Should Poland buy energy generated at a Russian nuclear plant in Belarus?
At the beginning of November the first nuclear block in Belarus’s Astravets NPP will be launched. It will take time before it will actually begin commercial operation, but it is a good moment to ask the question that has been pondered over for years: should Poland buy power from that NPP? –
Mariusz Marszałkowski, editor at BiznesAlert.pl, writes.
A discussion on energy from Belarus
The electricity deficit in north-eastern Poland has been a long standing problem. The discussions on how to solve it have continued for over a decade. The issue persists because the area is located far away from mining sites, e.g. of coal, and sufficient gas transmission infrastructure, which would make it possible to build conventional power plants. When discussions on tackling this issue started to emerge a decade ago, it seemed reasonable to consider working together with Poland’s neighbors, especially Ukraine and Belarus, to handle the problem.
Back in 2008, Member of Parliament Jarosław Matwiejuk officially asked the government whether it was planning any cooperation on the issue of addressing the energy needs of Poland’s north-eastern voivodships and if yes, which neighboring countries were being considered. The then secretary of state at the ministry of the economy, Joanna Strzelec-Łobodzińska replied that “the Polish government puts a high priority on cooperating with Belarus and Ukraine on power-related issues. During the proceedings of the inter-governmental committees on economic cooperation under the patronage of the Ministry of the Economy and during bilateral meetings, the parties discuss new investments in energy generation, modernization and expansion of the existing cross-border connections and the possibility of exchanging electricity. (…) The cooperation with Ukraine and Belarus is becoming especially important due to the possible increase in demand for power in Poland. (…) At the same time we are also seeing a lot of interest in cooperation with regard to the power sector between companies from Poland, Ukraine and Belarus. PGE SA is now in extensive negotiations with businesses and administrations of Poland’s eastern neighbors about modernization and construction of new cross-border links, but also on developing new capacities in those states with the participation of Polish capital.”
The interest in purchasing energy from the East started to emerge after 2011 when a few important events took place. The first one was PGE’s decision not to construct a nuclear power plant in Visaginas with the Baltic States. The company also rejected Russia’s offer to buy power from the Baltic NPP planned in Kaliningrad. The second was the contract to build a nuclear power plant in Belarus’s Astravets signed in 2012.
Since the idea to buy power from Kaliningrad was rightly criticized as a move that went against the overarching goal to become independent of energy imports from Russia, for many the purchase of energy from Belarus seemed reasonable. Especially that at that time there was a thaw in relations between Belarus and the EU. However, it quickly ended after the opposition had been brutally pacified after the presidential election in December 2010. The motivation behind transactions with Belarus was driven by the desire to create deeper business ties with Poland, the fact that the planned NPP would generate more electricity than Belarus could consume, the lack of any real possibility of building an NPP in Poland, as well as the piling up of issues caused not only by the energy deficit in eastern voivodships, but also the EU’s increasingly ambitious climate policy, which impacted the future of Poland’s energy sector as a whole, which is mostly based on lignite.
After the protests had been crushed, the EU sanctions against Belarus’s “elites” were reinstated and it quickly turned out that any hopes for an “economic westernization” of Belarus were false. Alexander Lukashenko did not intend to politically reorient from Moscow to the West, but he still counted on acquiring foreign currency by selling energy to the West. The picture was complete, when it was decided that the Belarusian NPP in Astravets would be based on Russian technology and paid for with Russian preferential credit under the control of Russia’s Rosatom.
Why shouldn’t we buy power from Astravets?
Today Poland’s ruling elites are not talking about buying power from Astravets, even though Belarusians are still hoping this will happen. Either way, it is worth explaining why this should not take place.
First, by buying power from Astravets we bolster Lukashenko’s regime in Minsk. The goal of the NPP (contrary to the propaganda claims on limiting energy dependence on Russia) was to create another, next to the petrochemical and fertilizer industries, state-run entity that would strengthen Belarus’s centrally managed economy. By exporting energy to Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic States, Lukashenko’s regime wanted to create another opportunity to acquire “hard” currency, without the necessity to introduce the free market in his own country. Moreover, for cooperation to flourish it needs to involve partners that are sensible and strategically stable. How sure could Warsaw be that if its relations with Minsk worsened (which happens regularly every few years), Belarus would not cut off the power? Even without such a tool, the Belarusian ruling class does not act logically. However, if it did have such leverage, Polish consumers would quickly experience “cold and darkness” in relations with Belarus, which is often the main goal of an economic blackmail.
