Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) that stood the test of time for 65 years is under severe strain.
Published May 19, 2025
DAWN
The writer is head of the Civil Society Coalition for Climate Change.
THE Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) that stood the test of time for 65 years is under severe strain.
Many things have changed since it was assiduously crafted with the help of the World Bank in 1960.
While the treaty provides a dispute-resolution mechanism that has been used in the past to address complaints, this time the issue has taken a sordid turn. At the heart of the matter are two things most responsible for the current impasse — i) demographic changes that are outstripping supply with shrinking resources and rising demand, ii) the emergence of politics of hate and division fuelling religious nationalism to fan public sentiment.
The post-Cold War attempt to create a rules-based international order is under assault from a rising wave of populist demagoguery. The inciting rhetoric takes different shapes and forms, but the message of punitive action remains the same.
Now it is the heft of nations that determines acceptance or rejection of its unilateral actions by the global community. The arbitrary suspension of the IWT is part of this wider malaise. Nations are now looking increasingly inward, taking a more distributive approach to negotiations and using muscular diplomacy to assert their agenda.
The IWT has a past history of invoking the dispute-resolution clause.
The issues between the two countries are no longer merely about territorial disputes but have taken a more insidious turn.
In 2007, the dispute resolution process over India’s design of the Baglihar hydroelectric plant on the Chenab was addressed by a neutral expert to determine the freeboard of India’s proposed dam.
In 2013, the Court of Arbitration rendered a decision on India’s diversion of a tributary of the Jhelum for the Kishenganga hydroelectric project. India was allowed to divert water for the Kishenganga project while maintaining a minimum specified storage in the reservoir and minimum release of nine cubic metres of water per second down river into the Jhelum tributary.
However, trouble started brewing in 2016 following the unresolved technical differences with regard to the Kishenganga hydroelectric project and India’s announcement of starting the Ratle hydroelectric project on the Chenab.
The strident tone adopted by India after the 2014 elections has continued to grow and alter political thinking with a palpable shift in its relationship dynamics with Pakistan. The already tense bilateral relations came under acute strain after the Pulwama terror attack in India for which it blamed Pakistan (without proof). This also marked the beginning of public statements from India threatening to use water as a weapon to punish Pakistan for its alleged role in sponsoring terrorism.
The revocation of Article 370 in 2019 stripping Indian-occupied Kashmir of its special status and its sharp rejection by Pakistan further poisoned the chalice.
In 2016 when Pakistan invoked the arbitral process via a Request For Arbitration, the water was already turning from muddy to murky. The RFA outlined seven disputes related to the disputed projects related to design and permissibility of pondage levels, submerged power intakes, low-level sediment outlets, spillway designs, and permissible freeboard intakes. India’s refusal to participate in the arbitral process led to a default appointment procedure for a five-year pause (2016-22) imposed by the World Bank. With heightened levels of animosity and a volley of threats hurled at Pakistan, India decried the ‘illegitimacy’ of the Court of Arbitration via a letter to the World Bank (Dec 21, 2022).
Parallel to this, India requested the appointment of a neutral expert under the Indus treaty. Pakistan’s refusal to participate resulted in the default appointment procedure for the appointment of a neutral expert after a five-year pause. In 2023, the Court of Arbitration issued an award upholding its competence for addressing the matter. In 2025, the neutral expert also issued an award upholding its competence to address the seven points of conflict.
The main problem is not overlapping jurisdictional competencies and their inconsistent outcomes. The real issue is the deepening divide between India and Pakistan. The issues between the two countries are no longer merely about territorial disputes but have taken a more insidious turn. The last 15 years have seen a sharp increase in animosity bordering on intense hatred. This trend has to be curbed.
The tragic and condemnable Pahalgam incident has, once again, ignited passions blinding reason and bringing the two countries to the brink of war. The unilateral suspension of the IWT by India is a sign of a new trend that blurs the line between separate incidents and uses a no-holds-barred approach to retaliation. The two countries have a history of bad blood laden with accusations of interference with the intent of fomenting disaffection and destabilsation. Such passionate feelings based on the politics of identity are a dangerous portent for the two nuclear-armed neighbours.
The multilayered dispute resolution mechanism of the fraying IWT must be seen in the context of the fractious geopolitical history of the region marked by its hydrological topography.
