Sub Prime Exploitation

Subprime mortgages impact disproportionately on the working class in particular the ethnic working class in the United State. Foreclosures will result in increased homelessness in the U.S. Even those who could afford better loans were subject to denial of access to better loan rates due to systemic racism.

This is what class war looks like under modern casino capitalism. It is the Enron moment for the mortgage industry.

The White House announcement of a Mortgage forgiveness program, after the Fed bailed out the financial markets, is too little too late.

Latinos and African-Americans who bought homes or refinanced mortgages in the San Jose metropolitan area last year were much more likely than white borrowers to get subprime loans, according to a study scheduled for release today.

In its annual survey based on federally collected data, this year titled "Foreclosure Exposure," community activism group ACORN said 47 percent of Latinos who got mortgages to buy homes in Santa Clara and San Benito counties in 2006 received "high cost" loans that the group considers to be synonymous with "subprime." Nearly 32 percent of African-American borrowers buying homes got high-cost loans, while only 8.5 percent of white borrowers did.

The trend is the same for those who refinanced loans - Latinos and African-Americans got subprime loans 23.5 percent and 22.8 percent of the time, respectively, compared with 9.4 percent among white borrowers.

"The racial disparity persists even among borrowers of the same income level," the report's authors wrote. Upper-income Latinos and African-Americans were more than five times as likely to get high-cost loans than upper-income whites, the study said. Upper-income borrowers were those with income of at least 120 percent of their area's median income.

Vallejo is the Bay Area's version of ground zero for the subprime loan crisis.

A significant number of residents of the largely blue-collar city of 120,000 have taken out subprime loans -- expensive mortgages issued to people with poor credit.

In 2005, almost one-quarter of mortgages in the Vallejo-Fairfield metropolitan area were subprime loans, according to the Center for Responsible Lending's analysis of Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data.

Vallejo home prices fell 8.5 percent from November to March, according to DataQuick Information Services. For people who bought in recent months without putting any money down, that means they may owe more on their mortgage than the house is worth.

In a report called "Losing Ground," the center spotlights the Vallejo-Fairfield metropolitan area (which comprises all of Solano County) as a potential trouble spot, with one of the highest projected foreclosure rates in the country. The report predicted "that 23.8 percent of subprimes there will end in foreclosure," said Paul Leonard, director of the center's office in Oakland.

Areas with high foreclosure rates tend to share some characteristics. One is sinking home prices. Many "tend to be on the perimeter of major metropolitan areas rather than at the heart," said Leonard. "The housing prices in those areas are most subject to change. Often they tend to have a high concentration of minorities."

The people seeking help have almost identical stories, Hardy said. They bought homes using subprime loans. After a low initial rate, their monthly payments skyrocketed. Meanwhile, home prices in their neighborhoods went down, so they cannot easily sell or refinance. The result is that the homeowners owe more on their homes than the houses are worth.

Hardy said her clients tend to be blue-collar workers who earn close to the median income for Solano County, which is $75,400 for a family of four. Some of them used what are called stated-income loans, meaning a loan officer allowed them to claim that their earnings were higher than they are.

They bought homes about two years ago, using a type of mortgage loan in which they made low, interest-only payments for two years, followed by 28 years of adjustable-rate payments. Usually they did not make down payments. Once the initial two years were up, their monthly mortgage payments shot up.

"Nobody sat down with them and said if your interest rate goes up just 2 percent, here's what your house payments will be," she said. "These people all of a sudden are getting notices that in 60 days their house payments will go up $600 or $800 a month, and they say 'I can't do that.' "

"Until six months ago, we could almost always save the person's investment, either by helping them to refinance or explaining that they needed to sell and get their equity out before foreclosure," said Martin Eichner, director of dispute resolution at Project Sentinel, a nonprofit HUD counseling agency in Sunnyvale.

"But more and more, the calls we're getting are from people who bought on a shoestring and have few, if any, options to avoid the foreclosure. They haven't built up any equity and they put themselves in loans that were essentially doomed to fail with 100 percent financing and/or negative amortization."

But a series of interviews with subprime borrowers, mortgage lenders, appraisers, current and former regulators, and the inspector general of the Department of Housing and Urban Development paints a different picture — of a widespread pattern of questionable lending practices and outright fraud that has already sparked a wave of criminal and civil actions against various players in the $10 trillion market for residential mortgages.

