India And Indonesia: Asian Giants That Refuse To Bow To The Superpowers – Analysis

India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi with President Prabowo Subianto in Jakarta, Indonesia on July 07, 2026. Photo Credit: India PM Office

July 12, 2026 
By Matija Šerić

Key Takeaways

Modi’s Visit Strengthens India-Indonesia Strategic Partnership — During his July 6–8, 2026 visit to Indonesia, Modi and President Prabowo Subianto signed major agreements on defense (including BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles and air-to-air missiles worth ~$630 million) and critical minerals, elevating bilateral ties to a new level.

Defense Cooperation Enhances Strategic Autonomy — The missile deals significantly boost Indonesia’s maritime defense capabilities, particularly in disputed areas like the South China Sea and Strait of Malacca, while helping both nations maintain independence from major powers like China and the U.S.

Economic and Cultural Ties Are Also Deepening — Bilateral trade reached $28 billion, with new agreements on rare-earth magnets and critical minerals. The visit highlights strong historical and cultural links, and both nations are pursuing a pragmatic foreign policy that balances relations with Russia, the U.S., and others without full alignment with any bloc.

These days, in early July, we are witnessing an intense diplomatic offensive by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. After hosting his Japanese counterpart Sanae Takaichi in New Delhi, Modi embarked on a six-day tour of Indonesia, New Zealand, and Australia from 6 to 11 July. His visit to the Republic of Indonesia (6–8 July) is undoubtedly the most significant stop on the trip, as the two countries further strengthened their already existing strategic partnership through a series of concrete agreements.

This is Modi’s first official visit to Indonesia since 2018, and it comes as a reciprocal visit following Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto’s trip to New Delhi in January 2025, when he attended India’s Republic Day celebrations as the guest of honour. Modi last visited Jakarta in 2023 to participate in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit.

A Visit of Great Importance

“Our history is built on shared culture, independence, and mutual trust, and our future will likewise be defined by shared prosperity,” Modi declared during a joint press conference

Prabowo was even more explicit:

“This visit reflects the commitment of our two countries to continue strengthening our Comprehensive Strategic Partnership through concrete and mutually beneficial cooperation.”

During Modi’s visit to Jakarta, representatives of India and Indonesia signed a series of strategic agreements, including deals on defence cooperation and the supply of critical minerals. In doing so, Prime Minister Modi and President Prabowo gave fresh momentum to India–Indonesia relations, which have often failed to realise the full potential that undoubtedly exists between Asia’s two largest democracies. It is enough to note that there are still no direct flights connecting New Delhi and Jakarta.

A Strategic Partnership Awaiting Full Implementation

India and Indonesia share remarkably deep cultural ties dating back approximately 2,000 years. Throughout history, these connections have manifested themselves through Hinduism, Buddhism, literature, theatre, cuisine, and the trade of spices and textiles.

Although the two countries signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2018, it has rarely been implemented to its fullest potential. New Delhi and Jakarta concluded the agreement with the aim of expanding cooperation in national and maritime security, trade, infrastructure development, and economic relations.

The geostrategic significance of the India–Indonesia partnership is underscored by the fact that India’s southernmost territory, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, lies in close proximity to Indonesia’s Aceh Province, adjacent to the Strait of Malacca—one of the world’s most important maritime trade routes. A substantial share of global commerce, including shipments of oil and liquefied natural gas between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, passes through this narrow waterway.

Indonesians Acquire Elite Indian Military Technology

During Modi’s visit to Indonesia, the greatest attention was drawn to two defence agreements that will significantly boost exports of Indian military technology to Indonesia. The agreements include the purchase of India’s BrahMos supersonic cruise missile system and Indian air-to-air missiles for the Indonesian armed forces. The combined value of the two missile deals amounts to approximately $630 million.

India has already exported BrahMos missile systems to the Philippines and Vietnam. The BrahMos is a versatile missile platform that can be launched from land-based batteries, warships, submarines, and combat aircraft. Its supersonic speed reaches up to Mach 3, roughly three times the speed of sound. The system was developed by Indian engineers with assistance from Russian specialists.

It is particularly noteworthy that the agreements on advanced Indian military technology were concluded just one day after China conducted a test launch of a long-range ballistic missile. Indonesia could use BrahMos systems not only to protect its extensive coastline but also to secure maritime routes in disputed areas of the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca. The most likely potential adversary, of course, would be China.

Viewed in this context, the partnership between India and Indonesia carries considerable strategic significance amid Asia’s increasingly intense arms race.

Advanced Military Technology Gives Indonesia Greater Strategic Autonomy

The acquisition of Indian missile technology enhances Indonesia’s strategic autonomy in the broader Indo-Pacific region. More precisely, Indonesia has no intention of becoming anyone’s satellite state—neither China’s nor America’s.

Jakarta is determined not to take sides in the growing rivalry between China and the United States across the Indo-Pacific. Instead, it seeks to preserve as much freedom of action, independence, and neutrality as possible.

In simple terms, Indonesia aspires to be recognised as a middle power in international relations, and it has strong credentials to support such ambitions: a population of 288 million people (the fourth largest in the world and the largest Muslim-majority country), the world’s 17th-largest economy, a strategic position between Asia and Australia, and membership in the G20, BRICS, and ASEAN.

Indonesia: A Middle Power with Friendly Ties to Russia

This explains why the newly signed agreements with India are so important, as are the defence and economic partnerships Indonesia has previously concluded with South Korea, Japan, Türkiye, Russia, and other countries.

Indonesia, in particular, maintains notably warm relations with Russia. Few people realise that Jakarta did not condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, instead adopting a neutral position.

The breadth of Russian-Indonesian relations was demonstrated by President Prabowo Subianto’s participation as the guest of honour at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in June 2025. On that occasion, Prabowo and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement, further elevating bilateral ties.

An Underrated Economic Partnership

While most analysts focus on military cooperation, the economic dimension of India–Indonesia relations is equally significant.

The two countries signed agreements on the development of rare-earth magnets as well as on the exploration, extraction, and processing of critical minerals. As one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, India is eager to diversify its sources of critical minerals. Indonesia, meanwhile, possesses vast reserves of nickel and substantial untapped deposits of rare-earth elements and other strategically important minerals.

These complementary strengths create an opportunity for the establishment of a reliable supply chain between the two countries.

In fiscal year 2024/25, bilateral trade between India and Indonesia reached $28 billion, highlighting the growing importance of their economic relationship.

Indonesians Hold India and Its Prime Minister in High Esteem

The importance Indonesia attaches to India is reflected in two highly symbolic gestures.

The first was Indonesia’s decision to award Prime Minister Narendra Modi its highest civilian honour, the Bintang Adipurna. Accepting the decoration from President Prabowo Subianto, Modi said that the award “belongs to the people of India” and represents a tribute to the enduring friendship between the two nations.

With this latest distinction, Modi has now received at least 35 of the highest state honours from foreign countries—more than any other Indian leader. Admittedly, this remarkable achievement is partly explained by the fact that he has been in office for more than 12 years, making him India’s second-longest-serving prime minister. The record is still held by independent India’s first prime minister, the legendary Jawaharlal Nehru.

Modi has received eight foreign state honours this year alone, while U.S. President Donald Trump has received just one. That fact illustrates the Indian leader’s considerable international standing and suggests that, after Nehru, he has arguably done more than any other prime minister to shape India’s foreign policy and global profile. At present, Modi can certainly be regarded as one of the world’s most respected active statesmen.

The second gesture demonstrating Indonesia’s appreciation of India was its decision to allow Modi to address the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR). While foreign leaders occasionally address national legislatures around the world, Indonesia grants this privilege only on rare occasions.

Before Modi, only Xi Jinping in 2013 and Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud in 2017 had been given the honour of addressing the Indonesian parliament.

Given the honours bestowed upon Modi, some observers might describe India and Indonesia as enjoying a brotherly relationship. While such a characterisation may be an exaggeration, there is little doubt that Jakarta and New Delhi currently enjoy the best relations in their modern history. Their partnership could even be compared to the kind of special relationship that exists between the United States and the United Kingdom.

India–Indonesia relations demonstrate that two large neighbouring countries can cooperate successfully without allowing major powers to divide them or draw them into a new Cold War.

India and Indonesia have shown that it is possible to maintain excellent relations simultaneously with Russia and the United States, pursuing national interests without becoming subordinate to either side.

That is a diplomatic balancing act worthy of admiration.


About Matija Šerić
Matija Šerić is a geopolitical analyst and journalist from Croatia and writes on foreign policy, history, economy, society, etc.

From The Arctic To ASEAN, Russia Is Recasting Its Role In Asia – Analysis

July 12, 2026 
By Collins Chong Yew Keat

Key Takeaways

Russia Is Actively Seeking Greater Relevance in Southeast Asia — Through the ASEAN-Russia Commemorative Summit in Kazan and initiatives like Panamax, Moscow is positioning itself as a fallback partner in energy, food security, and defense, capitalizing on regional anxieties about U.S.-China rivalry and supply chain vulnerabilities.

Energy and the Arctic/Northern Sea Route Are Key Levers — Russia is leveraging its energy exports and the Northern Sea Route to diversify its Asian engagement, offering alternatives to traditional Middle Eastern routes and reducing over-dependence on China in its Far East strategy.

Russia Remains a Secondary Player with Structural Limitations — While gaining traction in areas of regional vulnerability, Russia is still far behind China, the U.S., Japan, and the EU in overall influence. Its outreach is one of strategic convenience for ASEAN rather than ideological alignment, and success depends on overcoming sanctions, geography, and competition.

The ASEAN-Russia Commemorative Summit in Kazan in 17 – 18 June was not merely a ceremonial gathering, but a strategic intent to showcase presence and mark decades of relations, reflecting Moscow’s quest to strengthen fallback options and show resilience and defiance despite the Ukraine war.

Moscow is aware that Southeast Asia is not keen to be trapped in the binary Washington-Beijing rivalry and sees an opening to extend its sphere of relevance, presence and strategic influence in a region that is now actively searching for alternative options. It also senses that the region’s current vulnerabilities – particularly in energy, food, and security – create the means for Russia to reposition itself as a third strategic provider, away from the conventional choices.

In context, Russia’s strategic relevance to Southeast Asia has long been limited when measured against the predominant and historical roles of China, the United States, Japan, the European Union and other established partners. The latest State of Southeast Asia survey still ranks Russia only ninth among ASEAN Dialogue Partners in strategic relevance. This suggests that Moscow remains a peripheral player in ASEAN’s wider strategic calculus over the years. However, this looks set to change.


Russia is now increasingly becoming a functional fallback partner in practice. Its relevance is now no longer framed only by Cold War nostalgia, defence links with certain countries like Vietnam, or residual ties with Myanmar and Laos. It is being shaped by a broader set of regional anxieties that reflect the region’s growing vulnerabilities: energy insecurity, supply-chain disruption, food vulnerability, uncertainty over US policy, fear of overdependence on China, and the need for strategic redundancy in a more volatile and unpredictable international order.

This signals a new shift where Russia does not need to dominate ASEAN to become relevant.

Russia is not about to displace China or the United States in Southeast Asia at least in economic, defence or geopolitical weight, being far behind as compared to the economic reach of China, the security architecture of the United States, the development credibility of Japan, or the regulatory and investment weight of the European Union. However, it only needs to become useful in areas where regional states feel exposed, and this becomes the strategic opening.
Energy as the Immediate Opening

Energy is now Russia’s most important window of opportunity in Southeast Asia. The disruption around the Strait of Hormuz has exposed the region’s energy dependence and insecurity, and it is not just about affordability. It is now equally important about access, route security, reserves, diversification and fallback supply.

For decades, much of Southeast Asia’s dependence has been on the access to Middle Eastern crude and global maritime routes. The Hormuz crisis exposed the fragility and in this context, Russia’s offer of crude, LNG, LPG and nuclear energy becomes strategically attractive, even if it is politically sensitive.

Apart from crude support, nuclear-related deals involving Vietnam and Laos show that Russia is positioning itself in the diversification of energy support, connecting Russia’s energy diplomacy to ASEAN’s long-term transition needs.