The IWT can no longer only be seen through the technical lens of neutral experts. Given the relationship dynamics the intent and ability to do harm needs to be examined by a Court of Arbitration. Judicial interpretation has the provision for taking a broader view while neutral experts are limited by their narrow mandate. Both countries can do more with less water if hate and hostility are not part of the equation.
When the dust has settled, both countries need to embark on a sincere journey of truth and reconciliation. The need for working together has never been greater than it is today.
aisha@csccc.org.pk
Published in Dawn, May 19th, 2025
THE Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) that stood the test of time for 65 years is under severe strain.
Many things have changed since it was assiduously crafted with the help of the World Bank in 1960.
While the treaty provides a dispute-resolution mechanism that has been used in the past to address complaints, this time the issue has taken a sordid turn. At the heart of the matter are two things most responsible for the current impasse — i) demographic changes that are outstripping supply with shrinking resources and rising demand, ii) the emergence of politics of hate and division fuelling religious nationalism to fan public sentiment.
The post-Cold War attempt to create a rules-based international order is under assault from a rising wave of populist demagoguery. The inciting rhetoric takes different shapes and forms, but the message of punitive action remains the same.
Now it is the heft of nations that determines acceptance or rejection of its unilateral actions by the global community. The arbitrary suspension of the IWT is part of this wider malaise. Nations are now looking increasingly inward, taking a more distributive approach to negotiations and using muscular diplomacy to assert their agenda.
The IWT has a past history of invoking the dispute-resolution clause.
The issues between the two countries are no longer merely about territorial disputes but have taken a more insidious turn.
In 2007, the dispute resolution process over India’s design of the Baglihar hydroelectric plant on the Chenab was addressed by a neutral expert to determine the freeboard of India’s proposed dam.
In 2013, the Court of Arbitration rendered a decision on India’s diversion of a tributary of the Jhelum for the Kishenganga hydroelectric project. India was allowed to divert water for the Kishenganga project while maintaining a minimum specified storage in the reservoir and minimum release of nine cubic metres of water per second down river into the Jhelum tributary.
However, trouble started brewing in 2016 following the unresolved technical differences with regard to the Kishenganga hydroelectric project and India’s announcement of starting the Ratle hydroelectric project on the Chenab.
The strident tone adopted by India after the 2014 elections has continued to grow and alter political thinking with a palpable shift in its relationship dynamics with Pakistan. The already tense bilateral relations came under acute strain after the Pulwama terror attack in India for which it blamed Pakistan (without proof). This also marked the beginning of public statements from India threatening to use water as a weapon to punish Pakistan for its alleged role in sponsoring terrorism.
The revocation of Article 370 in 2019 stripping Indian-occupied Kashmir of its special status and its sharp rejection by Pakistan further poisoned the chalice.
In 2016 when Pakistan invoked the arbitral process via a Request For Arbitration, the water was already turning from muddy to murky. The RFA outlined seven disputes related to the disputed projects related to design and permissibility of pondage levels, submerged power intakes, low-level sediment outlets, spillway designs, and permissible freeboard intakes. India’s refusal to participate in the arbitral process led to a default appointment procedure for a five-year pause (2016-22) imposed by the World Bank. With heightened levels of animosity and a volley of threats hurled at Pakistan, India decried the ‘illegitimacy’ of the Court of Arbitration via a letter to the World Bank (Dec 21, 2022).
Parallel to this, India requested the appointment of a neutral expert under the Indus treaty. Pakistan’s refusal to participate resulted in the default appointment procedure for the appointment of a neutral expert after a five-year pause. In 2023, the Court of Arbitration issued an award upholding its competence for addressing the matter. In 2025, the neutral expert also issued an award upholding its competence to address the seven points of conflict.
The main problem is not overlapping jurisdictional competencies and their inconsistent outcomes. The real issue is the deepening divide between India and Pakistan. The issues between the two countries are no longer merely about territorial disputes but have taken a more insidious turn. The last 15 years have seen a sharp increase in animosity bordering on intense hatred. This trend has to be curbed.
The tragic and condemnable Pahalgam incident has, once again, ignited passions blinding reason and bringing the two countries to the brink of war. The unilateral suspension of the IWT by India is a sign of a new trend that blurs the line between separate incidents and uses a no-holds-barred approach to retaliation. The two countries have a history of bad blood laden with accusations of interference with the intent of fomenting disaffection and destabilsation. Such passionate feelings based on the politics of identity are a dangerous portent for the two nuclear-armed neighbours.