Second, since Rosatom was chosen as the main contractor and provider of technology, and the Russian state is the creditor, the NPP in Astravets, apart from its location, will have little to do with Belarus. According to the credit agreement, whether or not the NPP will generate profits from exports, Russian companies will profit anyway from, among others, providing nuclear fuel, servicing or trainings, while the Russian state will earn on the interest from the USD 10 bn loan. Recently, it has been revealed that even though the facility has not been opened yet, it is already generating losses. Therefore, one cannot exclude that if Belarus defaults on the debt, the NPP will be taken over by some Russian energy company. The NPP in Astravets may be an attractive asset for Russia, but if its EU neighbors are not eager to buy power, Russia will not need to pretend it is a Belarusian investment. On the other hand, Belarus will be forced to set a minimum fixed price on the energy generated in the NPP, which would be paid by Belarusian clients. Poland is one of Europe’s leaders in implementing gas diversification. It would be hard to imagine a situation where under the pressure of short-term and uncertain interests, Warsaw would replace its dependency on Russian gas with reliance on Russian power.
Third, to make it possible to import energy from Astravets without intermediaries (i.e. without paying Lithuania for energy transfers via the LitPol Link), it would be necessary to invest in a power connection with Belarus. In 2018 Poland’s PSE dismantled a 220 KV Białystok-Roś link between the two countries. Therefore, at this point it is physically impossible to import energy from Belarus. It would cost millions to restore this possibility, and that investment would have to be paid for by Poland.
Fourth, the decision on not to import energy from Astravets is a gesture of solidarity with the Baltic States, especially Lithuania. Vilnius, which is located less than 50 km from Astravets, is the biggest opponent of the NPP. Lithuania meticulously recorded every issue that happened during the construction of the nuclear facility. And there were plenty of accidents and incidents to report, including the fall of the reactor core from a few meters above the ground, which happened during installation work. Belarus never commented on these reports, which suggests that the rush and the necessity to cut corners to save money were a direct threat for its safe functioning. Additionally, since the very beginning Vilinus has been outspoken about the real reason behind building an NPP in this location, which is to have another leverage to exert pressure on Poland and the Baltic States. This includes the attempts at undermining the plans to desynchronize Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia from the post-Soviet BRELL power system Thus, the NPP may also impact the Baltics’ attempts at finally breaking off with the issue that, despite so many years, has been gluing it to Russia. In Poland we are talking a lot about European solidarity, also in the context of energy security. Lithuania expects Poland to act in solidarity as well. By agreeing to economically doubtful profits, we would undermine the authority of a country that aspires to become a leader in Central Europe. This would enable Russia to pursue the “divide and conquer” policy.
Fifth, importing power from Astravets could impact Poland’s energy transition plans, including the construction of its own nuclear facilities. The Belarusian alternative could distract Poles from pursuing their own project, especially at a time when an economic crisis is possible. However, even without that, the plans to build an NPP in Poland are constantly postponed and time is running out. According to the latest version of the Polish Nuclear Power Programme, the first reactor is to be opened in 2033. This means we have 12 years to complete the investment. Still, the Polish energy sector has seen many plans and strategies, but despite the hype none of those have ever materialized. BiznesAlert.pl learned that this may change in October, when Poland will reportedly sign a contract with the U.S. on building an NPP.
How to get rid of the energy deficit in north-eastern Poland?
There are three ways to handle this issue. The first one is to build a combined cycle unit at the Ostrołęka power plant. Such an investment would provide enough power to cover the demand in northern Masovia, as well as Warmia, Masuria and Podlasie. The second solution is something that was not seriously considered a decade ago – dispersed power generation based on renewable energy sources. The dynamic growth of the PV sector shows that in practice, every household in Poland could add to the national power system electricity generated on its own roof or in its own garden. Additionally, there is PGNiG’s plan for biomethane plants , which may be a driver behind the emergence of micro-power plants that use gas from organic waste. Moreover, the power generated by offshore wind farms, that will be constructed on the Baltic Sea, will be of huge benefit as well. The third, temporary solution is to import power, e.g. via the LitPol Link. The power itself may come from the Swedish-Lithuanian link that runs on the bottom of the Baltic Sea.
All of the options have their pros and cons. None is free from drawbacks and imperfections. Despite that, all of them are a lot better than becoming dependant on power from a country that, in the face of a crisis, acts erratically and presents towards Poland an attitude that is unfriendly, to put it mildly. We should remember about this when during the pompous opening of the NPP in November, Lukashenko will be talking about unwise Poles who did not want power “from Belarus”.
