Study Quantifies Lake CO₂ Emissions And Their Rising Trend In China

Researchers conducting in situ measurements of lake CO2 fluxes in Poyang Lake, China CREDIT: QI Huang


April 23, 2026 
By Eurasia Review


Lakes are often described as “hotspots” in the global carbon cycle, yet quantifying their “breath”—the exchange of carbon dioxide (CO2) between water and the atmosphere—has long been notoriously difficult due to extreme variability across time and space and a shortage of long-term, high-resolution observational data. As a result, they have remained a “missing piece” in regional carbon accounting.

To address this gap, a research team led by Profs. HUANG Jiacong and GAO Junfeng from the Nanjing Institute of Geography and Limnology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, together with collaborators from the Institute of Mountain Hazards and Environment and Jiangxi Normal University, has developed a novel high-resolution machine learning model based on a comprehensive national dataset, enabling high-precision prediction and spatial mapping of CO2 emissions from China’s lakes.

The findings were published in Science Advances.

The study estimates a substantial CO2 emission flux of 11.97 Tg C yr-1 from China’s lakes, offsetting roughly 12% of the nation’s total wetland carbon sink. While small lakes (<10 km2) exhibit higher emission intensities per unit area (0.29 g C m-2 d-1), large lakes (>50 km2) act as the dominant emission source, contributing 62% of the national total, with strong regional variability ranging from 33% to 79%.

Notably, the study quantifies how lake expansion has affected CO2 emissions between 2000 and 2021. Over this period, annual CO2 emissions from China’s lakes rose from 11.25 Tg C to 13.94 Tg C—a 24% increase. This upward trend accelerated after 2010 and is closely associated with sustained lake area expansion, which has ranged from 71 to 462 km2 per year across regions.

The researchers further investigated how extreme climatic events influence lake CO2 emissions. Both extreme heatwaves and intense rainfall events were found to trigger sharp increases in CO2 fluxes, by up to 48% in some regions. With climate change increasing the frequency and severity of such extremes, lake CO2 emissions are projected to continue rising.

“This study underscores the value of high-resolution modeling and long-term observations for carbon accounting at regional and national scales,” said Prof. HUANG, corresponding author of the study. “Our findings highlight an urgent need for sustained, high-resolution monitoring to refine lake carbon budgets and inform more effective climate mitigation policies.”

ALASKA

Arctic Oil And Gas Exploitation Overlaps Heavily With Indigenous Lands, Sensitive Ecosystems, And Key Wildlife Habitats

File photo of the trans-Alaska pipeline and Dalton Highway are seen on July 4, 2014, in the Brooks Range area near the pipeline's Pump Station 4, about 270 miles south of Prudhoe Bay. 

(Photo by Bob Wick/U.S. Bureau of Land Management)


April 23, 2026 
By Eurasia Review


Arctic fossil fuel development shows significant overlaps with Indigenous communities and ecologically sensitive areas, which might support calls from some scientists to keep Arctic fossil fuels in the ground, according to a study published in the open-access journal PLOS One by Daniele Codato of the University of Padova, Italy and colleagues.

The Arctic is a frontline for fossil fuel development and climate change impact, long portrayed as a region with abundant undiscovered oil and gas resources, while warming at a rate nearly four times higher than the global average. Reducing these impacts requires a thorough assessment of these factors and their relationship to local human and wildlife communities, and ecosystems. In this study, researchers compiled information from a variety of open access databases to create the first atlas of Arctic oil and gas.

The data reveals over 512,000 square kilometers of exploited Arctic territory, an area roughly equivalent to Spain or Thailand. Over 7% of this area overlaps with ecologically protected regions, and over 13% overlaps with the ranges of all three key Arctic species considered in the study: polar bears, yellow-billed loons, and caribou. Furthermore, approximately 73% of the exploited territory overlaps with Indigenous Peoples’ Lands. These overlaps highlight numerous areas of potential ecological disruption and social tension, particularly in heavily-exploited regions such as the North Slope of Alaska and the Yamal Peninsula of Russia.

The authors suggest that this data makes a strong case in favor of recent proposals to declare the Arctic a Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Zone, and for future decisions about Arctic fossil fuel extraction to focus on the inclusion of Indigenous perspectives and the safeguarding of regional ecosystems. The authors also note that future studies should include more fine-grained scale data and analyses about regions of concern such as Alberta and Alaska, as well as data on species of specific importance to Indigenous livelihoods.

The authors add: “Our atlas reveals the sheer scale of Arctic oil and gas development: over 500,000 square kilometers are already covered by licenses—an area comparable to Spain. We identified more than 44,000 wells, nearly 40,000 kilometers of pipelines, and almost 2 million kilometers of seismic lines across the Arctic. Moreover, over 73% of Arctic oil and gas concessions overlap with Indigenous Peoples’ lands, raising critical questions about spatial justice and governance.”

“Identifying where oil and gas extraction overlaps with ecological and cultural priorities helps define not only ‘when’, but also ‘where’ fossil fuels should remain underground. If climate goals are to be met, the Arctic may be one of the regions where fossil fuels should remain in the ground. The Arctic Atlas provides new spatial evidence that strengthens the case for an Arctic fossil fuel non-proliferation zone.”

“A recurring challenge in our research is the lack of accessible and integrated data on the oil and gas industry. In the Arctic, information on oil and gas is highly fragmented, so one of our main goals was to systematize these scattered sources into a single open tool that can support future research and decision-making.”