The multilayered dispute resolution mechanism of the fraying IWT must be seen in the context of the fractious geopolitical history of the region marked by its hydrological topography.
The IWT can no longer only be seen through the technical lens of neutral experts. Given the relationship dynamics the intent and ability to do harm needs to be examined by a Court of Arbitration. Judicial interpretation has the provision for taking a broader view while neutral experts are limited by their narrow mandate. Both countries can do more with less water if hate and hostility are not part of the equation.
When the dust has settled, both countries need to embark on a sincere journey of truth and reconciliation. The need for working together has never been greater than it is today.
aisha@csccc.org.pk
Published in Dawn, May 19th, 2025
International law & Indus wars
Published May 17, 2025
DAWN
The writer is former legal adviser to Pakistan’s foreign ministry, and faculty, Lums Law School.
ON April 23, India unilaterally declared the Indus Waters Treaty to be “in abeyance” — a term neither recognised in treaty law nor found in the IWT itself. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) — the authoritative international agreement on treaty law — instead describes a party’s releasing itself from its treaty obligations as a ‘suspension’.
Treaties such as the IWT are not limited by time, continuing instead in perpetuity under Article 42 of the VCLT. And under Article 57 of the VCLT, a treaty can only be suspended if it allows for such suspension, or with the mutual consent of all contracting parties. The IWT, a multilateral treaty with India, Pakistan and the World Bank as signatories, does not provide for suspension and can unilaterally only be terminated or suspended if a party commits a material breach of treaty as described under Article 60 of the VCLT. India’s accusations of Pakistan’s alleged role in the Pahalgam attack are completely unsubstantiated; but in any event, that attack has no nexus with the scope of the IWT nor — assuming that Pakistan were even hypothetically involved — constitutes a material breach thereof.
The scope of and obligations under the IWT, which Pakistan complies with, principally deal with the allocation and usage of river waters, and incidentally with hydropower generation from them. Any stoppage, restriction, or interference in the flow of waters in rivers allocated to Pakistan under the treaty, including the Chenab, constitutes a clear violation by India of Article III (2) of the IWT, which obligates India to refrain from interfering with the flow of the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab rivers.
Apart from these treaty violations, customary law codified in Article 2 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility establishes that conduct in the breach of a state’s international obligations, that is attributable to it, constitutes an internationally wrongful act, thus necessitating the payment of full reparations to affected parties. Violations of a state’s treaty obligations constitute prima facie an internationally wrongful act, as affirmed by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the ‘Phosphates in Morocco’ case and the famous ‘Rainbow Warrior’ arbitration. Thus, India’s interference in the flow of the Chenab river constitutes an internationally wrongful act and also places India in breach of Article 26 of the VCLT, which codifies the principle of pacta sunt servanda — ie, agreements must be honoured. India’s culpability under international law thus obliges it to pay Pakistan reparations for the damage caused by its illegal acts.
India’s interference in the flow of the Chenab constitutes an internationally wrongful act.
Article IX of the IWT provides only two methods of dispute resolution: technical disputes, including engineering issues, are referred to a neutral expert, while treaty violations and questions of its interpretation, which are legal disputes, are referred to the Permanent Court of Arbitration. In the present circumstances, India did not exercise this right, arguably as it knew it stood on shaky legal ground in holding the IWT “in abeyance”.
Though the Simla Agreement, a bilateral treaty between India and Pakistan, emphasises bilateral dispute resolution, it cannot be relied upon to undercut Pakistan’s right to third-party dispute resolution, as India might be interpreting it to do so. The IWT, signed in 1960, predates the Simla Agreement of 1972 by over a decade and, according to Article 28 of the Vienna Convention — as well as customary international law — treaties do not operate retrospectively. Thus, the commitment to promote bilateral dispute resolution under the Simla Agreement does not limit in any way Pakistan’s ability to highlight and prosecute India’s violations of the IWT, including through international fora such as the General Assembly, Security Council and other UN bodies.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) outlined in the ‘Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros’ and ‘Pulp Mills’ cases that states cannot rely on perceived treaty violations or other internationally wrongful acts as a premise to violate their own treaty obligations. Violating another treaty or international legal norm does not entitle a state to suspend its obligations towards the state owed under the treaty concerned; instead, it constitutes a breach of the said treaty for that state.
