Operation Divine Bytes and the Rise of Multi-Domain War in South Asia
Modern wars can begin before a missile is fired or a fighter aircraft crosses a border. Power grids, communication networks, surveillance systems and databases are now part of the battlespace. The May 2025 India-Pakistan conflict showed how firmly this reality has arrived in South Asia.
At the centre of Pakistan’s cyber response was Operation Divine Bytes, associated with Pakistan Air Force (PAF) cyber operations during the confrontation. Its significance goes beyond individual cyberattacks. It points to a broader change in military strategy, in which cyber capabilities are being integrated with air power, electronic warfare, intelligence and information operations.
This shift brings risks as well as military advantages. The International Committee of the Red Cross has warned that cyber operations in armed conflict can affect civilians and critical infrastructure, including energy, telecommunications, transport and financial systems. In interconnected societies, what happens in cyberspace does not necessarily stay there.
From air power to multi-domain warfare
Aircraft, missiles, armour and troop numbers remain important measures of military power. But increasingly, what matters is how effectively those capabilities are connected.
An advanced fighter is less useful if communications are disrupted. Logistics can be slowed without destroying a road or supply depot. Surveillance systems can be compromised without physically attacking them. Intelligence gathered through cyber operations and open sources can also reduce the time between detecting a threat and deciding how to respond.
Air Chief Marshal Zaheer Ahmad Babar Sidhu has led the PAF since March 2021, overseeing its shift toward multi-domain capabilities integrating cyber, space and electronic warfare. This modernization has increasingly positioned the PAF to operate across interconnected domains rather than treating air power as a standalone capability.
Operation Divine Bytes needs to be seen in this context.
During the May 2025 confrontation, Pakistan employed an increasingly multi-domain approach, combining conventional air operations with cyber capabilities, electronic warfare and information systems. Pakistan’s air chief later stated publicly that PAF cyber force targeted Indian communication hubs, power grids and transport infrastructure during the conflict.
Air Commodore (retd) Khalid Chishti described the confrontation as a “watershed moment” for South Asian military affairs because operations took place simultaneously across the air, cyber, information and electromagnetic domains.
What matters here is not simply the number of cyberattacks. It is the attempt to connect cyber operations with conventional military activity. Cyber capability is moving closer to the centre of operational planning rather than remaining a specialized technical function.
Inside the digital campaign
Accounts of Operation Divine Bytes describe operations against 100 Indian organizations and entities, involving more than 4,400 information and communications technology elements.
Reported targets ranged from government institutions and political organizations to energy companies, surveillance infrastructure and digital platforms.
One publicly documented incident involved the Madhya Pradesh BJP website, which was compromised during the confrontation and displayed a message referring to the PAF Cyber Force and Operation Bunyan Al-Marsous. Other reported incidents affected government databases and digital infrastructure in several Indian states.
More consequential were operations involving energy, fuel, communications, surveillance and logistics infrastructure. Accounts of the campaign identify electricity and power-distribution networks, petroleum and gas infrastructure, and surveillance systems along strategically important transport routes among the targets.
Cyber conflict, however, presents an attribution problem. Confirming that a system was compromised, establishing who was responsible and determining the actual operational effect are three different questions. During a crisis, military cyber units, intelligence agencies, independent hackers and politically motivated groups can all be active at the same time.
That uncertainty is not a side issue. It is part of what makes cyber conflict difficult to manage.
When civilian infrastructure enters the battlespace
The strategically important part of Operation Divine Bytes was not website defacement but the reported penetration or disruption of infrastructure supporting electricity, fuel, communications, surveillance and logistics.
Modern civilian and military systems are deeply interconnected, complicating both military operations and the protection of civilian infrastructure. Electricity powers communications. Telecommunications support everyday civilian activity but are also used by governments. Fuel networks serve ordinary consumers while sustaining transportation and military logistics.
This creates obvious humanitarian risks.
A cyber operation designed to cause temporary disruption can have wider consequences when interconnected systems fail. Electricity disruption can affect hospitals, water supplies and communications. Problems in fuel distribution can affect civilian transport and supply chains.
Cyber effects can also spread beyond the intended target. Malware and network disruptions do not necessarily respect institutional or national boundaries.
This is the paradox of cyber power. It may allow states to produce strategic effects without the physical destruction associated with conventional strikes, but those effects can still spread into civilian life in unpredictable ways.
The race for information superiority
Cyber operations are only one part of the transformation. Electronic warfare, artificial intelligence and open-source intelligence perform different functions, but together they can create an information and decision-making advantage.
Modern militaries receive huge amounts of data from satellites, drones, sensors, communications networks and publicly available sources. The challenge is no longer simply obtaining information. It is processing it quickly enough to make better decisions than an adversary.
Commercial satellite imagery, geospatial information and online activity can contribute to early warning, situational awareness and battle-damage assessment. Pakistani accounts indicate that cyber and open-source capabilities contributed to monitoring Indian military preparations and assessing developments during the 2025 confrontation.
Combined with AI, surveillance and conventional intelligence, these tools can shorten the interval between detection and response.
The contest is therefore no longer simply over who possesses the better fighter or missile. Increasingly, it is about who can see first, understand first and act first.
A new instability for nuclear South Asia
Pakistan is not alone in moving in this direction. The Russia-Ukraine war has demonstrated the extensive integration of drones, cyber operations, electronic warfare and AI-assisted intelligence. Similar trends are visible in Middle Eastern conflicts.
South Asia is now part of this technological transition, but with an additional complication: India and Pakistan are nuclear-armed rivals with a history of crises that can escalate quickly.
Cyber operations provide governments with options below the threshold of conventional warfare. Yet they can also make escalation harder to control.
An intrusion into a power grid, military communications network or surveillance system could be interpreted as preparation for a larger attack. Attribution takes time, while cyber operations and AI-assisted decision-making are increasing the speed at which military commanders are expected to respond.
Cyber capability can therefore strengthen deterrence while simultaneously creating instability. Its ambiguity allows states to impose costs without immediately crossing the threshold into conventional war. But that same ambiguity can make intentions harder to read when tensions are already high.
Operation Divine Bytes should therefore be understood as more than a series of cyberattacks. Its importance lies in what it reveals about the direction of warfare in South Asia.
Future military advantage will increasingly depend on how well states integrate aircraft, drones, electronic warfare, cyber operations, intelligence and AI-assisted analysis. But technological capability also brings responsibility. As cyber operations move closer to the centre of military planning, protecting civilian infrastructure and distinguishing military objectives from civilian systems will become increasingly important.
The lesson of May 2025 is not that cyber power has replaced conventional warfare. It is that the boundary between the digital and physical battlefield is becoming harder to see.
In the next South Asian crisis, the decisive contest may begin inside networks and information systems long before it becomes visible in the skies.
No comments:
Post a Comment