ByTurkish Minute
June 3, 2025
Syrian Kurds wave independence-era flags during a demonstration in support of the US-backed, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces in the northeastern city of Qamishli, on December 19, 2024. - The show of support for the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) comes after Islamist-led rebels toppled Syria's longtime strongman Bashar al-Assad earlier this month, and as Turkey said on December 19 it would push to "disarm" the Kurdish-led forces on its border. (Photo by Delil SOULEIMAN / AFP)
Turkey has entered direct talks with Syrian Kurdish leaders, including the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in a major shift from years of military hostility, Al-Monitor and Middle East Eye reported on Tuesday.
The talks, which began in secret in 2024 and are continuing in 2025, are part of a broader initiative to end the Turkish state’s decades-long war with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), according to Al-Monitor.
Initial meetings were held in Europe — in France and Switzerland — between Turkish officials and senior representatives of the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, Al-Monitor said, citing informed sources.
The meetings followed Turkey’s March 2024 local elections, in which the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) won nationwide for the first time with backing from the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party).
The election outcome prompted the government of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to open a new channel of negotiations with jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in a bid to regain Kurdish support and secure Erdoğan’s rule beyond the 2028 term limit.
Parallel to this, Turkey sought direct engagement with the Syrian Kurds, despite its ongoing military operations in northern Syria, which have displaced thousands and destroyed civilian infrastructure.
Talks with the SDF — the US-backed force that controls much of northeast Syria — gained new momentum after the fall of Bashar al Assad in December 2024, according to Middle East Eye.
The Assad regime’s replacement by a Sunni-led government under Ahmed al-Sharaa, a former Islamist militant on good terms with Turkey, eased Ankara’s fears that the Kurds would again be used as a proxy against it.
Devlet Bahçeli, Erdoğan’s far-right ally and a longtime opponent of Kurdish rights, stunned observers in October 2024 by calling for Öcalan to be allowed to address parliament and possibly be granted amnesty if he succeeded in ending the war.
On February 27, Öcalan issued a call for the PKK to dissolve.
The PKK leadership, based in the Qandil mountains in Iraq, publicly accepted Öcalan’s call on May 12.
As part of this wider process, SDF commander Mazloum Kobane — reportedly once regarded as Öcalan’s adopted son — signed a landmark agreement with Syria’s new president in March, pledging to integrate the SDF into a future Syrian national army.
The agreement also laid the foundation for Kurdish-led governance to operate within a decentralized framework under Damascus’s oversight — an arrangement Ankara has opposed for years.
However, Middle East Eye reported that Turkey’s stance is shifting, with Ankara now open to informal Kurdish autonomy, provided it stops short of constitutional enshrinement or formal federalism.
Direct Turkish-SDF meetings, including one held last week in southern Turkey, were facilitated by the United States, Middle East Eye said, citing sources with knowledge of the negotiations.
The agenda included the possible US military withdrawal from Syria, the transfer of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) detainees and camps from SDF to Syrian government control, and the integration of the SDF into a restructured Syrian military.
Kobane confirmed the ongoing talks in a May 30 interview with Shams TV, saying the ceasefire with Turkey had held for more than two months and could evolve into something lasting.
“We are not at war with Turkey,” he said, adding that his group is prepared for improved relations.
According to Al-Monitor, Kobane was offered the possibility of meeting with either Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan or intelligence chief İbrahim Kalın if the negotiations advance.
Both the SDF and the Turkish Foreign Ministry denied such an offer had been made, Al-Monitor noted.
The reopening of the Nusaybin border crossing — closed since 2012 — is among the concessions being discussed, a step that could revitalize trade and offer an economic boost to Kurdish and Arab-majority regions under SDF control.
Still, Ankara’s key demand remains unchanged: the full elimination of PKK influence within the Syrian Kurdish administration.
A US State Department official told Middle East Eye they would not comment on private diplomacy but welcomed efforts to implement the March 10 agreement between the SDF and the Syrian government.
US envoy Thomas Barrack told Turkish media that the SDF’s continued survival depended on progress with Damascus and warned that the US military presence was being reduced, with bases shrinking from eight to five and only one likely to remain.