India’s interference with the Chenab river’s flow is not only a treaty violation, but also a violation of international humanitarian law considering the state of armed conflict between the two nations, as it impedes civilians’ access to water. Article 54 (4) of the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug 12, 1949, (AP I) specifically outlaws the impediment of water for the purpose of reprisals.
International law explicitly prohibits the destruction or diversion of natural or ecological resources — such as rivers — for the purpose of reprisals or to achieve military objectives. This is recognised through the principle’s inclusion in the Berlin Rules on Water Resources 2004, which codify customary law on water resources, and is framed as a war crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the AP I.
During the recent military conflagration, India carried out strikes on the Neelam-Jhelum hydropower project, triggering Pakistan’s right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. To protect its flow of water guaranteed under the IWT, in an armed conflict, Pakistan reserves the right to target Indian dams and dykes on transboundary rivers as a military objective, if it is necessary and proportional, if such works are being used “in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support”, as outlined in Article 56 of AP I, a treaty signed by Pakistan and now mostly considered customary international law.
This permissibility is reinforced considering the ICJ went even further to protect state sovereignty in interpreting Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, as held in its ‘Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons’, where the court refused to outlaw even the threat or use of nuclear weapons in extreme cases of self-defence, where a state’s political survival faces an existential threat.
India is violating the law of the use of force by threatening Pakistan’s political survival through its weaponisation of dams and barrages, as the Indus system provides 90 per cent of Pakistan’s water.
Published in Dawn, May 17th, 2025
Treaties such as the IWT are not limited by time, continuing instead in perpetuity under Article 42 of the VCLT. And under Article 57 of the VCLT, a treaty can only be suspended if it allows for such suspension, or with the mutual consent of all contracting parties. The IWT, a multilateral treaty with India, Pakistan and the World Bank as signatories, does not provide for suspension and can unilaterally only be terminated or suspended if a party commits a material breach of treaty as described under Article 60 of the VCLT. India’s accusations of Pakistan’s alleged role in the Pahalgam attack are completely unsubstantiated; but in any event, that attack has no nexus with the scope of the IWT nor — assuming that Pakistan were even hypothetically involved — constitutes a material breach thereof.
The scope of and obligations under the IWT, which Pakistan complies with, principally deal with the allocation and usage of river waters, and incidentally with hydropower generation from them. Any stoppage, restriction, or interference in the flow of waters in rivers allocated to Pakistan under the treaty, including the Chenab, constitutes a clear violation by India of Article III (2) of the IWT, which obligates India to refrain from interfering with the flow of the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab rivers.
Apart from these treaty violations, customary law codified in Article 2 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility establishes that conduct in the breach of a state’s international obligations, that is attributable to it, constitutes an internationally wrongful act, thus necessitating the payment of full reparations to affected parties. Violations of a state’s treaty obligations constitute prima facie an internationally wrongful act, as affirmed by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the ‘Phosphates in Morocco’ case and the famous ‘Rainbow Warrior’ arbitration. Thus, India’s interference in the flow of the Chenab river constitutes an internationally wrongful act and also places India in breach of Article 26 of the VCLT, which codifies the principle of pacta sunt servanda — ie, agreements must be honoured. India’s culpability under international law thus obliges it to pay Pakistan reparations for the damage caused by its illegal acts.
India’s interference in the flow of the Chenab constitutes an internationally wrongful act.
Article IX of the IWT provides only two methods of dispute resolution: technical disputes, including engineering issues, are referred to a neutral expert, while treaty violations and questions of its interpretation, which are legal disputes, are referred to the Permanent Court of Arbitration. In the present circumstances, India did not exercise this right, arguably as it knew it stood on shaky legal ground in holding the IWT “in abeyance”.
