REST IN POWER

MARIO TRONTI: AN OBITUARY

by Sergio Fontegher Bologna

TRONTI AND NEGRI WERE COMRADES IN FORMING WORKERS POWER

August 18, 2023*

On August 7 Mario Tronti passed away at the age of 92, in the village of Ferentillo, not far from Rome. He was the leading figure of “Italian workerism” (operaismo), the basic tenets of which he expressed in his articles for the journal Quaderni Rossi (Red Notebooks, 1961–1963) and, above all, in his book Operai e capitale (Turin, 1966).2 Anyone interested in how he characterized his thought shortly before his death would do well to watch the video of a discussion with him on June 10th of this year. In this video, we see a man who knows that he has little time left to live.3

This discussion was organized by the Derive&Approdi publishing house, founded in the nineties by a former comrade of Potere Operaio (Workers’ Power). Since then, the publishing house has published all of the most important texts of operaismo and autonomia operaia, in addition to a whole series of contributions and testimonies from former activists, including those who made the transition from autonomia into the armed struggle groups. The fact that Mario Tronti again entered into dialogue with the most radical parts of the extra-parliamentary movement in the last phase of his life exemplifies the parabolic path of his political development quite well.

In 1964, after distancing himself from Raniero Panzieri4 and other founders of Quaderni Rossi, he founded the journal Classe Operaia (Working Class) with Toni Negri, Romano Aquati5 and others, with the aim of building a new revolutionary organization. But after just one year, he suddenly decided to rejoin the Italian Communist Party (PCI), continuing a family tradition he had grown up in. For those of us who had poured all of our energy into the project of creating an alternative to the PCI, which had already set out along the path of social democracy, Tronti’s decision was tantamount to a betrayal. This prompted the crisis within the Classe Operaia group, and we had to stop publishing in 1966. I remember how bitter our disappointment was. Other comrades joined the PCI alongside him, including Massimo Cacciari, Alberto Asor Rosa and Umberto Coldagelli.

There is no doubt that the “operaisti mindset” played a hegemonic role in the Italian workers’ movement in the period from 1969–1973. This hegemony must be emphasized if we are to understand subsequent events, such as the so-called “April 7th affair” and the systematic persecution of former Potere Operaio activists.6 Thus, at the beginning of the 1970s, Mario Tronti vanished from sight just as his theories found their greatest resonance within the social movements.

His decision to rejoin the PCI (in fact, he had never formally left, but was considered a “heretic”) was by no means an opportunistic move. On the contrary, it corresponded to a new phase of his thinking, which found expression in the publication of the short essay entitled “Sull’autonomia del politico” (“On the Autonomy of the Political”, Milan 1977). What does this title mean?

In operaist theory, the relationship between class and organization, working class and party, is constantly called into question by class struggles. The working class achieves an identity only when it comes into conflict with the power of capital; in this way it achieves its autonomy. The collective intelligence it develops allows it to determine both its form of organization and its strategy.

In his short essay, Tronti claims that politics, that is, the traditional organizational form of the workers’ movement, i.e., the party, maintains its own space in which it can operate and pursue its strategy in total autonomy, that is, independently of the class struggles taking place in the social context of capital’s exploitation. Machiavelli, Weber, Rathenau and Carl Schmitt are the authors Tronti uses to develop his argument. Marx and Lenin remained in the background.

With the idea of the “autonomy of the political,” it seemed to us at the time that his thinking had taken an about-face. In the subsequent years, he repeatedly emphasized that his ideas were a continuation of the path he had embarked upon in 1966 and that the idea of the autonomy of the political arose from the crisis of the autonomy of class struggles in the factories.7 In fact, the power relations between the working class and capital had become increasingly complex after the oil crisis of October 1973, and not only in Italy. Even the so-called “movement of 1977”8 was highly critical of the operaist concepts from the 1960s as well as of Marxist ideas in general. Foucault was the new prophet, and feminism also played an important role. But Tronti, Cacciari and Asor Rosa went about their own “critical thinking” differently than Foucault. Max Weber, the Frankfurt School, and Walter Benjamin were their main references. The problem is that their role within the party had no impact on the party leadership’s line and in no way hindered or slowed down the party’s systematic orientation toward neoliberalism. Cacciari fared well as mayor of Venice (especially compared to today’s municipal administrations), and Tronti increasingly focused on his work teaching at the University of Siena. Even a summary analysis of his thought would exceed the scope of this text.9 The various, conflicting interpretations of the meaning of the “autonomy of the political” which ranged from enthusiastic approval to mean-spirited derision constitute a special chapter in Italian political theory. For a better understanding, it is worth watching the recording of the 2017 discussion between Tronti and Cacciari at the House of Culture in Milan10 and reading the small book in which he debates his theory with Toni Negri and Étienne Balibar.11

On the other hand, it must be admitted that even the revolutionary variant of operaismo reached a dead end after 1975. Neither Mario Tronti within the PCI nor Toni Negri within the social movements succeeded in influencing the general course of events. But while Negri’s writings always contained a perspective imbued with hope and the will to fight, Tronti’s works seemed increasingly characterized by an ever-deeper despair. In this sense, his disposition recalls that of Bruno Trentin, the charismatic CGIL trade union leader, who in his posthumously published diaries gives free rein to despair in the face of the decline of socialist values in the Italian workers’ movement, both in his organization and in the party. And yet both men, Tronti and Trentin, maintained fidelity to their organizations.