The region is trying to transition itself into new energy platforms, but will still need gradual transition. Its industrialisation, urbanisation, data-centre expansion, transport demand and climate commitments all require a more complex energy mix where conventional fossil fuel sources, LNG, nuclear power, renewables, grids, storage and transition financing will all be part of the equation. Knowing that Southeast Asia cannot transition away from fossil fuels overnight, Russia is trying to present itself as a provider across a strategic spectrum of phased transition: oil and gas for today, nuclear energy for stability, and possibly advanced technologies for future energy systems.

Sanctions have never been enough to deter or block the path of Russian energy, at least in the path towards Asian states. Regional players have shown that, during crisis conditions, energy security often takes precedence over geopolitical signalling. For ASEAN, engagement with Russa will not be framed as alignment but as diversification.
The Arctic and the Northern Sea Route

Russia’s energy strategy also has an Arctic dimension that Southeast Asia cannot ignore. The Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the Arctic now remain at the forefront of the next strategic global route and frontier. Although the NSR remains constrained by weather, insurance risk, infrastructure gaps, sanctions, environmental risks and specialised vessel requirements, its long-term strategic significance is growing.


For Russia, the Northern Sea Route is part of a wider effort to redirect energy and trade flows as fallback options, toward Asia, amidst how the Western markets narrows due to sanctions and the Ukraine conflict. It is also part of Moscow’s larger attempt to revive Russia’s position as an energy bank for Asia, and this position relies on the Arctic LNG, Siberian resources, Far Eastern ports, icebreaker capacity, and the eventual integration of rail, maritime and energy corridors across the Eurasian landmass.

This strategic opening remains with high potential. It is not only about shorter shipping distance, but strategic optionality. Traditional maritime routes that have become increasingly vulnerable whether through the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, Suez, the Malacca Strait or other chokepoints, will mean that alternative northern routes will gain greater strategic attention. For Southeast Asia and East Asia, which depend heavily on open sea lanes and these traditional routes which will now fall under greater scrutiny and vulnerability, the NSR introduces a new layer of strategic opening.

For Asian economies, the Arctic is gaining in future prominence because it may open shorter routes between parts of Europe and Asia, expand access to Arctic LNG and minerals, and create new logistical options outside traditional chokepoints. Major maritime economies especially Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia will watch whether Arctic routing changes the balance of global shipping and energy transit.

The NSR will not replace the Malacca Strait or South China Sea for now, but it could diversify Eurasian trade flows and reduce the monopoly of existing southern routes for certain cargoes.

This also will change ASEAN’s energy future. The more Russia can move Arctic and Siberian energy eastward, the more Moscow can present itself as a resilient supplier beyond the Middle East.

The Northern Sea Route strengthens Russia’s long-term narrative that Moscow is not only a continental Eurasian power, but also an energy, logistics and resource gateway to Asia.
Russia’s Far East Intent and the Wider Indo-Pacific Repositioning

Russia’s renewed push toward Southeast Asia should also be seen through the lens of its Far East strategy. The Russian Far East is no longer just a distant peripheral region in Moscow’s domestic geography but is now adjusted as the strategic front door of Russia’s pivot to Asia.

Strategic advantages like Vladivostok, Sakhalin, Primorye, Kamchatka, the Kuril chain, the Pacific Fleet, Far Eastern ports, Arctic logistics and eastern rail corridors have become central to Russia’s long-term geopolitical readjustments as it looks East. Moscow sees the Far East as a new asset to serve multiple purposes at once: an energy export base, a defence frontier, a maritime gateway, a logistics hub, a mineral and resource platform, and a diplomatic bridge to Northeast and Southeast Asia.

Russia’s traditional westward economic model has been made almost obsolete by the Ukraine war and Western sanctions, with reduced access to European markets and technology.


The Far East allows Russia to project itself as an Asian power, not merely a European power under pressure. Initiatives including the Eastern Economic Forum, port development, rail modernisation and energy projects all reflect this objective.
No Limits but Persistent Wariness

But this ambition faces real constraints. Russia wants to use the Far East to diversify away from the West, but it risks becoming excessively dependent on China instead. That is why Southeast Asia, India, Japan and other Asian partners matter to Moscow. They provide Russia with a wider Asian field and fallback and reduce the risk that Russia’s entire eastern pivot becomes a one-way dependence on Beijing.

Despite the No Limits Ties, Russia and China are not identical actors. Both have overlapping ambitions and intent in Central Asia, the Arctic, energy corridors, minerals, logistics and influence across Eurasia, and excessive Chinese dominance could reduce Russia’s strategic autonomy in its own eastern frontier.

Russia’s outreach to Southeast Asia is not only about ASEAN but a wider effort to make the Russian Far East more internationally connected and less dependent on China alone. ASEAN provides markets, diplomatic legitimacy, energy demand, and a broader Asian audience at a time when Russia is trying to show that China alone it not its solitary strategic future.

China will watch this carefully where it may welcome Russian influence that reduces Western influence, but it will be cautious if Moscow gains ground in energy infrastructure, critical minerals, defence technology, ports or transport corridors that will challenge or dilute China’s traditional stronghold and ingrained presence in what Beijing calls as its own backyard. Russia’s Southeast Asian strategy is therefore not only about Russia versus the West, it is also about navigating an Asia where China is both partner and competitor.
The Japan Factor: A Possible Future Reset

Russia-Japan ties have been strained since the Ukraine war, with Tokyo being a part of Western sanctions and maintained a hard political line against Moscow. The unresolved territorial dispute over the Southern Kurils/Northern Territories still remains a barrier.

Yet Japan has not fully severed its Russia connection, with energy being the factor. Japan remains exposed to Russian energy, especially LNG from the Sakhalin-2 project. Even as Tokyo aligns with the G7 position on Ukraine, it will still need the energy channels because energy security remains a national-security priority. This creates a pragmatic dilemma: politically, Tokyo must oppose Moscow’s actions in Ukraine, while strategically and economically, it cannot fully ignore the Russian energy equation.

This is where Russia sees an opening for a future recalibration. Moscow is aware that Japan cannot easily replace all Russian energy supplies without cost in the near term. It also knows that Japan remains ultimately concerned about China and North Korea’s threats and the long-term balance in Northeast Asia.


These give factors for future recalibration of ties.

For Russia, improving ties with Japan would be a multi-faceted beneficial outcome. It would reduce Russia’s overdependence on China in the Far East, reopen channels for technology, capital, maritime cooperation and energy investment, and strengthen Moscow’s claim that it remains a serious regional power, not a junior partner to Beijing. Meanwhile, for Japan, targeted engagement with Russia could preserve energy access, maintain communication in Northeast Asia, and prevent Russia from moving even more tightly into China’s strategic orbit.

Japan will not abandon its G7 commitments or reverse its Ukraine position but a limited, pragmatic and sectoral reset is possible over time. If Japan still has to preserve certain Russian energy links, ASEAN states will feel justified and validated to maintain their own pragmatic approach,and this strengthens Moscow’s argument that engagement with Russia is not ideological alignment, but strategic necessity.
Defence and Food Security

Food security is another Russian advantage where conflicts and climate shocks, and fertiliser and maritime disruption have exposed deep vulnerabilities. Russia remains a major supplier of wheat, fertilisers and agricultural inputs and this gives Moscow practical leverage. Russia’s offer to ASEAN is through the three-pronged pillar of energy, food and security. Energy supports supply resilience, food helps manage inflation pressure, and security provides defence fallback and strategic hedging.

Defence has traditionally been Russia’s strongest anchor in Southeast Asia, especially through ties with Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar. Moscow is now trying to expand into maritime Southeast Asia, but its position is weaker than before. Arms exports have fallen because of the Ukraine war and regional states also worry about sanctions exposure.


Russia hopes to give ASEAN another option: a non-Western partner and source of cooperation in energy, food, nuclear technology, defence maintenance and minerals but still faces serious limitations. Distance and geography constrain its regional presence. The Ukraine war and sanctions further drain resources, and competition is intense from traditional powers that have established a historical presence in the region. In many sectors, Russia is the fallback rather than the first choice.

ASEAN’s relationship with Moscow is largely, for now, a partnership of convenience, but if Russia becomes more Asia-oriented, and other variables improve including when Arctic routes strengthen, energy instability persists and ASEAN continues to be trapped in the binary US-China pressure -Moscow’s relevance and reach could grow, as the region continues to seek geopolitical breathing space. Still, it is hard to dislodge the commanding presence of traditional powers here in the Indo-Pacific.


About Collins Chong Yew Keat
Collins Chong Yew Keat has been serving in University of Malaya, the top university in Malaysia for more than 9 years. His areas of interests include strategic and security studies, American foreign policy and power analysis and has published various publications on numerous platforms including books and chapter articles. He is also a regular contributor in providing op-eds for both the local and international media on various contemporary global issues and regional affairs since 2007.
View all posts by Collins Chong Yew Keat →

1,000 Days After Oct. 7, Israelis Still Wait For Answers – OpEd

July 12, 2026 
Arab News
By Yossi Mekelberg

Key Takeaways

Netanyahu’s Government Bears Heavy Responsibility for October 7 — The article argues that the Israeli government, led by Netanyahu, failed in its most basic duty to protect citizens, with policies that strengthened Hamas and left the country catastrophically unprepared for the attack.

Lack of Accountability Persists — Despite the scale of the failure, Netanyahu refuses to accept responsibility, blaming others and resisting an independent state commission of inquiry, while the defense minister and security chiefs who did take responsibility stepped down.

The Response Has Been Morally and Strategically Flawed — The prolonged military campaigns, disproportionate force, and lack of a credible political exit strategy have caused massive civilian suffering, deepened Israel’s international isolation, and failed to deliver decisive victory, leaving the country in a state of prolonged trauma and insecurity.

To mark 1,000 days since the horrific surprise attack on Israeli border communities near the Gaza Strip on Oct. 7, 2023, many thousands of Israelis took to the streets in protest. Others visited the affected communities to pay their respects in silent vigils, carrying photographs of those killed as a reminder that the worst failure in the country’s history has a face, indeed many faces, of lives suddenly and cruelly cut short.

Common to these gatherings was a unified call for the establishment of a state commission of inquiry to investigate the failures of the government on the day of the Hamas attack, which left almost 1,200 people dead and 251 taken hostage in Gaza, as well as the conflicts on multiple fronts that followed. Yet the failure did not end on Oct. 7. More than 1,000 days later, it continues to haunt the country through a deep collective trauma and Israel’s prolonged involvement in fighting on seven fronts, with scarcely any respite. This has left little room for the country to reflect, draw lessons from what led to Oct. 7, assess what has happened since, and determine how to ensure such a catastrophe never happens again.


It needs little explanation why the current government, led by an aging, ailing, and increasingly authoritarian prime minister, who is also standing trial on corruption charges while repeatedly attempting to obstruct the judicial process, should long ago have left office. For Benjamin Netanyahu, the country’s future has become secondary to the political survival of both his government and himself.

Nothing can diminish the responsibility of Hamas and the others who carried out the Oct. 7 massacre. Nevertheless, for Israel to recover from its collective trauma, it must also understand how Netanyahu and his government, without in any way excusing the brutality of that day, contributed to creating the conditions that made such an attack possible. Equally important is asking difficult questions about the morality and wisdom of Israel’s response.

The justified anger directed at the perpetrators of Oct. 7 gradually became, for many, a justification for the destruction of large parts of Gaza. About 75,000 people are estimated to have been killed there, roughly two-thirds of them noncombatants, many of them children, while the view that “there are no innocent people in Gaza” has become disturbingly widespread in parts of Israeli society. Responding to one war crime with another can never be morally justified. It has led only to moral bankruptcy, failed to defeat Hamas, and resulted in a degree of international isolation unprecedented in Israel’s history.

The grief, pain, and sadness of families who lost loved ones will never disappear. The suffering of those who were kidnapped and later returned from captivity may gradually ease with time, but it can never be erased. Their pain and anger are only compounded by the absence of accountability from those who failed to protect them on that terrible day. They, like the rest of Israeli society, deserve answers from those who were responsible for the country’s security.

Yet this government, and above all, Netanyahu, whose lack of moral compass has become more obvious than ever, refuses to accept responsibility. Instead, they blame everyone else: the security services, the opposition for allegedly weakening the military through its resistance to the government’s assault on Israel’s democratic institutions, and even promote baseless conspiracy theories suggesting that elements within the security establishment colluded with Hamas to allow the attack to happen.