Wildfire-Driven Deforestation Rates In California Among Highest In World

April 23, 2026
By Eurasia Review


California has one of the highest rates of wildfire-driven deforestation in the world, and the trend has accelerated over the past three decades, according to a study from the University of California, Davis.

The study, published in the journal Frontiers in Forests and Global Change, assessed the state’s wildfire-driven deforestation rates and reforestation needs between 1991 and 2023. It found that deforestation in California’s conifer-dominated forests increased exponentially over the study period, taking place primarily on USDA Forest Service and private lands. Meanwhile, reforestation efforts are not keeping pace with the losses.

Reforestation needs were minimal in the early 1990s, rose sharply in the early 2000s and surged after 2020. During that time, California lost between 6% and 11% of its conifer forests. Multiple big-fire years caused deforestation rates to rise to between 0.25% and 0.47% per year between 2001 and 2023. That is substantially higher than the global average of 0.15% per year.

“Those rates are right up there with the world’s leaders in fire-driven forest loss, like Russia, Portugal, Greece, Bolivia and even Canada,” said senior author Hugh Safford, a forest and fire ecologist with the UC Davis Environmental Science and Policy department. “In the case of California, the rate is also accelerating rapidly. A couple more big-fire years like 2020 or 2021, and we could be looking at large-scale loss of conifer forests over wide swaths of the state.”

Estimating forest loss and growth

For the study, scientists combined remotely sensed fire severity data with a tool called POSCRPT (Postfire Spatial Conifer Regeneration Prediction Tool) that was developed by UC Davis, UC Berkeley and the Forest Service. They were able to estimate how much forest was actually lost by incorporating both tree mortality and projected five-year postfire seedling densities.

Forest restoration needs were assessed under scenarios of moderate, high and acute priority. Moderate scenarios incorporated only a tree mortality measure, while the other scenarios incorporated both tree mortality and the probability that seedlings will regenerate.

The team found that on Forest Service lands only about 8% of high-priority areas and less than 3% of acute-priority areas were reforested during the entire study period. Between 2016 and 2023, only about 1% of deforested Forest Service lands were replanted. In contrast, on private industrial timberlands, more than 90% of severely burned lands were replanted.

Fire-driven reforestation needs

The state’s greatest reforestation needs are in Sierra Nevada mixed conifer forests and Northern California Douglas-fir forests, especially areas hit by the massive 2020 and 2021 wildfires: the northern Inner Coast Ranges, the northern Sierra Nevada–southern Cascades, and the southwestern Sierra Nevada.

While middle-elevation forests experienced the greatest losses, high-elevation forests showed the fastest increases in deforestation.

The paper noted that federal budgets and staffing for reforestation have been dropping for decades, even as drought, wildfire and pest outbreaks increase. This is in contrast to Canada, where similar trends have led to increases in budgets for reforestation science and management. Without sustained, substantial intervention, current restoration efforts will not be enough to prevent the long-term transformation of California’s forest ecosystems.

“California has much more fire-driven forest loss than people understand,” Safford said. “It’s high even by international standards. It’s happening more in high-elevation, climate-sensitive areas that protect our watersheds, and there’s almost nothing being done about it. If commensurate actions aren’t taken soon, we’re going to lose huge areas of conifer forest and the ecosystem services those forests provide.”

Georgian Government Gets US President’s Attention With Tbilisi Tower Deal

April 23, 2026 
By Eurasianet

(Eurasianet) — The Trump Administration has largely ignored the Republic of Georgia diplomatically since returning to power in January 2025. The Trump Organization is another story.

The Trump Organization, the family real estate firm, has announced plans to build a 70-storey Trump Tower in the Georgian capital Tbilisi. It would be the tallest building not just in the country, but in the entire Caucasus region.

Critics describe the Trump Tower idea as a cynical ploy by Georgian Dream officials to get the US president’s attention at a time when they face potential sanctions from the United States and European Union over the government’s rapid embrace of authoritarian practicesand pro-Russian policies. Georgia also faces the prospect of being economically bypassed by TRIPP, or the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, a planned trade link involving Armenia and Azerbaijan that is envisioned as a key transport node in the Middle Corridor trade network connecting Central Asia and Europe.

The Tbilisi tower project will be a joint venture involving four Georgian firms, Archi Group, Biograpi Living, Blox Group, and Finvest Georgia, alongside the US-based Sapir Organization, a longtime Trump partner.

Archi Group’s founder, businessman Ilia Tsulaia, previously served as an MP for the Georgian Dream party, while Biograpi Living is part of the Wissol Group, owned by the Pkhakadze brothers, who have faced repeated scrutiny over their support for the government.

Georgian Dream leaders have trumpeted the project as a vote of confidence in Georgia’s economy and governance. The speaker of Georgia’s rubber-stamp parliament, Shalva Papuashvili, said that “when Trump’s company enters Georgia under its own brand, it means it has a strong understanding of the existing environment. Naturally, Trump and his company are careful to protect the reputation they have built.”

Critics see it very differently. Roman Gotsiridze, a former head of the National Bank and MP, called the project politically motivated. “This is Bidzina Ivanishvili’s attempt to bribe Trump… a sanctioned Ivanishvili is looking for ways to save himself,” he said, referring to the Georgian Dream party’s founder and funder.

“Using businessmen he [Ivanishvili] has backed, he has created a consortium in which, of course, the largest share will indirectly be Ivanishvili’s money, and with this idea they are approaching Trump,” Gotsiridze added.