In 1992, Mario Tronti was elected to the Italian Senate of the Republic12 with more than 80,000 votes, testifying to his popularity among the party base. In 2013, he was again elected to the Senate in the constituency of Lombardy. From this last period in Parliament, his commemorative speech on the centenary of the Russian Revolution in October 2017 remains unforgettable.13 From 2003–2015, he was chairman of the Centro per la Riforma dello Stato (Center for the Reform of the State) Foundation, founded by Pietro Ingrao, one of the great figures of the postwar CPI. He remained a man of institutions until the end: as recently as February of this year, he donated his estate to the archives of the Senate – an institution whose president, as of 13 October 2022, is now the old fascist Ignazio Benito La Russa.

But this is not the end of the story. As a school of thought, operaismo has had a wider reach than that of the operaisti themselves. As a method of research, it was particularly important––and not only in Italy––in the mid-1970s, when the decomposition of the industrial working class began and the incessant precarization and flexibilization of the work force broke the militancy of the mass worker. This is when wage earners and technicians began their struggles in the service industries (in the health care system, in transportation), and medical workers learned from the experience of the workers' councils in the chemical industry and other hazardous sectors. Without the operaist approach, there would not have been journals like Primo maggio (First of May), Quaderni del territorio (Notebooks of the Territory), Sapere (Knowledge) or Classe (Class), which have left quite a mark on historians, urban planners, physicists, and so on. The ecological movement in Italy was initially very strongly influenced by operaismo.

The radical feminism of the group “Wages for Housework”14 was born in the context of Potere Operaio. Even though operaismo was no longer hegemonic, it still played a major role. When the great counter-revolution of capitalism erupted in the early 1980s in all its various forms, when the 1968 generation retreated into private life and all seemed lost, operaismo still survived as rivers carved through limestone, while the persecution of operaist militants and the ensuing diaspora contributed to its spread abroad. Even politically militant tendencies that had a significant impact, such as Lotta Continua (The Struggle Continues), saw themselves in the tradition of operaismo - that of Panzieri rather than Tronti – and thus as the legitimate heirs of Quaderni Rossi.

It is much easier to destroy an organization than to eradicate a school of thought. With the beginning of the new century, the subterranean rivers emerged from their stone karst, and Mario Tronti showed increasing interest in the lessons of the old comrades and the initiatives of the new generation, who found his early writings to be a source of new material for reflection and practical research. This was the case, for example, with my analyses of the independent self-employed or freelance workers, but Tronti also followed the increasing role of logistics in globalization with great curiosity.

He never wavered from his way of thinking. The question of the political was like an obsession for him, his despair had deepened, he described it as “anthropological pessimism,” which made it difficult for him to make himself understood to his “interlocutors, since they interpret it as resignation,” as he says in the video mentioned above. His pessimism was directed against the individualization of society, but a particular kind of individualization whose agents he called “mass individuals.”

His style became increasingly contemplative, and the more politics became a bandit’s game, the more he spoke of its necessity, of its dignity, of its sublimity. For the generations of activists that have succeeded our generation, who have inherited a globalized world and want to continue fighting in the midst of very great difficulties, Mario Tronti has always remained simply the author of Operai e capitale, a “maestro.” On the other hand, for those of us who, regardless of our differences with him, have harbored a most humane compassion for him — and which he reciprocated in turn — it is difficult not to criticize some of his decisions. But we recognize in all his writings, in all his statements, a distinctive style that is always fascinating and thought provoking – even when we disagreed.

Recently, many sections of the working class around the world seem to have once again seized the initiative to contest their exploitation. I believe that wherever such movements spring up, they send us a call in which the soft, gentle voice of Mario Tronti can always be heard, loud and clear.

En.wikipedia.org

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mario_Tronti

Mario Tronti - Wikipedia 

Mario Tronti ... Mario Tronti (24 July 1931 – 7 August 2023) was an Italian philosopher and politician, considered one of the founders of the theory of operaismo ...

Commonnotions.org

https://www.commonnotions.org/the-weapon-of-organization

Weapon of Organization: Mario Tronti - Common Notions Press 

“The Weapon of Organization is a breakthrough in scholarship on Italian workerism, and the recovery of the history of revolutionary theory for the present.

Newstatesman.com

https://www.newstatesman.com/ideas/2023/09/mario-trontis-divine-comedy

Mario Tronti's divine comedy - New Statesman 

Sep 14, 2023 ... Mario Tronti's divine comedy. How the Italian philosopher, who died last month aged 92, turned to theology in his war with the world. By ...

Versobooks.com

https://www.versobooks.com/products/101-workers-and-capital

Workers and Capital | Verso Books 

Far from simply an artefact of the intense political conflicts of the 1960s, Tronti's work offers extraordinary tools for understanding the powerful shifts in ...

Libcom.org

https://libcom.org/article/strategy-refusal-mario-tronti

The strategy of refusal - Mario Tronti | libcom.org 

There must come a point where all will disappear, except one - the demand for power, all power, to the workers, This demand is the highest form of the refusal.

Workingnowandthen.com

https://www.workingnowandthen.com/scholarstudent/reviews/mario-tronti-workerism-and-politics

Mario Tronti, "Workerism and Politics" | Working N... 

In 2006, Italian philosopher Mario Tronti gave a lecture on the theory of workerism, or operaismo, an approach to labor, capital, and politics that he helped ...

Newleftreview.org

https://newleftreview.org/sidecar/posts/a-message-from-the-emperor

Mario Tronti, A Message From the Emperor — Sidecar 

Aug 10, 2023 ... Here, the prophecy has been fulfilled: the medium is the message. The messenger is the proclamation. Only nothing is allowed to come and go, ...