Though the Simla Agreement, a bilateral treaty between India and Pakistan, emphasises bilateral dispute resolution, it cannot be relied upon to undercut Pakistan’s right to third-party dispute resolution, as India might be interpreting it to do so. The IWT, signed in 1960, predates the Simla Agreement of 1972 by over a decade and, according to Article 28 of the Vienna Convention — as well as customary international law — treaties do not operate retrospectively. Thus, the commitment to promote bilateral dispute resolution under the Simla Agreement does not limit in any way Pakistan’s ability to highlight and prosecute India’s violations of the IWT, including through international fora such as the General Assembly, Security Council and other UN bodies.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) outlined in the ‘Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros’ and ‘Pulp Mills’ cases that states cannot rely on perceived treaty violations or other internationally wrongful acts as a premise to violate their own treaty obligations. Violating another treaty or international legal norm does not entitle a state to suspend its obligations towards the state owed under the treaty concerned; instead, it constitutes a breach of the said treaty for that state.
India’s interference with the Chenab river’s flow is not only a treaty violation, but also a violation of international humanitarian law considering the state of armed conflict between the two nations, as it impedes civilians’ access to water. Article 54 (4) of the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug 12, 1949, (AP I) specifically outlaws the impediment of water for the purpose of reprisals.
International law explicitly prohibits the destruction or diversion of natural or ecological resources — such as rivers — for the purpose of reprisals or to achieve military objectives. This is recognised through the principle’s inclusion in the Berlin Rules on Water Resources 2004, which codify customary law on water resources, and is framed as a war crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the AP I.
During the recent military conflagration, India carried out strikes on the Neelam-Jhelum hydropower project, triggering Pakistan’s right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. To protect its flow of water guaranteed under the IWT, in an armed conflict, Pakistan reserves the right to target Indian dams and dykes on transboundary rivers as a military objective, if it is necessary and proportional, if such works are being used “in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support”, as outlined in Article 56 of AP I, a treaty signed by Pakistan and now mostly considered customary international law.
This permissibility is reinforced considering the ICJ went even further to protect state sovereignty in interpreting Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, as held in its ‘Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons’, where the court refused to outlaw even the threat or use of nuclear weapons in extreme cases of self-defence, where a state’s political survival faces an existential threat.
India is violating the law of the use of force by threatening Pakistan’s political survival through its weaponisation of dams and barrages, as the Indus system provides 90 per cent of Pakistan’s water.
Published in Dawn, May 17th, 2025
Rehabilitating the treaty
Ali Tauqeer Sheikh
Ali Tauqeer Sheikh
Published May 16, 2025
DAWN
The writer is a climate change and sustainable development expert.
INDIA has neither suspended nor abrogated the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). It has held it ‘in abeyance’ which is neither a technical nor a legal term in the treaty. The announcement represents a belligerent political action rather than a legal decision. Pakistan’s response therefore has to be primarily crafted in the political realm. The present status has left the door open for the treaty’s rehabilitation. Can Pakistan provide the Modi government a diplomatic opening, or a fig leaf, to engage in a meaningful process to preserve the treaty?
In the immediate term, India will not get extra water, nor will freshwater flows to Pakistan diminish. The engagement process therefore needs a long view. Since maintaining the treaty offers greater advantages to both nations, how can they look back and draw some lessons for future water relations within and outside the treaty?
India’s April 24 letter to Pakistan argued that fundamental changes in circumstances necessitated reassessment of treaty obligations. These changes include altered population demographics, clean energy development imperatives, and cross-border terrorism allegedly impeding India’s full utilisation of treaty rights. For precisely these reasons, the two countries need the treaty more than ever before. None of the listed issues can be addressed unilaterally by either side.
Regrettably, these issues were never formally raised by India in the Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) meetings. The negotiators from India and Pakistan, predominantly civil engineers, failed to recognise that climate change was altering the Indus basin hydrology, creating challenges beyond the treaty’s original scope. They failed to utilise Article 7 as a framework through which both nations could have collaboratively addressed the issues without treaty renegotiation.
The Indus basin has experienced unprecedented climate impacts including shifting monsoon patterns, extreme precipitation events and accelerated glacial melt. Water availability has begun to decrease, with projections indicating continuing decline. The IWT employed fixed allocation mechanisms not always suited to hydrological variability while PIC meetings remained infrequent and adversarial rather than collaborative.
Negotiators displayed no desire to study and adopt global best practices in transboundary water management.
Article 7 provided the legal foundation for future cooperation and “optimum development” of the rivers, yet it remained largely unutilised. India never requested the creation of specialised working groups under the PIC focused on climate adaptation and extreme weather response, the energy needs of the two sides or changing demographic trends. A joint climate research agenda examining glacial melt, changing precipitation patterns, and climate impact on water flows would have built mutual understanding of shared challenges.
