As tensions between the United States and China show little sign of abating, Asia finds itself caught in the crossfire of a geopolitical rivalry that is increasingly shaping global dynamics. From trade and technology to security and soft power, the choices made by nations across the continent are of immense consequence - not just for the region, but for the world at large.
Some obvious names have nailed their colours firmly to the mast early, aligning themselves clearly with Washington or Beijing.
Others, wary of jeopardising economic interests or provoking security dilemmas, prefer the middle ground - engaging both sides where advantageous and avoiding overt commitments. This diplomatic hedging reflects the complex realities of a multipolar Asia, where the calculus is not simply a binary choice but a subtle dance of pragmatism, history and national interest.
In Washington's corner
Several Asian nations have, for a variety of reasons, backed the United States.
Japan remains one of Washington's closest allies in the region – a position held since the end of WWII. Bound by a post-war security treaty and a shared commitment to liberal democratic values, Tokyo has grown increasingly wary of China's maritime ambitions over the years, particularly in the East China Sea where the bulk of Asia-watchers see conflict as most likely in the years ahead. Under successive Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) governments, Japan has enhanced defence cooperation with the United States and joined regional initiatives such as the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) alongside India and Australia. Tokyo’s added willingness to supply defensive arms and aid to like-minded partners further underscores its clear US-centric alignment.
South Korea, although economically entwined with China, like Japan, has deep military ties with the US. The presence of tens of thousands of American troops on its soil and the mutual concern over North Korea’s nuclear programme keep Seoul closely tethered to Washington. Indeed, the first story to make headlines of note in the South Korean media on June 4 after the election of new President Lee Jae-myung, focussed on the timing of a phone call to the White House – a norm in South Korea and Japan when a new leader is elected. Nonetheless, on paper, South Korea walks a diplomatic tightrope of sorts, mindful of Beijing’s sway over Pyongyang and the importance of China just over the Yellow Sea as its largest trading partner.
The Philippines has seen a notable shift in orientation back towards the US under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. After a period of flirtation with China under the now-jailed Rodrigo Duterte, Manila has restored robust defence ties with Washington, allowing increased access to strategic military bases under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA).
This has been aided, ironically on China’s part by frequent stand-offs with Chinese naval and coastguard vessels in the South China Sea which has helped to push public opinion and official policy back towards the United States. Culturally and in terms of the size of its US-based diaspora too, Manila is heavily reliant on links across the Pacific.
Taiwan, while diplomatically isolated and lacking formal recognition by most countries, remains a de-facto ally of the US. Washington provides arms, political support, and an implicit security guarantee against any potential Chinese aggression. Taipei, for its part, has thus long-aligned itself economically and strategically with the liberal democratic order led by the United States and will continue to do so despite the cultural links across the Taiwan Strait being much stronger than those shared with the US.
Australia, though not an Asian nation per-se, plays a significant role in the regional security calculus. It has firmly sided with the US, participating in the AUKUS defence pact and vocally criticising Beijing on issues ranging from cyber security to human rights. Australia – and New Zealand – have also sent their ships through the Taiwan Strait in the past year in a clear message to China not to get overly aggressive with Taiwan – a fellow backer of the US in Asia.
Leaning towards Beijing
While fewer in number, some Asian nations have displayed clear signs of alignment or strategic proximity to China.
Cambodia is among Beijing’s staunchest supporters in Southeast Asia. Former Prime Minister Hun Sen and his son - now PM - Hun Manet have both welcomed Chinese investment and security assistance, even allowing Chinese-funded infrastructure projects near naval facilities. This has served to raise eyebrows in Western capitals. Phnom Penh has also consistently defended Beijing in ASEAN forums, often obstructing unified positions on the South China Sea (SCS) despite not have a coastline on the SCS.
Pakistan, long reliant on American aid, has pivoted strongly towards China in recent years, particularly in the wake of US actions in neighbouring Afghanistan. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative, has helped to cement the strategic partnership shared by Islamabad and Beijing and shared concerns over India and converging political interests have further deepened the relationship, making Pakistan a key Chinese ally in South Asia.
Myanmar, under military rule since the 2021 coup, has found itself increasingly isolated from the West. Beijing meanwhile, although officially calling for stability, has maintained a dialogue with the highly unpopular ruling junta and has both expanded economic ties and reportedly offered security-related assistance of late. A recent earthquake that led to the deaths of thousands saw an immediate response by China with aid shipments arriving soon after. Though the relationship is pragmatic rather than ideological, Naypyidaw’s dependence on Chinese capital and diplomatic cover is growing.
The fence-sitters
Most Asian nations, however, do not fit neatly into either camp. Instead, they pursue a route best titled "strategic ambiguity" or "hedging". These countries recognise the risks of alienating either power and seek to maximise benefits from both.