Seagullbooks.org

https://www.seagullbooks.org/our-authors/t/mario-tronti

Mario Tronti | Seagull Books 

Mario Tronti (b. 1931) is best known for his ground-breaking book Workers and Capital (1966). An active member of the Italian Communist Party, Tronti taught ...

Journals.sagepub.com

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0896920520911995

Mario Tronti's Copernican Revolution, 50 Years On - Sage... 

Long a household name in Italy, Mario Tronti has finally arrived on Anglo shores. Although his influence has rumbled through social theory and activist ...

The Straussian Character of Post-Soviet Russian Statecraft

The behaviour of post-Soviet Russian statecraft is poorly understood in the Western world. Long gone is the age of clever Kremlinologists.

BYJOSÉ MIGUEL ALONSO-TRABANCO
DECEMBER 19, 2023

Photo: Sergei Bobylev, TASS


The behaviour of post-Soviet Russian statecraft is poorly understood in the Western world. Long gone is the age of clever Kremlinologists —men like George Kennan— whose sober insights shaped Western strategies and policies in the second half of the twentieth century. In the post-Cold War era, it was expected that Russia would follow the path of Westernisation by embracing liberal democracy, free markets, human rights, the so-called “rules-based order” and even the most emblematic flagships of postmodernism. However, Russia has not become a post-historical state like much of North America and Western Europe. Instead, in the last couple of decades, it has acted as an increasingly assertive, revisionist and self-confident great power that does not seek to emulate Washington or Brussels or join the collective West as a junior partner. Since this course of action does not respond to the overzealous gospel of Western liberalism, Russia is often portrayed as a “rogue”, “backward”, “outdated”, “evil”, “un-European” or even “irrational” state. For those unable to transcend such narrow horizons, Russia will always remain a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.

The prevalence of such oversimplistic and Manichean views reveals an overall lack of a genuine intellectual effort. Without this element, uncovering the reasons and perceptions which have influenced Moscow’s political trajectories in the last couple of decades is an exceedingly arduous undertaking. Far from being only a cognitive shortcoming, these limited opinions have been directing policymaking in much of the collective West. The results —including the eastward expansion of NATO, the invasion of Ukraine, the unprecedented level of intense antagonism between Russia and the West and the strategic reproachment between Russia and China— speak for themselves. Needless to say, Russia can hardly be described as a charitable or altruistic state. In fact, Moscow does not even bother hiding its predatory ruthlessness in contested theatres of engagement. Yet, as an imperial great power that has played a key role in the Eurasian geopolitical Grossraum for centuries, the sources of its conduct deserve to be examined from a more accurate perspective.

Few Western intellectuals have tried to explain contemporary Russia in accordance with a more nuanced and unjudgmental viewpoint. American representatives of political realism —such as Professor John Mearsheimer, Kenneth Waltz and Henry Kissinger— have offered analytical assessments based on the logic of Realpolitik in order to understand Russian statecraft through the lens of national security, high politics and grand strategy. In turn, Canadian scholar Michael Millerman has highlighted the connection between Russian foreign policy and Russian philosophical thinking. Specifically, Millerman’s work has scrutinised the theories of Aleksander Dugin, the leading ideologue of Eurasianism as an alternative geopolitical project which intends to position Russia as civilisational and strategic counterweight to Atlanticism. These contributions represent valuable stepping-stones towards a better and deeper understanding. However, the development of a more in-depth scrutiny requires the integration of complementary perspectives. The purpose of this analysis is not to contradict the ideas of the aforementioned thinkers, but to offer additional elements than can sharpen, strengthen and calibrate the existing explanatory arsenal that is used to study the evolution of post-Soviet Russia. A more holistic guide for the perplexed is needed.

In this regard, this assessment holds that the teachings of German-American philosopher Leo Strausss provide an analytical framework that is helpful to interpret Russian statecraft. At first glance, Professor Strauss is an unlikely and maybe even counterintuitive candidate as a prophet of Kremlinology. First and foremost, Strauss was as a scholar of classical political philosophy. As such, his work seldom addressed the leading issues of the twentieth century. He had more to say about the lessons found in the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Thucydides, Xenophon, Maimonides, Al-Farabi and Machiavelli than about the Cold War’s geopolitical, strategic or ideological realities. Furthermore, his ideas are often maligned because of their supposed association with the militant neoconservative movement and its responsibility for disastrous endeavours like the Anglo-American of Iraq. However, said connection is inaccurate and, if anything, based on a distorted vision of his thought. Strauss believed in wisdom and moderation as cardinal virtues in statesmanship, not in a neo-Trotskyist permanent revolution inspired by a megalomaniac messianic fervour. In fact, his ideas were more influenced by the wisdom of the ancients and key authors who developed —directly or indirectly— the so-called ‘conservative revolution’ in Weimar Germany (Nietzsche, Hegel, Heidegger, Spengler and Schmitt) than by the Kantian acolytes of Wilsonian idealism. Leo Strauss was hardly the herald of people like Annalena Baerbock, Anne Applebaum or Victoria Nuland. Furthermore, he never endorsed a worldwide crusade to remake the world’s political systems. In fact, he supported a plurality of political models rather than uniformity. For Strauss, the prospect of global homogeneity literally represented the end of man and the ultimate death of philosophy, understood as intellectual contemplation.

