China Teaches Japan’s New Leader a Lesson
December 12, 2025
Photograph Source: 依田奏 – CC BY 4.0
Two weeks after she asserted that a military threat to Taiwan would spur military intervention by Japan, commentators continue to ask themselves what on earth Sanae Takaichi, the country’s new leader, had in mind when she blurted out such a provocative statement on such a sensitive issue.
China’s response was immediate and angry. Aside from taking Takaichi to task for intervening in a domestic concern, Beijing discouraged its citizens from traveling to Japan, and its consul general in Osaka posted on X that “the dirty neck that sticks its neck in must be cut off.” A ban on Japanese seafood exports to China was announced, and a large number of planned concerts by Japanese entertainers were cancelled, with Japanese singer Maki Otsuki stopped in the middle of a song during a concert in Shanghai. The latest casualties are youth exchange programs between the two countries, with Beijing apparently adamant that things will not return to normal until Takaichi retracts her statement.
Firestorm on the Net
Not surprisingly, Takaichi’s comments triggered an Internet firestorm in China, where Japan’s wartime crimes remain vivid and the Japanese prime minister had the image of being a hawkish protégé of the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who represented for many Chinese the unreconstructed, unrepentant attitude of many Japanese towards their country’s World War II-era war crimes.
What exactly did Takaichi say? At a parliamentary budget hearing, she asserted, in response to a question, that an attack on Taiwan involving warships would represent a “survival threatening” situation that would require Japanese military intervention. Previous Japanese prime ministers had never specified how Japan would respond to a Chinese military move against Taiwan. As one observer put it, “The difference in Takaichi’s remarks was less the content of what she said, and more the directness with which she said it. Her comments could perhaps be interpreted as moving further away from Japan’s version of a ‘strategic ambiguity’ policy, by directly linking Japan’s own security with the security of Taiwan.”
The most benign interpretation of Takaichi’s words was that they were uttered in the context of a parliamentary debate by a prime minister who was still learning the ropes and who made an error of making explicit a course of action best left vague. Those taking this view say that it could not be reconciled with the tenor of a meeting between Takaichi and Chinese President Xi Jinping just a week earlier on the sidelines of a regional meeting in Seoul where both pledged to work towards “stable and constructive relations.” In this view, it was Beijing that was at fault for “overreacting.” Moreover, although Takaichi refused to retract her words, as demanded by Beijing, she did say that she would refrain from making such statements again.
There are those that discount the “clumsy politician” argument and say it was deliberate, a ploy to strengthen her shaky domestic standing by adopting a strong image in foreign policy. They point out that, aside from being a disciple of Abe, she sees the late UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, the “Iron Lady,” as a role model. But to disrupt relations with China, Japan’s second most important foreign policy relationship, for the sake of a small and fleeting domestic political dividend does not seem credible.
Continentalists Ascendant?
The most likely explanation, in my view, has to do with Donald Trump, whose visit to Japan in late October was one of the highlights of a week-long swing through the Asia Pacific region. Prior to Trump’s visit, the whole region was apprehensive about Trump’s second presidency. Though Trump had declared a trade war on practically all countries, the East Asian countries, the so-called Asian Tigers that had built export-powered economies, were his special targets. Nearly all the Southeast Asian countries were penalized with a 19 percent tariff increase, while Japan and Korea were each punished with a 15 percent rise under Trump’s blanket justification that both U.S. enemies like China and U.S. allies had taken advantage of American “generosity.”
Washington’s Northeast Asian allies, Japan and Korea, however, were concerned with more than trade. Over the last 80 years, they have served as protectorates in the frontlines of the American Empire in Asia. At the end of Cold War, they hosted hundreds of bases and facilities from which the U.S. Pacific Command could project power towards the Asian mainland. When Trump brusquely told them to shoulder more of the costs for their defense during his first term, they began to worry about their security umbrella; and they were not unrattled in 2019, when he crossed the Demilitarized Zone to shake North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s hand and pat him on the back. When Trump came back to power earlier this year, the conservative elites in Seoul and Tokyo became alarmed that the old containment policy of the last 80 years had become a bone of contention within the new foreign policy team.