An April 18 report by The Wall Street Journal described the Tbilisi project as “another example of how the Trump family firm has changed its approach to overseas business during the second Trump administration,” adding that “critics say that such overseas ventures raise potential conflicts of interest.”

Eric Trump, president’s son and executive vice president of the company, said the development would bring the firm’s “globally recognized standard of excellence” to Georgia.

This is not Trump’s first attempt to plant a flag in Georgia. In 2012, with the encouragement of then-president Mikheil Saakashvili, the Trump Organization announced plans for a development in the Black Sea resort city of Batumi. After years of relative inactivity, the organization backed out in 2017, after Trump gained the White House for the first time.

The Batumi project was subsequently taken over by the Georgian Co-Investment Fund, backed by Ivanishvili, and rebranded as the Silk Tower. It is expected to be completed by the end of the decade.

At the time, Ivanishvili, who then as now viewed Saakashvili as his arch-political enemy, derided the Batumi project. “Trump has made no investment in Georgia … they used it, both of them [Saakashvili and Trump] pulled off a clever trick,” he said in 2012. “They paid Trump money, and Saakashvili, as a master of deception, took advantage of it.”

The new tower is planned for Tbilisi’s central Saburtalo district, on land that, according to Georgian Business Media, is still officially owned by the Cartu Foundation, which belongs to Ivanishvili.

Over the past year, the Trump administration has largely continued its predecessor’s approach, freezing out Georgian Dream over its authoritarian drift. When Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke with Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze on March 30, their first ever call, the ruling party rushed to frame it as a breakthrough. US Congressman Joe Wilson, Georgia’s most vociferous critic in the US Congress, told RFE/RL it was no “reset,” and that both Rubio and Trump “want only the best for the people of Georgia, which clearly means fair and free elections.”

Malaria Shaped Distribution Of Early Human Populations

April 23, 2026 
By Eurasia Review


Increasing evidence suggests that our species emerged through interactions between populations living in different parts of Africa, rather than from a single birthplace. Until now, however, most explanations for how those populations were distributed across the continent have focused on climate alone. The new research shows that disease—specifically malaria—also played a crucial role.

In a paper published this week in Science Advances, researchers from the Max Planck Institute of Geoanthropology, the University of Cambridge, and colleagues investigated whether Plasmodium falciparum induced malaria shaped human habitat choice between 74,000 and 5,000 years ago, the critical period before humans dispersed widely beyond Africa and before agriculture dramatically altered malaria transmission.

The study shows that malaria, one of humanity’s oldest and most persistent pathogens, influenced habitat choice by pushing human groups away from high-risk environments and separating populations across the landscape. Over tens of thousands of years, this fragmentation shaped how populations met, mixed, and exchanged genes, helping create the population structure seen in humans today. The findings suggest that infectious disease was not simply a challenge early humans faced: it was a fundamental factor shaping the deep history of our species.

“We used species distribution models of three major mosquito complexes together with palaeoclimate models,” explains lead author Dr Margherita Colucci of the Max Planck Institute of Geoanthropology and the University of Cambridge. “Combining these with epidemiological data allowed us to estimate malaria transmission risk across sub-Saharan Africa.”

The researchers then compared these estimates with an independent reconstruction of the human ecological niche across the same region and time period. The results show that humans strongly avoided, or were unable to persist, in areas with high malaria transmission risk.


“The effects of these choices shaped human demography for the last 74,000 years, and likely much earlier,” says Professor Andrea Manica of the University of Cambridge, one of the senior authors of the study. “By fragmenting human societies across the landscape, malaria contributed to the population structure we see today. Climate and physical barriers were not the only forces shaping where human populations could live.”

“This study opens up new frontiers in research on human evolution,” adds Professor Eleanor Scerri of the Max Planck Institute of Geoanthropology, also senior author of the study. “Disease has rarely been considered a major factor shaping the earliest prehistory of our species, and without ancient DNA from these periods it has been difficult to test. Our research changes that narrative and provides a new framework for exploring the role of disease in deep human history.”

The Iran War Is Breaking The Wrong Economies – Analysis

April 23, 2026
By Deepak Kumar


Wars are usually judged by who wins and who loses on the battlefield. The Iran War is not. The conflict surrounding Iran is producing a different kind of outcome. Its most significant effects are not confined to the countries fighting it. They are moving outward across markets, infrastructure and societies, reaching states that neither shape the conflict nor can control it.

The result is a war in which the heaviest economic consequences are being absorbed by those with the least influence over how it ends. That is not an unintended side effect. It reflects how modern conflict now interacts with an interconnected global system.

A war that moves through systems

The violence of the war may be concentrated in the Gulf, but the disruption is not. Pressure around the Strait of Hormuz, which carries a substantial share of global oil and liquefied natural gas, is already translating into broader instability. Insurance premiums for shipping have surged. Tanker routes have been adjusted or delayed. Even limited disruptions have forced rerouting through longer and more expensive corridors. Energy markets have responded with volatility that reflects not only current supply risks, but uncertainty about how far escalation could extend.

These effects are not linear. They move through the same channels that sustain the global economy. Energy flows, maritime logistics, financial markets and supply chains react simultaneously, but unevenly. A disruption at one point in the system propagates outward, reshaping conditions elsewhere.

The Gulf states are encountering the first layer of this pressure. Infrastructure, once treated as secure, is now exposed. Oil facilities, ports and shipping terminals are at increasing risk. More critically, desalination plants, which provide the majority of potable water in several Gulf countries, have emerged as potential vulnerabilities. Any sustained disruption to these systems would not only affect economic output but also the basic functioning of daily life.