Likewise, Pakistan never raised the subject of transboundary water terrorism. Not surprisingly, both nations failed to establish real-time coordination mechanisms for flood warnings, drought management and other extreme events. More agile dispute-resolution mechanisms would have prevented the escalation of tensions. The commission never increased the meetings’ frequency beyond the minimum twice yearly for more responsive governance.
The negotiators also did not show any appetite to study and adopt global best practices in transboundary water management. Approximately, 40 per cent of the global population relies on shared water sources, with 70pc of transboundary basin areas governed by treaties. The Ganges Water Treaty between Bangladesh and India, despite its imperfections, offered a regional model with provisions for water-sharing during droughts and a Joint Water Commission mandated to conduct studies on water-sharing, irrigation, and flood control.
The Permanent Joint Technical Commission on the Nile Basin represented another valuable model despite controversies surrounding Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. This framework enabled upstream and downstream countries to make recommendations for cooperation in energy generation, dam filling, or water allocations during extraordinary droughts.
Water management experts had identified four key mechanisms that transboundary agreements should incorporate: flexible allocation strategies, specific drought and extreme weather provisions, regular review processes and strong institutional frameworks.
Despite past failures, the door remains open for both countries to rehabilitate the treaty. The World Bank, as the third signatory to the IWT, retains significant potential to facilitate this process. Article IX explicitly designates the World Bank as a potential mediator when differences arise, and this mechanism remains available despite the current tensions. Neither party appears to have informed the World Bank of recent developments. Pakistan need not hold back.
The World Bank’s unique position enables it to facilitate technical dialogues separated from political rhetoric. There is a case for the bank to expand beyond its role of appointing neutral experts or arbitrators, and bring together international experts with experience in successful transboundary water cooperation models like the Danube river basin, which transformed from a contested resource into “an emblem of peace and cooperation in Europe”.
Using the trust fund created when the treaty was signed in 1960, the World Bank can help India and Pakistan undertake studies on implementation experiences from agreements like the Mekong River Commission, which has developed sophisticated joint monitoring protocols for changing flow conditions.
Rather than allowing the treaty to stagnate, India and Pakistan can rehabilitate it through incremental technical cooperation. The World Bank could be requested to facilitate initial technical dialogues on non-controversial aspects of climate impacts, growing regional hydro energy needs, and gradually building momentum for more complex discussions. Article 7 remains the most viable pathway for tackling the issues raised by India without reopening the entire treaty.
There is still an opportunity to establish specialised technical working groups. Protocols for coordinated responses to extreme weather events, following models from other basins, could be developed without altering the treaty’s core structure.
The IWT remains a viable framework for transboundary water cooperation, but its implementation must evolve. By transforming climate challenges into opportunities for technical cooperation, India and Pakistan can ensure water security while potentially rebuilding a foundation for regional stability. The World Bank’s involvement as an honest broker could provide a neutral platform for this technical renaissance, allowing professionals to work beyond political constraints while giving the leadership in both countries space for a face-saving return to cooperative water governance. After all, it is in everyone’s interest to deweaponise regional waters rather than have a dysfunctional treaty parked in indefinite abeyance.
The writer is a climate change and sustainable development expert.
Published in Dawn, May 16th, 2025
INDIA has neither suspended nor abrogated the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). It has held it ‘in abeyance’ which is neither a technical nor a legal term in the treaty. The announcement represents a belligerent political action rather than a legal decision. Pakistan’s response therefore has to be primarily crafted in the political realm. The present status has left the door open for the treaty’s rehabilitation. Can Pakistan provide the Modi government a diplomatic opening, or a fig leaf, to engage in a meaningful process to preserve the treaty?
In the immediate term, India will not get extra water, nor will freshwater flows to Pakistan diminish. The engagement process therefore needs a long view. Since maintaining the treaty offers greater advantages to both nations, how can they look back and draw some lessons for future water relations within and outside the treaty?
India’s April 24 letter to Pakistan argued that fundamental changes in circumstances necessitated reassessment of treaty obligations. These changes include altered population demographics, clean energy development imperatives, and cross-border terrorism allegedly impeding India’s full utilisation of treaty rights. For precisely these reasons, the two countries need the treaty more than ever before. None of the listed issues can be addressed unilaterally by either side.