They were disconcerted by reports coming out of Washington that, as one analyst summed it up, three factions were struggling for influence in Trump’s inner circle: “First, the ‘maximalists’—a dwindling group that still clings to the dream of global American dominance. Then come the ‘specificists,’ led by Elbridge Colby and his allies, who believe America must retreat from Europe and the Middle East to focus single-mindedly on China. Finally, the ‘continentalists,’ or ‘neo-Monroeists’—Stephen Miller and Vice President J.D. Vance chief among them—who advocate an almost hermit-like retrenchment, turning the U.S. into a fortress continent.”
By mid-year, the Koreans and Japanese were getting really alarmed. Trump seemed to be recognizing Russia’s suzerainty in Eastern Europe, the NATO allies were left to fend for themselves on Ukraine, and the United States was attacking Venezuelan boats on the pretext that they were drug dealers while positioning more and more ships, including an aircraft carrier, close to Venezuela. It seemed that the United States was putting its military focus on the Western hemisphere, meaning the isolationists or continentalists were gaining the upper hand.
What was especially disconcerting was that no clear policy posture was coming out on the Asia-Pacific from the White House. Although Peter Hegseth, the secretary of war, visited the region earlier in the year and muttered the old Cold War shibboleths, the fears of Seoul and Tokyo were not assuaged. It seems like Washington was informally adopting a spheres-of-influence strategy.
The visit of Trump in late October on the way to attend the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Seoul provided an opportunity for the Japanese to get more definitive statements from Trump on the future of the U.S. security shield. Takaichi played up to his vanity, promising to nominate him for the Nobel Peace Prize. But all Trump was interested in talking about was more investment by Japanese corporations in the United States, even when she promised “to take the Japan-US alliance to a higher level with President Trump.”
A Declaration of Love Denied
Was Takaichi’s throwing off strategic ambiguity on the Taiwan question a move to get Trump to make a more definitive commitment to maintaining or upgrading the military alliance with Tokyo?
If the intent of Takaichi’s remarks on Taiwan was to elicit a strong affirmation from Trump of the U.S.-Japan security relationship and that the “collective security” principle would entail coordination in the event of a Taiwan contingency, she was most likely disappointed. In his account of a telephone conversation with Chinese President Xi Jinping a few days after Takaichi’s remarks, Trump said he had “a very good telephone call with President Xi, of China. We discussed many topics including Ukraine/Russia, Fentanyl, Soybeans and other Farm Products, etc….Our relationship with China is extremely strong!” There was no mention of support for Takaichi’s position or even some acknowledgement that the Japan-Taiwan issue was discussed. Equally suggestive was the tone of his post, which was respect for Xi, if not enthusiasm.
In a telephone call with Takaichi the next day, instead of giving her the backing she wanted, Trump apparently told her to avoid further actions that might inflame the dispute with Beijing. This was practically an acknowledgment that she was to blame for the row.
Reflecting on Trump’s comments, a respected analyst, Zhu Feng, dean of the School of International Studies at Nanjing University, suggested that Washington was “unwilling to let the Taiwan issue be used to hijack China-US relations” and that “Trump’s domestic and foreign policy priorities have not focused on Taiwan or the Asia-Pacific.”
To many in Japan and the Asia Pacific, Trump’s fawning account of his conversation with Xi and his telling Takaichi to dial down the rhetoric are one more indication that the isolationists or continentalists are ascendant and that Trump is in the process of informally ceding the Asia Pacific as China’s sphere of influence.
Many observers talk about the onset of a “long winter” in China-Japan relations, and that Tokyo is on the losing end of this protracted conflict. What many Japanese, foremost of which is Takaichi, an unreconstructed hawk, do not seem to understand is that for China, the Second World War is not over and that Beijing will not ease the pressure until Tokyo cries uncle. For a rapidly aging society that is suffering from technological and economic stagnation, whose military is having a tough time filling its recruitment quotas, and whose protector no longer considers the alliance a priority, that is a very daunting future. Takaichi’s poll numbers are said to have gone up, but they’re likely to plunge once the pain of having recklessly offended an ascendant nation to whom the country owes a blood debt is felt.
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