India, for instance, is a founding member of the Quad and has deepened defence ties with Washington, yet remains outside formal alliances. It continues to purchase Russian weapons - often made with Chinese components – while maintaining a complicated, often adversarial, relationship with Beijing, especially on the back of deadly border clashes in the Himalayas in the past few years and the knowledge that China did back Pakistan in their cross-border conflict over a seemingly Islamabad-backed terrorist attack that killed 26 in Pahalgam, India.
However, New Delhi remains cautious about becoming a full-fledged ally of the US, preferring a multipolar world in which it can chart an independent course.
Indonesia, Southeast Asia’s largest economy and the world’s largest Muslim nation as well as the de-facto leader of ASEAN, exemplifies non-alignment. Jakarta maintains strong trade and investment ties with China while also engaging on multiple levels with the United States on security cooperation and military training. Indonesia's traditional foreign policy doctrine of "free and active" diplomacy encourages engagement without entanglement which largely removes the nation from headlines leaning one way or the other.
Vietnam, like Indonesia, also treads a careful line. Historically wary of Chinese influence - due to over a thousand years of conflict and ongoing maritime disputes in the South China Sea - Hanoi has recently welcomed closer defence ties with the US. Yet it is also deeply intertwined economically with China, its largest trading partner. The Communist Party of Vietnam too shares ideological ties with Beijing, even as it seeks to diversify its strategic options and moves closer towards the West particularly in the energy sector as Hanoi looks to increase its LNG infrastructure.
Thailand, a US treaty ally, has in recent years developed closer economic ties with China, now its largest trading partner. Because of this, Bangkok participates in multiple Chinese-led infrastructure projects while also continuing joint military exercises with the US. Thailand’s internal political flux and strategic geography combine to make it a cautious actor, unwilling to commit too firmly to either side.
Malaysia maintains both deep cultural ties and strong trade relations with China, particularly in the technology and commodities sectors. Yet it is also wary of Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea and quietly supports regional defence cooperation with Western powers. Kuala Lumpur prefers quiet diplomacy over overt alignment and this is best demonstrated in its lack of condemnation in periods of increased tension in the SCS.
Singapore, while not a treaty ally, has one of the region’s most sophisticated militaries and maintains close ties with both Beijing and Washington. It allows rotational US naval deployments and supports international rules-based order, but also hosts significant Chinese investment and maintains robust bilateral and cultural ties with Beijing. Former Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong had frequently spoken of the need for the two great powers to avoid confrontation, reflecting Singapore’s acute awareness of the stakes involved. New PM, Lawrence Wong meanwhile has already indicated his own preference to focus first and foremost on Singapore’s best interests rather than lean one way or the other, having said in reference to US ties and China’s response that “The new era will be more volatile, with more frequent and unpredictable shocks. We must be ready to stand firm, and protect our interests, no matter how the external winds may blow” according to The Straits Times.
The cost of choice
For most Asian nations therefore, the decision is less about choosing sides and more about managing relationships. Economic dependency on China, particularly through trade and investment, is undeniable. At the same time, the security umbrella provided by the United States remains vital to deterring coercion by Beijing and maintaining regional stability.
The underlying theme is clear: while a few states have chosen sides, most are keen to avoid entanglement. Their strategic calculus is shaped not only by immediate national interests but also by the fear that an overt choice could bring retaliation or exclusion from one side or the other.
For decades, the United States has been the principal arms supplier to Taiwan, a self-governing democracy that China regards as a breakaway province across the Taiwan Strait. American military sales to Taipei are often framed in Washington as a moral imperative – a commitment to help a democratic partner defend itself.
But beneath this well-worn rhetoric lies a more complex story: one shaped by global power dynamics, shifting military technology, and persistent economic incentives oftentimes forced upon a US-friendly outpost on the Western Pacific.
Since the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979 – the same year Washington formally recognised the Communist People’s Republic of China – the US has pledged to provide Taiwan with “defensive articles and services” sufficient for self-defence. This strategic ambiguity, designed to deter both Chinese aggression and a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan, has given the US wide latitude in its arms transfers.
As a result, over the past four decades, the result has been a steady stream of weapons systems, training, and logistical support from American defence firms to Taiwan’s armed forces. Yet critics argue that not all of this assistance has been necessary in countering the military threat posed by China.
A long history of arms sales
Taiwan’s earliest American-made equipment, including F-5 fighter jets and Knox-class frigates, reflected Cold War-era military thinking: a conventional force prepared to repel an amphibious invasion. But over time, the nature of the Chinese threat evolved – and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) modernised at an astonishing pace.
Today, China fields a military force that dwarfs Taiwan’s. The PLA Navy is now the largest in the world by number of ships. Its missile arsenal includes precision-strike systems aimed at Taiwan’s command centres and airbases. In the skies, China’s J-20 stealth fighters and radar-evading cruise missiles place Taiwan’s ageing fleet of American F-16s and Indigenous Defence Fighters at a marked disadvantage.