One thousand days later, the central conclusion remains straightforward. Regardless of what an independent state commission of inquiry, rather than the politically appointed body the government seeks, may ultimately conclude, it was the government of the day that failed its people, and it continues to fail them. Had its members possessed even a basic sense of public decency and integrity, they would long ago have resigned from political life, bowing their heads and asking the nation for forgiveness.

They owe this not only to the families of those murdered on Oct. 7, but also to the soldiers and civilians who have since lost their lives, to the destroyed communities, to those who endured captivity, to the reservists who have served hundreds of days away from their families, to the conscripts whose military service has been extended, and to every Israeli citizen.


Despite the nearly three years that have passed since Oct. 7, a profound sense of insecurity has become deeply entrenched throughout Israeli society. Its impact extends far beyond psychology; it has far-reaching political consequences. The most basic expectation citizens have of their government is that it will protect them from those who seek to murder or abduct them. On that fundamental test, Netanyahu, his government, and the security establishment failed in the worst possible way.

Yet, while the defense minister at the time, the heads of Israel’s security agencies, and numerous senior military commanders accepted responsibility and left their positions, Netanyahu has consistently blamed everyone but himself. What many Israelis want is a candid account of what happened, or at the very least one delivered under oath before an independent state commission of inquiry. It was, after all, Netanyahu’s policy of allowing large sums of money to flow into Hamas-controlled Gaza that helped strengthen the militant group’s rule and military capabilities, while Israel itself was catastrophically unprepared when those capabilities were ultimately turned against it.

The reckoning does not end there. One thousand days later, Israelis also deserve answers about why, despite repeated promises of “total victory,” no decisive strategic success has been achieved on any of the fronts on which Israel is fighting, even though severe damage has undoubtedly been inflicted on its enemies. Moreover, the extensive use of disproportionate force, the apparent disregard for civilian lives, and the destruction of communities and essential infrastructure in both Gaza and Lebanon have exposed an increasingly troubling side of Israel.

The government frequently argues that its public relations efforts have failed to explain or justify its policies at home and abroad. This fundamentally misunderstands the problem. The issue is not one of communication but of policy. A strategy centered on overwhelming military force, lacking a credible political or diplomatic exit strategy, and increasingly shaped by the demands of the most extreme elements within the governing coalition, is itself deeply flawed.

When leaders take their country to war, whether by choice or because war is forced on them, they have an obligation to provide a full account of their decisions and to accept responsibility when those decisions fail. One thousand long days later, the Israeli people are still waiting for that accountability. Judging by everything we have learned about Netanyahu and his political allies, the people may be waiting in vain, at least until the coming general election.

Yossi Mekelberg is a professor of international relations and an associate fellow of the MENA Program at Chatham House. X: @YMekelberg


About Arab News
Arab News is Saudi Arabia's first English-language newspaper. It was founded in 1975 by Hisham and Mohammed Ali Hafiz. Today, it is one of 29 publications produced by Saudi Research & Publishing Company (SRPC), a subsidiary of Saudi Research & Marketing Group (SRMG).
View all posts by Arab News →

African Drone Manufacturers Seek ‘Security Sovereignty’

Based in Abuja, Nigeria, Terra Industries manufactures attack and surveillance drones. 

July 12, 2026 
By Africa Defense Forum

Key Takeaways

Africa accelerates local defense manufacturing: Nine countries now produce drones domestically as Nigeria leads via public-private deals like Terra Industries with DICON, reducing costly imports.

Terra Industries delivers real capability: 23-year-old CEO Nathan Nwachuku’s firm demonstrated combat drones and mine-clearers, scales to 30,000 drones/year in Abuja, builds Africa’s largest factory in Ghana (50,000/year), and exports to 8 countries.

Sovereign defense enables Pax Africana: Nwachuku argues local security tech is essential to defeat insecurity, enable industrialization, and achieve lasting African peace.

Nathan Nwachuku’s vision of Pax Africana is front and center on his company’s website: “Bringing lasting peace to the continent through African security sovereignty, a future in which Africa builds, deploys and controls its own defense technology.”

The 23-year-old Nigerian is CEO of Abuja-based startup Terra Industries, which signed a joint venture agreement in February with Nigeria’s state-run military-industrial ⁠corporation Defence Industries Corp. of Nigeria (DICON) to research and develop drones, robotics and cybersecurity systems.

After years of buying drones from China, Pakistan and Türkiye, Nigeria’s military has turned its attention inward, exemplifying a trend across the continent of governments investing in indigenous manufacturing. Costs and delays in acquiring and maintaining drones have only strengthened the case for local production.


Between 1980 and 2026, 34 countries procured 1,959 drones, according to 234 purchase records compiled by defense website Military Africa. More than half — 1,054 of the 1,959 — were acquired between 2020 and 2026. Today, nine African countries are manufacturing drones domestically with South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria and Ethiopia leading the way.

Moses Wambui, CEO of Kenyan research and consulting firm Insight Strategists Solutions Africa, said the continent’s nascent drone market has shifted from agriculture and healthcare to serving military combat and intelligence needs.

“The penetration rate of drones in Africa is around 14% of the whole drone market in the world,” he told Lagos-based News Central TV in a December 2025 broadcast. “The initial cost becomes an issue. You’re talking about an economy of around $8 billion.”

The proliferation of drones in the hands of armed groups has changed the calculus for African militaries. Cheap commercial drones modified for surveillance or attack roles have forced armies to invest in counterdrone systems, electronic warfare and autonomous ground equipment.


Nigeria is positioning itself as a leading defense manufacturing hub in the region, as government and private companies invest in local production to strengthen security and surveillance capabilities. Lagos-based Elite Logistics & Development Services launched military drone production and assembly in 2023.

More recently, Terra conducted a live demonstration of its interceptor drones and unmanned mine-clearing vehicles for military and government officials on April 27.

“Today is a day that we show our readiness for battlefield operations and actual forward deployment onto the frontlines,” Nwachuku told Reuters news service while standing outside his company’s 1,394-square-meter drone factory.

DICON chief Maj. Gen. Babatunde Alaya said Terra’s attack and surveillance drone systems are designed to aid counterinsurgency operations and fill capability gaps.

“There is no other company that is bringing these [drones] on board for our troops in the field to use for real-life challenges that we are having, for example, with improvised explosive devices that we are having in the northeast, now in the northwest,” he said in a news conference before the demonstration. “The highest casualties that we are sustaining are through improvised explosive devices.”

Terra’s Abuja factory is ramping up to an annual capacity of 30,000 drones, including long-range drones built for surveillance missions, quadcopters for first response and data collection, and small self-driving vehicles for ground surveillance and transport. The company said it exports drone systems to eight African countries.

It also has expanded manufacturing to Ghana with the construction of a 3,159-square-meter factory that Nwachuku says will be the largest on the continent and will be able to produce 50,000 drones a year at full capacity.

“Ghana just makes sense as a country,” he told defense technology website Tectonic for an April 20 article. “It’s one of the safest in Africa right now, and it’s also one of the fastest-growing economies [with a] strong currency, strong manufacturing base, really smart people and a high political will to want to lead the continent in terms of industrial development and sovereign defense.”

Nwachuku said his dream is to help industrialize Africa, but for that to happen, “we must solve the common denominator, which is insecurity.”

“The only way Africa can have lasting peace is by uniting to build sovereign defense, not by relying on foreign security architecture,” he said on Terra’s website. “We need to control our own destiny by building the tools and systems needed to protect ourselves. That’s how this continent defeats terrorism.”


About Africa Defense Forum
The Africa Defense Forum (ADF) magazine is a security affairs journal that focuses on all issues affecting peace, stability, and good governance in Africa. ADF is published by the U.S. Africa Command.

 

Africa records world’s fastest growth in ultra-rich population

Nigerian entrepreneur Aliko Dangote is Africa’s richest person, with an estimated fortune of $28.5bn. / Dangote GroupFacebook

TwitterLinkedInTelegramFlipboardFeedly

By bne IntelliNews July 10, 2026

Africa recorded the fastest growth in its population of ultra-high-net-worth individuals worldwide in 2025, although the continent still accounted for less than 1% of global ultra wealth, according to a report by wealth intelligence firm Altrata.

The number of Africans with net worth of more than $30mn rose 23.7% to 3,440 last year, the strongest increase of any region, the World Ultra Wealth Report 2026 showed. This compared with growth of 15.8% in Asia, 15% in North America and 14.5% in Europe.

The combined wealth of Africa’s ultra-rich increased 22.4% to $400bn, giving the continent 0.7% of global ultra-high-net-worth wealth and 0.6% of the worldwide population in this category.

Altrata attributed Africa’s growth to more favourable financing conditions, the appreciation of several currencies against the US dollar, expanding digitalisation and new investment linked to rising demand for the continent’s critical mineral reserves.

The firm expects Africa to remain the fastest-growing ultra-wealth region through 2030, projecting average annual growth of 8.4% in the number of ultra-high-net-worth individuals.

The continent’s ultra-rich population is forecast to rise to about 5,200 by the end of the decade, supported by infrastructure development, commodity demand and expanding consumer markets. Its share of the global total is nevertheless expected to remain below 1%.

Africa’s wealthiest individuals remain concentrated in a small number of countries and industries, particularly manufacturing, luxury goods, mining, telecommunications, construction and food production.

Dangote remains Africa’s richest person

Nigeria’s Aliko Dangote remained Africa’s richest person in Forbes’ 2026 ranking, with an estimated fortune of $28.5bn. Dangote built his wealth through the Dangote Group, whose interests include cement, sugar, fertiliser and oil refining. His fortune rose sharply following gains in Dangote Cement’s share price and the expansion of the group’s large oil refinery near Lagos.

South Africa’s Johann Rupert and his family ranked second with an estimated $16.1bn. Rupert’s wealth comes primarily from his family’s controlling interest in Swiss luxury goods group Compagnie Financière Richemont, whose brands include Cartier, Montblanc and Van Cleef & Arpels. He also has investments through South African holding company Remgro Ltd. (JSE:REM).

Nigerian industrialist Abdul Samad Rabiu ranked third with an estimated fortune of $11.2bn. He founded BUA Group, a conglomerate active in cement production, sugar refining, food processing and real estate. Rabiu controls listed cement producer BUA Cement Plc (NGX:BUACEMENT) and food company BUA Foods Plc (NGX:BUAFOODS).

South Africa’s Nicky Oppenheimer and his family ranked fourth with an estimated $10.6bn. Their wealth was built through a controlling interest in diamond producer De Beers, which the family sold to Anglo American Plc (LSE:AAL; JSE:AGL) for $5.1bn in 2012. Oppenheimer has since invested in private equity, conservation and aviation.

Egyptian businessman Nassef Sawiris ranked fifth. His fortune stems largely from stakes in Amsterdam-listed chemicals and fertiliser group OCI Global (Euronext Amsterdam:OCI) and engineering and construction company Orascom Construction Plc (Nasdaq Dubai:OC; EGX:ORAS). Sawiris is also a major shareholder in sportswear company Adidas AG (Xetra:ADS) and co-owns English football club Aston Villa.

Other prominent African billionaires include Nigeria’s Mike Adenuga, whose wealth comes from telecommunications operator Globacom and oil producer Conoil Plc (NGX:CONOIL), and Egypt’s Naguib Sawiris, who built his fortune in telecommunications before expanding into gold mining and other investments.

The ranking illustrates the continued importance of traditional sectors in the creation of large African fortunes. Cement, mining, energy, telecommunications and consumer goods remain dominant, although technology and financial services account for a growing share of newly created wealth.

Global ultra wealth reaches $63.8 trillion

Worldwide, the ultra-high-net-worth population grew 14.4% in 2025 to a record 556,850, marking the strongest annual expansion since 2017. Their combined wealth rose 14.3% to $63.8 trillion.

Altrata said ultra-rich portfolios benefited from lower inflation, continued fiscal and monetary support, resilient corporate earnings and investor enthusiasm for artificial intelligence. Global equities also delivered double-digit returns for a third consecutive year.

The US remained the world’s largest ultra-wealth market, with 206,880 individuals, or 37% of the global total. China ranked second with 55,490, followed by Germany with 28,330, Japan with 22,435 and the UK with 20,495.