These states are not directing the war, but they cannot distance themselves from it. Their exposure is structural, rooted in geography and infrastructure. Beyond the Gulf, the effects become less visible but more complex.

South and Southeast Asia are absorbing the next layer of impact. Countries such as India, which rely heavily on imported energy, are particularly sensitive to even modest price increases. Currency pressure intensifies as import costs rise; inflation begins to move; governments face difficult trade-offs between stabilizing prices and maintaining fiscal discipline. These pressures do not appear all at once; they build gradually, often unnoticed at first.

Recent movements in global oil prices have already begun to translate into higher domestic costs across several Asian economies. Airlines face rising fuel expenses, manufacturing sectors dependent on energy inputs adjust output and households encounter rising costs that are not immediately traceable to the conflict, but are directly linked to it.

There is also a human dimension that remains largely overlooked. Millions of migrant workers from South Asia are employed across the Gulf. Their income supports families and local economies back home. As uncertainty increases, their position becomes more precarious. Flight routes are disrupted; insurance premiums increase; mobility becomes more constrained at the very moment when flexibility is most needed. They are not participants in the conflict. Yet they are embedded within its consequences.

Further east, the constraints tighten. Japan and South Korea sit at the far end of the same energy chain, but with far less flexibility. Their dependence on Middle Eastern energy imports is not marginal; it is structural. A significant portion of their oil imports passes through the same contested maritime routes. When supply tightens, they are forced into competition for alternative sources, often at higher cost.

This has immediate effects: Industrial output begins to slow, petrochemical production adjusts, and financial markets react to uncertainty in input costs and output expectations. What begins as an energy shock extends into industrial and financial systems. The war is not expanding geographically in the traditional sense; it is expanding through systems.
The economies that carry the burden

The most consequential aspect of this dynamic is not simply the scale of disruption, but its distribution. The countries bearing the greatest economic pressure are not those setting the conflict’s trajectory. They are not determining strategy or shaping escalation. Yet their economies, infrastructure and populations are directly exposed to the consequences.

 What emerges from this is a structural imbalance that is difficult to correct.

The US, despite its central role, is relatively insulated from the immediate energy shock. As a major energy producer, it experiences price fluctuations differently. Domestic pressure exists, but it does not threaten systemic stability in the same way. Iran, for its part, is already operating under long-term economic constraints. Additional pressure intensifies existing challenges, but does not fundamentally alter the conditions under which it operates. Israel’s exposure is primarily security-driven, rather than rooted in systemic economic vulnerability of the same kind.

The most severe pressures are concentrated elsewhere. They are felt most acutely in economies that are deeply integrated into global systems, but lack the capacity to shape them. This is where the situation becomes more complex than it initially appears.

If energy prices continue to rise, governments across affected regions will be forced to respond. Subsidies may be expanded; strategic reserves may be drawn down; emergency fiscal measures may be introduced to stabilize domestic conditions. These responses are not cost-free; they shift pressure into financial systems.

Several large Asian economies hold substantial foreign-currency reserves, including US treasuries. In periods of sustained stress, the liquidation of such assets can serve as a tool for maintaining domestic stability. If undertaken at scale, these actions would transmit pressure into global financial markets, affecting borrowing costs, liquidity and investment conditions.

A regional conflict begins to generate global financial consequences. At that point, the distinction between participant and observer begins to weaken.

A system that redistributes risk

What is unfolding is not simply economic disruption. It is a redistribution of risk across an interconnected system. Energy markets are beginning to fragment, as different regions experience different price pressures and supply constraints. Supply chains are adjusting, but not uniformly. Some states are able to absorb shocks through reserves and diversification. Others face more immediate constraints. The longer the conflict persists, the more these differences widen.

Recent developments suggest that even limited escalation can have disproportionate effects. Temporary disruptions to shipping routes have already extended delivery times and increased costs. Insurance markets have adjusted faster than physical supply, amplifying the economic impact. Financial markets are reacting not only to current conditions, but to the possibility of further escalation.

Over time, this begins to resemble a feedback loop. Uncertainty drives cost. Cost drives policy response. Policy response introduces new distortions. The system does not stabilize quickly. It adjusts, but unevenly and often with delay. This is not a temporary disturbance that will dissipate once the conflict slows. It reflects a deeper shift in how war interacts with global systems. Conflict is no longer contained by geography. It is transmitted through connectivity.

The wrong economies

The countries most exposed to the economic consequences are not the ones making strategic decisions or defining objectives. Yet they are the ones managing inflation, stabilizing currencies, protecting supply chains and absorbing social pressure. They carry the cost without controlling the cause. This is increasingly how modern conflict operates. Power is exercised in one place. Consequences are distributed across many. The further a country is from the center of decision-making, the more likely it is to experience the conflict as an external shock rather than a controllable process. And the longer the war continues, the more entrenched this pattern becomes.

Wars are still fought between states, but their effects are no longer confined to them. They move through the systems that connect economies, societies and markets. And in that movement, the burden does not fall where power is concentrated; it falls where exposure is greatest. That is why this war is not just reshaping the balance of power; it is reshaping the distribution of vulnerability. And in doing so, it is placing the heaviest burden on the economies least able to shape the outcome.

This article was published by Fair Observer

Deepak Kumar is a geopolitical analyst focusing on power transitions, deterrence theory, and strategic competition in the 21st century.