Against this backdrop though, the US has continued to sell and in many ways force Taiwan to buy arms – some of them cutting-edge, others less so. Recent packages have included HIMARS rocket systems designed over a quarter of a century ago, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and upgraded F-16V fighters with advanced avionics and radar. In 2020, the Trump administration approved over $5bn in arms sales to Taipei, a figure sustained by the Biden administration through a series of smaller, more targeted deals, often framed as “fast and asymmetric”.
But not all Taiwanese leaders are convinced.
Pressure and procurement – the American way
There is a growing sense in Taipei that Washington’s insistence on certain purchases is driven as much by domestic industrial interests as it is by strategic necessity for Taiwan.
American lawmakers, particularly those from districts hosting defence contractors, are known to lobby vigorously for foreign military sales. The result, according to some analysts, is a pattern in which Taiwan is ‘encouraged’ to purchase systems that benefit US industry but do not necessarily match Taiwan’s own defence strategy.
The controversial purchase of M1A2 Abrams tanks is a case in point. The deal, approved in 2019, was worth nearly $2bn. Yet many defence experts questioned whether the 70-ton vehicles which are designed for open warfare in the deserts of the Middle East are appropriate for the mountainous terrain and dense urban environments of Taiwan.
And these were the first new tanks received by Taiwan in almost 25-years after a shipment of M60A3 TTS tanks crossed the Pacific in the late 90s through to 2001.
On the waves, Taiwan has also been offered older-model naval ships and aircraft parts that some critics describe as “second-tier”. While not obsolete, these systems require significant maintenance and upgrades to remain in any way viable in a high-intensity conflict.
Strategic realism or symbolic support?
The US, however, insists that its arms sales to Taiwan are tailored to help the island adopt a “porcupine strategy” in making any potential Chinese invasion so costly that Beijing is deterred from acting in the first place.
Taipei has increasingly leaned into this model, investing in mobile Stinger missiles, improved radar networks, and indigenous drone and missile production. In this context, US sales of precision-guided munitions and support systems appear more relevant.
Still, there remains a fundamental and glaringly obvious financial imbalance: China spends more on defence in a month than Taiwan does in a year. The PLA continues to rehearse blockade scenarios, cyber attacks, and joint air-sea operations that outstrip Taiwan’s capacity to respond on its own.
And while the US remains Taiwan’s security partner of choice, it is not a formal treaty ally. On paper, the US does not even recognise Taiwan as a full diplomatic ally.
Because of this ambiguity over how, if at all, the US would react were China to invade hangs over every arms deal and defence conversation. American weapons might buy time in the event of a Chinese assault – but they do not ensure direct US intervention.
Hegseth’s warning - and the 2027 timeline
Amid growing concern over the cross-Strait balance of power therefore, the US Secretary of Defence, Pete Hegseth recently drew headlines for his stark warning of an “imminent” Chinese move against Taiwan. Hegseth, citing internal Pentagon estimates, suggested that a potential conflict could unfold “sooner than many think”.
It was a claim that many before have made, albeit not at the level held by Hegseth.
However, while Hegseth’s comments underscored the urgency felt in some US defence circles, they also referenced a projected timeline of 2027 – not next week as many media outlets have implied in recent days. Besides drawing the scorn of more astute Taiwan watchers, the date aligns with prior US intelligence assessments that highlight the PLA’s goal of achieving the capability to invade Taiwan by the end of the current decade.
As ever, such forecasts are not predictions but planning scenarios. Nonetheless, they do influence defence postures, congressional rhetoric, and the cadence of US arms sales to Taiwan – reinforcing a climate of urgency that is both strategic and, at times, politically convenient.
Beyond questions of military strategy, there is the simple reality that arms sales are big business. The US defence industry relies heavily on foreign military sales to sustain production lines and support high-skilled jobs. Taiwan, given its strategic significance and political alignment with the West, represents a relatively secure and dependable market.
Defence giants such as Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and Boeing have all been involved in Taiwan deals.
China, for its part, routinely retaliates by placing sanctions on these firms – a largely symbolic gesture, but one that illustrates the geopolitical stakes.
This blend of economic self-interest and strategic signalling is hardly unique to Taiwan. But on the island – where every sale is interpreted as a message to both Beijing and Washington – it carries disproportionate weight.
Reality on the ground
The US-Taiwan defence relationship is thus a marriage of pragmatism and politics. On one hand, Taiwan urgently needs modern capabilities to deter an increasingly assertive and aggressive China.
On the other, US arms packages are shaped as much by congressional lobbying and industrial incentives as they are by military planning and as long as cross-Strait tensions persist, and voices like Hegseth’s amplify the sense of looming confrontation, the economic pressure on – some say bullying of - Taiwan to keep buying American military hardware, will very likely intensify.
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