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Will Lukashenko give Putin “Belarusian nuclear energy” back? (ANALYSIS)
On the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, the 7th of November, an official opening ceremony of the nuclear power plant in Belarus’s Ostrovets was to take place. The facility may become one of the elements of the transaction that Alexander Lukashenko had to agree on after receiving political and economic support from Russia.
On the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, the 7th of November, an official opening ceremony of the nuclear power plant in Belarus’s Ostrovets was to take place. The facility may become one of the elements of the transaction that Alexander Lukashenko had to agree on after receiving political and economic support from Russia.
A construction with a long history
The nuclear power plant (NPP) in Ostrovets has a long history despite the fact it has not even been launched yet. The opening ceremony was to take place symbolically at the beginning of November, but the plant will start generating power in the first quarter of 2021 at the earliest. The investment started in 2005. That is when in the face of yet another crisis in the Minsk-Moscow relations (or rather Lukashenko-Putin relations), it was decided, without any research, environmental permits or consultations, that an NPP would be constructed in the republic.
The main reason behind this move was Belarus’s crushing dependence on Russian gas. The country uses over 20 bcm of gas a year to generate over 90 percent of its power. To fully display the scale of reliance on Russia, it is worth to compare it to Poland, which has about 20 million citizens more than Belarus, but uses “only” 17 bcm of gas annually. The reasoning behind building the NPP was that it would contribute to lowering the demand for natural gas by over 4 bcm a year.
While Belarus had its own reasons for making this decision, the media were reporting about the real goals behind setting up an NPP in Ostrovets. The town is located 20 km away from the border with Lithuania and 240 km away from the border with Poland. The business reason behind the NPP was to sell power to the Baltics and Poland. This issue generated intense discussions not only in Poland. They have turned especially tense after it had been revealed who would deliver the technology.
At first Minsk announced that the main constructor (and technology provider) would be selected in an open, international competition to which all major players would be invited.
The nuclear power plant (NPP) in Ostrovets has a long history despite the fact it has not even been launched yet. The opening ceremony was to take place symbolically at the beginning of November, but the plant will start generating power in the first quarter of 2021 at the earliest. The investment started in 2005. That is when in the face of yet another crisis in the Minsk-Moscow relations (or rather Lukashenko-Putin relations), it was decided, without any research, environmental permits or consultations, that an NPP would be constructed in the republic.
The main reason behind this move was Belarus’s crushing dependence on Russian gas. The country uses over 20 bcm of gas a year to generate over 90 percent of its power. To fully display the scale of reliance on Russia, it is worth to compare it to Poland, which has about 20 million citizens more than Belarus, but uses “only” 17 bcm of gas annually. The reasoning behind building the NPP was that it would contribute to lowering the demand for natural gas by over 4 bcm a year.
While Belarus had its own reasons for making this decision, the media were reporting about the real goals behind setting up an NPP in Ostrovets. The town is located 20 km away from the border with Lithuania and 240 km away from the border with Poland. The business reason behind the NPP was to sell power to the Baltics and Poland. This issue generated intense discussions not only in Poland. They have turned especially tense after it had been revealed who would deliver the technology.
At first Minsk announced that the main constructor (and technology provider) would be selected in an open, international competition to which all major players would be invited.
Russia is the lender and the constructor…
On the 25 of November 2011 it formally became clear who would build the NPP. Belarus signed a government loan contract for USD 10 billion that would be spent on the plant. Russia was the lender and the company that would deliver the technology and build the facility was Rosatom’s daughter company – Atomstroyexport. The borrowed USD 10 bn constitutes 90 percent of the NPPs cost. The remaining 10 percent was supposed to have been paid for by Belarus in advance.
According to the contract, Belarus was allowed to use the credit between 2011 and 2020. The repayment was due to start six months after the launch of the NPP, but not later than by the 1st of April 2021. The transfers were to be wired in 30 equal instalments, paid every six months. In the middle of July this year, the PMs of both states signed an annex to the credit agreement, where they agreed to extend the credit until 2022. The deadline for paying the first instalment was also changed to the 1st of April 2023 and it was decided the interest rate would be at 3.3. percent.
Up until that moment, the cost of the credit was calculated on the basis of a mixed formula. The interest rate for half of the credit was at a fixed 5.23 percent, whereas the other half was to be based on six-month LIBOR in dollars with reference to the London Interbank Market, plus an additional 1.83% of margin per year.