Questionable mortgage practices can take on many forms, but the fall into two broad categories:

• Predatory lending. In this case, complex mortgage terms and interest rate risks were not fully explained as required by federal law. The borrower is usually the victim.
• Mortgage fraud. In these cases, often carried out by sophisticated swindlers, the lender is typically the victim.

As the housing market boomed in the early part of this decade, lenders proliferated with deals that often seemed too good to be true. To be sure, some borrowers - eager to "cash out" their rising home equity generated by the housing boom - were too quick to refinance at below-market interest rates and artificially low monthly payments.

SEE:

Canadian Banks and The Great Depression

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Canadian Banks and The Great Depression

I found this informative post at Market Oracle which made reference to a little known fact about how Banks in Canada and the U.S. faired differently during the great depression.

The comments from Market Oracle about Americas current Housing Bubble crash, once again remind us that American Exceptionalism includes massive market failures due to speculation.

Greed is as American as apple pie.

A Letter from a former Banking President Discussing the Housing Bubble

an article that came out in the Saturday Evening Post in November of 1932 from a former bank president in New York, three years after the crash, highlighting the economic situation of a post bubble world.

“This is a shameful and humiliating exhibition. It is uniquely bad. Across the border in Canada, there was not a single bank failure during our period of depression, and one must go back to 1923 to find even a small one. Nowhere else in the world at any time, were it a time of war, or of famine, or of disaster, has any other people recorded so many bank failures in a similar period as did we. We were not experiencing a war, a famine or any other natural disaster. All the economic tribulations we have undergone in the past three years have been man-made troubles, and Nature has continued to shower us with an easy abundance – more, indeed, than we have known how to distribute with economic wisdom.”

Of course the banks in Canada foreclosed on Western Farmers, during the depression and used the land bank to shore up their wealth. Until the creation of Canada's National Bank the commercial banks issued dollars and currency from which they made their profit. Canadians were big savers after WWI but without deposit insurance found their savings wiped out during the depression.

According to the Department of Finance, two small regional banks failed in the mid-1980s, the only such failures since 1923, which is the year Home Bank failed. There were no bank failures during the Great Depression.

The Canadian recovery from the Great Depression proceeded slowly. Economists Pedro Amaral and James MacGee find that the Canadian recovery has important differences with the United States In the U.S. productivity recovered quickly while the labor force remained depressed throughout the decade. In Canada employment quickly recovered but productivity remained well below trend. Amaral and MacGee suggest that this decline is due to the sustained reduction in international trade during the 30's.

It took the outbreak of World War II to pull Canada out of the depression. From 1939, an increased demand in Europe for materials, and increased spending by the Canadian government created a strong boost for the economy. Unemployed men enlisted in the military. By 1939, Canada was in the first prosperity period in the business cycle in a decade.

The Depression also led governments to be more present in the economy. It brought about the creation in 1934 of the Bank of Canada, a central bank to manage the money supply and bring stability to the country’s financial system.

Hard to imagine now, but not too long ago paper money in Canada was issued by commercial banks. That was before 1934, when the Bank of Canada Act established a central bank with the sole right to issue paper money. It was just one of the many roles the Bank of Canada would take on.

Creating a central bank was one of the first major things Canada did on its own after becoming more independent of Great Britain in 1931 (with the Statute of Westminster). But the Bank of Canada was not established just to assert our independence. Instead, Prime Minister R.B. Bennett was frustrated that there was no way for Canada to settle international accounts with England. A central bank could do that.

The time was ripe to set up a central bank. During the Great Depression, Canadians had criticized and mistrusted the commercial banking system. They had doubts about the efficiency of Canada’s financial structure. Pressure also came from outside our borders to create a central bank to help settle international accounts. There was no independent agency issuing notes or managing government banking.

The creation of the Bank of Canada was the result of protests against the banks by Western farmers in particular those from Alberta! Like the Wheat Board farmers demanded and got a Central Bank.

At the same time that the Canadian
government was doing nothing on the monetary
front, the chartered banks were repaying their
borrowings from the government under the
Finance Act.63 The resulting monetary contraction
exacerbated the economic downturn. The banks
became increasingly cautious about their own
lending activities as the economic environment
deteriorated. Banks may have also repaid their
borrowings under the Finance Act in response to
earlier criticism for having borrowed so extensively
prior to the stock market crash (Fullerton 1986, 36).
While the extent of the economic downturn
in Canada was undoubtedly made worse by
these monetary developments, the monetary
contraction helped to strengthen the Canadian
dollar, which reached US$0.90 by the spring
of 1932.