Ankara remains firmly opposed to any form of Kurdish federalism in Syria but now appears willing to accept a limited form of Kurdish self-governance, Middle East Eye reported.
Despite years of enmity, Turkish-SDF talks — once unimaginable — are now being quietly normalized through a web of ceasefires, diplomatic backchannels and shared concerns over post-ISIL security and regional stability.
Turkey has entered direct talks with Syrian Kurdish leaders, including the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in a major shift from years of military hostility, Al-Monitor and Middle East Eye reported on Tuesday.
The talks, which began in secret in 2024 and are continuing in 2025, are part of a broader initiative to end the Turkish state’s decades-long war with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), according to Al-Monitor.
Initial meetings were held in Europe — in France and Switzerland — between Turkish officials and senior representatives of the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, Al-Monitor said, citing informed sources.
The meetings followed Turkey’s March 2024 local elections, in which the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) won nationwide for the first time with backing from the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party).
The election outcome prompted the government of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to open a new channel of negotiations with jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in a bid to regain Kurdish support and secure Erdoğan’s rule beyond the 2028 term limit.
Parallel to this, Turkey sought direct engagement with the Syrian Kurds, despite its ongoing military operations in northern Syria, which have displaced thousands and destroyed civilian infrastructure.
Talks with the SDF — the US-backed force that controls much of northeast Syria — gained new momentum after the fall of Bashar al Assad in December 2024, according to Middle East Eye.
The Assad regime’s replacement by a Sunni-led government under Ahmed al-Sharaa, a former Islamist militant on good terms with Turkey, eased Ankara’s fears that the Kurds would again be used as a proxy against it.
Devlet Bahçeli, Erdoğan’s far-right ally and a longtime opponent of Kurdish rights, stunned observers in October 2024 by calling for Öcalan to be allowed to address parliament and possibly be granted amnesty if he succeeded in ending the war.
On February 27, Öcalan issued a call for the PKK to dissolve.
The PKK leadership, based in the Qandil mountains in Iraq, publicly accepted Öcalan’s call on May 12.
As part of this wider process, SDF commander Mazloum Kobane — reportedly once regarded as Öcalan’s adopted son — signed a landmark agreement with Syria’s new president in March, pledging to integrate the SDF into a future Syrian national army.
The agreement also laid the foundation for Kurdish-led governance to operate within a decentralized framework under Damascus’s oversight — an arrangement Ankara has opposed for years.
However, Middle East Eye reported that Turkey’s stance is shifting, with Ankara now open to informal Kurdish autonomy, provided it stops short of constitutional enshrinement or formal federalism.
Direct Turkish-SDF meetings, including one held last week in southern Turkey, were facilitated by the United States, Middle East Eye said, citing sources with knowledge of the negotiations.
The agenda included the possible US military withdrawal from Syria, the transfer of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) detainees and camps from SDF to Syrian government control, and the integration of the SDF into a restructured Syrian military.
Kobane confirmed the ongoing talks in a May 30 interview with Shams TV, saying the ceasefire with Turkey had held for more than two months and could evolve into something lasting.
“We are not at war with Turkey,” he said, adding that his group is prepared for improved relations.
According to Al-Monitor, Kobane was offered the possibility of meeting with either Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan or intelligence chief İbrahim Kalın if the negotiations advance.
Both the SDF and the Turkish Foreign Ministry denied such an offer had been made, Al-Monitor noted.
The reopening of the Nusaybin border crossing — closed since 2012 — is among the concessions being discussed, a step that could revitalize trade and offer an economic boost to Kurdish and Arab-majority regions under SDF control.
Still, Ankara’s key demand remains unchanged: the full elimination of PKK influence within the Syrian Kurdish administration.
A US State Department official told Middle East Eye they would not comment on private diplomacy but welcomed efforts to implement the March 10 agreement between the SDF and the Syrian government.
US envoy Thomas Barrack told Turkish media that the SDF’s continued survival depended on progress with Damascus and warned that the US military presence was being reduced, with bases shrinking from eight to five and only one likely to remain.