Altrata forecasts that the global ultra-high-net-worth population will reach 746,570 by 2030, an increase of almost 190,000 from 2025, while its combined wealth is projected to rise by one-third to $85 trillion.

 

Trump's Patriot licence will help Ukraine in its next war with Russia, not this one

Trump has promised to grant Ukraine a licence to make its own badly-needed Patriot missiles. But practicle problems mean the first won't be ready for several years - probably well beyond the duration of this conflict. / bne IntelliNewsFacebook

TwitterLinkedInTelegramFlipboardFeedly

By Ben Aris in Berlin July 9, 2026

US President Donald Trump’s pledge to give Kyiv a license to make Patriot missiles could be a game changer – in Ukraine’s next war with Russia, but not in this one.

As IntelliNews reported, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy must be very happy with the results of the Ankara Nato summit on July 8 where he had his warmest ever meetings with the US leader. After abandoning the ceasefire talks, the Trump administration is back in the game after Trump made serious commitments to supporting Ukraine’s long-term efforts to counter the Russian invasion.

This is the first time the US has granted a licence to a foreign power to make one of its most sought after weapons systems and is a commitment to a long-term industrial partnership rather than just a short-term solution to Ukraine's immediate air defence missile shortage. Trump's surprise offer to allow Ukraine to manufacture Patriot interceptor missiles under licence marks one of the biggest shifts in US policy towards Kyiv since Russia's full-scale invasion.

However, military analysts caution that while the Patriot deal looks good on paper, putting it into practice is fraught with practical problems and it will be years before the first PAC-3 interceptor rolls off a Kyiv-based conveyor belt.

Speaking alongside Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy at the Nato summit in Ankara, Trump announced that Washington would transfer the technology needed for Ukraine eventually to manufacture Patriot missiles itself.

"We're going to give a licence to you to make Patriots," Trump said. "That's pretty cool. This way you can't complain that we're not giving them enough. I said, 'Make them yourself.'"

Production system at breaking point

The Patriot system remains the West's only widely deployed interceptor capable of reliably defeating Russian ballistic missiles, making it one of the most sought-after weapons in the world. And as IntelliNews reported, in the drones vs missiles arms race, Russia is far ahead. Without interceptor ammo, Ukraine is essentially defenceless against the constant barrage of Russian missile attacks. Currently Russia is producing enough missiles of all types to fire a half dozen of them at Ukraine every day. In addition, it has added jet engines to things like the new Geran-5 drone that are now fast enough to evade Ukraine’s new interceptor drones.

Rob Lee of the Foreign Policy Research Institute described ballistic missile defence as "one of Ukraine's greatest vulnerabilities" in a social media post

Demand for Patriot interceptor missiles was already higher than the US’ ability to produce them before the Iran war. Now it has exploded and the backlog of orders stretches into years.

Ukraine has consumed most of the interceptors donated to it by US and European allies defending its cities against Russian missile attacks. European countries are now scrapping the bottom of the barrel and stockpiles have fallen below the strategic reserve minimums set by military planners. Middle Eastern allies have also drawn heavily on Patriot inventories during the ongoing Gulf war.

Even the US has depleted its stockpile to the point where the US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth briefly stopped all military supplies to Ukraine last July after stockpiles fell below the strategic minimum threshold. In the first month of the Gulf war European allies looked on in disbelief after the US appropriated weapons they've already paid for, for use in Iran – especially the Patriot interceptors.

Bottlenecks

RTX (NYSE: RTX), which manufactures much of the Patriot system, and Lockheed Martin, which produces the PAC-3 interceptor, currently manufacture only a few hundred interceptor missiles each year. Although production is being expanded significantly, executives have warned that meaningful increases will not appear for at least a year due to shortages in specialised components rather than final assembly.

Following the opening phase of the Iran conflict and the unfolding disaster as Tehran forced the US and Israeli forces to burn through their stockpile of expensive interceptors by firing a swarm of cheap but plentiful drones as significant targets, Trump called an emergency meeting of top US arms manufacturers and demanded a rapid ramping up of production. The weapons-makers said annual output could eventually rise towards 1,000 interceptors a year - but not before the second half of this decade.

Starting from scratch, Ukraine faces all these same problems, but with bells on. That recasts Trump’s promise from a game changing commitment to little more than a gesture.

"The move is more political than practical—intended to demonstrate that the Trump administration is prepared to support Ukraine for the long haul," analysts at The Bell wrote. "It will not resolve the country's immediate air defence issues, as the production of these complex interceptors is constrained by the availability of components rather than the assembly process itself."

Years, not months

Military specialists caution that licensing production is only the first step in a very long process. The Patriot is among the most sophisticated missile systems in existence. Technology transfer must pass through strict US export controls while new factories require certification, security clearance, trained personnel and entirely new supply chains.

Kyrylo Shevchenko, the former governor of the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU), estimates that establishing meaningful production would require three to five years even after a licence has been granted.

Germany's own GEM-T Patriot production programme provides a guide. Announced in 2024, construction of new facilities is expected to take roughly two years before production gradually ramps up, reaching full output only around 2028.

Even then, Ukraine would still depend heavily on US-produced components.

"It really remains to be seen whether US manufacturers are really willing to share sensitive technology, including seekers, solid rocket motors and guidance software with their Ukrainian counterparts," Franz-Stefan Gady, a US and European military advisor, told the Financial Times. He questioned whether the programme was intended for the current conflict at all.

"Will it be in time for this war or is it aimed at post-war sustainment?"

Factories become targets

There are also military considerations. Any Patriot production facility established inside Ukraine would immediately become one of Russia's highest-priority targets.

"The question is how long will it take to set up production, how would Ukraine defend such facilities in wartime, will US companies who are currently reluctant actually follow through with tech transfer and will the supply chain expand to allow increased output?" Gady said.

For that reason, analysts believe much of any future production may ultimately be located elsewhere in Europe rather than inside Ukraine itself. This process is already under way as part of the so-called Danish model, but it comes with the risk of Russia targeting those facilities in Nato member countries, on the basis they are proactively participating in the war, rather than just passively supporting an ally.

Trump separately announced that Lockheed Martin would establish a new Patriot sustainment facility in Europe, highlighting Nato's growing emphasis on expanding the continent's missile production base, but without naming a country.

Russia ramps up missile production

Russian President Vladimir Putin put the entire economy on a war footing from the first day of the war and missile and drone production remains a top priority. Russia continues rapidly expanding production of both ballistic and cruise missiles while increasing output of long-range strike drones as well as constant technological development. Russia will produce an estimated 2,500 missiles of all types this year – twice as many as last year.

Although Ukraine has developed its own interceptor projects and recently completed successful testing of the FP-7 surface-to-air missiles – the so-called Flamingo cruise missile -- serial production has yet to begin.

Even the most optimistic estimates suggest it will be some time before Ukraine’s indigenous systems can replace Patriots that are now in such short supply, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) is rationing their use. For example, on the last day of the Ankara Nato summit Russia fired 29 missiles during another large attack on the Kyiv region and all of them got through. Zelenskiy recently told the FT that stocks of PAC-3 interceptors had become critically low and that replacement missiles sometimes arrived "literally the day before a massive attack".

A broader defence partnership

Alongside the Patriot announcement, Trump confirmed that the United States intends to purchase Ukrainian-made military drones, finally embracing Zelenskiy’s proposal for a mega drones-for-weapons deal, first advanced last year.

"We would buy their drones," Trump said. "And you know, if we made that deal, we'd have great protection."

Zelenskiy welcomed the move: "I'm very happy that our sides began to work on a drone deal, and it's a very good beginning."

Together, the two announcements suggest Washington increasingly views Ukraine not simply as a recipient of military aid but as a future partner in defence production – an important strategic shift. Yet it does little to alter the immediate military balance.

By the time Ukrainian-built Patriot interceptors begin rolling off production lines—assuming the programme proceeds as envisaged—it is highly likely the current war may have already ended. In that case the Patriot licence will become a huge advantage in Ukraine’s next war with Russia; not this one.

No Gas, No Lights, No Comms, No Tourists: Ukraine’s Crimea Blockade Starts To Bite – Analysis

The empty beaches of Feodosia, Crimea, in July, 2026. Photo Credit: RFE/RL


July 12, 2026 
RFE RL
By Timofei Rozhanskiy

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian drone campaign isolates Crimea: Strikes have hit nearly all bridges to Crimea and targeted shipping/fuel supplies, causing severe fuel shortages, power outages, and communication disruptions across the peninsula.

Tourism devastated in peak summer season: Beaches are empty, hotels offer cheap deals mainly to locals, tourists who drove in are stranded without gasoline, and many are seeking urgent evacuation.

Widespread civilian impact and shortages: Food prices have skyrocketed, supermarkets limit operations or raise prices sharply, small businesses are closing, and residents rely on assistance centers for power, water, and phone charging.

Ukrainian drone strikes have hit nearly all the bridges to Crimea and launched a blitz on shipping in recent days, leaving the Russian-occupied Ukrainian peninsula cut off from fuel supplies and its tourist industry devastated at the height of summer.

The relentless campaign continued overnight into July 11 with a Ukrainian attack on four vessels in Taganrog Bay on the Sea of Azov, Russian authorities said.

Ukraine’s drone chief, Robert Brovdi, has reported some 50 strikes in five days — figures which can’t be confirmed independently but appear to be borne out by the fuel crisis in Crimea.

Crimea Goes Dark As Ukrainian Drones Target Electricity Grid

“Fuel has become increasingly scarce. There’s practically none left. There used to be some sold under the counter,” said Oleksandr Liev, tourism minister in the Crimean autonomous government that existed before Russia seized the region in 2014.

“Sometimes something would show up at gas stations…fuel would sometimes appear at exorbitant prices. Over the past day, fuel hasn’t appeared anywhere, not even at exorbitant prices. Sales under the counter are also becoming less frequent,” he told Current Time on July 10.

Tourists Seek Evacuation

The fuel crisis has been replicated to varying degrees in regions across Russia, where restrictions have been introduced following Ukraine’s campaign of strikes on oil refineries.

Residents across the peninsula are complaining not only about the lack of gasoline, but also about power outages, communication disruptions, and even shortages of food and water.

Tourists are asking for help with evacuation from Crimea, traditionally a mecca for Russians seeking summer sun on the beach.

Trains are running across a billion-dollar road-and-rail bridge that spans the Kerch Strait, to the peninsula’s east. But some tourists arrived for their vacation by car and now don’t have enough gasoline to leave.

The crisis has been building for weeks. In early June, a drone strike on a train caused Russia to suspend rail operations on the bridge. Shortly afterwards, as fuel shortages got worse and attacks mounted, one Russian blogger urged vacationers not to travel to Crimea.

“You can’t go to Crimea right now unless it’s absolutely necessary. I won’t go, even though I need to. There’s no gas — there just isn’t any, friends. Not only that — the land route is closed. It’s been bombed, and they’re shelling the tanker trucks,” wrote the blogger, who said her father lived on the occupied peninsula.

‘We Won’t See A Single Butt’

This week, a Crimea-based video blogger took his subscribers on a tour of an empty beach in Feodosia.

“It’s totally empty. I wanted to show you more people, but, unfortunately, there aren’t that many. Yeah. The beach, of course… actually, guys, looks like we won’t see a single butt here,” he said.

Liev, the former minister, told Current Time that cut-price hotel deals were only attracting local customers from different parts of Crimea.


“Just today, one of the managers of a hotel in Yalta told me that they have started receiving reservations from Crimeans,” he said. “Some of them, having the money, now have the opportunity to take a vacation themselves this summer. It’s rare for Crimeans to have such an opportunity.”

Russians wishing to travel to Crimea face background checks including interviews with officials.

The seizure of the territory has been singled out by Russian President Vladimir Putin as a crowning achievement of his rule. In 2014, he said the peninsula had a “sacred meaning” for Russia, comparing it to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem.

The inhabitants are now paying a heavy price for Russian occupation.

“Today is July 6. I woke up to a power outage, just like everyone else in Sudak and Novy Svet. And, they say, all over Crimea,” a Sudak resident wrote this week.

“No power, no signal, no Internet. Well, I mean, I could make calls and send messages, but mobile Internet was effectively down — I’d only get notifications, but I couldn’t log into any of the messaging apps,” she said.