 

Half of Argentina's children still poor as austerity bites

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By bnl editorial staff April 23, 2026

More than half of children and adolescents in Argentina were living in poverty in 2025, with nearly a third going without adequate food, according to a report by the Catholic University of Argentina (UCA), underscoring the uneven social impact of President Javier Milei's austerity-driven economic overhaul.

The study found that child poverty stood at 53.6% last year, down from 59.7% in 2024, while extreme poverty affected 10.7% of minors, based on data from the Argentine Social Debt Survey.

Despite the decline, which coincided with a broader macroeconomic stabilisation under Milei's belt-tightening programme, the report cautioned against interpreting the figures as a lasting improvement. "We must not confuse a temporary improvement with the solution to a structural problem," the UCA said.

Milei took office in December 2023 promising radical economic reform by slashing public spending, eliminating the fiscal deficit and deregulating markets. These measures initially deepened Argentina's recession and sent inflation spiralling before a gradual stabilisation took hold. While dollar reserves improved and foreign investment began to recover under the libertarian government, the peso's effective depreciation and deep cuts to food, energy and transport subsidies fell hardest on low-income households, a distributional toll the UCA data suggest has not yet been reversed.

Using a multidimensional poverty index that includes access to food, housing, sanitation, healthcare, education and information, the report concluded that deprivation remains widespread. Food insecurity affected 28.8% of children and adolescents, including 13.2% facing severe conditions, above levels recorded for most of the previous decade.

The findings also pointed to record levels of distress-driven reliance on food assistance, reaching 64.8% of children. Coverage of the Universal Child Allowance, a flagship cash transfer scheme, reached 42.5% of minors in 2025, slightly below the previous year.

Healthcare access has also deteriorated, with nearly one in five minors failing to see a doctor or dentist at all in 2025 for financial reasons, a figure that rises to more than a quarter among teenagers. The obstacle is financial rather than logistical, the report's lead researcher Ianina Tuñón noted: even nominally free public healthcare carries indirect costs when parents must skip work to accompany their children. Dental care is the most acutely neglected area, with roughly one in six children lacking any access to a dentist, a neglect Tuñón said has lasting consequences for children's nutrition, self-esteem and overall wellbeing.

Mental health represents a further dimension of the crisis. More than one in six children between the ages of five and 17 showed signs of sadness or anxiety as perceived by their parents or guardians, rising to over a fifth among adolescents, with girls disproportionately affected. Children exhibiting such symptoms were nearly twice as likely to be assessed by their families as not learning effectively at school.

Educational quality also emerged as a concern, with nearly a third of children attending schools where teachers are frequently absent or classes regularly cancelled, a proportion that climbs to 44% among pupils from lower-income households and in the greater Buenos Aires area. One in ten children said they did not enjoy attending school, a figure that rose to more than one in six among adolescents from the poorest strata.

"These data reflect the persistence of structural deficits that condition children's development," the UCA concluded, noting that while conditions have improved compared with 2024, they remain above levels seen before Argentina's recent economic crises. The researchers argued that the country's obligations to its children extend well beyond income support, encompassing healthcare and education failings that are amenable to policy action regardless of fiscal conditions.

 

Renewables overtake coal in global electricity mix – Statista

Renewables have overtaken coal as a fuel for producing electricity. / bne IntelliNews

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By Tristan Gaudiaut for Statista April 23, 2026

Ten years after the Paris Agreement was opened for signature by member states at the UN Headquarters in New York on April 22, 2016, the global energy transition is beginning to reshape the electricity mix, Statista reports.

As data from Ember's Global Electricity Review 2026 shows, renewables have now overtaken coal as the world’s largest source of electricity generation. In 2025, renewables accounted for 33.8 percent of global power output, slightly ahead of coal at 33.0 percent — a symbolic milestone in the shift toward low‑carbon energy.

The trend reflects a steady but uneven rise of renewables over the past twenty‑five years, from less than 19 percent in 2000 to nearly 34 percent in 2025. Growth was relatively modest in the early 2000s, with the share hovering below 20 percent until 2010, then accelerating markedly over the past decade as wind and especially solar power expanded rapidly. In 2025, this momentum strengthened further, with the entire increase in global electricity demand met by clean energy sources. Solar power alone accounted for 75 percent of the net increase, adding 636 TWh of generation during the year.

Over the same period, the role of fossil fuels in electricity generation has followed a two-phase trajectory. Between 2000 and the mid-2010s, their combined share initially edged up, peaking at around 69 percent in 2012, as growing global demand was largely met by coal and gas. Since then, however, the trend has reversed. Coal’s share has seen the most pronounced decline, falling from about 41 percent at its peak to 33 percent in 2025, while gas and other fossil fuels have decreased more gradually from roughly 28 percent to 24.4 percent. Despite this progress, fossil fuels still account for a majority of global electricity generation (around 57 percent in 2025), highlighting the scale of the challenge ahead in meeting climate targets.

Nuclear energy, for its part, has seen a long-term decline in its share of global electricity generation, falling from around 16.6 percent in 2000 to 8.9 percent in 2025. Most of this drop occurred in the early 2000s and 2010s, as aging reactor fleets were retired and new construction lagged, particularly in Europe and Japan following the Fukushima disaster in 2011. Since then, the decline has been more gradual. Looking ahead, nuclear power is regaining attention as one of the few scalable, firm low‑carbon complements to renewables available today, with expansion plans in countries such as France, the United Kingdom and China, alongside U.S. support for plant lifetime extensions and next‑generation technologies.

