April 8, 2026
By Paul Goble
Russian anger over President Vladimir Putin’s moves against the internet is growing and spreading even to groups long thought to be his most loyal supporters (The Moscow Times; Kavkaz Realii; Vazhnye Istorii, April 3; see EDM, April 6). Russian commentators are pointing to other mistakes the Kremlin leader has been making, and polls show that his approval rating is falling to the lowest level since before he launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine (The Moscow Times; Agentstvo; Radio Svoboda, April 3). He now faces a buildup of negativity that one Russian sociologist calls “a perfect storm” (Echo, April 5).
There are even signs—and this is surely more important in the Russian system—that opposition to Putin’s policies is spreading within Russian elites, increasing the likelihood that they will coalesce into groups that will seek and perhaps even succeed in blocking Kremlin policies that they do not approve of (Agentstvo, April 4).
None of this, to be sure, means Putin is about to be overthrown—all of it could lead him, as it has in the past when he felt at all cornered, to take even more repressive and aggressive steps. This combination of factors, however, does suggest that he will no longer be able to act as if opposition is irrelevant and will likely have to devote more time to rebuilding his authority among elites and in the population than he has in recent times.
Putin’s moves against the internet are increasingly unpopular because they have affected the lives of so many Russians, including members of the elite in government, the military, and business, who have grown accustomed to using various internet channels (see EDM, April 2;Agentstvo, April 4).
Recent polls show that support for and trust in the Kremlin leader have fallen to seven-year lows. The decline reflects anger over his internet policies, a flood of bad news at home and abroad in recent months, and signs that Putin does not intend to change course. This marks a shift from the past, when he often backed away from the more extreme aspects of his policies or sought to isolate unpopular ones by restricting their impact, as was the case with his war against Ukraine, where, instead of general mobilization, he relied on huge bonuses to encourage enlistment (see EDM, September 11, 23, October 9, 21,November 5, 2025, February 12, March 2).
That policy, however, is also failing. In 2022, only 15 percent of Russians had a close relative in the war. Now more than twice that share do (Echo, April 5). Russian analysts argue that popular anger over Putin’s moves against the internet is compounded by other concerns, including the lack of progress in Ukraine toward either victory or peace, failures in Venezuela and Iran, and deteriorating economic and social conditions at home (The Moscow Times, April 3).
Putin has responded to protests about the internet in two ways—repression and silence. He has ordered widespread arrests and detentions of those who have taken to the streets to protest his actions. He has not spoken out about the internet restrictions or any of these other problems in recent times, reducing his public appearances in the last quarter by a significant amount compared to a year ago (see EDM, April 6). The Kremlin leader may assume that repression is enough, but his failure to address various issues may result in an even larger problem, analysts say, as it contributes to the sense that he is out of touch (The Moscow Times, April 3).
The Kremlin leader may not care very much about popular opposition to his internet policies. He still has reliable security forces to control the situation, and his popularity ratings are above 60 percent in polls released by his regime (Echo, April 5). Putin certainly has reason to worry about the appearance of opposition to his internet policies among members of his elite, especially technocratic groups that favor development over tighter control. Ever more members of these groups have been speaking out, contributing to the sense, not only among other elite groups but also in the Russian population, that splits are developing in the Kremlin. This perception encourages others to resist, in the hope of tipping the political balance away from Putin and toward those who share their views (Echo, April 5). [1]
The question now is how far this process, involving the alienation of the Russian population and of Russian elites beyond the super-loyalist siloviki segment, will go. Russian commentator Sergey Shelin suggests that Putin has been committing more mistakes and angering more ordinary people and members of the elites than at any time since he began his expanded war against Ukraine. While the situation has not yet reached a critical level and, as a result, Putin may be able to ride out this storm, it will come with increased difficulty, especially if he does not return to the tactics he used in earlier crises his regime has faced (The Moscow Times, April 3).
In six earlier crises since Putin became president, Shelin says, the Kremlin leader not only took public positions to seize the propagandistic high ground but also modified his policies. This signaled that he was paying attention to the population and would avoid angering it more than he felt necessary. Now Putin is doing neither, however, appearing in public far less frequently and showing no signs of being willing to modify his original decisions. This increasingly sclerotic approach has come to a head over the last three months, as the Kremlin has suffered a series of policy defeats abroad amid a rising tide of problems at home. Dictators fail when the number of problems grows too large for them to handle. Such rulers, however, risk serious problems if they do not show themselves responding to crises and act as if they are not required to (The Moscow Times, April 3).
That is where the Putin dictatorship now stands. The number of problems is growing, although likely not yet to the point where they alone will be enough to bring the Kremlin leader down, Shelin suggests. Putin’s failure to react now is undermining his rule, perhaps not enough to lead to his ouster in the immediate future but likely reducing the number of additional crises that could prove sufficient to produce that outcome.
[1] For a detailed, heavily footnoted survey of who among the Russian elites has spoken out on Putin’s moves against the internet, see, in particular, the compilation at Agentstvo, April 4.
This article was published at The Jamestown Foundation
Paul Goble
Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .
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