The government finally reduced the
Advance Rate to 3 per cent in October 1931 and
to 2.5 per cent in May 1933. (See Chart C2 in
Appendix C.)64 In the autumn of 1932, it also used
moral suasion to force the banks to borrow under
the Finance Act and reflate the economy
(Bryce 1986, 132). This easing in monetary policy
led to some temporary weakness in the Canadian
dollar, which briefly fell as low as US$0.80. The
weakness was short-lived, however.

Following the U.S. decision to prohibit the export of
gold in April 1933 and similar efforts in the United
States to reflate, the Canadian dollar began
to strengthen.65 The Canadian government’s
decision in 1934 to expand the amount of Dominion
notes in circulation by reducing their gold backing
to 25 per cent did not have much impact on the
Canadian dollar.

In the economic circumstances of the time,
and given similar developments in the
United States, this move was viewed as appropriate
and elicited little market reaction (Bryce 1986, 143).
The Canadian dollar returned to rough parity
with its U.S. counterpart by 1934 (Chart 3) and, at
times, even traded at a small premium. With the
U.S. dollar depreciating against gold and the pound
sterling, the Canadian dollar returned to its old
parity with sterling.

Not surprisingly, as the 1930s progressed
with little sign that the Depression was ending,
pressure began to mount on the government to do
something. In addition to concerns about the
adequacy of the Finance Act, there was also
widespread public distrust of the banking system,
largely because of the high cost and low availability
of credit.

Farmers, especially those in western
Canada, who were suffering from a sharp fall in
both crop yields and prices, were particularly
critical of banks and consequently very supportive
of the formation of a central bank. They hoped
that a central bank would be a source of steady and
cheap credit.

With effective nominal interest rates on farm loans in
excess of 7 per cent, real interest rates were very high
—about 17 per cent in 1931 and 1932, owing to
sharply declining consumer prices.

In July 1933, the government set up a
commission with a mandate to study the
functioning of the Finance Act and to make
“a careful consideration of the advisability
of establishing in Canada a Central Banking
Institution . . . .” (Macmillan Report 1933, 5).66
Lord Macmillan, a famous British jurist and known
supporter of a central bank, was chosen by Prime
Minister Bennett to chair the commission.
The other members were Sir Charles Addis, a
for mer director of the Bank of England;
Sir William T. White, the former wartime Canadian
Finance Minister and banker; John Brownlee,
Premier of Alberta; and Beaudry Leman, a
Montréal banker.

Public hearings began on 8 August 1933,
and the final report was presented to the government
less than seven weeks later on 28 September. While
the commission voted only narrowly in favour of
the establishment of a central bank, its conclusion
was never really in doubt. The two British
members of the committee, joined by Brownlee,
voted in favour of a central bank, a position
supported by both the Conservative government
and the Liberal opposition.

When we look back at the monetarist policies put in place during the Depression and those in effect today one gets a disturbing sense of Deja Vu.


SEE:

Social Credit And Western Canadian Radicalism

Historical Memory on the Eve of the Election

Calgary Herald Remembers RB Bennet

Origins of the Capitalist State In Canada

Rebel Yell

A History of Canadian Wealth, 1914.

Radical Capitalists Not So Radical

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The Importance of Savings

In an a interesting article on the Austrian School of Economics and the Great Depression, the author contends that what is necessary to resolve a depression or large scale recession is to increase savings, allowing for real investment funds to accrue.

The reality of this is clear that with the Depression and after, until the late 1960's, most Canadians were savers. Today most are in debt. Which means that a serious downturn in the economy is going to be a disaster.

However as the author points out the way to mitigate that disaster is by increasing savings. The savings culture that resulted after the Great Depression attests to this. However in that case it was a harsh lesson learned the hard way. And unfortunately in our easy credit consumer culture it is one that is forgotten in this long boom.

Austrian Business Cycle Theory: A Corporate Finance Point of View

The lesson is that as long as output prices stay up (through Keynesian
policies) and the Monetarists keep interest rates from rising (or maybe push them lower), if input prices are rising (a real resource crunch), we will have a recession. And the only way out is through the painful but necessary liquidation process.

The best means to transform malinvestments into viable economic activities is
through increasing savings. This means that one of the government’s most effective
policies is to cut taxes on the savers. Those who are savers are usually labeled as “the rich.” Unfortunately, the prescriptions of “get government out of the market” or a “tax cut for the rich” tend not to be politically popular. However, the idea of “tax cuts are for the tax payers” has had some success.