Ankara remains firmly opposed to any form of Kurdish federalism in Syria but now appears willing to accept a limited form of Kurdish self-governance, Middle East Eye reported.
Despite years of enmity, Turkish-SDF talks — once unimaginable — are now being quietly normalized through a web of ceasefires, diplomatic backchannels and shared concerns over post-ISIL security and regional stability.
Israel and the new Syria: Where are ties heading?
Hints at normalisation are a way to keep the US engaged and restrain Israel's destabilisation campaign in Syria, but full-fledged diplomatic ties are unlikely
Analysis
Giorgio Cafiero
03 June, 2025
THE NEW ARAB
Since Bashar Al-Assad’s regime fell in late 2024, constant Israeli airstrikes have targeted Syria’s military infrastructure in locations across the war-torn country.
Israeli forces have also advanced into the UN-monitored demilitarised buffer zone separating Syria from the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, as well as into adjacent regions, including the summit of Mount Hermon.
This Israeli military campaign of destabilisation is about weakening, dividing, and Balkanising Syria to the maximum extent possible to further shift the Levant’s balance of power in Israel’s favour.
In early April, Israeli air operations struck key infrastructure across several Syrian provinces, including airports and military installations in Hama and Homs, as well as a scientific research facility in Damascus.
Residential areas were also hit, with villages such as Koayiah, located near Syria’s borders with Jordan and the Golan Heights, suffering significant damage. Subsequently, on 2 May, Israeli fighter jets targeted an area near the presidential palace in Damascus.
This action came amid escalating sectarian violence in Syria, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu cynically justifying this aggression under the banner of Israel defending Syria’s Druze minority community.
Nonetheless, last month reports surfaced that Syrian and Israeli officials had engaged in direct “deconfliction” talks aimed at preventing further flareups along their shared border.
These face-to-face meetings marked a notable shift for the relatively new Syrian government, led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa, which had previously relied on backchannel communication through intermediaries such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Ahmad al-Dalati, the governor of Quneitra province and security chief in Suweida, has led the discussions on the Syrian side.
Patrick Theros, the former US ambassador to Qatar, spoke to The New Arab about what he believes might emerge from these “deconfliction” talks.
“At this stage, everything depends on the internal politics of Israel. Israel's advance into the border buffer zones and beyond, the IDF's continuing high intensity bombardment of anything it can find in Syria that could remotely be connected to military rearmament, its demand for the disbarment of southern Syria, and its offer to defend the Druze in Syria are designed to keep Netanyahu in power. If he stays in power, the deconfliction talks will continue forever,” he told TNA.
“If Netanyahu falls, a lot would depend on who replaces him,” added Theros.
Drastic changes in US-Syria relations
The state of Syrian-Israeli bilateral affairs must be analysed within the context of bold policy shifts by US President Donald J. Trump’s administration regarding Syria, which signal Washington’s growing openness toward the post-Assad government in Damascus. Such changes in US foreign policy carry the potential to profoundly transform Syria and its position on the international stage.
The first leg of Trump’s Gulf tour last month was Riyadh, where he announced the lifting of Washington’s sanctions on Syria. The following day, he held a face-to-face meeting with Sharaa in Riyadh, joined by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan participating via phone.
On 23 May, the US Treasury Department issued sanctions relief, allowing American individuals and businesses to engage in financial transactions with Syrian entities - activities that had previously been prohibited under Washington’s sanctions regime.
By the end of the month, the American flag was raised outside the US ambassador’s residence in Damascus - a moment that powerfully symbolised Washington and the nascent Syrian government’s movement toward normalisation in the post-Assad era.
While the US, the UK, and the EU have lifted many sanctions on Syria and engage the relatively new government in Damascus diplomatically, their approaches stand in contrast to Netanyahu’s position.
The Israeli government articulates its desire to see the West keep economic pressure on post-Assad Syria and for Washington and other Western capitals to avoid steps which legitimise Sharaa’s government.