This analysis constitutes an attempt to understand Russia through a perspective that does not respond to the commonplace views of conventional Westernist ‘democratism’. This pursuit is pertinent, not just as an intellectual quest, but as necessity of pragmatic expediency. Relations between Russia and the collective West are likely to remain adversarial for the foreseeable future because their geopolitical imperatives are incompatible under the current status quo. Even the end of the Ukraine War will not diminish strategic competition in Eastern Europe and several corners of the post-Soviet space. However, perhaps this rivalry can be managed so that strategic stability within the international system can be preserved. Hence, Straussian thinking can be instrumental for the rise of a new school of Kremlinology that brings more clarity for policymaking. Specifically, there are four theoretical principles found in Straussian teachings that can enlighten emerging generations of Western Kremlinologists: 1) the reassertion of traditionalism; 2) elite rule; 3) the rejection of unipolar cosmopolitanism and 4) the dangerous nature of the human condition. The ensuing contents discuss why and how each of them is relevant for a serious reading of post-Soviet Russian statecraft. In each case, a summary of key Straussian philosophical teachings is followed by observations that explain their empirical reflection in today’s Russia.

The Reassertion of Traditionalism

Leo Strauss was an outspoken opponent of liberal modernity and everything it stands for. According to Straussian thinking, modernity is the vulgar age in which frivolity, entertainment, degradation, comfort, triviality, emptiness, permissiveness, leisure, commercialism, pacifism and complacency have triumphed. Therefore, the Nietzschean ‘last man’ —the quintessential avatar of modernity— is a contemptible creature in whose nihilistic existence there is nothing worth fighting for. Rather than the fulfilment of a grandiose promise of ‘progress’, modernity represents a major crisis that has brought the fall of man and eclipsed the wisdom of the ancients. Therefore, abandoning the metaphorical caves of liberalism requires the rediscovery of pre-modern wisdom. Specifically, Straussian teachings emphasise that relearning the philosophical lessons from classical antiquity is the key source of inspiration for the restoration of vitality, resolve, morale and purposefulness. Yet, this is not only an intellectual journey. The chains of modernity must be broken so that the Promethean pursuit of human excellence can flourish. Moreover, Straussian teachings underscore that the weight of history —and the scrutiny of its instructive lessons— matters as a navigational compass for statesmanship.

Likewise, Strauss is an opponent of the so-called ‘open society’, one of modernity’s most worshipped totems. The values of an open society impoverish the seriousness of political life and embracing them can only lead to terminal decline. In contrast, Strauss holds that a closed society encourages exceptional qualities that raise the strength of the human spirit, including loyalty, virtue, wisdom, discipline, patriotism, the nobility of effort and honour. Rather than seeking wealth or prosperity, a closed society is focused on the collective pursuit of political outcomes, even if that quest leads to sacrifices for the sake of the greater good. As the concept suggests, the existential horizon of a closed society is confined to the substance of a particular national state whose cultural heritage, unique identity, traditional values and historical sources of inspiration are to be cherished. A polity whose closedness is extinguished is headed in the corrosive direction of decay, weakness, dissolution or even external predation. Only the martial virtues of a closed society can nurture the Spartan-like warrior ethos that a polity needs to ensure its greatness.

If is debatable if Russia is a modern national state. A long-range appraisal reveals ambivalent answers. Russia has experimented with recipes derived from two ideologies born in the cradle of modernity: socialism during the decades of the Soviet era and liberalism in the late 20th century. However, the results of experiments based on both models turned out to be counterproductive. First, the implosion of the Soviet Union was not just a tectonic “geopolitical catastrophe” for Russian national interests. It also represented the death knell of a declining and decrepit system —anchored to the ideological prism of Marxist-Leninist socialism— whose contradictions, failures and bankruptcies had become impossible to overcome. Second, the ensuing liberal era of ‘Weimar Russia’ exacerbated existing problems like political turmoil, economic stagnancy, corruption, interethnic tensions, falling birth rates, substance abuse, disarray, organised crime and prostitution. In contrast, post-Cold War Russian statecraft has had favourable experiences with non-liberal aspects of modernity. In fact, the complex nature of the Kremlin’s geopolitical strategies in this period can be described as exceedingly modern. In the increasingly confrontational chessboard of strategic competition, Moscow relies on sophisticated policies which embrace technological change, adaptation to the changing Zeitgeist of international politics, and the weaponisation of various vectors of complex interdependence (such as energy, social media platforms, migratory flows, finance and money).

On the other hand, Russian policy no longer intends to remake the national character in accordance with the liberal ideological tenets preached by the high priests of modernity in Washington, Davos and Brussels. In fact, the Russian state is rejecting Western trends like secularism, technocratic policymaking, open borders, feminism, the LGBT movement and militant “wokeness”. Some of these are even regarded as instruments of political, propagandistic and ideological subversion ran by Western powers. From the Russian perspective, the Western world is akin to a fallen angel that —driven by intellectual pride— has forsaken its heritage, identity, traditions and religion, all of which have been sacrificed at the altar of ‘progress’. Russia is not interested in sharing the post-historical fate of Western ‘open societies’. In opposition to such creed, Russia has embraced a return to older traditions as sources of guidance, authority, inspiration, symbols and referential frameworks that can fuel the revitalisation of the Russian national state.

