A Lucrative Hypothetical: Mauritania And The Nigeria–Morocco Pipeline – Analysis

November 29, 2025 
Geopolitical Monitor
By Arthur Michelino





The Nigeria–Morocco Gas Pipeline (NMGP) is a diplomatic leverage with an engineering blueprint attached. Announced in 2016, the project would run about 5,600 kilometers along the West African coast through more than a dozen states, connecting Nigerian reserves to European markets via Morocco’s pipeline network into Spain. Construction is priced at around $25 billion. European gas demand is projected to contract through the 2030s. Commissioning before 2040 looks implausible. Morocco and Nigeria continue enrolling states into memoranda of understanding, feasibility studies move slowly, and political capital accumulates around a corridor that may never carry molecules. The NMGP functions as a framework for positioning, where countries stake claims to future optionality regardless of whether pipe ever touches seabed.

Mauritania entered West African hydrocarbon politics late. Greater Tortue Ahmeyim reached first gas in late 2024. The BirAllah field adds more than 50 trillion cubic feet of reserves, placing the country among Africa’s largest future producers. Aligning with NMGP makes little sense for near-term exports. Project economics rule out northward flows before the mid-2030s. But Nouakchott gains strategic room. It diversifies its options beyond a single joint development. It keeps routing pathways open beyond LNG. It inserts itself between Nigeria’s resource base and Morocco’s gateway role into European markets, where Algeria delivers gas in the tens of billions of cubic meters annually. For a state straddling the Sahel and the Maghreb, NMGP participation converts marginal geography into diplomatic weight.

Mauritania’s position in the project is defined by a clear imbalance between what it contributes and what it stands to gain. Mauritania pays almost nothing to participate. The returns arrive immediately: greater strategic autonomy within the GTA partnership, visibility in Maghrebi energy politics, a seat in West African integration narratives, and diversification away from exclusive LNG pathways. Infrastructure remains hypothetical. A country that became a gas producer less than a year ago has bought influence by joining a project that today exists mainly in conference rooms and communiqués. The pipeline’s materialization matters less than the alignments it generates. For Mauritania, the NMGP delivers option value through minimal cost, maximum flexibility, and leverage that compounds whether or not gas ever flows north.
Nigeria–Morocco Gas Pipeline in Context

The NMGP emerged in December 2016 as a joint initiative between the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and Morocco’s Office National des Hydrocarbures et des Mines. The project envisages an approximately 5,600-kilometer offshore route parallel to the West African coast, linking via Morocco into the existing Maghreb–Europe Gas Pipeline to Spain. The anticipated route passes through thirteen countries including Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, The Gambia, Senegal, Mauritania, and Morocco. It is framed as an ambitious corridor of coastal integration. Stated objectives are threefold: monetise Nigeria’s substantial gas reserves, provide regional access to gas along the West African seaboard, and offer European markets a new supply corridor away from Russian hydrocarbons.

Progress has been irregular despite repeated declarations of political will. Memoranda of understanding have been signed with multiple states. Feasibility and front-end engineering studies have been launched. Preparatory financing from institutions such as the OPEC Fund and, in some reports, the Islamic Development Bank has been discussed. Construction remains distant. The estimated cost of $25 billion places NMGP among the most capital-intensive energy infrastructure projects in Africa. Investment risk is heightened by uncertainty over long-term European gas demand, the advance of renewable energy, and competition from lower-cost LNG supply chains. Under low-carbon pathways, European gas imports could fall significantly by the 2040s. Whether NMGP would arrive in time to anchor meaningful offtake remains an open question.



Pipeline economics are structured in phases as a hedge against this uncertainty. Early segments would targetregional consumption in West Africa, where demand for electricity generation and industrial supply remains strong. Later stages would extend the system along the Atlantic coast through Morocco toward Europe. This sequencing reflects recognition that European demand alone cannot secure financing at present. Regional consumption provides a more credible foundation. Even under this model, most observers situate commissioning well into the 2030s or 2040s, placing the project within a period of accelerating global decarbonization pressures. By the time gas could flow north, the market it was designed to serve may have contracted sharply.

These structural realities explain why NMGP functions better as a geopolitical framework than as a near-term supply route. By enrolling multiple states through memoranda and political agreements, Morocco and Nigeria build a shared narrative of integration and strategic solidarity. The project’s material delivery remains uncertain, but the political capital it generates is immediate. For Europe, NMGP offers both opportunity and contradiction. It presents a diversification instrument after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that may nonetheless arrive too late to anchor a reshaping energy mix. For the coastal states along the route, participation signals alignment and opens the door to bargaining long before a meter of pipe is laid. Infrastructure may be hypothetical, but the positioning is real.
Mauritania’s Option Value

Mauritania’s integration into the NMGP framework has taken place through successive memoranda signed since 2022, alongside Senegal, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, and other coastal states. These agreements do not commit Mauritania to construction or financing. They bring the country into the political architecture that Morocco and Nigeria are constructing around the pipeline. This matters because Mauritania sits at the northern hinge of the West African coastline, where the offshore route begins to turn toward Morocco and the Mediterranean.