The Islamist rebels-turned-rulers in Damascus understand that only Washington can pressure Israel into halting its military aggression against post-Assad Syria. This is one reason why Sharaa sees entering a new chapter in relations with the US as critical for his country’s future.
“The Trump administration’s 180-degree turn on Syria will constrain Israel’s freedom of action on Syria to some degree, but not completely. Even though US Syria policy now conflicts with Israel’s policy, Trump generally lets Israel do as it pleases,” said Aron Lund, a fellow with Century International and senior analyst at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (who does not speak on behalf of either institution), in a TNA interview.
“Trump may decide to put real pressure on Israel at some point, but it’s more likely to be over Iran or Gaza than over Syria,” he added. Lund did, however, address the possibility of a US military withdrawal from Syria, which he said could result in Washington needing to get “more serious with Israel to prevent disruptions to those plans.”
The Turkish factor
Frequently described as the “big winner” in post-Assad Syria, Turkey plays a significant role in these evolving dynamics. Israel’s current posture presents a direct challenge to Erdogan’s regional and international policies, as well as his reputation as a decisive and influential leader within the broader Islamic world. It is likely safe to conclude that the most critical de-escalation talks are those which began between Turkey and Israel under Azerbaijani auspices earlier this year, and have gone through more than three rounds.
“The ‘de-escalation’ between Damascus and Tel Aviv is highly dependent on the Ankara-Tel Aviv talks and the relation between both countries,” explained Yeghia Tashjian, the Regional and International Affairs Cluster Coordinator at the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in a TNA interview.
“If the talks continue on the current path, we may witness a limited de-escalation. If not, Israel would even bomb assets affiliated with Turkey or potential Turkish bases as it did a few months ago,” he added.
Syrian-Israeli normalisation?
A key question many analysts are raising is how the Trump administration could leverage sanctions relief and the diplomatic openings between Washington and Damascus to cajole Syria into the Israeli normalisation camp.
Sharaa has stated that such normalisation with Israel could be on the table, albeit under certain circumstances. Yet, Lund believes that Syria formalising full-fledged diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv is an “unlikely” scenario.
“Sharaa seems to have decided that holding out the prospect of an Israel deal is a good way to keep Washington engaged and perhaps also to make it restrain the Israelis,” he told TNA, adding that “flirting with the idea of normalisation is not the same as actually normalising.”
It is necessary to note that Syria today, unlike Egypt, Jordan, the UAE, and Morocco at the time of the signing of their Israeli normalisation accords with Israel, has an unresolved territorial dispute with Tel Aviv, making it increasingly difficult to imagine Syria entering the Israeli normalisation camp.
“It’s not just about the Palestinians, it’s also about Syrian territory - the Golan Heights. Israel occupies that region and claims to have annexed it as sovereign Israeli land. If you ask Israeli leaders, it's now part of Israel forever. The United States endorses that claim. That makes Syria’s position vis-à-vis Israel very different from the countries that entered into normalisation agreements in the past,” explained Lund in a TNA interview.
“In addition, of course, the regional situation is not conducive to an agreement, with so much anger in Syria and elsewhere over Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians in Gaza,” he added.
Syria’s leadership will ultimately seek to maintain diplomatic momentum with the West, most importantly the US. This is one dynamic which will probably prompt Damascus to avoid being confrontational toward Israel, at least for as long as that is possible.
Nonetheless, Israeli land theft in Syria and bombardments of various parts of the war-ravaged country seem likely to continue (assuming the Trump administration refuses to use Washington’s leverage to rein in Israel’s destabilisation campaign in Syria), making it quite unrealistic to imagine Syria entering the Abraham Accords under current circumstances.
“I do not expect that the Israeli side will withdraw from the newly occupied areas in southern Syria. We have seen similar tactics in Gaza and southern Lebanon, the mindset of Netanyahu and his cabinet members has shown that they seek maximalism rather than pragmatism,” Tashjian told TNA.
“The idea of ‘land for peace’ has always been on the table, but it was refused by the Israeli side. The destruction of the Syrian air force and navy by Israel has shown that Israel is not eager for compromise but is seeking to weaken its rival without committing to a long-term agreement,” concluded the Beirut-based scholar.