The interest on the loan was to be paid off twice a year – on the first of April and on the first of October. If the interest is not paid on time (even a one-day delay), a 2 percent yearly margin will be added to the credit cost until the credit is paid in full. If the deadline for paying off interest is missed by 180 days the to-date arrears will be consolidated and be subject to immediate repayment (debt, interest, margin). Until the entire credit is paid off, all the money will be spent on covering the existing debt.
On the 25 of November 2011 it formally became clear who would build the NPP. Belarus signed a government loan contract for USD 10 billion that would be spent on the plant. Russia was the lender and the company that would deliver the technology and build the facility was Rosatom’s daughter company – Atomstroyexport. The borrowed USD 10 bn constitutes 90 percent of the NPPs cost. The remaining 10 percent was supposed to have been paid for by Belarus in advance.
According to the contract, Belarus was allowed to use the credit between 2011 and 2020. The repayment was due to start six months after the launch of the NPP, but not later than by the 1st of April 2021. The transfers were to be wired in 30 equal instalments, paid every six months. In the middle of July this year, the PMs of both states signed an annex to the credit agreement, where they agreed to extend the credit until 2022. The deadline for paying the first instalment was also changed to the 1st of April 2023 and it was decided the interest rate would be at 3.3. percent.
Up until that moment, the cost of the credit was calculated on the basis of a mixed formula. The interest rate for half of the credit was at a fixed 5.23 percent, whereas the other half was to be based on six-month LIBOR in dollars with reference to the London Interbank Market, plus an additional 1.83% of margin per year.
The interest on the loan was to be paid off twice a year – on the first of April and on the first of October. If the interest is not paid on time (even a one-day delay), a 2 percent yearly margin will be added to the credit cost until the credit is paid in full. If the deadline for paying off interest is missed by 180 days the to-date arrears will be consolidated and be subject to immediate repayment (debt, interest, margin). Until the entire credit is paid off, all the money will be spent on covering the existing debt.
… Russia will be the investor as well?
Vladimir Putin’s statement during his latest meeting with Lukashenko in Sochi is noteworthy – he stressed that Russian investments in Belarus were very important. “The value of only one of them – the construction of a nuclear power plant – is USD 10 bn,” he stressed. It should be remembered that the only full and formal investor and the investment’s operator is the Belarus Nuclear Power Plant state unitary enterprise. Russia is the creditor and its Atomstroyexport is the main contractor. Does Putin’s words mean that the owner of the facility may change soon?
Recently it has been revealed that the state enterprise and investor in the Ostrovets NPP has a gigantic debt. According to the Ekonomika account on the Telegram messenger, on 1 June 2020 the company’s debt was at BYN 1.3 bn (USD 500 m).
The Belarusian Ministry of Energy denied the news and stated it was “surprised” about the fact that the company, which has not yet started any commercial activities, was in debt. It is worth taking into consideration the fact that all the news about accidents during the construction of the NPP were also leaked by anonymous accounts on the Telegram. At first they were officially denied as well, but in time external inspectors, intelligence services, and even Belarusians themselves, confirmed them.
Minsk’s unfulfilled expectations with regard to exporting electricity, which makes it impossible to acquire foreign currency from sales, the necessity pay off the debt to Russians, pay off the credit from China to build power infrastructure (loan from 2012 from China’s NCPE worth USD 350 m) all mean that maintaining this investment could kill the country’s budget. On the other hand, putting the NPP under Russian management may be one of the elements of the political deal between Minsk and Moscow. Russia may, for instance, write off part of Minsk’s NPP debt.
Vladimir Putin’s statement during his latest meeting with Lukashenko in Sochi is noteworthy – he stressed that Russian investments in Belarus were very important. “The value of only one of them – the construction of a nuclear power plant – is USD 10 bn,” he stressed. It should be remembered that the only full and formal investor and the investment’s operator is the Belarus Nuclear Power Plant state unitary enterprise. Russia is the creditor and its Atomstroyexport is the main contractor. Does Putin’s words mean that the owner of the facility may change soon?
Recently it has been revealed that the state enterprise and investor in the Ostrovets NPP has a gigantic debt. According to the Ekonomika account on the Telegram messenger, on 1 June 2020 the company’s debt was at BYN 1.3 bn (USD 500 m).