India’s renewable surge hits critical mass as solar drives structural shift

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By IntelliNews April 21, 2026

In part because of the ongoing limited flow of LNG and oil coming out of the Strait of Hormuz, but more as a result of solid policy implementation India’s renewable energy sector has entered a phase of striking acceleration.

Much of this has been underpinned by falling technology costs and a hard fought push for energy security in which the pace of expansion over the past 12–18 months has been particularly notable. As a result, record capacity additions have appeared as has a broadening of activity across the solar and wind sectors in particular and associated emerging segments such as storage. In turn this has led to a structural shift in how the country generates electricity.

The headline numbers are at times jaw dropping when compared to other countries. India added in excess of 55GW of non-fossil fuel capacity in the recently finished 2025–26 financial year alone. This is the largest annual increase on record for India, taking total non-fossil capacity to an estimated 283GW. This comes on top of 44.5GW added in 2025, with solar accounting for the overwhelming majority of new installations. As such, the scale of green energy deployment has pushed renewables to more than half of all installed electricity capacity.

What distinguishes the current expansion, however, is the speed at which renewable output is now outpacing demand growth across the subcontinent. In 2025 alone, renewable energy generation in India rose by roughly 98 terawatt hours, more than double the increase in electricity consumption. This subsequently led to a decline in coal-fired output, in the process marking a significant turning point given that for the first time ever in the country, clean energy is not simply supplementing fossil fuels but is beginning to displace them at scale.

Across India, solar power is the undisputed engine of this transformation. A record 38GW of solar capacity was installed in 2025, a 54% increase on the previous year. This was followed by an even larger 44.6GW of additional capacity in FY2026. At present, total installed solar capacity has now exceeded 150GW, making India the world’s third-largest solar market.

Several factors explain solar’s dominance in India. Utility-scale projects continue to benefit from some of the lowest tariffs globally—roughly $29–$31 per megawatt hour—The Times of India reports, while government-backed auction schemes have ensured a steady pipeline of projects.

At the same time, distributed solar is expanding rapidly nationwide. Rooftop installations added nearly 9GW in FY2026 alone and this has been supported by subsidy programmes aimed at millions of households and small businesses.

Crucially though, India’s solar expansion is increasingly tied to industrial policy as New Delhi has made wide-ranging efforts to reduce its dependence on Chinese imports across the PV supply chain.

Yet, while China still leads globally in polysilicon, wafers and modules production, India has introduced numerous production-linked incentives and tariff barriers to encourage domestic manufacturing and use.

This has in turn seen a gradual localisation of module assembly and, increasingly, upstream components brought to bear in a move as much about energy security as economics.

Wind power too, long overshadowed by solar, is also experiencing a much needed revival. India added just over 6GW of wind capacity in FY2026, which while significantly lower than the numbers seen in solar added, is its strongest performance in several years. As a result, wind output rose by around 28% in 2025. Policy reforms and implementation, particularly around hybrid auctions combining solar and wind at the same site, have seen a rise in investor confidence in a sector that had fallen behind in recent years.

Similarly, hydropower, though more mature in its exploitation, has also contributed to the recent surge thanks to favourable monsoon conditions which has seen generation rise by about 14% as recently as 2025. And while large hydro projects remain limited by environmental and social considerations, the sector can play a balancing role given the intermittent solar and wind output.

Beyond the typical core generation technologies, two adjacent sectors are gaining momentum and are increasingly coming to the fore in India. The first, battery storage, although constrained in its existence, has seen storage capacity expanding rapidly, supported in large part by falling costs and policy incentives aimed at stabilising the country’s grid. Globally, battery deployment rose sharply in 2025, and India was no different as renewables penetration increases and storage facilities are needed to avoid power loss.

The second is grid infrastructure and transmission – another sector affected by the rapid addition of renewable capacity as bottlenecks in India’s power network have been exposed. This has led to increased investment at the state and national level on transmission corridors and digital grid management.

Taken together, these developments suggest that India’s energy transition is entering a more mature phase.

Because of this, the country has moved beyond the headline-making capacity targets and is now facing a more complex challenge in which integrating large volumes of variable renewable energy into a still coal-heavy system must be seen to work given that coal remains dominant, accounting for around 70% of generation, but its share is beginning to edge downwards as renewables scale up.

To this end, the broader economic implications are significant in that renewable energy is no longer just an environmental policy tool but is a central pillar of industrial strategy, investment and job creation. With nearly 100GW of capacity added in just two years and hundreds more gigawatts in the pipeline, India is leading South Asia as both a major market and an emerging manufacturing hub for clean energy technologies.

 

ISTANBUL BLOG: Message for the CHP. The number of jailed opposition mayors in Turkey has reached 24

At this week's routine CHP parliamentary group meeting, the audience rose to their feet in applause for more demonstrative drivel from party chair Ozgur Ozel. / CHP.org.trFacebook

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By Akin Nazli in Belgrade April 21, 2026

The number of jailed main opposition party mayors in Turkey reached 24 as of April 18, according to data compiled by Intellinews.

Official statistics covering the wide-scope operations are not available. (See statistics and lists compiled by this publication here).

It is not possible to follow up all developments as there are dozens of separate prosecutions and ongoing trials. Each day, more Republican People’s Party (CHP) members are detained, arrested, released or put on trial.

The sorely lacking CHP

The CHP itself does not provide statistics on the operations. As per usual with Turkey’s less-than-compelling biggest opposition party, it has no consistent policy response. A riposte that you might expect to be maintained against the entirety of the ruling regime’s operations is sorely lacking. Many mayors are detained without a squeak from CHP headquarters.