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics
Follow him on Twitter: @GiorgioCafiero
Hints at normalisation are a way to keep the US engaged and restrain Israel's destabilisation campaign in Syria, but full-fledged diplomatic ties are unlikely
Analysis
Giorgio Cafiero
03 June, 2025
THE NEW ARAB
Since Bashar Al-Assad’s regime fell in late 2024, constant Israeli airstrikes have targeted Syria’s military infrastructure in locations across the war-torn country.
Israeli forces have also advanced into the UN-monitored demilitarised buffer zone separating Syria from the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, as well as into adjacent regions, including the summit of Mount Hermon.
This Israeli military campaign of destabilisation is about weakening, dividing, and Balkanising Syria to the maximum extent possible to further shift the Levant’s balance of power in Israel’s favour.
In early April, Israeli air operations struck key infrastructure across several Syrian provinces, including airports and military installations in Hama and Homs, as well as a scientific research facility in Damascus.
Residential areas were also hit, with villages such as Koayiah, located near Syria’s borders with Jordan and the Golan Heights, suffering significant damage. Subsequently, on 2 May, Israeli fighter jets targeted an area near the presidential palace in Damascus.
This action came amid escalating sectarian violence in Syria, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu cynically justifying this aggression under the banner of Israel defending Syria’s Druze minority community.
Nonetheless, last month reports surfaced that Syrian and Israeli officials had engaged in direct “deconfliction” talks aimed at preventing further flareups along their shared border.
These face-to-face meetings marked a notable shift for the relatively new Syrian government, led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa, which had previously relied on backchannel communication through intermediaries such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Ahmad al-Dalati, the governor of Quneitra province and security chief in Suweida, has led the discussions on the Syrian side.
Patrick Theros, the former US ambassador to Qatar, spoke to The New Arab about what he believes might emerge from these “deconfliction” talks.
“At this stage, everything depends on the internal politics of Israel. Israel's advance into the border buffer zones and beyond, the IDF's continuing high intensity bombardment of anything it can find in Syria that could remotely be connected to military rearmament, its demand for the disbarment of southern Syria, and its offer to defend the Druze in Syria are designed to keep Netanyahu in power. If he stays in power, the deconfliction talks will continue forever,” he told TNA.
“If Netanyahu falls, a lot would depend on who replaces him,” added Theros.
Giorgio Cafiero
Drastic changes in US-Syria relations
The state of Syrian-Israeli bilateral affairs must be analysed within the context of bold policy shifts by US President Donald J. Trump’s administration regarding Syria, which signal Washington’s growing openness toward the post-Assad government in Damascus. Such changes in US foreign policy carry the potential to profoundly transform Syria and its position on the international stage.
The first leg of Trump’s Gulf tour last month was Riyadh, where he announced the lifting of Washington’s sanctions on Syria. The following day, he held a face-to-face meeting with Sharaa in Riyadh, joined by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan participating via phone.
On 23 May, the US Treasury Department issued sanctions relief, allowing American individuals and businesses to engage in financial transactions with Syrian entities - activities that had previously been prohibited under Washington’s sanctions regime.
By the end of the month, the American flag was raised outside the US ambassador’s residence in Damascus - a moment that powerfully symbolised Washington and the nascent Syrian government’s movement toward normalisation in the post-Assad era.
While the US, the UK, and the EU have lifted many sanctions on Syria and engage the relatively new government in Damascus diplomatically, their approaches stand in contrast to Netanyahu’s position.
The Israeli government articulates its desire to see the West keep economic pressure on post-Assad Syria and for Washington and other Western capitals to avoid steps which legitimise Sharaa’s government.
The Islamist rebels-turned-rulers in Damascus understand that only Washington can pressure Israel into halting its military aggression against post-Assad Syria. This is one reason why Sharaa sees entering a new chapter in relations with the US as critical for his country’s future.
