hours of the Pahalgam massacre and then being unable to share verifiable evidence with Western powers, also seems to have undermined its case and may explain the lack of endorsement of its stance by the West unlike in the past.
It is also true that while the Israeli military campaign continues against the mostly unarmed Palestinians in Gaza, the Ukraine-Russian war shows few signs of ending soon and the US-Israel duo tries to defang Iran’s nuclear capability, Washington and its (somewhat estranged) European allies are not interested in another distraction which has the potential to turn into a nuclear war.
The US secretary of state and vice president have both underlined the need for India not to do something rash and for the two countries to calm things down. The EU and major Gulf leaders have also made similar calls, with Saudi Arabia and Iran even offering to mediate.
Against this backdrop, the naming of the ISI chief Lt-Gen Asim Malik as the prime minister’s national security adviser brings hope, however faint, of a backchannel. This hope is based on the excellent rapport established between Ajit Doval and his Pakistan counterpart, retired Lt-Gen Nasser Khan Janjua, from 2015 to 2018, when the two smokers developed bonhomie during cigarette breaks as they engaged in backchannel talks in Southeast Asia.
One can only hope that having ignored Clemenceau once, South Asian leaders will do so again and prove him wrong, because he said: “It is easier to make war than to make peace.”
abbas.nasir@hotmail.com
Published in Dawn, May 4th, 2025
SOUTH Asia is on tenterhooks this weekend, as many informed experts are saying that the window of opportunity for India to embark on some ‘kinetic action’ against Pakistan, which it blames without evidence for the Pahalgam incident, is fast closing because the significant global support New Delhi was hoping for is missing.
While the hysteria that the governing Hindu nationalist BJP-dominated media has whipped up makes it impossible to rule out such an eventuality, it is also becoming clear that the international community, most notably the US, is telling India to desist from any action that could ignite a conflict in the region.
Later in the year, India is heading to state elections in key states such as Bihar and, after jumping the gun and blaming Pakistan, as has been its wont, it would be hard-pressed to explain to its Hindu nationalist support base why it failed to take action. In such a scenario, it is not clear what face-saving would suffice for the governing party’s support base.
India’s hard-line prime minister has left it to his military leaders to decide on the target and timing of any action to be taken against Pakistan as he, like his Pakistani counterpart, seems not to buy the argument attributed to French prime minister Georges Clemenceau that “war is too serious a matter to be entrusted to military men”.
The world is not prepared to react as it used to in the past to charges of Pakistani complicity.
In Narendra Modi’s case, at least, it looks like an attempt by the Indian PM to shield himself from any adverse fallout from any such possible adventurism. Or perhaps he could cite the counsel of his military leaders for not plunging the region into a spiralling conflict, the course of which cannot be predicted or controlled.
Why is the aggressive Indian leader — who scrapped occupied Kashmir’s special autonomous status, did not seem to care about the consequences and triggered new tensions between his country and Pakistan — now trying to insulate himself from the repercussions?
There could be a number of factors. Despite the size of the growing Indian market and economy, he must also realise that growth and investment are risk-averse. A rapid climb up the escalation ladder in any conflict in a nuclear-armed region could prove to be the kiss of death for his economy.
Secondly, India’s policy, reportedly developed by National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and endorsed by the Modi government, to assassinate/ seek to eliminate supposed threats to national security abroad from Canada to the US to other Western countries to Pakistan has raised more than one brow, with Canada going public with its evidence where a Sikh citizen was killed and the US filing murder-for-hire and money-laundering charges against an Indian government employee.
While neither has affected its economy nor scared away foreign investors and business interests, the incidents have eroded India’s credibility in the West. So the world is not prepared to react as it used to in the past to charges of Pakistani complicity or instigation in terror attacks on Indian soil or in occupied Kashmir.
This is not to say that India does not remain a strategic ally of the US, especially with respect to containing China. China seems mindful of the Indian hostility towards its presence in Pakistan. Security sources claim Pakistan has shared evidence of some role attributable to India in attacks against Chinese nationals working on CPEC projects in Pakistan.
One is not sure if China found what was shared with it verifiable and credible, but something must explain the change in language Beijing has started using of late. From the foreign minister to state-sponsored think tanks down to social media handles representing official positions, the Chinese seem to have moved from their unequivocal ‘business first’ stance.
Both Pakistan and China have often acknowledged their ‘time-tested’ friendship as being manifest in close Pakistan military-PLA relations but even so, in the past, Beijing has not hesitated to tell Pakistan to step back, as it did during the Kargil confrontation. In the wake of the Pahalgam incident, China has gone on record as saying it would stand by Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
I doubt this level of Chinese support is carte blanche for wild adventurism by Pakistan. But it surely does mirror China’s concerns regarding an outbreak of hostilities between the two nuclear-armed South Asian neighbours, as Beijing may not itself remain immune from devastation in the worst-case scenario.
One strategic blunder committed by India, in blaming Pakistan within hours of the Pahalgam massacre and then being unable to share verifiable evidence with Western powers, also seems to have undermined its case and may explain the lack of endorsement of its stance by the West unlike in the past.
It is also true that while the Israeli military campaign continues against the mostly unarmed Palestinians in Gaza, the Ukraine-Russian war shows few signs of ending soon and the US-Israel duo tries to defang Iran’s nuclear capability, Washington and its (somewhat estranged) European allies are not interested in another distraction which has the potential to turn into a nuclear war.
The US secretary of state and vice president have both underlined the need for India not to do something rash and for the two countries to calm things down. The EU and major Gulf leaders have also made similar calls, with Saudi Arabia and Iran even offering to mediate.
Against this backdrop, the naming of the ISI chief Lt-Gen Asim Malik as the prime minister’s national security adviser brings hope, however faint, of a backchannel. This hope is based on the excellent rapport established between Ajit Doval and his Pakistan counterpart, retired Lt-Gen Nasser Khan Janjua, from 2015 to 2018, when the two smokers developed bonhomie during cigarette breaks as they engaged in backchannel talks in Southeast Asia.
One can only hope that having ignored Clemenceau once, South Asian leaders will do so again and prove him wrong, because he said: “It is easier to make war than to make peace.”
abbas.nasir@hotmail.com
Published in Dawn, May 4th, 2025
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