This emerging neo-traditionalist Weltanschauung —which seeks to emphasise the uniqueness of the country— encompasses a series of overlapping identitarian underpinnings. Russia is evoking its legacy as the heir to the Byzantine Empire, which outlived the Western Roman Empire for a millennium. With Moscow as the ‘third Rome’, the Russian Federation intends to position itself as an Eastern great power, bulwark of Orthodox Christianity and multi-ethnic empire. In addition, the doctrine of Eurasianism states that Russia is more than a national state. According to this vision, Russia is a natural conservative tellurocracy which operates as an organic civilisational pole whose historical development has blended European and Asian components. Likewise, Russia is also harnessing the strength of nationalism to encourage pride and morale. Such course of action includes the heroic portrayal of Russian historic achievements —such as military victories and acts of conquest— and the celebration of figures like Peter the Great.

Needless to say, these views are not merely ideological. They are consistent with the Kremlin’s foreign policy in the ‘near abroad’, the projection of Russian ‘soft power’ and its strategic opposition to the league of liberal Atlanticist thalassocracies. Ultimately, Russia aspires to emulate the triumph of Sparta —a militaristic and aristocratic monarchy— against Athenian cosmopolitan democracy in the Peloponnesian War. Therefore, a neo-traditionalist revival must be pragmatically read as an attempt to restore the status of Russia as a key player in international politics and to revert the strategic setbacks provoked by the dissolution of the USSR, but also to counter pressing societal problems such as an impeding demographic contraction. Furthermore, the worldview of Russian neo-traditionalism is also reflected in the implementation of domestic policies. In fact, the Russian state officially supports religiosity, family values and traditional gender roles.

Elite Rule

For Professor Leo Strauss, the distinction between democratic and authoritarian political mores is often a cartoonish oversimplification. According to Straussian thinking, everything that overzealous liberal democrats disapprove of is portrayed as ‘authoritarian’. Much like Plato, Leo Strauss revers the figure of philosopher kings as ruling elites. Their position is determined not by their privileged upbringing, heritage or wealth. Instead, philosopher kings are exceptional men who embody the traditional archetypes of both the warrior (action) and the ascetic (intellectual contemplation). As such, they are enlightened by their superior knowledge of greater truths that the vulgar are unable to grasp. Their profound understanding of complex matters, hidden realities, dangerous affairs, and harsh revelations that the uninitiated are not aware of gives them a worldly wisdom for the masterful practice of statesmanship. These rulers are able to gaze into the depth of abyss without losing their unperturbed stoic temper and to still perform diligently. Their rule does not seek to please the fluctuating whims of public opinion, but to do what is needed to satisfy the national interest of the state.

During the 90s, Russia tried to reform its system of political governance and the structure of its economy in accordance with Western standards. However, said experiment failed to deliver essential public goods like order and prosperity. Judging by their disappointing outcomes, such efforts were largely discredited. For all intents and purposes, Russia rejected liberal democracy as a model worth replicating because it was utterly dysfunctional for its geopolitical, historical, societal, idiosyncratic and strategic conditions. Russian scepticism about the universalisation of Western liberal political dogmas is unapologetic. Actually, it seems that, from the Kremlin’s perspective, the march towards ‘the end of history’ —championed by the so-called ‘Davos men’— is a sanctimonious “cocktail of ignorance, arrogance, vanity and hypocrisy”.

In this regard, the regime built by President Vladimir Putin and the Siloviki clan can be described as a neo-Caesarist securocracy. This hermetic ruling elite is integrated by former KGB spooks involved in foreign intelligence activities during the Cold War. The rise of these cadres to power in a moment of deep crisis is not surprising if once considers that they represented —by far— the most competent and better trained personnel of the Soviet regime. Unlike Commissars and Party apparatchiks, KGB operatives were pragmatists whose fierce performance responded to the necessities of raison d’état rather than to ideological abstractions or preferences. Their word-class expertise was also forged by fire in some of the world’s most challenging flashpoints. Accordingly, the esoteric tradecraft of these people includes the arcane arts of espionage, covert action (‘active measures’), duplicity, conspiratorial intrigues, unconventional warfare and psychological operations. In fact, their fateful takeover of the Russian government at the dawn of the 21st century can likely be explained not just as the result of impersonal forces, but as a political masterstroke orchestrated thanks to the clandestine operational dexterity of these men.

Moreover, an exegesis of the policies implemented by this ruling elite indicates a worldview shaped by the principles of hardcore political realism. The members of the Russian ‘deep state’ live in a Machiavellian intellectual universe in which malice, secrecy, ruthlessness, threats, Faustian pacts, amoral calculations, deception, skullduggery and all sorts of ‘dark arts’ are necessary ingredients of politics and statecraft. In contrast, self-righteousness is a recipe for disaster in such cloak-and-dagger world. Hence, the authority of this elite has not been justified through democratic processes or by political popularity. In fact, the willingness and ability of doing what it takes to secure order, retain control, pursue the national interest and confront enemies is perhaps the strongest source of legitimacy for the Siloviki cabal. As the spectre of Leo Strauss is haunting Moscow, the rule of the Russian spy kings is seemingly here to stay.

Rejection of Unipolar Cosmopolitanism

Contrary to what is commonly believed, Leo Strauss was not a supporter of Quixotic quests for global imperial domination by any regime. He never endorsed any crusade to remake all political systems in accordance with a homogeneous blueprint. In fact, he was fiercely opposed to the prospect of a supranational state populated by ‘citizens of the world’ that have been detached from any connections to particular polities. For Strauss, the hypothetical fulfilment of liberal or socialist cosmopolitanism as a model of world order would represent a dystopian tyrannical threat that could only exist under the ironclad control of a Soviet-like bureaucratic dictatorship. Even worse, according to Straussian thinking, such nightmare —seen as unnatural because it neglects key traits which define the human condition— would lead to the ultimate death of philosophy. Under such conditions, the pursuit of intellectual contemplation, the proliferation of inquiry and the discovery of greater truths would never be possible. In short, Straussian teachings are antithetical to the ideas pushed by the likes of Immanuel Kant, Karl Popper, George Soros, Klaus Shwab or Yuval Noah Harari.