And while he praises tax breaks for savers he mistakenly identifies them with the rich. Which is currently true, because only a relative handful of the population in the G20 countries have access to liquid capital. The average person who used to save, such as my parents, now has easy access to credit and thus is leveraged into debt. However to have a successful saver economy you need the masses to have access to enough surplus cash to encourage saving.

Savings by the wealthy elite while larger than the average persons, are not nearly as effective as a mass saver culture, as witnessed by Japanese savings numbers. And while various explanations are given for Japan's long recession, the reality is that what kept it from flat out crashing as bad as the Wall Street Crash of 1929, with the same global impact, was the savings accrued by the average Japanese.

The way to solve this problem of easy credit, and its recessionary effects on the business cycle is not to expand capital gains tax breaks, or give business tax breaks, or even to encourage investments in RRSPs or Income Trusts, but rather to eliminate all taxes on incomes of $100,000 or less.

The real savers, the folks who saved capitalism according to the Austrians, are our parents and grandparents who were cruelly forced to learn this lesson, to save in order to survive.

In order to encourage individual saving in a credit card debt based consumer economy, tax cuts, not tax credits, are required for the working class. Currently tax breaks for most folks put anywhere from a few hundred to a couple of thousand dollars back in their pockets come tax day, which is Monday.

Now imagine if you actually had the income tax from your income, you could invest in saving. Instead of a paltry hundred or even a thousand bucks this could be anywhere from $5000 to $10,000 to as high as $25,000 annually.

Further if EI were run as a joint investment cooperative between Employers and Workers, without the government plundering it for it's surplus costs could be reduced, And with a profitable investment strategy put more money in workers pockets, while also insuring a better and fairer process for collecting EI. This has already occurred with the CPP. Ironically it is the NDP and the Bloc who support this idea of joint ownership and elimination of the government from EI.

Furthermore such a joint cooperative EI program could offer alternative financial opportunities such as micro credit for self employment opportunities, as well as the usual Guaranteed Income that we associate with EI currently. It would allow for broader education and training opportunities, while not costing as much as the current program does, because the government would not have access to the profit, surplus.

Similarly we should eliminate Workers Compensation Boards and replace them with a joint labour employer cooperative, that would not have the government as its arbitrator or with its hands in the pockets of workers and employers as currently occurs.

A failure to come up with adequate support for an injured worker, would result in the option of the worker to sue the employer in civil court, which is currently not available with the state as the arbitrator. WCB payments would then decrease under such a joint management and investment plan.

It is often argued that labour relations is problematic because it is an adversarial relationship between workers and employers, unions and corporations. While this is true, the real advocate of this adversarial relation is the state who wishes to arbitrate between the two parties. Unions are the working classes voice in labour relations with the bosses and their associations and cartels. The state is never neutral, as we saw with the recent CN strike. It interferes in the natural social relationship between workers and their bosses.

In fact one has to ask why we need the government period. We have common laws, we have workers and employers, and they can resolve their conflicts through negotiations, arbitration, strikes, or mediation. They can cooperate as well for mutual aid and benefit, such as with works councils, joint management labour pension and benefit funds, EI, Workers Compensation, etc. The State is not required for a cooperative commonwealth.

As Samuel Gompers pointed out long ago;

The worst crime against working people is a company which fails to operate at a profit

The more thoroughly the workers are organized and federated the better they are prepared to enter into a contest, and the more surely will conflicts be averted. Paradoxical as it may appear, it is nevertheless true, that militant trade unionism is essential to industrial peace.

What we have endeavored to secure in industrial relations is industrial peace. When industrial justice prevails, industrial peace will follow. It is a result and not an end in itself.

We want a minimum wage established, but we want it established by the solidarity of the working men themselves through the economic forces of their trade unions, rather than by any legal enactment. . . . We must not, we cannot, depend upon legislative enactments to set wage standards. When once we encourage such a system, it is equivalent to admitting our incompetency for self-government and our inability to seek better conditions.

To strengthen the state, as Frederick Howe says, is to devitalize the individual. . . . I believe in people. I believe in the working people. I believe in their growing intelligence. I believe in their growing and persistent demand for better conditions, for a more rightful situation in the industrial, political, and social affairs of this country and of the world. I have faith that the working people will better their condition far beyond what it is today. The position of the organized labor movement is not based upon misery and poverty, but upon the right of workers to a larger and constantly growing share of the production, and they will work out these problems for themselves.