Tatyana, a YouTuber in the coastal town of Chornomorske near the western tip of Crimea, has documented similar experiences, including charging her phone from a power point set up by local authorities using a generator in a park.

“We only had five hours of electricity over four and a half days,” she said in one recent video. “My husband brings water in buckets from the hydrant.”

Tatyana has even asked her subscribers for financial support so she can purchase her own generator.

Local TV has told residents they can use “assistance centers.” There, they can also make a call from a landline or store medication in a refrigerator.

“Need to make an urgent call or finish a conversation on a messaging app? You can now charge your cell phone or use a landline at the city’s assistance center for residents,” says one promotional message.

The centers recall the “invincibility points” where Ukrainians have sought refuge from the cold during Russian winter campaigns of attacks on power infrastructure.

In summertime Crimea, though, the weather is more favorable –even if air conditioning units are not working.

Food Prices Skyrocket

The electricity crunch has badly affected small businesses.

“Some stores aren’t open at all, while others are still open but only accept cash. The post office isn’t open today either,” said a YouTuber in Yalta this week.

Larger stores such as supermarkets are open — but have hiked prices.

“Parmalat lactose-free milk was 179 rubles ($2.30), now it’s 307,” said one resident in a video recorded as she walked around a store this week. “At the register, the prices were even higher than they were on the price tags. There are signs everywhere stating that the merchandise is being repriced and that the current price is the one at the register.”


Experts cite logistics problems as the main reason for the rise in food prices. As well as the shortage of gasoline, some drivers are afraid to drive to Crimea because they could fall victim to drone attacks.

Brovdi, the Ukrainian drone commander, has declared that trucks carrying gasoline are legitimate targets for the Ukrainian army and has released video footage of drone attacks on Russian trucks.

The Russian occupation authorities promised this week that the supply problems would be solved within two weeks and that gasoline prices would fall. But they did not explain how this would come about.

Written by Ray Furlong based on reporting by Timofei RozhanskyTimofei Rozhanskiy is a correspondent in Riga for Current Time, the Russian-language network led by RFE/RL in cooperation with VOA. Born in Russia, he graduated from St. Petersburg State University and also received film and video production training at Bard College in New York. Before joining Current Time’s Moscow bureau in 2019, Rozhanskiy worked for the independent Russian television channel TV Rain.

About RFE RL
RFE/RL journalists report the news in 21 countries where a free press is banned by the government or not fully established.
View all posts by RFE RL →

 

Ukraine war fatigue laid bare by anti-conscription riot in Lviv

Tempers boiled over in the western Ukrainian city of Lviv when locals clashed with TCK conscription officers and rioted, smahing up thier car in the orocess. / bne IntelliNewsFacebook

TwitterLinkedInTelegramFlipboardFeedly

By Ben Aris in Berlin July 10, 2026

Tensions are approaching boiling point in Ukraine after citizens rioted in a protest against Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s compulsory conscription programme in the western city of Lviv on July 9.

An anti-mobilisation demonstration turned violent after a large crowd of people attacked recruitment officers, before overturning and smashing their car. The clash broke out spontaneously after a member of the press gang, reportedly a martial arts coach, hit a man in the street.

Ukraine’s social media has become full of footage of the much-hated officers of the Territorial Recruitment and Social Support Centres (TCK) grabbing men from the street and brutally beating them before roughly manhandling them into vans in a process that has been dubbed “busification.”

Often wives, babushki and passers-by intervene in an attempt to rescue the victim – usually without success. The “recruit” is then taken to a processing centre where they are kept in prison-like accommodation before being given a brief military training and shipped off to serve on the front. According to reports, the life expectancy of many of these green, underprepared troops is counted in the weeks.

Russia is reportedly losing over 1,000 men a day, but Ukraine is also taking heavy losses. Ukraine’s manpower shortage is much more acute than Russia’s which continues to receive some 25,000 men a month, through its voluntary recruitment programme – not quite enough to replace losses at the front, according to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy.

While Ukraine’s losses remain a state secret, Russia is losing between three and eight men for each member of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) taken out of action, according to various sources. Based on those ratios then Ukraine is losing approximately 125–330 personnel daily.

Both the attacker/defender kill ratios and estimates of the number of Russians killed and wounded must be taken with extreme caution. The actual figures remain an extremely politically sensitive subject.

Iuliia Mendel, Zelenskiy’s former press secretary, who has become an outspoken critic of her former boss, has questioned all the estimates and is starkly critical of the compulsory conscription programme, as one of the few dissenting voices from Ukraine’s elite.

The authorities reacted harshly to the Lviv riot. The Ministry of Defence, law enforcement, and government officials insist that the burdens of war are shared equally—and that anyone protesting them is doing the "Kremlin’s work," reports Marta Havryshko, a Ukrainian analyst and government critic. A 23-year-old man that participated in the riot was arrested and faces up to eight years in prison.

“Branding every act of dissent as Russian subversion may be politically convenient, but it cannot conceal a deeper reality: public anger over coercive mobilization and the unequal distribution of wartime sacrifice is growing,” Havryshko said in a social media post. “An unsanctioned Maidan—one without Western approval—is unlikely to succeed. But that should not be mistaken for public consent. A government can suppress protest. It cannot indefinitely suppress the grievances that produce it.”

Social impact

The social impact of the war has been dire. According to a new report, Ukraine’s homeless population has surged to one million during the full-scale war. Nearly half of those now living rough on the street are internally displaced people (IDPs) whose homes and lives were destroyed by the invading Russian forces.

The brutal tactics of the TCK officers is fuelling resentment and coming under increased scrutiny. The number of physical attacks on offices is increasing and at least two officers have been killed in scuffles with their victims.

In the most recent case last week, a 34-year-old father from Kryvyi Rih, was snatched by the TCK officers in front of his 5-year-old daughter as he picked her up from school. The father was the sole caregiver after the mother abandoned the family, leaving the girl with no one to look after her, which under Ukrainian law excludes the father from conscription. The principal of the school took the daughter to the TCK offices to try and secure his release without success. It was only after the story went viral on social media, including a video of the little girl sobbing in the playground, that the authorities relented and released the father.

The majority of Ukrainians continue to support the government in the war against Russia, but support for fighting until the complete liberation of all occupied territory has declined. Ukrainians have become more pragmatic without becoming more willing to concede to Russia, according to Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS). Around 70% say they do not expect current attempts at peace talks to produce a lasting settlement. Only 17% think the war will end by the summer of 2026 and another 14% expect it to end before the end of the year. Only 31% expect the war to finish during 2026.

Despite growing war weariness, most Ukrainians still reject recognising Russian sovereignty over occupied territory, but more recently have conceded that some territory will be lost, which they would accept if a “just” ceasefire deal can be struck.

The war is also becoming unpopular in Russia that is eating into Russian President Vladimir Putin’s approval ratings. The share of respondents in the VTsIOM poll saying they trust Putin declined to 75%, down from 76.7%, to its lowest level since the invasion four years ago. But Zelenskiy's approval rating has fallen even further to around 58% according to the more recent polls.

Ukraine: Conscientious Objectors Convicted, Jailed, Held In Military Units – Analysis

July 12, 2026
 F18News
By Felix Corley

Key Takeaways

Ukraine Is Aggressively Prosecuting Conscientious Objectors — Prosecutors have launched over 1,000 criminal cases against men (mostly Jehovah’s Witnesses, Seventh-day Adventists, Baptists, and Orthodox) whose applications for alternative civilian service were rejected, with about 500 cases reaching court.

Hundreds Are Jailed or Held in Military Bases — At least 24 conscientious objectors are currently serving prison sentences, with 7 awaiting appeals and 21 in pre-trial detention. Hundreds more (including ~300 Seventh-day Adventists and 50 Council of Churches Baptists) are being held against their will on military bases, often facing pressure and torture.

No Alternative Service During Wartime — Despite martial law and UN concern, Ukraine’s Defence Ministry insists alternative civilian service does not exist during wartime. A promised new law to allow it has not yet reached Parliament, despite a June 2026 deadline. Courts are handing down prison terms of 3–6 years under various Criminal Code articles.

Prosecutors have launched more than a thousand criminal cases to punish conscientious objectors whose applications for alternative service have been rejected. About 500 cases are believed to have already reached court. In cases known to Forum 18, 24 conscientious objectors are in jail serving sentences, with a further 7 awaiting appeals. Courts handed 11 conscientious objectors probation or restricted freedom sentences. Courts are hearing at least 12 new cases, while 21 conscientious objectors are known to be in pre-trial detention.

Jehovah’s Witnesses, Seventh-day Adventists, Baptists, Orthodox and others are among those convicted and jailed after Recruitment Offices rejected their applications for alternative civilian service on grounds of conscience.


(For a list of some of those convicted and jailed, convicted and awaiting appeals, convicted and serving probation sentences, in pre-trial detention, and forcibly held on military bases, see below. Those whose sentences have been completed are not included.)

Recruitment Offices have forcibly taken hundreds of conscientious objectors aged from their twenties to their late fifties to military bases against their will. There they often face pressure and torture. Of those currently being held, about 300 are Seventh-day Adventists, while 50 are Council of Churches Baptists (see below).

Many Jehovah’s Witnesses are among those forcibly taken to military facilities, “where they have sometimes been held for days or even months,” Jehovah’s Witnesses told Forum 18 in June. “Once there, they often face physical abuse and emotional pressure to compromise their neutral stand.”

In addition, one man, 50-year-old Council of Churches Baptist Dmytro Koval, died in military detention on 21 March. When returned to his family, his body showed signs of brutal treatment (see below).


On 9 March, a court in Mykolaiv Region jailed 42-year-old Jehovah’s Witness conscientious objector Volodymyr Klementiev for six years. Mykolaiv Appeal Court rejected his appeal on 14 May. “To date, this is the longest prison sentence imposed on one of our brothers since the war in Ukraine began,” Jehovah’s Witnesses noted. The previous longest prison sentence was of five years.

On successive days in June, a court in Chernihiv Region found two Seventh-day Adventist conscientious objectors guilty. The Judges jailed Andrii Skliar and Ihor Kiktev – both in their thirties – for a combined period of 5 years and one month each.

After Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, Ukraine declared a state of martial law. All men between the ages of 27 (later reduced to 25) and 60 were deemed eligible for call-up in a general mobilisation and were banned from leaving the country. Ukraine’s Defence Ministry insists that even the limited alternative service allowed in peacetime does not exist during wartime (see below).

Viktor Yelensky, head of the State Service for Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience (DESS), noted the “sharp increase” in requests for alternative service from 2025. The Office of the Parliamentary Human Rights Commissioner (Ombudsperson) told the DESS that it had received 2,395 appeals from individuals about the denial of their request to perform alternative service “due to their religious beliefs” between Russia’s full-scale attack on Ukraine between 2022 and 2025, more than two-thirds of them in 2025 alone.

In March, the United Nations (UN) Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine renewed earlier UN concern about the lack of the possibility of conducting alternative civilian service at a time of war. It has also expressed concern about violence against conscientious objectors who have been forcibly taken to military bases.

The ⁠Rule of Law Roadmap, adopted by Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers on 14 May 2025, identifies priority reform areasin the fields of the judiciary, prevention and fight against corruption, protection of fundamental rights, as well as justice, freedom and security. The document forms part of Ukraine’s commitments under the EU accession process.


The Roadmap identifies a “strategic goal”: “The right to conscientious objection to military service on grounds of religious belief is ensured during martial law.” The Roadmap set a deadline of the end of June for “Development and adoption of a law on ensuring the right to undergo alternative service during martial law, for a special period”. The government has assigned the task of preparing the new Law to the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture. It has prepared a first draft, according to Yelensky of the DESS.

As of 10 July, no draft Law to allow for alternative civilian service for conscientious objectors during wartime has yet reached the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament), despite the end of June deadline in the Cabinet of Ministers’ Roadmap. Yelensky of the DESS told Forum 18 on 24 June that the Economy Ministry’s draft Law from the beginning of 2026 “is not even a draft, just a draft of a draft”.

The Defence Ministry’s “categorical position” – set out at a February Presidential Office meeting – is that alternative service must be undertaken within the army.
Severe human rights violations in Russian-occupied Ukraine

Serious violations of freedom of religion and belief and other human rights take place within all the Ukrainian territory Russia has illegally occupied.