Far from preserving diversity, the globalisation of the ‘open society’ would bring an enforced uniformity that abolishes distinctions, plurality, contrasts, the need for noble deeds and identities, as well as both history and politics. Once history has been buried by the tempting promise of everlasting universal happiness, there would be no need for political struggles under the grey rule of a global tyranny presenting itself as ‘benevolent’. However, Leo Strauss prophesises that plans fuelled by globalist aspirations will invariably elicit the backlash of those that refuse to submit. In fact, he anticipates the prospect that growing opposition to universalist schemes and their sophistry will eventually ensure their demise. Even if this project were to be launched by a democracy, that would not make it any better or sugarcoat its undesirability. Strauss himself acknowledged that even democracies can give birth to imperialistic projects. Together, these arguments convincingly show that Straussian teachings reject the convenience and feasibility of a unipolar hegemonic configuration.

In this regard, the Soviet Union was a superpower interested in the pursuit of global hegemony. In contrast, the Russian Federation does not intend to achieve world domination or even to recreate the USSR. However, Russia is trying to reassert itself as the leading power of the post-Soviet space, especially throughout the so-called “Russian world”. Although it is nowhere near the US and China in many fields of national power, Moscow has the strength, assets and influence to operate as a major player in the global geopolitical chessboard. As such, Russian statecraft has been incrementally challenging Washington’s attempts to establish a hegemonic unipolar order and to remake the world in its image and likeness. Russia does not seek to overtake the US, only to advance a multipolar correlation of forces under which it can act as one of the key epicentres. Interestingly, the Kremlin is willing to partner with anybody —including state and nonstate actors— interested in undercutting US power, regardless of their civilisational, ideological or religious affiliations. In this Schmittian rejection of Western Atlanticism and everything it stands for, the beliefs held by the regimes of states like Brazil, China, Cuba, India, Iran, North Korea, Serbia, South Africa, Syria, Turkey or Venezuela are inconsequential as long as they oppose unipolarity and its pretensions to freeze history. This course of action reveals not just the pragmatic calculations of traditional Realpolitik, but also a resolved struggle to rollback the influence of a project focused on the universal expansion of the ‘open society’.

Considering the bilateral balance of power, Moscow’s response to American hegemonic pretensions is asymmetric, but its intensity has grown. This is reflected in the reliance of the Kremlin’s revisionist schemes on an arsenal which includes covert means, a myriad of unconventional power projection vectors, military force and even nuclear sabre-rattling. In short, Russia is aggressively contesting the vision of a unipolar world order undergirded by cosmopolitan liberalism as its official missionary ideology. Accordingly, rather than adopting post-historical Western models as a follower, Russia’s ‘heretical’ attitude seems determined to overturn them. Yet, there is an important nuance that deserves to be highlighted. For Russia, this rivalry is no Apocalyptic crusade or kamikaze mission. Actually, Moscow has hinted that perhaps a deal for the redistribution of spheres of influence can be negotiated in order to achieve a reasonable accommodation with the West. Thus, from the Kremlin’s perspective, it would be preferable to deal with pragmatic Western nationalist forces rather than with the uncompromising apostles and inquisitors trying to convert barbarians to the “one true faith” of universalist liberalism.

The Dangerous Nature of the Human Condition

Leo Strauss was no scholar of contemporary international relations or geopolitics, let alone Kremlinology. Nevertheless, as a student of political philosophy, the exegesis of his teachings reveals a mindset that is close to what the so-called realist school has to say. Not unlike hardcore classical realists, Strauss acknowledges the existence of hierarchies, the subordination of the weak by the strong, the amoral character of statecraft, human baseness and the propensity for conflict as permanent features of politics. As a crypto-realist with a Nietzschean twist, Strauss supported the views of Thrasymachus, Thucydides and Machiavelli about the rule of the powerful as the natural order of things in the political sphere. In accordance with this logic, justice is little more than the advantage of the mighty. Under such conditions, political lifeforms have no choice but to fight in order to pursue their interests, enhance their preparedness, preserve their vitality and uphold what they believe is right. In other words, polities can either embrace danger or perish as a consequence of their folly and/or cowardice. As a result, the practice of statesmanship responds to the particular priorities and preferences of a polity, but not to universalistic expectations. Nevertheless, Strauss never glorified warmongering. He simply recognised politics as an intrinsically confrontational realm whose circumstances often require the decisive ability to overcome risk-aversion in matters of life and death. These perspectives are fully compatible with the philosophical underpinnings of what classical realist thinking is all about. Yet, unlike most realists, Strauss emphasised the importance of ideological motivation to strengthen national morale in engagements which demand a substantial mobilisation of effort.

Interestingly, there are other revealing connections between Straussian teachings and realism as a school of thought. Leo Strauss was an avid student of Thucydides’ writings about the Peloponnesian War. For the German-American philosopher, the work of Thucydides was more than a foundational treatise of realist theory. In his view, such source of ancient wisdom imparted timeless lessons about statecraft, history, human nature and the virtues of the warrior spirit, as well as the importance of attributes like prowess, resolve, and courage in the quest for greatness. In addition, Hans Morgenthau thanked Leo Strauss for his contribution to the introduction of Politics Among Nations, a seminal text which presents the theoretical principles of classical realism. The intellectual cornerstone which underwrites this specific branch of realism is an anthropologically pessimistic conception of human nature due the sinfulness of man and his quintessential condition as a political creature. As Carl Schmitt observed, “all serious political theories presuppose man to be evil”. Moreover, the quasi-Nietzschean concept of the ‘Animus Dominandi’ —put forward by Morgenthau and understood as the natural inclination of humans to subordinate their peers— is fully aligned with the spirit of Straussian teachings.