Mauritania also entered the regional hydrocarbon landscape late. Greater Tortue Ahmeyim, a joint development with Senegal, reached first gas at the turn of 2024–2025. The BirAllah field, estimated at more than 50 trillion cubic feet of reserves, ranks among the largest undeveloped gas accumulations in Africa. This combination places Mauritania in a position to influence export decisions in the decade ahead, a shift that elevates its role in both West African and Atlantic energy politics.

Participation in the Nigeria–Morocco Gas Pipeline is not about immediate offtake. Project economics and sequencing rule out northward transit before the 2030s. What NMGP offers Mauritania is strategic diversification. The shared governance of GTA binds Mauritania and Senegal through a common upstream architecture and shared offshore infrastructure. This is cooperation, not rivalry, but it does create a concentration of dependence. Mauritania’s first LNG exports will be channeled through a project in which Senegal is a large stakeholder. By joining NMGP, Nouakchott avoids relying exclusively on a single monetization model or a single axis of export.

This diversification is only one part of the picture, because NMGP also links Mauritania to a wider regional geometry. Mauritania positions itself between Nigeria’s resource base and Morocco’s established pipeline interface with Europe. Algeria already delivers gas in the tens of billions of cubic meters annually through Trans-Med and Medgaz, giving it structural influence in Mediterranean energy politics. NMGP offers Mauritania an avenue to diversify its strategic relationships within this landscape. By inserting itself into the Nigeria–Morocco–Europe geometry, Mauritania gains access to diplomatic channels, negotiations, and energy dialogues that would otherwise unfold without it.

Mauritania’s location between the Sahel and the Maghreb strengthens this strategic flexibility. Straddling the Sahel and the Maghreb, Mauritania functions as a hinge state. Its presence in NMGP extends the corridor’s political reach northward and strengthens Mauritania’s visibility in regional integration debates. Participation requires little financial investment but opens a platform that connects West African producers with a Mediterranean gateway. It multiplies Mauritania’s symbolic weight across both ECOWAS and Maghreb-oriented forums.

For Mauritania, the balance between cost and potential advantage tilts strongly in its favor. If the pipeline materializes, Mauritania gains diversified export routes and future revenue opportunities. If it does not, Nouakchott still benefits from diplomatic dividends, visibility, and leverage gained simply by being in the room where regional energy strategy is shaped. Minimal cost, potentially significant return. Mauritania pays almost nothing upfront, commits to no binding infrastructure obligations, and secures a strategic position that compounds regardless of whether gas ever flows north.
Risks and Strategic Dividends

Assessing the Nigeria–Morocco Gas Pipeline requires weighing a dense set of risks alongside the potential dividends, particularly for secondary countries such as Mauritania whose involvement is indirect. Financing remains the most immediate challenge. With cost estimates exceeding $25 billion, investors will demand credible offtake guarantees, which are difficult to provide while European demand declines under decarbonization trajectories. Technical uncertainties add a second layer, since the planned route crosses deep-water sections and politically fragile coastal and Sahelian environments where delays are likely. A further degree of unpredictability stems from regional geopolitics. Several ECOWAS states have been suspended following recent coups. Rivalries between Morocco and Algeria over regional influence persist. Instability along any portion of the thirteen-country corridor could delay or derail the entire system.

Mauritania bears only a fraction of these risks. Nigeria must anchor supply and mobilize reserves. Morocco must underwrite diplomatic credibility as the project’s sponsor. Mauritania’s exposure is marginal by comparison. Its main vulnerability lies in over-committing its long-term strategy to a project that may be delayed for decades. Treating NMGP as a supplementary option rather than the backbone of national planning mitigates that risk. Nouakchott’s public statements reflect this approach: participation without exclusivity, alignment without dependence.

The dividends, however, arrive immediately. By joining the NMGP framework, Mauritania signals alignment with Nigeria and Morocco, increasing its visibility in both West African and Maghreb diplomatic arenas. The association reduces the concentration of reliance on Senegal by broadening Mauritania’s negotiation space. It strengthens the perception of Mauritania as a hinge state capable of participating in multiple regional configurations. Participation allows Nouakchott to reference NMGP in ECOWAS energy discussions, positioning itself within a continental project rather than a bilateral partnership. Even if no gas flows northward, being present within NMGP’s diplomatic architecture enhances Mauritania’s ability to shape future decisions, alliances, and negotiations.

The paradox of NMGP is that strategic returns emerge long before physical construction. For Mauritania, the asymmetry is favorable. Risks are diluted, while diplomatic capital accumulates rapidly. Whether or not steel is ever laid on the seabed, the alignments fostered by NMGP are already reshaping Mauritania’s regional role.

This article was published by Geopolitical Monitor.com

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