The Belarusian Ministry of Energy denied the news and stated it was “surprised” about the fact that the company, which has not yet started any commercial activities, was in debt. It is worth taking into consideration the fact that all the news about accidents during the construction of the NPP were also leaked by anonymous accounts on the Telegram. At first they were officially denied as well, but in time external inspectors, intelligence services, and even Belarusians themselves, confirmed them.
Minsk’s unfulfilled expectations with regard to exporting electricity, which makes it impossible to acquire foreign currency from sales, the necessity pay off the debt to Russians, pay off the credit from China to build power infrastructure (loan from 2012 from China’s NCPE worth USD 350 m) all mean that maintaining this investment could kill the country’s budget. On the other hand, putting the NPP under Russian management may be one of the elements of the political deal between Minsk and Moscow. Russia may, for instance, write off part of Minsk’s NPP debt.
Why does Putin need a company that is going bust?
One cannot exclude the fact that Russia could be interested in taking over the Belarusian NPP as an owner. Such a turn of events could be desirable for two reasons. First, the investment will be paid off by Belarus. The credit will have to be paid off sooner or later. The majority of the money was spent in Russia, which means Russian companies and contractors were the main beneficiaries of the investment.
Russians may also be interested in selling the power to clients in Belarus on terms similar to how, e.g. gas is sold. Gazprom Transgaz Belarus, because it was taken over by the Russian monopoly, has state-guaranteed fixed rates related to delivering gas to clients. It is possible that Russians will force Belarusians to agree on a minimal rate for sales of electricity, which would ensure profitability to the owner.
The Belarusian operator is no longer needed to “hide” the real reason behind constructing an NPP in Belarus. So far, the supporters of this investment in the Baltic States and Poland, explained that buying energy from Ostrovets was not a bad idea because it would help the Belarusian state to become less dependant on Russia, and claimed that the project had ‘nothing to do’ with Russia. However, because the political elites in Poland, Lithuania, and to a lesser degree in Latvia and Estonia strongly object to the idea of buying power from the NPP, “Minsk as a front” is no longer useful, because these states will probably not buy “Belarusian” power from a Russian power plant anyway.
In recent years Belarusians have rushed to switch their economy from running on gas to electricity to “balance” the costs of the NPP construction. If the investment is taken over by Russia, it would turn out that those actions were lethal to the essence of energy independence of the Belarusian state. Additionally, Russia could also try to use any surplus energy to produce alternative fuels, e.g. hydrogen. This would indirectly help to reduce the negative effects of the “embargo” on power from Ostrovets, if clients for “yellow” hydrogen from the NPP could be found.
“Electric Nord Stream”, a moniker that could be used to meanly describe the political project that the NPP in Ostrovets is, did not attain the overarching goal, which was to flood CEE with cheap, seemingly “not Russian”, and yet very Russian, energy. Despite that, the investment is still very likely to impact the state of Belarus on many levels. Considering Lukashenko’s current situation, such an opportunity may be worth taking by Russia.
Related Posts:
Linkevičius: International community stands in solidarity with Lithuania on Ostrovets NPP issue
Nuclear energy is feared in Belarus, but there won’t be another Chernobyl
One cannot exclude the fact that Russia could be interested in taking over the Belarusian NPP as an owner. Such a turn of events could be desirable for two reasons. First, the investment will be paid off by Belarus. The credit will have to be paid off sooner or later. The majority of the money was spent in Russia, which means Russian companies and contractors were the main beneficiaries of the investment.
Russians may also be interested in selling the power to clients in Belarus on terms similar to how, e.g. gas is sold. Gazprom Transgaz Belarus, because it was taken over by the Russian monopoly, has state-guaranteed fixed rates related to delivering gas to clients. It is possible that Russians will force Belarusians to agree on a minimal rate for sales of electricity, which would ensure profitability to the owner.
The Belarusian operator is no longer needed to “hide” the real reason behind constructing an NPP in Belarus. So far, the supporters of this investment in the Baltic States and Poland, explained that buying energy from Ostrovets was not a bad idea because it would help the Belarusian state to become less dependant on Russia, and claimed that the project had ‘nothing to do’ with Russia. However, because the political elites in Poland, Lithuania, and to a lesser degree in Latvia and Estonia strongly object to the idea of buying power from the NPP, “Minsk as a front” is no longer useful, because these states will probably not buy “Belarusian” power from a Russian power plant anyway.