Post-Cold War Russian statecraft is a textbook example of Darwinian Realpolitik. This inclination is the natural consequence of Russian history, shaped by imperial traditions, intense geopolitical rivalries and the constant threat of invasions. Moscow’s foreign policy, national security and grand strategy are driven by the need to prepare for confrontation against hostile forces and to prevent an eventual encirclement of the motherland. As an assertive and self-confident player in the arena of high politics, the Kremlin believes that being feared is a wise course of action that will deter potential enemies. In turn, Russia intends to subordinate neighbouring weaker states by integrating them into its orbit in one way or another and, at the same time, it refuses to capitulate before stronger counterparts like the US. When Moscow’s arm-twisting tactics do not produce the expected outcomes, the Russians are willing to flirt with danger by embracing war as an instrument of statecraft. From Moscow’s perspective, it is preferable to fight in a vicious jungle as a predator than to assume a subservient role in a neo-Edenic garden in which rules made by others are selectively implemented. Better to reign in its own hell than to serve in the Westernist heaven. Unsurprisingly, the proportion of Russian citizens willing to fight for the country is way higher than in many Western European states. Rather than following the path of the ‘last man’, Russian wants to be amongst the last men standing.

In some cases —including Chechnya, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Syria— Russian military interventions have been successful. Concerning the invasion of Ukraine and its fallout, President Putin and his ruling elite made a risky gamble, but they are convinced that the conflict is worth fighting. The war offers a window of opportunity to remake the global balance of power and to achieve beneficial facts on the ground even if that comes with the risks and costs of challenging NATO. However, the Russians are not suicidal or megalomaniac. Moscow’s pragmatic aims are rather limited. The idea of Russian tanks overrunning Warsaw or even Lviv is out of touch with reality. Russians lack the appetite for an ominous conflict which might directly spark a nuclear Armageddon. Nonetheless, if necessary, they are prepared to fight to make sure their national interests prevail, especially in the so-called ‘near abroad’. As a neo-Spartan polity, Russia expects to prevail against Athen’s spiritual heirs in the West because the balance of resolve and its pool of resources favour the commitment of its war effort. Still, as is often the case in the art of war, only time will tell if this aggressive bid leads to glory or to ruin. If the war effort backfires or in the case of a pyrrhic victory, Vladimir Putin will have a lot to answer for, both politically and historically. But if Russia eventually manages to prevail in any meaningful way, he will be seen by posterity as a successful —and implacable— statesman that performed proficiently.

Conclusions

Understanding post-Cold War Russian statecraft under the Vladimir Putin is a challenging intellectual task whose complexity requires transgressing the myopic and self-righteous horizon of liberalism. In fact, an in-depth examination reveals that contemporary Russia has followed an increasingly Straussian trajectory in more than one respect. Certainly, that does not mean that Leo Strauss is somehow the posthumous sinister mastermind of Moscow’s behaviour. Strauss passed away nearly three decades before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Likewise, President Putin and his court of spy kings may not even be remotely familiar with Strauss’ obscure writings, especially considering his undeserved reputation as the patriarch of neoconservatism. Yet, there is a substantial degree of uncanny resemblance between key Straussian principles and the behaviour of the Russian state. Accordingly, the instructive insights found in the philosophical teachings of the German-American Professor offer a sharp referential framework whose interpretative merits can help decipher the underlying logic and qualities of the Kremlin’s strategic playbook. The Straussian philosophical worldview has turned out to be a powerful key which can unlock some of the cryptic matters of contemporary Kremlinology and perhaps also to recalibrate the examination of other illiberal states, including China and Iran. This usefulness highlights the relevance of the far-sighted lessons of Straussian thinking not just for scholars, but also for practitioners involved in foreign policy, intelligence analysis and national security. An increasingly illiberal world in which illiberal states are acting in accordance with illiberal rationales requires a profound knowledge of illiberal political science for analytical, predictive and prescriptive purposes.

Etgar Keret: Israel's democracy is in danger

Stefan Dege

DW
18/03/23
In Israel, protests against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's planned judicial reform have been going on for weeks. Cultural activists say Israel's democracy is in danger. Writer Etgar Keret explains why.

Etgar Keret is a superstar of Israel's literary scene. The Jewish Museum in Berlin is currently dedicating an exhibition to him titled "Inside Out" in which the author's work and life is presented. Keret, who was born in 1967 in Israel, is considered a master of short story writing and stands firm on his political views, including protesting the judicial reform in his country. "All the demonstrators have one thing in common," Keret said back in February in an interview with journalist Uri Schneider reporting for DW from Israel, "they don't want democracy to be robbed from them."

Keret is also one of the signatories of a letter to the ambassadors of Germany and the UK in Israel. In the letter, around 1,000 Israeli artists, writers and intellectuals called for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's inaugural visits to Berlin and London to be cancelled.