Arrests, prosecutions, trials

After Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, Ukraine declared a state of martial law. All men between the ages of 27 (later reduced to 25) and 60 were deemed eligible for call-up in a general mobilisation and were banned from leaving the country. Ukraine’s Defence Ministry insists that even the limited alternative service allowed in peacetime does not exist during wartime.

Prosecutors bring cases against conscientious objectors under Criminal Code Article 336 (“Refusing call-up for military service during mobilisation or in a special period, and for military service during call-up of reservists in a special period”). The punishment is a jail term of three to five years.

More recently, prosecutors have increasingly brought cases under Criminal Code Article 402 (“Disobedience”), Article 409 (“Evasion of military service by means of self-mutilation or otherwise”) or Article 407 (“Absence without leave from a military unit or place of service”). The punishment for offences committed under martial law under these Articles is a jail term of 5 to 10 years.

In earlier prosecutions, conscientious objectors were generally jailed only when they lost their appeals after conviction. However, courts are placing an increasing number in pre-trial detention before a trial has even begun.

More than a thousand conscientious objectors prosecuted

Many conscientious objectors have faced prosecution since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 after Recruitment Offices rejected their applications on grounds of conscience for alternative civilian service. They include Jehovah’s Witnesses, Seventh-day Adventists, Baptists, Orthodox and others (see lists below).

Prosecutors have launched more than a thousand criminal cases to punish conscientious objectors whose applications for alternative service have been rejected. About 500 cases are believed to have already reached court. In cases known to Forum 18, 24 conscientious objectors are in jail serving sentences, with a further 7 awaiting appeals. Courts handed 11 conscientious objectors probation or restricted freedom sentences. Courts are hearing at least 12 new cases, while 21 conscientious objectors are known to be in pre-trial detention (see lists below).

Courts have handed down prison terms, which are then suspended and the individual is put on probation for a defined period (usually between one and three years). If they commit another offence during this period, the original prison term will then be applied.

As of 2 June 2026, 1,091 criminal cases had been launched against Jehovah’s Witness conscientious objectors, a lawyer representing more than 50 of them told Forum 18 in June. Of these, 418 cases had been sent to court. A total of 12 men had been sentenced, with a further 21 in pre-trial detention.

More than 90 per cent of these cases against Jehovah’s Witnesses had been brought under Criminal Code Article 336 (“Refusing call-up for military service during mobilisation or in a special period, and for military service during call-up of reservists in a special period”), the rest under Articles supposed to be used only against those in the military.

Courts have handed 41 Jehovah’s Witness men probation sentences (of which 10 have come into force), a lawyer told Forum 18 on 8 July. (5 of these cases are listed below.)

Courts have closed some criminal cases mid-trial as conscientious objectors’ circumstances have changed. Some were closed with the birth of another child in the family (fathers with three or more are exempt from mobilisation), or when a religious leader has persuaded the court that his mobilisation should be deferred as his religious community has been designated a part of the country’s “critical infrastructure”. (About a third of registered religious organisations now have this designation.)
Hundreds of conscientious objectors held in military bases

Recruitment Offices have forcibly taken hundreds of conscientious objectors aged from their twenties to their late fifties to military bases against their will, despite their expressing a willingness to perform alternative civilian service. Soldiers – often using torture – pressure them to accept joining the army.


A Council of Churches Baptist, 50-year-old Dmytro Koval, died in military detention on 21 March. When returned to his family, his body showed signs of brutal treatment.

Nearly 300 Seventh-day Adventists are being held against their will in military units or military training centres, a representative told Forum 18 on 9 July.

Council of Churches Baptists list 50 of their men held against their will in military units (see list below).

The military has allowed a few men, including Council of Churches Baptists, to serve in roles that do not violate their conscientious beliefs. Such individuals are allowed to serve in the military without swearing the military oath, without wearing a uniform and without bearing weapons. They are assigned to such tasks as cleaning, cooking or repairing vehicles. Such service is not acceptable to the majority of conscientious objectors, who will not serve in any role associated with the military.
Repeat prosecutions?

A number of conscientious objectors sentenced since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 have completed court-imposed sentences. None is so far known to have faced renewed mobilisation and repeat prosecution. As war and the state of martial law continue, and as men are eligible for mobilisation until the age of 60, it is possible some might face renewed mobilisation attempts.

Consecutive administrative fines are routinely imposed. “Given the large size – nearly an average monthly salary (in case of enforcement, twice so) – these could be considered as having a criminal character,” Yurii Sheliazhenko of the Ukrainian Pacifist Movement and the Institute of Peace and Law told Forum 18 on 10 July.


A Kyiv Recruitment Office fined Sheliazhenko twice – on 11 May and 4 June – under Article 210-1, Part 3 of the Administrative Offences Code (“Violation of legislation on defence, mobilisation training and mobilisation”), according to the decisions seen by Forum 18.

“I received a notice a month later that a new fine will be imposed on 5 August,” Sheliazhenko told Forum 18. “The notice says I continue to ‘evade’ military duty. They know they repeatedly punish people for the same ‘offence’ of conscientious objection.”
LIST OF KNOWN PROSECUTED CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS

Listed here are known conscientious objectors, giving their date of birth or age (where known) and religious affiliation:
– Conscientious objectors who died in military bases (1 case)
– Conscientious objectors jailed serving sentences (24 cases)
– Conscientious objectors sentenced, awaiting jailing (2 cases)
– Conscientious objectors sentenced, awaiting appeal (7 cases)
– Conscientious objectors handed probation/restricted freedom sentences (11 cases)
– Conscientious objector sentenced to military restrictions (1 case)
– Conscientious objectors on trial (12 cases)
– Conscientious objectors in pre-trial detention (21 cases)
– Prosecutor challenging acquittal (2 cases)
– Conscientious objectors held against their will on military bases (50 Council of Churches Baptists)


The true number of cases in any category may be higher.

Those whose sentences have been completed are not included.

The lists below are based on court decisions, information from individuals and religious communities, and other information known to Forum 18. Cases are listed in alphabetical order of name within each section.
Conscientious objectors who died in military bases

1) Dmytro Bohdanovych Koval (born 30 January 1976)
Council of Churches Baptist
Died 21 March 2026, 425th Assault Regiment Skelya
When returned to his home town of Kovel on 30 March 2026, his body showed signs of brutal treatment.
Conscientious objectors jailed serving sentences

1) Hennadii Hryhorovych Barabash, 48
Jehovah’s Witness
Criminal Code Article 407, Part 5, 5 years’ imprisonment
Sentenced: 16 February 2026, Stryi City District Court, Lviv Region
Appeal: unsuccessful, Lviv Appeal Court, 30 June 2026
Taken to prison: 10 June 2025
Release due: 10 June 2030
Prison: Lviv Penitentiary Institution No. 19

2) Serhii Volodymyrovych Bashkirov, 58
Jehovah’s Witness
Criminal Code Article 336, 3 years’ imprisonment
Sentenced: 29 January 2026, Yampil District Court, Vinnytsia Region, 2 years’ probation
Appeal: 18 May 2026, Vinnytsia Appeal Court changed to 3 years’ imprisonment
Second appeal: Supreme Court, ongoing
Taken to prison: 8 June 2026
Release due: 8 June 2029
Prison: Vinnytsya Penitentiary Institution No. 1


3) Serhii Viktorovych Ivanushchenko, 48
Jehovah’s Witness
Criminal Code Article 336, 3 years’ imprisonment
Sentenced: 28 March 2024, Bilopillia District Court, Sumy Region
Appeal: unsuccessful, 13 December 2024, Sumy Appeal Court
Taken to prison: 11 February 2025
Release due: 12 February 2028
Prison: Pervomayska Penal Colony No. 117, Kharkiv Region

4) Andrii Borysovych Khomenko, 50
Jehovah’s Witness
Criminal Code Article 336, 3 years’ imprisonment
Sentenced: 26 July 2024, Okhtyrka District Court, Sumy Region
Appeal: unsuccessful, Sumy Appeal Court, 23 December 2024
Second Appeal: unsuccessful, Supreme Court, 27 November 2025
Taken to prison: 3 February 2025
Release due: 4 February 2028
Prison: Sumy Detention Centre
Supreme Court: “Notably, one of the three judges dissented from the Court’s opinion. Citing the Constitution of Ukraine and several international human rights laws, the judge described prosecution on the grounds of conscientious objection as ‘unnecessary’,” Jehovah’s Witnesses note.

5) Volodymyr Kostyantynovych Klementiev, 42
Jehovah’s Witness
Criminal Code Article 407, Part 5, 6 years’ imprisonment
Sentenced: 9 March 2026, Mykolaiv District Court, Mykolaiv Region
Appeal: unsuccessful, Mykolaiv Appeal Court, 14 May 2026
Taken to prison: 20 October 2025
Release due: 20 October 2031
Prison: Mykolaiv Detention Centre
Criminal Code Article 336
Sentenced: 27 January 2026, Kherson City Court
Appeal: Kherson Appeal Court, due 22 July 2026

6) Andrii Bohdanovych Kliuka, 40
Jehovah’s Witness
Criminal Code Article 407, Part 5, 5 years’ imprisonment
Sentenced: 16 July 2025, Kamianets-Podilskyi District Court, Khmelnytskyi Region
Appeal: unsuccessful, Khmelnytskyi Appeal Court, 24 November 2025
Second Appeal: Supreme Court, ongoing
Taken to prison: 16 July 2025
Release due: 16 July 2030
Prison: Kolomyia Penal Colony No. 41, Ivano-Frankivsk Region


7) Vasyl Pavlovych Kononchuk, 54
Jehovah’s Witness
Criminal Code Article 336, 3 years’ imprisonment
Sentenced: 28 January 2026, Dubrovytsia District Court, Rivne Region
Appeal: unsuccessful, Rivne Appeal Court, 26 May 2026
Taken to prison: 28 January 2026
Release due: 28 January 2029
Prison: Rivne Detention Centre

8) Oleksii Oleksandrovych Kovalenko (born 30 November 1980)
Dzogchen Buddhist
Criminal Code Article 336, 4 years’ imprisonment
Sentenced: 9 October 2024, Darnytskyi District Court, Kyiv
Appeal: 7 August 2025, Kyiv Appeal Court
Second Appeal: 11 December 2025, Supreme Court refused to open cassation proceedings
Taken to prison: 27 October 2025
Release due: 27 October 2029
Prison: Pivdennoukrainsk Penitentiary Institution No. 83, Mykolaiv Region

9) Dmytro Serhiiovych Kozhemiakin, 36
Jehovah’s Witness
Criminal Code Article 336, 3 years’ imprisonment
Sentenced: 26 January 2026, Kalynivka District Court, Vinnytsia Region, 1 year’s probation
Appeal: 28 April 2026, Vinnytsia Appeal Court changed verdict to 3 years’ imprisonment
Taken to prison: 26 May 2026
Release due: 26 May 2029
Prison: Vinnytsya Penitentiary Institution No. 1

10) Viktor Mykhailovych Marko, born 1995
Jehovah’s Witness
Criminal Code Article 336, 3 years’ imprisonment
Sentenced: 8 November 2024, Chortkiv District Court, Ternopil Region
Appeal: unsuccessful, 3 December 2025, Ternopil Appeal Court
Taken to prison: 22 January 2026
Release due: 23 January 2029
Prison: Chortkiv Penitentiary Institution No. 26, Ternopil Region
Note: cares for his elderly parents and grandmother


11) Andriy Ivanovych Mishchenko
Christian (no community affiliation)
Criminal Code Article 336, 3 years’ imprisonment
Sentenced: 5 September 2025, Andrushivka District Court, Zhytomyr Region
Appeal: none
Prison: Pivdennoukrainsk Penitentiary Institution No. 83, Mykolaiv Region

12) Rustam Emomovich Nazarov
Jehovah’s Witness
Criminal Code Article 336, 3 years’ imprisonment
Sentenced: 26 August 2025, Orativ District Court, Vinnytsia Region
Appeal: unsuccessful, Vinnytsia Appeal Court, 10 November 2025
Taken to prison:
Release due:
Prison:

13) Serhii Anatoliyovych Nechayuk, 35
Jehovah’s Witness
Criminal Code Article 336, 3 years’ imprisonment
Sentenced: 10 December 2024, Yarmolyntsi District Court, Khmelnitsky Region
Appeal: unsuccessful, 17 February 2025, Khmelnitsky Appeal Court
Second Appeal: Supreme Court, ongoing
Taken to prison: 3 March 2025
Release due: 3 March 2028
Prison: Kolomyia Penal Colony No. 41, Ivano-Frankivsk Region

14) Ihor Serhiyovych Nosenko (born 23 July 1997)
Seventh-day Adventist
Criminal Code Article 402, Part 4, 5 years’ imprisonment
Sentenced: 23 June 2025, Kolomyia City District Court, Ivano-Frankivsk Region
Appeal: unsuccessful, 15 October 2025, Ivano-Frankivsk Appeal Court
Second Appeal: unsuccessful, Supreme Court, 26 March 2026
Taken to prison: 16 January 2025
Release due: 16 January 2030
Prison: Kolomyia Penal Colony No. 41, Ivano-Frankivsk Region

15) Dmytro Vasylovych Petrov, 49
Jehovah’s Witness
Criminal Code Article 336, 3 years’ imprisonment
Sentenced: 19 November 2025, Staryi Sambir District Court, Lviv Region
Appeal: unsuccessful, Lviv Appeal Court, 3 February 2026
Taken to prison: 11 March 2026
Release due: 11 March 2029
Prison: Drohobych Penal Colony No. 40, Lviv Region


16) Vitalii Pavlovych Popov
Jehovah’s Witness
Criminal Code Article 336, 3 years’ imprisonment
Sentenced: 25 September 2024, Shevchenko/Dzerzhynsk District Court, Kharkiv
Appeal: unsuccessful, Kharkiv Appeal Court, 10 March 2025
Taken to prison:
Release due:
Prison:

17) Dmytro Anatoliiovych Prodan, 32
Jehovah’s Witness
Criminal Code Article 336, 3 years’ imprisonment
Sentenced: 18 November 2025, Yampil District Court, Vinnytsia Region
Appeal: unsuccessful, Vinnytsia Appeal Court, 24 February 2026
Taken to prison: 18 March 2026
Release due: 19 March 2029
Prison: Pivdennoukrainsk Penitentiary Institution No. 83, Mykolaiv Region

18) Serhii Mikhaylovych Semchuk (born 1992)
Baptist
Criminal Code Article 402, Part 4, 5 years’ imprisonment
Sentenced: 8 May 2024, Shevchenko/Dzerzhynsk District Court, Kharkiv Region
Appeal: unsuccessful, Kharkiv Appeal Court, 30 September 2024
Taken to prison: 29 January 2025
Release due: 30 January 2030
Prison: Lviv Penal Colony No. 19

19) Oleksandr Oleksandrovych Serbul, 45
Jehovah’s Witness
Criminal Code Article 336, 3 years’ imprisonment
Sentenced: 29 October 2024, Ripky District Court, Chernihiv Region
Appeal: unsuccessful, 22 January 2025, Chernihiv Appeal Court
Taken to prison: 24 March 2025
Release due: 24 March 2028
Prison: Chernihiv Detention Centre

20) Oleksandr Volodymyrovych Shnyra, 34
Jehovah’s Witness
Criminal Code Article 336, 3 years’ imprisonment
Sentenced: 28 May 2025, Starokostiantyniv District Court, Khmelnytskiy Region
Appeal: unsuccessful, 18 November 2025, Khmelnytskiy Appeal Court
Taken to prison: 18 December 2025
Release due: 19 December 2028
Prison: Kolomyia Penal Colony No. 41, Ivano-Frankivsk Region


21) Serhii Vasilyovych Starovoit
Jehovah’s Witness
Criminal Code Article 336, 3 years’ imprisonment
Sentenced: 18 December 2024, Popilnya District Court, Zhytomyr Region
Appeal: unsuccessful, 3 March 2026, Zhytomyr Appeal Court
Taken to prison:
Release due:
Prison:

22) Vadym Valentynovych Stasiuk (born 19 October 1999)
Seventh-day Adventist (verdict wrongly gives him as a Baptist)
Criminal Code Article 408, Part 4, 5 years’ imprisonment
Sentenced: 9 June 2026, Shevchenko District Court, Dnipro City
Taken to prison: 19 February 2026

23) Petro Vasylovych Yatsyshyn
Jehovah’s Witness
Criminal Code Article 336, years’ imprisonment
Sentenced: District Court,
Appeal: unsuccessful, Appeal Court,
Taken to prison:
Release due:
Prison:

24) Zenovii Mykolaiovych Zhabiak, 27
Jehovah’s Witness
Criminal Code Article 336, 3 years’ imprisonment
Sentenced: 3 December 2025, Zhydachiv District Court, Lviv Region
Appeal: unsuccessful, Lviv Appeal Court, 25 February 2026
Second Appeal: unsuccessful, Supreme Court, 28 May 2026
Taken to prison: 27 March 2026
Release due: 28 March 2029
Prison: Drohobych Penal Colony No. 40, Lviv Region
Conscientious objectors sentenced, awaiting jailing

1) Andriy Bohdanovich Popik (born 1982)
Jehovah’s Witness
Criminal Code Article 336, 3 years’ imprisonment
Sentenced: 4 March 2025, Striy City District Court, Lviv Region
Appeal: unsuccessful, Lviv Appeal Court, 28 October 2025


2) Serhii Ihorovych Stadnitskyi (born 1990)
Protestant
Criminal Code Article 336, 3 years’ imprisonment
Sentenced: 26 March 2024, Chervonohrad/Sheptytskyi City Court, Lviv Region
Appeal: unsuccessful, Lviv Appeal Court, 20 June 2024
Second appeal: 4 October 2024, Supreme Court refused to open cassation proceedings
Conscientious objectors sentenced, awaiting appeal

1) Valentyn Oleksandrovych Adamchuk (born 1986)
Pentecostal
Criminal Code Article 336, 3 years’ imprisonment
Sentenced: 29 January 2025, Darnytsky District Court, Kyiv Region
Appeal: Kyiv City Appeal Court, pending

2) Denis Yevheniyevych Dudin (born 23 May 1979)
Council of Churches Baptist
Criminal Code Article 336, 3 years’ imprisonment
Sentenced: 3 November 2025, Chuhuyiv Town Court, Kharkiv Region
Appeal: unsuccessful, Kharkiv Appeal Court, 2 April 2026
Second appeal: Supreme Court, pending
Not taken into custody

3) Ihor Oleksiyovych Kiktev (born 1989)
Seventh-day Adventist
Criminal Code Article 402, Part 4, Article 409, Part 4, 5 years and one month’s imprisonment
Sentenced: 9 June 2026, Kozelets District Court, Chernihiv Region
Appeal: pending, Chernihiv Appeal Court

4) Oleksandr Volodymyrovych Kurochkin (born 24 November 1984)
Seventh-day Adventist
Criminal Code Article 336, 4 years’ imprisonment
Sentenced: 2 June 2026, Peresypsky District Court, Odesa Region
Appeal: pending, Odesa Appeal Court
Not taken into custody


5) Mykola Mikolayevich Marko (born 21 April 1991)
Council of Churches Baptist
Criminal Code Article 336, 3 years’ imprisonment
Sentenced: 5 November 2025, Kherson City Court
Appeal: Kherson Appeal Court, hearing due 4 August 2026

6) Andrii Hryhorovych Skliar (born 31 October 1991)
Seventh-day Adventist
Criminal Code Article 402, Part 4, Article 409, Part 4, 5 years and one month’s imprisonment
Sentenced: 10 June 2026, Kozelets District Court, Chernihiv Region
Appeal: pending, Chernihiv Appeal Court

7) Ivan Ivanovych Tsebak
Jehovah’s Witness
Criminal Code Article 336, 3 years’ imprisonment
Sentenced: 26 January 2026 Stryi City District Court, Lviv Region
Appeal: pending, Lviv Appeal Court
Conscientious objectors handed probation/restricted freedom sentences

1) Kostyantin Volodymyrovich Chovhan (born 23 June 1971)
Council of Churches Baptist
Criminal Code Article 336, 2 years’ probation
Sentenced: 2 March 2026, Sakhnovshchyna District Court, Kharkiv Region
Prosecutor’s Appeal: Kharkiv Appeal Court, next hearing due 26 November 2026

2) Zoltan Ivanovych Demesh, 43
Jehovah’s Witness
Criminal Code Article 402, Part 4, 1 year’s probation
Sentenced: 22 June 2026, Yavoriv District Court, Lviv Region
Ordered held in pre-trial detention: 8 April 2026, Lychakiv District Court, Lviv City
Lviv Penitentiary Institution No. 19
The judge said Demesh could remain free on bail under condition that he live inside a military facility. Based on his personal convictions, he declined the offer and remains in custody.

3) Yuriy Viktorovych Harkusha
Baptist
Criminal Code Article 336, ?1 year’s probation
Sentenced: 7 November 2025, Kherson City Court
Prosecutor’s appeal: unsuccessful, 1 April 2026, Kherson Appeal Court


4) Artyom Mikolaiovich Kravtsov (born 1993)
Baptist
Criminal Code Article 336, 3 years’ probation
Sentenced: 19 October 2023, Kryve Ozero District Court, Mykolaiv Region
Appeal: none

5) Vitaly Mikhailovych Kriushenko
Jehovah’s Witness
Criminal Code Article 336, 1 year’s probation
Sentenced: 8 July 2024, Bilopillia District Court, Sumy Region, 3 years’ imprisonment
Appeal: unsuccessful, 5 December 2024, Sumy Appeal Court
Taken to prison: 27 January 2025
Second appeal: 27 October 2025, Supreme Court refused to overturn guilty verdict but reduced sentence to one year of probation, released same day

6) Roman Yaroslavovych Kvik, 39
Jehovah’s Witness
Criminal Code Article 336, 2 years’ probation
Sentenced: 23 May 2025, Netishyn City Court, Khmelnytskyi Region, 3 years’ imprisonment
Appeal: unsuccessful, Khmelnytskyi Appeal Court, 17 November 2025
Taken to prison: 11 December 2025
Second appeal: 6 May 2026, Supreme Court refused to overturn guilty verdict but reduced sentence to two years of probation, released same day

7) Dmytro Oleksyiovych Pasechnik
Jehovah’s Witness
Criminal Code Article 336, 3-year jail term, 1 year’s probation
Sentenced: 20 November 2025, Dykanka District Court, Poltava Region

8) Oleksii Vasylovich Pozniak (born 19 February 1978)
Council of Churches Baptist
Criminal Code Article 336, 2 years’ probation
Sentenced: 3 December 2024, Dobroslav/Komintern District Court, Odesa Region, 3 years’ imprisonment
Appeal: Odesa Appeal Court, 8 June 2026, changed to 2 years’ probation

9) Oleh Heorhyovych Shpilovii
Seventh-day Adventist
Criminal Code Article 336, 2 years’ probation
Sentenced: 16 April 2026, Oleksandriya City District Court, Kirovohrad Region


10) Vitalii Mykolaiovych Stepaniuk
Jehovah’s Witness
Criminal Code Article 336, 1 year’s restricted freedom
Sentenced: 8 December 2025, Lyuboml District Court, Volyn Region, 2 years’ imprisonment
Appeal: 23 April 2026, Volyn Appeal Court changed punishment to 1 year’s restricted freedom
Second appeal: Supreme Court, ongoing

11) Volodymyr Volodymyrovich Ukhal (born 1992)
Orthodox
Criminal Code Article 336, 3 years’ probation
Sentenced: 24 October 2023, Tyachiv District Court, Zakarpattia Region
Prosecutor’s appeal: next hearing due 5 October 2026
Conscientious objector sentenced to military restrictions

1) Oleksandr Andryovych Prun
Seventh-day Adventist
Criminal Code Article 402, Part 4, 1 year ban on promotion and 10 per cent reduction in pay
Sentenced: 9 March 2026, Kolomyia City District Court, Ivano-Frankivsk Region
Conscientious objectors on trial

1) Volodymyr Oleksandrovich Baranov
Jehovah’s Witness
Criminal Code Article 402
Trial: Darnytsky District Court, Kyiv, next hearing due 28 July 2026