From time to time, Ozgur Ozel, head of the CHP, holds a press conference and yells before the assembled cameras to protest against the arrest of a mayor or the seizure of a municipality.

Unfortunately, he’s renowned for demonstrative drivel. No one takes what he says seriously. On April 18, Ozel declared US Ambassador to Ankara and Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack persona non grata for questioning whether democracy was the right fit for countries in the Middle East. As of April 21, there were no reports of Barrack bothering to reply or pondering whether he should vacate his post.

A serious opposition party that outlines achievable targets, focuses on realising those targets, insists on sticking to those targets and eventually achieves results has been missing in Turkey since 2002, the year in which the CHP was relegated to the status of main opposition party.

Ozel talks, Ozel forgets. He is a bankrupted former pharmacy shopkeeper. He does not project much potential. That’s actually the reason why Ozel is not in jail. The powers that be are only too pleased to let him perform the role of main opposition leader. He is pleasingly tolerable.

There again, the government does keep the possibility of a court trial hanging over his head. Should Ozel suddenly find his mojo and cause a sensation by becoming an actual threat to the government, his time at the helm of the CHP could be ended in a flash.

Real deal, real target Imamoglu

In October 2024, the judicial operations targeted at the CHP began with the arrest of Esenyurt mayor Ahmet Ozer, who was accused of terrorism. In November 2025, he was released.

Ekrem Imamoglu, the deposed mayor of Istanbul, Turkey’s largest city, has been in jail since March 19, 2025. He remains the presidential candidate of the CHP and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s chief political rival. He is entirely intolerable as in anything even resembling a fair fight he would very likely wipe the floor with Erdogan.

So far, Erdogan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) have taken over 19 municipalities held by the CHP.

When lead state prosecutor Akin Gurlek took over the justice minister post in February, operations with the CHP in their cross-hairs were boosted.

Criminal case hearings, in which state prosecutors allege that Imamoglu is the leader of an “octopus-like” gang that has spread its tentacles into corrupt activities in Istanbul Municipality and some other CHP municipalities, are currently being held at Silivri Prison.

On March 9, the first hearing of the Imamoglu trial was held. Court officials wrote in the trial papers that the target is to complete the trial within 4,600 days (13 years).

Ankara mayor Mansur Yavas, another CHP member, is, like Ozel, not in jail, though he is a subject of many investigations. Observers say he remains outside the prison system because he has kept a public distance from suggestions that he run for the presidential candidacy. As if!

 

Trump's blockade of Hormuz fails as dozens of tankers pass through - FT

Cargo tracking data contradicts Trump's claim of "tremendous success" as shadow fleet exploits enforcement gaps; USS Spruance fires on and seizes Iranian vessel in escalating standoff. / bne IntelliNewsFacebook

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By Ben Aris in Berlin April 23, 2026

The Trump administration naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz failed after at least 34 tankers with links to Iran passed through the narrow waterway and exited the Persian Gulf in defiance of the US warships attempts to halt Iran’s oil exports.

US President Donald Trump imposed a naval blockade on any ship leaving the Gulf carrying Iranian oil last week, but has been unable to enforce the order. The two-week ceasefire was supposed to end on April 21, but at the eleventh hour the White House extended it indefinitely as the US failed to impose its will on Iran, which remains firmly in control of the strategic chokepoint.

According to cargo tracking group Vortexa, the vessels departing were confirmed to be carrying Iranian crude oil, the Financial Times reports — a finding that sits awkwardly alongside Donald Trump's assertion that the blockade has been a "tremendous success."

The data, which covers the period since the blockade came into force at 10am Eastern time on April 13, reveals the scale of the enforcement failure.

At least 19 tankers with links to Iran have passed through the blockade to exit the Gulf, while at least 15 have entered, heading toward Iran from the Arabian Sea. Six of those that departed were confirmed as carrying Iranian crude, in the volume of 10.7mn barrels. Assuming a $10 discount to Brent crude — typical for sanctioned Iranian oil — that volume represents revenues of approximately $910mn flowing to Tehran despite the blockade, the FT estimated.

"The blockade has been a tremendous success," Trump told CNBC on April 21, adding that he would not lift the US embargo on the Strait of Hormuz until Washington reached a "final deal" with Iran.

A fresh round of talks was slated to take place on April 22, led by US Vice President JD Vance and Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, however, the plane due to ferry them to Islamabad failed to leave and no talks are scheduled.

The FT report contradicts White House claims that US forces ordered 28 vessels to turn back to Iranian ports since the embargo began — a figure US Central Command appeared to present as evidence of effectiveness of the blockade, though the Vortexa data suggests the overall picture is considerably more mixed.

Ships under fire

Not all ships headed towards the strait are leaving. In a separate report, one tanker headed to India was reportedly duped by cryptocurrency scammers who were paid the $2mn transit fee imposed by Tehran. However, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) fired on the ship as it entered the straits. Recording of the conversation between the capital and the IRGC administration in charge of the strait detail pleas to halt the attacks on the ship as the IRGC explained it had not received the required funds. The tanker eventually turned back.

On April 18, Iranian troops fired on a French container ship and an Indian tanker attempting to cross the waterway, Al Jazeera reports. No tankers passed through the strait on April 19, according to tracking data.

Most of the approximately 30 vessels that attempted to pass on April 17 have since reversed course and are now at anchor at the southern end of the Gulf, awaiting clarity that maritime officials say may not come soon.