According to a report in the Israeli news outlet "Haaretz," the cultural activists who signed the letter say Israel is in the most serious crisis in its history and is "on the way from a vibrant democracy to a theocratic dictatorship." Prominent signatories include writer David Grossmann and sculptor Sigalit Landau. Nevertheless, Netanyahu arrived in the German capital on March 16 where he met German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier.

Israelis protest proposed judicial overhaul
02:21

Less power for the Supreme Court

The new reform calls for more power for the government and less rule of law controlled by an independent judiciary. Critics accuse Netanyahu and his right-wing religious coalition of weakening the judicial system and thus undermining democracy. The government in Jerusalem, which has been in office since December, wants the reform to strengthen its influence in selecting judges, among other things.

Under the new law, the Supreme Court's powers will be restricted. Authorities justify such a move with claims that judges have interfered in politics. Netanyahu, who is in coalition with ultra-Orthodox and right-wing extremists, is currently facing trial for corruption charges. "The whole state," Keret says, "is hostage to this man who — like Nero or Caligula — considers himself more important than the state."

"This protest movement doesn't need writers to explain the world," Keret said in the interview. "Every liberal democrat understands that a court under the control of the prime minister is a weak court." The same is true, he said, if the government hires a "misogynist, homophobic racist" in the Education Ministry. "My son then learns misogynistic and homophobic attitudes. You don't have to be a genius to understand that. Everybody gets that."

Benjamin Netanyahu visited Chancellor Scholz in Berlin on March 16, 2023

Matthias Rietschel/REUTERS

A widespread protest movement

In Keret's observation, the protest movement unites people in Israel, across political divides. "In my whole life, I've never been to demonstrations with so many people with whom I have almost nothing in common," reports Keret. "To my left are hipsters with a joint in their mouth, to my right are high tech entrepreneurs, and behind me are communists. A range of rich and poor, people from the army and conscientious objectors." What they all have in common, he said, is a fear of losing democracy.

Older people in particular took to the streets. There's a reason for that, Keret said, and it's because Israel is a country of immigration. "A large part of the people who came here did so because they watched the democracies they came from collapse." Older people in particular shaped the image of the demonstrations today, he said, "They are the ones who come week after week. In the rain. In the cold. Maybe because they know the price we will pay if these government plans go through."

Protesters against the judicial reform have taken to the streets in recent weeks

Saeed Qaq/imago images/ZUMA Wire

Religious fundamentalists in the government

The State of Israel, founded in 1948, defines itself as Jewish and democratic, Keret said. "But it's actually a Jewish state that is also democratic as a hobby." Those who talk to members of the religious camp, he said, are told: "Democracy is a temporary phenomenon." Judaism existed before and will exist after democracy, he said. "They don't care about the weakening of democracy, because in the end only God decides anyway."

The interview was conducted by Uri Schneider and this article was translated from German.

SEE LA REVUE GAUCHE - Left Comment: Search results for CARL SCHMITT 

Israelis protest for 11th consecutive week against Netanyahu's judicial reform plans

Issued on: 18/03/2023 - 

Text by:NEWS WIRES

Israelis gathered in towns and cities nationwide on Saturday for an 11th straight week of protests against the judicial reform plans of the hard-right government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

The protesters fear that the proposed reforms, which are already moving through parliament and would increase the power of politicians over the courts, are a threat to Israeli democracy.

In Tel Aviv's Dizengoff square, thousands of demonstrators waved the blue and white Israeli flag of Israel, as well as the rainbow flag of the LGBTQ community.

The demonstrators blocked roads as they set off on a march through the heart of the city. "Saving Democracy!" said one placard held aloft by the crowd.

"I'm worried not about myself, but for my daughters and grandchildren," said Naama Mazor, 64, a retiree from the city of Herzliya.

"We want to keep Israel democratic and liberal, Jewish of course, but liberal. We are very concerned it is going to become a dictatorship," she told AFP.

"There isn't a half-democracy. We're either a democracy or a dictatorship. There is nothing in between."

Sagiv Golan, 46, from Tel Aviv, said the government was "trying to destroy civil rights, women's rights, LGBTQ rights and every thing that democracy stands for... We want to show the voice of democracy."

Israeli media reported demonstrations in more than 100 towns and cities, including Haifa, Jerusalem and Beersheba.

Compromise plan nixed

Since Netanyahu's government announced the reforms in January, days after taking office, massive demonstrations have regularly taken place across Israel.

Opponents of the package have accused Netanyahu, who is on trial on corruption charge he denies, of trying to use the reforms to quash possible judgements against him. The prime minister has rejected the accusation.

Expressing concern over the deepening rift in Israeli society, President Isaac Herzog presented a proposed compromise on Wednesday, but the government immediately rejected it.

"Anyone who thinks that a genuine civil war, with human lives, is a line that we could never reach, has no idea what he is talking about," Herzog said.

Leaders of opposition parties said in a joint news conference on Thursday they supported Herzog's outline.

"The offer is not perfect," said former premier Yair Lapid. "It is not what we wanted, but it is a fair compromise that allows us to live together."

The ruling coalition, which includes ultra-Orthodox Jewish and extreme-right parties, argues the proposed reforms are necessary to correct a power imbalance between elected representatives and Israel's top court.

Immediately after Herzog's announcement, Netanyahu called it a "unilateral compromise", the "key points" of which "only perpetuate the existing situation and do not bring the required balance between the powers".

The reforms would, among other things, allow lawmakers to scrap supreme court rulings with a simple majority vote.

Other proposals would give more weight to the government in the committee that selects judges and would deny the supreme court the right to strike down any amendments to so-called Basic Laws, Israel's quasi-constitution.

(AFP)