It is not the organizations of labor which take away from the workers their individual rights or their sovereignty. It is modern industry, modern capitalism, modern corporations, and modern trusts. . . . The workingmen in modern industries lose their individuality as soon as they step into a modern industrial plant, and that individuality which they lose is regained to them by organization--they gain in social and industrial importance by their association with their fellow workmen.

Also See:

Not Your Usual Left Wing Rant

State-less Socialism

Fair Share

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Wall Street Deja Vu

I draw my readers attention to this article from the business section of the Saturday Globe and Mail. If you are regular here you will know I have said this exact thing.

Disturbingly, bankers, investors and regulators have seen this movie before. The boom-bust scenario now playing out the market for subprimes – loans to the riskiest borrowers – is remarkably similar to other recent episodes when the basic principles of sound lending were ignored or forgotten, until it was too late. There was the technology bubble of the late 1990s, as well as the trust and savings-and-loan crises of the 1980s.

Then, as now, financial institutions dramatically reined in credit after getting burned on bad loans. Indeed, the flight of lenders from the tech bubble of the late 1990s drove many of them toward the perceived stability of consumer credit – including home equity loans and mortgages.

How the industry got in this mess, again, is a disturbing tale of lending excess.

The simple explanation for why HCL and other lenders made seemingly uneconomic loans is because they could. A thriving aftermarket quickly turns subprime mortgages into bonds, flipping the revenue stream to investors around the world. Most banks no longer keep the loans in-house, so they don't care if homeowners can't keep up with payments. Instead, they make money on lucrative fees and push the risk up the line to an investment dealer such as Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. or Goldman Sachs Group Inc., which then passes it on to hedge fund and pension fund investors.

American finance, the much touted Wall Street Bull market is living in a consumer driven bubble. There is no real boom, just a growth in credit, loans and party mow pay later consumption. Later comes sooner than the market expects.

What is scary is that folks pensions are tied up in these get rich quick schemes like variable and sub-prime mortgages. Which they weren't when the Junk Bonds and later the Savings and Loans meltdowns occurred.

See

China Burps Greenspan Farts Dow Hiccups

Housing Bubble

Housing

Economy



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Housing Crash the New S&L Crisis

When you build a house the key to the solidity of its construction is a well built basement. When you buy a house the key to its market stability is your mortgage. When you are poor and buy a house using a sub-prime mortgage you are buying on a weak foundation as the market is discovering in the U.S. this week.

As housing prices fall and interest rates increase those who bought over-valued homes in the U.S. on a variable mortgage will find themselves paying more for a home of less value.

And what they thought were sub-prime mortgages, that is below prime rates, are actually variable rate mortgages. The were sold as below prime due to being longer to pay back, but if interest rates increase they will increase to be above the prime rate. It is a classic bait and switch scheme. Already the U.S. is experiencing thousands of bankruptcies and foreclosures.

It is yet another example of business as usual which cheats the poor to line the pockets of the rich. In this case folks with bad credit were given credit by companies that had dubious funds themselves, who in effect once they had enough debt were able to be financed by the big banks looking to sink their profits into the market.

Then the market crashes, and the banks withdraw their funds from the sub prime market leaving the dubious credit companies without financial backing, and their creditors in foreclosure to the same banks that lent their creditors the credit in the first place. But only one of these crooked credit lenders is going to jail. And it ain't the big banks.

Instead the U.S. economy could tail spin, especially in light of massive layoffs recently announced by Chrysler and Hershey's, and other companies. The result will be massive foreclosures leaving banks and lenders holding declining valued properties that cannot be sold off fast enough to recoup their loses. And then they will come with their hands out asking for taxpayers to bail them out.

The market correction yesterday on news of the sub-prime crash impacted on global markets world wide even as far away as South Africa; US sub-prime crisis batters JSE

Sub-prime worries echo the S&L crisis

DID those troublemaking sub-prime US home borrowers actually know that their mortgage rates could (and in many cases certainly would) go up one day? Were they properly informed by sub-prime lenders? That's the startlingly mundane question at the core of the sub-prime mortgage meltdown, which threatens global markets and may billow into a financial cataclysm to rival the 1980s US savings and loan (S&L) financial debacle.

Both the question - obvious though the answer might seem to most Australians - and the comparison are worth scrutiny.