Regrettably, these issues were never formally raised by India in the Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) meetings. The negotiators from India and Pakistan, predominantly civil engineers, failed to recognise that climate change was altering the Indus basin hydrology, creating challenges beyond the treaty’s original scope. They failed to utilise Article 7 as a framework through which both nations could have collaboratively addressed the issues without treaty renegotiation.
The Indus basin has experienced unprecedented climate impacts including shifting monsoon patterns, extreme precipitation events and accelerated glacial melt. Water availability has begun to decrease, with projections indicating continuing decline. The IWT employed fixed allocation mechanisms not always suited to hydrological variability while PIC meetings remained infrequent and adversarial rather than collaborative.
Negotiators displayed no desire to study and adopt global best practices in transboundary water management.
Article 7 provided the legal foundation for future cooperation and “optimum development” of the rivers, yet it remained largely unutilised. India never requested the creation of specialised working groups under the PIC focused on climate adaptation and extreme weather response, the energy needs of the two sides or changing demographic trends. A joint climate research agenda examining glacial melt, changing precipitation patterns, and climate impact on water flows would have built mutual understanding of shared challenges.
Likewise, Pakistan never raised the subject of transboundary water terrorism. Not surprisingly, both nations failed to establish real-time coordination mechanisms for flood warnings, drought management and other extreme events. More agile dispute-resolution mechanisms would have prevented the escalation of tensions. The commission never increased the meetings’ frequency beyond the minimum twice yearly for more responsive governance.
The negotiators also did not show any appetite to study and adopt global best practices in transboundary water management. Approximately, 40 per cent of the global population relies on shared water sources, with 70pc of transboundary basin areas governed by treaties. The Ganges Water Treaty between Bangladesh and India, despite its imperfections, offered a regional model with provisions for water-sharing during droughts and a Joint Water Commission mandated to conduct studies on water-sharing, irrigation, and flood control.
The Permanent Joint Technical Commission on the Nile Basin represented another valuable model despite controversies surrounding Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. This framework enabled upstream and downstream countries to make recommendations for cooperation in energy generation, dam filling, or water allocations during extraordinary droughts.
Water management experts had identified four key mechanisms that transboundary agreements should incorporate: flexible allocation strategies, specific drought and extreme weather provisions, regular review processes and strong institutional frameworks.
Despite past failures, the door remains open for both countries to rehabilitate the treaty. The World Bank, as the third signatory to the IWT, retains significant potential to facilitate this process. Article IX explicitly designates the World Bank as a potential mediator when differences arise, and this mechanism remains available despite the current tensions. Neither party appears to have informed the World Bank of recent developments. Pakistan need not hold back.
The World Bank’s unique position enables it to facilitate technical dialogues separated from political rhetoric. There is a case for the bank to expand beyond its role of appointing neutral experts or arbitrators, and bring together international experts with experience in successful transboundary water cooperation models like the Danube river basin, which transformed from a contested resource into “an emblem of peace and cooperation in Europe”.
Using the trust fund created when the treaty was signed in 1960, the World Bank can help India and Pakistan undertake studies on implementation experiences from agreements like the Mekong River Commission, which has developed sophisticated joint monitoring protocols for changing flow conditions.
Rather than allowing the treaty to stagnate, India and Pakistan can rehabilitate it through incremental technical cooperation. The World Bank could be requested to facilitate initial technical dialogues on non-controversial aspects of climate impacts, growing regional hydro energy needs, and gradually building momentum for more complex discussions. Article 7 remains the most viable pathway for tackling the issues raised by India without reopening the entire treaty.
There is still an opportunity to establish specialised technical working groups. Protocols for coordinated responses to extreme weather events, following models from other basins, could be developed without altering the treaty’s core structure.
The IWT remains a viable framework for transboundary water cooperation, but its implementation must evolve. By transforming climate challenges into opportunities for technical cooperation, India and Pakistan can ensure water security while potentially rebuilding a foundation for regional stability. The World Bank’s involvement as an honest broker could provide a neutral platform for this technical renaissance, allowing professionals to work beyond political constraints while giving the leadership in both countries space for a face-saving return to cooperative water governance. After all, it is in everyone’s interest to deweaponise regional waters rather than have a dysfunctional treaty parked in indefinite abeyance.
The writer is a climate change and sustainable development expert.
Published in Dawn, May 16th, 2025
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