The shadow fleet in action

Some of the ships are sneaking past the US warships posted in the Indian Ocean at the exit of the straits. The Dorena, an Iranian-flagged supertanker, snuck past the US forces with its Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponder switched off. Satellite imagery analysed by the FT shows the Dorena off the coast of Malaysia engaged in a ship-to-ship transfer — a common dodge to avoid sanctions on arrival at its destination to mask the origin of cargo.

Oil export figures for Malaysia have soared since the conflict began, despite the fact that Malaysia has no oil fields of its own. The Dorena last signalled its position off the southern coast of India on April 18, and according to Indian and Iranian media reports, arrived carrying approximately 2mn barrels of crude as part of a broader 6mn barrel Iranian delivery to Indian refiners completed under the final days of a 30-day sanctions waiver.

The US also temporarily suspended sanctions on the purchase of Russian oil trapped on tankers at sea. Those sanctions were initially reimposed last week, almost immediately to be removed again on April 17 by the US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent in an effort to push oil prices down.

US gas prices reached a national average of $4.05 a gallon on April 19. Energy Secretary Chris Wright told CNN they may not return to under $3 a gallon until "next year," while not ruling out the possibility of reaching that level "later this year." High prices of petrol at the pump are a political problem for Trump and his Republican party that face midterm elections in November.

The Treasury Department's waiver lets countries purchase Russian oil and petroleum products loaded on vessels as of April 17 through May 16. It replaces a 30-day waiver that expired on April 11 and excludes transactions involving Iran, Cuba and North Korea.

"As negotiations (with Iran) accelerate, Treasury wants to ensure oil is available to those ⁠who need it," a Treasury Department spokesperson said at the time of the announcement, Reuters reported.

Global prices for Brent have fallen from recent highs to around $100 a barrel as of the time of writing after Iran temporarily reopened the Strait ​of Hormuz at the weekend, before almost immediately closing it again due to the US naval blockade.

As of April 17, there were 177 tankers carrying Iranian cargo on the water globally, according to Windward Maritime AI the FT reported, with maritime traffic mostly headed toward Asia and the Middle East — China, the UAE, Oman, India and Singapore among the primary destinations. A further 163 of those vessels were operating under what analysts describe as fraudulent flags.

Alongside the Dorena, several other sanctioned tankers have re-entered the Gulf, including the Murlikishan and the Alicia — both sanctioned by the US Treasury last year — which transited the strait on the night of April 14 before sailing north toward Iran.

The Touska seizure

The limits of enforcement were demonstrated on April 19 when the US escalated its blockade operations dramatically. The guided-missile destroyer USS Spruance intercepted the Iranian-flagged cargo ship Touska in the Gulf of Oman as it transited the north Arabian Sea at 17 knots en route to Bandar Abbas, Iran's main commercial port.

After the Touska's crew failed to comply with repeated warnings over a six-hour period, Spruance directed the vessel to evacuate its engine room and fired several rounds from its 5-inch MK 45 gun, disabling the ship's propulsion, NS Energy reports. US Marines from the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, flying from the amphibious assault ship USS Tripoli, then rappelled onto the vessel and took control.

Trump announced the seizure on Truth Social in characteristically blunt terms. "The US Navy Guided Missile Destroyer USS Spruance intercepted the Touska in the Gulf of Oman and gave them fair warning to stop. The Iranian crew refused to listen, so our Navy ship stopped them right in their tracks by blowing a hole in the engine room. Right now, US Marines have custody of the vessel," he wrote.

The Touska had last docked in Port Klang, Malaysia, on April 12 and was under US Treasury sanctions due to its prior history of illegal activity, according to a US official. Iran's military described the operation as "maritime highway robbery" and an act of piracy, vowing retaliation.

The upshot of the seizure was Tehran suspended its participation in the second round of peace talks due on April 21 in Islamabad.

Iran's parliamentary speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf was unequivocal in response: "It is impossible for others to pass through the Strait of Hormuz," he said on state television Al Jazeera reported.

The double blockade

The result of the competing claims of authority over the waterway has created what the shipping industry has taken to calling a "double blockade" — a situation with no modern precedent.

On one side, Washington is attempting to prevent vessels from calling at Iranian ports or carrying goods that could assist Iran in the conflict. On the other hand, Tehran insists all transits of the Strait of Hormuz must follow routes prescribed by the IRGC and receive prior permission from Tehran, in effect also blocking passage through the strait.

Far from forcing Tehran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, the US naval blockade has double locked it closed. After briefly declaring the strait "completely open" on April 17, Iran clarified that it was only open to vessels with prior permission from Tehran.

The combination of a shadow fleet that has already moved nearly 11mn barrels of Iranian crude past the blockade, an Iranian military with its finger on the trigger in the strait's chokepoint, and a diplomatic process now in renewed jeopardy following the Touska seizure presents Washington with a problem that brute naval force alone is unable to resolve.

Rumours are circulating that the US has used the brief ceasefire to ferry fresh equipment and supplies to the Middle East in a convoy of planes visible on aviation flight tracking sites. At the same time the IRGC has been digging out mountainous caches of drones and missiles that have been targeted by the US-Israeli coalition, significantly increasing the amount of weaponry available to the IRGC should hostilities resume.

Most worryingly, Tehran issued an official warning for the Gulf states to evacuate immediately over the weekend, in an implicit threat of widespread drone and missile attacks on neighbouring cities should the US launch a mooted major ground and bombing assault on Iran.