There is a reasonable chance some of these poor and usually first time home buyers - with loans Wall Street likes to refer to as "trailer-trash mortgages" - didn't understand they were taking out variable rather than fixed-rate home loans.

After all, most US mortgages historically were flat rate - repayments were constant over their 20 or 30-year term, although the mix of interest costs and capital repayments obviously varied.

Just as Australian mortgages became a more diverse mix of fixed and variable rate loans through the 1990s, a minority of the US market has gradually shifted to variable rate loans. And thanks to the exceptionally low level of near-term interest rates in recent years, which made these loans appear stable and cheap, these were often the very loans that sub-prime lenders pushed hardest to less traditional home buyers, such as those in, yes, you already know where they supposedly live.

The S&Ls were pillaged of their best assets by the big Wall Street houses, which quickly figured out that a bunch of dusty Fannie Mae-supported mortgages snapped up at 60 per cent of face value from struggling narrowly based S&Ls in the flyover states could be pooled, securitised and resold as diverse, near federal-quality, mortgage-backed bonds at large profits.

Fears of US mortgage crisis as homeowners face 12% interest

· Shares fall on worries for wider economy
· Research predicts 2.2m defaults on homeloans

Larry Elliott and Jill Treanor
Wednesday March 14, 2007
The Guardian

The US central bank was under pressure last night to underpin the country's troubled housing market as figures showed an increasing number of US homeowners falling behind with their mortgage payments and having their properties repossessed.

The problems had a knock-on effect on Wall Street where the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 242 points to close at 12,075 amid fears the malaise in the housing market would infect the rest of the economy. There were signs of mounting problems for firms that have aggressively sold home loans to people with poor credit ratings - so-called sub-prime mortgages.

The US Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) yesterday pushed back its forecast of a rebound in the real estate market from the middle of 2007 until the end of the year after reporting an increase in both late payments and foreclosures in the final three months of 2006. It said defaults had risen for all loan types but were particularly marked for those with sub-prime mortgages with adjustable rates.

Borrowers with loans totalling $265bn (£137bn) are scheduled to have the interest rates on their mortgages reset this year and many of the poorest homeowners in the US could face interest rates as high as 12%. The Fed meets next week to set base interest rates but is expected to leave them unchanged at 5.25% despite the latest mortgage default figures.

Research by the Centre for Responsible Lending has predicted that one in five of the sub-prime mortgages made in the past two years will end in foreclosure, resulting in the biggest crisis for the mortgage market in modern times.

The centre said 2.2m sub-prime home loans had already failed or would end in foreclosure and that the losses to homeowners could be as high as $164bn.

The data from the MBA showed total mortgage defaults up from 4.67% to 4.95%, but sub-prime delinquencies rose from 12.56% to 13.33%.

The problems have most clearly been illustrated by New Century Financial, which is on the brink of bankruptcy without enough cash to repay its own lenders. Its shares have been suspended by the New York Stock Exchange and it has admitted receiving a grand jury subpoena as part of a criminal inquiry into trading in its shares as well as accounting errors. State regulators in Massachusetts yesterday ordered New Century to fulfil its promises on loans in process and barred it from making new loans. It was coordinating its order with several other states, including New York, New Jersey and New Hampshire.

Other states, however, were reluctant to take action that could contribute to a lender filing for bankruptcy, leaving borrowers stranded.

US banks face sub-prime note inquiry

The fallout from America’s mortgage implosion continued yesterday when the state of Massachusetts said it is investigating the possibility that Wall Street firms had issued unrealistically upbeat research notes on leading “sub-prime” home loan makers to safeguard lucrative investment banking business.

William Galvin, the state’s commonwealth secretary, has subpoenaed Bear Stearns and UBS Securities for documents about their analysts’ recommendations of New Century Financial and other troubled lenders of high-risk mortgages made to people with the lowest credit ratings.

Mr Galvin said he was concerned that some investment banks may be violating terms of a 2003 global research settlement, reached in the wake of the bursting of the dot-com bubble. Under that agreement, investment banks paid fines and agreed to isolate their analysts from other businesses after regulators accused them of publishing biased research to win investment banking work from companies they covered.

Mr Gavin said: “Recent revelations that research analysts issued positive reports on mortgage lenders to those with less than solid credit ratings even as those companies faced more and more defaults suggests that the commitment of 2003 has not been met.”

See

China Burps Greenspan Farts Dow Hiccups

Housing Bubble

Housing

Economy



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