2) Kirilo Oleksandrovych Berestovoi (born 8 May 1988)
Council of Churches Baptist
Criminal Code Article 409, Part 4
Trial: Kostopil District Court, Rivne Region, next hearing not yet set
Under house arrest since 23 May 2025, after release from military unit

3) Andrii Yaroslavovych Bobyk
Jehovah’s Witness
Criminal Code Article 407, Part 5
Trial: Ivano-Frankivsk City Court, next hearing due 8 July 2026
Ordered held in pre-trial detention


4) Volodymyr Volodymyrovych Horbatiuk
Seventh-day Adventist
Article 336
Trial: Lutsk City District Court, Volyn Region

5) Vasyl Manuylovych Ivanitskyi
Seventh-day Adventist
Criminal Code Article 402, Part 4, next hearing due 25 September 2026
Trial: Kolomyia City District Court, Ivano-Frankivsk Region

6) Pavlo Oleksandrovych Kovalchuk
Seventh-day Adventist
Criminal Code Article 336, next hearing due 26 August 2026
Trial: Rozdilna District Court, Odesa Region

7) Mykhailo Mykhailovych Liubchenko, 43
Jehovah’s Witness
Criminal Code Article 407, Part 5
Trial: Kostopil District Court, Rivne Region, next hearing due 6 August 2026
Ordered held in pre-trial detention: 5 November 2025, for at least three months. He was in 2026 released on bail

8) Andrii Hennadievych Priymak (born 1984)
Council of Churches Baptist
Criminal Code Article 336
Trial: Zarichne District Court, Sumy Region, next hearing due 8 October 2026

9) Dmytro Serhiyovych Prokhodovskyi
Seventh-day Adventist
Criminal Code Article 402, Part 4
Trial: Sosnivskyi District Court, Cherkasy City, next hearing not yet set

10) Roman Oleksandrovych Sarhosh, 34
Jehovah’s Witness
Criminal Code Article 407, Part 5
Trial: Yavoriv District Court, Lviv, ongoing
Prison: Lviv Penitentiary Institution No. 19
Ordered held in pre-trial detention: 15 May 2026, Lychakiv District Court, Lviv
Note: Sarhosh’s great-grandfather, grandfather and father were all imprisoned for their faith.


11) Mykhailo Yuriyovych Savochka
Pentecostal
Criminal Code Article 336
Trial: Vasylkiv District Court, Kyiv Region, next hearing due 13 August 2026

12) Vadim Mikhaylovych Yedinak (born 1998)
Council of Churches Baptist
Criminal Code Article 336
Trial: Liubar District Court, Zhytomyr Region, next hearing due 8 September 2026
Conscientious objectors in pre-trial detention

1) Tiberii Tiberiiovych Boiok, 42
Jehovah’s Witness
Lviv Penitentiary Institution No. 19
Investigation under Criminal Code Article (alleged military crime)
Ordered held in pre-trial detention: 1 May 2026, a court in Lviv Region

2) Mykhailo Anatoliyovych Diavoliuk, 46
Jehovah’s Witness
Lviv Penitentiary Institution No. 19
Investigation under Criminal Code Article (alleged military crime)
Ordered held in pre-trial detention: 20 April 2026, Zaliznychnyi District Court, Lviv City

3) Denys Myroslavovych Havranyk, 28
Jehovah’s Witness
Zakarpatska Penitentiary Institution No. 9
Investigation under Criminal Code Article (alleged military crime)
Ordered held in pre-trial detention: 8 May 2026, a court in Zakarpattia Region

4) Oleksii Eduardovych Holoviatynski, 49
Jehovah’s Witness
Lviv Penitentiary Institution No. 19
Investigation under Criminal Code Article (alleged military crime)
Ordered held in pre-trial detention: 8 April 2026, Lychakiv District Court, Lviv City


5) Yurii Hordynskyi
Jehovah’s Witness
Detention Centre
Investigation under Criminal Code Article (alleged military crime)
Ordered held in pre-trial detention: September/October 2025, for at least two months.

6) Mykhailo Mykhailovych Hoshiy, 49
Jehovah’s Witness
Zakarpatska Penitentiary Institution No. 9
Investigation under Criminal Code Article (alleged military crime)
Ordered held in pre-trial detention: 3 June 2026, a court in Zakarpattia Region

7) Mykola Fedorovych Ivanskyi, 55
Jehovah’s Witness
Dnipro Penitentiary Institution No. 4
Investigation under Criminal Code Article (alleged military crime)
Ordered held in pre-trial detention: September/October 2025, for at least two months.

8) Ruslan Khramtsov, 39
Jehovah’s Witness
Ordered held in pre-trial detention: 2 March 2026, Lychakiv District Court, Lviv City

9) Oleksandr Petrovych Kovtun, 47
Jehovah’s Witness
Khmelnytskyi Detention Centre
Investigation under Criminal Code Article 336
Ordered held in pre-trial detention:

10) Ihor Mykolaiovych Melnychenko, 35
Jehovah’s Witness
Rivne Detention Centre
Investigation under Criminal Code Article (alleged military crime)
Ordered held in pre-trial detention: 9 February 2026, officials extended pretrial detention.

11) Artur Leonidovych Miroshkin, 30
Jehovah’s Witness
Lviv Penitentiary Institution No. 19
Investigation under Criminal Code Article (alleged military crime)
Ordered held in pre-trial detention: 5 May 2026, a court in Lviv Region extended pretrial detention


12) Serhii Mykhailovych Myinov, 48
Jehovah’s Witness
Izmail Detention Centre, Odesa Region
Investigation under Criminal Code Article (alleged military crime)
Ordered held in pre-trial detention: 25 February 2026, Peresypskyi District Court, Odesa City

13) Vitalii Volodymyrovych Nedzelenko, 46
Jehovah’s Witness
Lviv Penitentiary Institution No. 19
Investigation under Criminal Code Article (alleged military crime)
Ordered held in pre-trial detention: September/October 2025, for at least two months.

14) Kostiantyn Anatoliiovych Perevozenko, 42
Jehovah’s Witness
Lviv Penitentiary Institution No. 19
Investigation under Criminal Code Article (alleged military crime)
Ordered held in pre-trial detention: 7 April 2026, Lychakiv District Court, Lviv City

15) Bohdan Denysovych Rohov, 25
Jehovah’s Witness
Zakarpatska Penitentiary Institution No. 9
Investigation under Criminal Code Article (alleged military crime)
Ordered held in pre-trial detention: 8 May 2026, Vynohradiv District Court, Zakarpattia Region

16) Oleksii Volodymyrovych Rudov, 40
Jehovah’s Witness
Rivne Detention Centre
Investigation under Criminal Code Article 407, Part 5
Ordered held in pre-trial detention: 22 October 2025, Rivne City Court, since extended by Kostopil District Court, Rivne Region

17) Oleksii Oleksandrovych Sushko
Jehovah’s Witness
Investigation under Criminal Code Article 336
Shevchenko District Court, Lviv

18) Liubomyr Vasyliovych Tomchuk, 47
Jehovah’s Witness
Lviv Penitentiary Institution No. 19
Investigation under Criminal Code Article (alleged military crime)
Ordered held in pre-trial detention: 28 May 2026, court in Lviv Region


19) Bohdan Illich Turushev, 30
Jehovah’s Witness
Zakarpatska Penitentiary Institution No. 9
Investigation under Criminal Code Article (alleged military crime)
Ordered held in pre-trial detention: 3 June 2026, a court in Zakarpattia Region

20) Artem Serhiiovych Voroniuk, 28
Jehovah’s Witness
Izmail Detention Centre, Odesa Region
Investigation under Criminal Code Article (alleged military crime)
Ordered held in pre-trial detention: 23 May 2026, a court in Odesa Region

21) Ivan Fedorovych Zorivchak (born 21 June 1969)
Baptist
Investigation under Criminal Code Article 407, Part 5
Ordered held in pre-trial detention: 6 March 2026, Uzhhorod City District Court, Zakarpattia Region
Released on bail 10 March 2026
Prosecutor challenging acquittal

1) Oleksii Oleksandrovych Belikov
Baptist
Criminal Code Article 336
Acquitted: 19 March 2025, Kyiv District Court, Kharkiv Region
Prosecutor’s Appeal: Kharkiv Appeal Court, next hearing 16 July 2026

2) Serhii Oleksandrovych Tatarov
Jehovah’s Witness
Criminal Code Article 336
Acquitted: 12 January 2025, Boryspil Inter-District Court, Kyiv Region
Prosecutor’s Appeal: Kyiv Region Appeal Court, pending
Conscientious objectors held against their will on military bases

(All these listed here are Council of Churches Baptists. Many other conscientious objectors are also held on military bases.)
1) Ihor Pavlovych Alyokhyn (born 30 March 1978)


2) Mykola Mykolayovych Arkhyptsov (born 13 April 1977)

3) Serhii Anatolyovych Arshava (born 1973)

4) Volodymyr Vasilyovych Bula (born 1977)

5) Serhii Bulai

6) Vasyl Stanyslavovych Bugayev (born 1974)

7) Arkadii Anatolyovych Bondarenko (born 1 January 1967)

8) Pavlo Valeryovych Butmerchuk (born 21 April 1995)

9) Mykhailo Drozdov (born 11 October 1996)

10) David Volodymyrovych Harbovskyi (born 23 October 1997)

11) Oleksandr Hariachykh (born 1980)

12) Ruslan Leonydovych Hasiuk (born 18 August 1973)

13) Ihor Mykolayovych Hodunko (born 1971)

14) Oleksandr Vitalyovych Homon (born 11 July 1992

15) Illya Anatolyovych Hordeyev (born 21 October 1992)

16) Tymofyi Oleksandrovych Husak (born 7 November 1997)

17) Yehor Anatolyovych Iseyev (born 1995)

18) Ruslan Mykolayovych Ishchenko (born 1971)

19) Oleh Viktorovych Kachur (born 1997)

20) Volodymyr Viktorovych Kamenskykh (born 1976)

21) Myroslav Vasilovych Kaniuk, (born 1974)

22) Volodymyr Oleksandrovych Kanunnykov (born 21 September 1982)

23) Vyacheslav Leonydovych Kharenko (born 9 January 2001)

24) Ruslan Yakovych Kliuchnyk (born 1974)


25) Volodymyr Stepanovych Koshkolda (born 1973)

26) Yosyp Mykolayovych Kravchenko (born 11 August 1997)

27) Oleksandr Volodymyrovych Kuchynskyi (born 5 January 1981)

28) Yuryi Lomakovych (born 22 March 1997)

29) Dmytro Lysyk (born 22 September 1987)

30) Serhyi Volodymyrovych Mandziuk (born 16 May 1971)

31) Dmytro Mantulenko (born 5 June 1973)

32) Andryi Mikhaylovych Margita (born 30 July 2000)

33) Yuryi Ivanovych Matvyichuk (born 23 December 1967)

34) Mykola Olehovych Mysnyk (born 24 August 1988)

35) Dmytro Vasilyovych Nazarchuk (born 1997)

36) Pavlo Vasilyovych Nazarchuk (born 13 June 1995)

37) Nazar Vasilyovych Panasenko (born 16 November 1995)

38) Anatolyi Olehovych Pasychnik (born 1 May 1972)

39) Serhyi Borysovych Pavlik (born 11 November 1972)

40) Petro Valeryanovych Prysiazhniuk (born 9 November 1998)

41) Oleksandr Mykhailovych Redkostin (born 1973)

42) Matvyi Viktorovych Sapozhnikov (born 1995)

43) Oleh Oleksandrovych Shcherbyna (born 13 July 1993)

44) Petro Yaroslavovych Shkraba (born 7 June 1974)

45) Mykyta Oleksandrovych Soldatkin (born 1988)

46) Andryi Vasilyovych Sytarchuk (born 8 March 1991)

47) Volodymyr Vasilyovych Taratuta (born 13 January 1996)


48) Oleksandr Dmytrovych Vasianovych (born 27 June 1970)

49) Viktor Andryiovych Vasylyvetskyi (born 22 March 1968)

50) Vadym Vasilyovych Yatsyuk (born 29 September 1978)


About F18News
Forum 18 believes that religious freedom is a fundamental human right, which is essential for the dignity of humanity and for true freedom.
View all posts by F18News →