“The Trump administration’s 180-degree turn on Syria will constrain Israel’s freedom of action on Syria to some degree, but not completely. Even though US Syria policy now conflicts with Israel’s policy, Trump generally lets Israel do as it pleases,” said Aron Lund, a fellow with Century International and senior analyst at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (who does not speak on behalf of either institution), in a TNA interview.
“Trump may decide to put real pressure on Israel at some point, but it’s more likely to be over Iran or Gaza than over Syria,” he added. Lund did, however, address the possibility of a US military withdrawal from Syria, which he said could result in Washington needing to get “more serious with Israel to prevent disruptions to those plans.”
Since Assad's fall, Israel has annexed land in the UN-monitored demilitarised buffer zone separating Syria from the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, while heavily bombarding the country. [Getty]
The Turkish factor
Frequently described as the “big winner” in post-Assad Syria, Turkey plays a significant role in these evolving dynamics. Israel’s current posture presents a direct challenge to Erdogan’s regional and international policies, as well as his reputation as a decisive and influential leader within the broader Islamic world. It is likely safe to conclude that the most critical de-escalation talks are those which began between Turkey and Israel under Azerbaijani auspices earlier this year, and have gone through more than three rounds.
“The ‘de-escalation’ between Damascus and Tel Aviv is highly dependent on the Ankara-Tel Aviv talks and the relation between both countries,” explained Yeghia Tashjian, the Regional and International Affairs Cluster Coordinator at the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in a TNA interview.
“If the talks continue on the current path, we may witness a limited de-escalation. If not, Israel would even bomb assets affiliated with Turkey or potential Turkish bases as it did a few months ago,” he added.
Syrian-Israeli normalisation?
A key question many analysts are raising is how the Trump administration could leverage sanctions relief and the diplomatic openings between Washington and Damascus to cajole Syria into the Israeli normalisation camp.
Sharaa has stated that such normalisation with Israel could be on the table, albeit under certain circumstances. Yet, Lund believes that Syria formalising full-fledged diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv is an “unlikely” scenario.
“Sharaa seems to have decided that holding out the prospect of an Israel deal is a good way to keep Washington engaged and perhaps also to make it restrain the Israelis,” he told TNA, adding that “flirting with the idea of normalisation is not the same as actually normalising.”
It is necessary to note that Syria today, unlike Egypt, Jordan, the UAE, and Morocco at the time of the signing of their Israeli normalisation accords with Israel, has an unresolved territorial dispute with Tel Aviv, making it increasingly difficult to imagine Syria entering the Israeli normalisation camp.
“It’s not just about the Palestinians, it’s also about Syrian territory - the Golan Heights. Israel occupies that region and claims to have annexed it as sovereign Israeli land. If you ask Israeli leaders, it's now part of Israel forever. The United States endorses that claim. That makes Syria’s position vis-à-vis Israel very different from the countries that entered into normalisation agreements in the past,” explained Lund in a TNA interview.
Giorgio Cafiero
“In addition, of course, the regional situation is not conducive to an agreement, with so much anger in Syria and elsewhere over Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians in Gaza,” he added.
Syria’s leadership will ultimately seek to maintain diplomatic momentum with the West, most importantly the US. This is one dynamic which will probably prompt Damascus to avoid being confrontational toward Israel, at least for as long as that is possible.
Nonetheless, Israeli land theft in Syria and bombardments of various parts of the war-ravaged country seem likely to continue (assuming the Trump administration refuses to use Washington’s leverage to rein in Israel’s destabilisation campaign in Syria), making it quite unrealistic to imagine Syria entering the Abraham Accords under current circumstances.
“I do not expect that the Israeli side will withdraw from the newly occupied areas in southern Syria. We have seen similar tactics in Gaza and southern Lebanon, the mindset of Netanyahu and his cabinet members has shown that they seek maximalism rather than pragmatism,” Tashjian told TNA.
“The idea of ‘land for peace’ has always been on the table, but it was refused by the Israeli side. The destruction of the Syrian air force and navy by Israel has shown that Israel is not eager for compromise but is seeking to weaken its rival without committing to a long-term agreement,” concluded the Beirut-based scholar.
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics
Follow him on Twitter: @GiorgioCafiero
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