Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko has launched a calculated charm offensive towards Washington, using a mix of political prisoner releases, diplomatic gestures and strategic flattery aimed at aligning with US President Donald Trump’s foreign policy instincts. In the process, he is borrowing directly from the playbook he has long used with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
On December 13 after a US-brokered deal, Lukashenko released 123 political prisoners, including some of the most famous: presidential candidate Viktor Babariko, protest leader Maria Kolesnikova, Nobel laureate Ales Bialiatski, and Tut.by editor Maryna Zolatava. In return, the US lifted sanctions on Belarus’s potash industry—its biggest cash cow—and hinted at broader concessions to come.
“Lukashenko is using the same approach in his dealings with Trump that has long proven successful with Putin,” political analyst Artyom Shraibman wrote in a commentary for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “That consists of identifying the senior partner’s soft spots and then massaging them with flattery, demonstrative loyalty, and unexpected offers of crisis management services.”
Relations between Belarus and the US have been warming in the last year, but it is still not clear if this a fundamental change in the relations or just a tactical play by Lukashenko. If Trump successfully concludes his transactional peace deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin and the US goes into business with Russia then the relationship with Minsk can be deepened, but if the war continues, Lukashenko will remain heavily dependent on Moscow which will limit any split.
In the meantime, the White House has been keen to engage in an attempt to peel Belarus away from Putin’s sphere of influence and Lukashenko has been a willing participant as he looks for leverage to balance his almost total dependence on Moscow. The Trump administration also believes Lukashenko provides a useful channel for influencing Putin. And this comes at very little cost to Washington.
“The US side has delegated the actual diplomacy to professionals. All Donald Trump is required to do is periodically pat Lukashenko on the shoulder via the US president’s social media posts, sign whatever his aides put on his desk when they talk to Minsk and bask in the glory of becoming the first Western leader to have secured the release of several hundred Belarusian political prisoners," says Shraibman.
Trump has appointed his former lawyer, John Coale, as special envoy to Belarus in November. Washington now appears willing to deepen ties, despite the limited strategic significance of Belarus compared to Ukraine or Russia. For Lukashenko, the shift presents a rare chance to escape years of diplomatic isolation.
“Trump may well get the credit for having rescued hundreds of hostages in support of his Nobel Peace Prize bid,” Shraibman noted, adding that Lukashenko is trying to capitalise on “Trump’s approach to the region,” which favours symbolic victories and transactional diplomacy.
Lukashenko has already played several of his aces. The release of 16 prisoners, including Sergey Tikhanovsky (Siarhei Tsikhanouskiy), this summer, the husband of Belarusian opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya (Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya), and now Bialiatski, Babariko, and Kolesnikova—shows that Minsk sees Trump’s policies as a rare opportunity to end what had looked set to be lifelong isolation.
Domestically, the opposition faces renewed pressure to reorganise. With several 2020-era leaders now free, the previously central figure in exile of Tikhanovskaya may see her position as de facto leader contested. Babariko and Kolesnikova have already taken more moderate stances, calling for dialogue with Minsk and for Europe to reassess its sanctions stance—contrasting with Tikhanovskaya’s harder line. As bne IntelliNews reported, the opposition in exile has already been riven by disputes over the best policy direction and a leadership struggle. After Tikhanovsky’s release, his blunt style and ambition have reportedly already led to several conflicts with his wife’s inner circle.
“The structure of the opposition must inevitably become more polyphonic,” Shraibman says. “Personal capital in the West is not easy to pass on, even if Tikhanovskaya wanted to do so.”
On the economic front, logistical constraints remain a key obstacle to restoring Belarusian potash exports. Despite US sanction relief, viable export routes through the Lithuanian port of Klaipeda remain blocked due to deteriorating relationships driven by a balloon smuggling scandal. While some in Vilnius have floated conditional cooperation—such as allowing potash transit in exchange for US troop deployments— the government has been lobbying the EU for increased sanctions on Minsk.
There are few alternative ports to handle the potash exports. There is a corridor to Russia’s northern ports, but the distances involved mean it is too expensive to transport the potash to them by rail. Poland’s Gdansk port remains politically off limits, as Lukashenko has refused to release Polish citizens in Minsk’s jails. A more radical option of exporting via Ukraine’s port of Odesa has been floated. But that is also unlikely as Kyiv considers Lukashenko complicit in Russia’s invasion after he allowed Russian troops to cross the northern border and attack Kyiv from Belarussian territory at the start of the Russian invasion.
One option for circumventing the remaining EU sanctions is if US companies buy Belarusian potash and then export it as their own. But it’s not clear whether such a scheme would be in keeping with the letter and spirit of EU sanctions.
“But that is precisely what could make it a tempting option for the United States,” said Shraibman. “The economic entanglement of former enemies after the war… fits perfectly with Trump’s approach to the region.”
In a surprise move, most of the released political prisoners were transferred not to Lithuania, but to Ukraine, signalling a shift in diplomatic positioning. According to Shraibman, the aim is twofold: “to exclude Lithuania and the Belarusian opposition-in-exile from the proceedings” and “to insert itself into the Russia–Ukraine peace process.”
“By framing his negotiations with the United States within the context of the Russia–Ukraine talks, Lukashenko is demonstrating his full support for Washington’s peace initiatives and his willingness to contribute as much as possible to them. Lukashenko also began his meeting with Coale on December 12 by praising Trump’s latest efforts to end the war and expressing his support for them.”3
Lukashenko has even offered Belarus as a safe haven for Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro—another authoritarian leader Trump is seeking to dislodge. This overture, combined with a media interview given to pro-Trump outlet Newsmax, marks a full-scale attempt to present Minsk as a useful partner in Washington’s geopolitical goals.
“Even if some ideas are not ultimately needed, the enthusiasm and desire to be helpful will not be forgotten,” Shraibman concluded.
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