In recent years Belarusians have rushed to switch their economy from running on gas to electricity to “balance” the costs of the NPP construction. If the investment is taken over by Russia, it would turn out that those actions were lethal to the essence of energy independence of the Belarusian state. Additionally, Russia could also try to use any surplus energy to produce alternative fuels, e.g. hydrogen. This would indirectly help to reduce the negative effects of the “embargo” on power from Ostrovets, if clients for “yellow” hydrogen from the NPP could be found.
“Electric Nord Stream”, a moniker that could be used to meanly describe the political project that the NPP in Ostrovets is, did not attain the overarching goal, which was to flood CEE with cheap, seemingly “not Russian”, and yet very Russian, energy. Despite that, the investment is still very likely to impact the state of Belarus on many levels. Considering Lukashenko’s current situation, such an opportunity may be worth taking by Russia.
Related Posts:
Linkevičius: International community stands in solidarity with Lithuania on Ostrovets NPP issue
Nuclear energy is feared in Belarus, but there won’t be another Chernobyl
Chernobyl’s demons still haunt Poland’s nuclear projects
26 April is here, so the time to open the old wounds caused by the Chernobyl nuclear disaster has come. Despite the fact that it’s been 34 years since the tragedy, it is not often possible to assess nuclear power and its role in the energy sector rationally. The problem sits with excessive concern over radioactive radiation – writes Patrycja Rapacka, editor at BiznesAlert.pl.
26 April is here, so the time to open the old wounds caused by the Chernobyl nuclear disaster has come. Despite the fact that it’s been 34 years since the tragedy, it is not often possible to assess nuclear power and its role in the energy sector rationally. The problem sits with excessive concern over radioactive radiation – writes Patrycja Rapacka, editor at BiznesAlert.pl.
Emotions over logic
The 1986 disaster is seen by the international community as the worst nuclear accident in the history of the industry. After 34 years we know that a few factors caused this tragedy: human error and a faulty design. After over 30 years of discussions on nuclear energy one of the most popular arguments against the industry is the problem of high risk of nuclear radiation in case of a breakdown.
It’s true that a breakdown may happen at any power plant, but in the years after the incident sufficient safety systems have been designed that protect us against the threat of radiation. New power plants are designed and constructed in line with safety regulations and do not pose a threat to locals even in the event of a serious malfunction. Nuclear power as a source of energy is not perfect. The industry faces costly investments and delays. On the other hand, coal-powered energy generation and renewable energy sources have their own faults, but do not stir up as many emotions as the atom.
Ironically, nuclear power plants have been located near Poland’s borders for years – in Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Ukraine, Hungary and soon Belarus. For whatever reason the participants of discussions on nuclear power rarely talk about the 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear power plant accident, during which a partial meltdown of the second reactor occurred. It turned out that the containment vessel withstood the breakdown. One also needs to mention the Fukushima accident caused not by a faulty technology used, but by a tsunami. The water flooded the power plant, which had been designed to withstand an earthquake and a wave, but not of this magnitude. In result Japan temporarily turned off all nuclear power plants, which covered a third of the country’s electricity demand.
In view of these events, many countries started to reconsider investments in nuclear energy. Germany decided to completely phase out nuclear energy and chose high emission coal and gas as its reserve capacity sources. However, this does not mean nuclear energy does not pose a threat to the society. Yet, it is difficult to assess the real level of risk it poses.
The 1986 disaster is seen by the international community as the worst nuclear accident in the history of the industry. After 34 years we know that a few factors caused this tragedy: human error and a faulty design. After over 30 years of discussions on nuclear energy one of the most popular arguments against the industry is the problem of high risk of nuclear radiation in case of a breakdown.
It’s true that a breakdown may happen at any power plant, but in the years after the incident sufficient safety systems have been designed that protect us against the threat of radiation. New power plants are designed and constructed in line with safety regulations and do not pose a threat to locals even in the event of a serious malfunction. Nuclear power as a source of energy is not perfect. The industry faces costly investments and delays. On the other hand, coal-powered energy generation and renewable energy sources have their own faults, but do not stir up as many emotions as the atom.
Ironically, nuclear power plants have been located near Poland’s borders for years – in Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Ukraine, Hungary and soon Belarus. For whatever reason the participants of discussions on nuclear power rarely talk about the 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear power plant accident, during which a partial meltdown of the second reactor occurred. It turned out that the containment vessel withstood the breakdown. One also needs to mention the Fukushima accident caused not by a faulty technology used, but by a tsunami. The water flooded the power plant, which had been designed to withstand an earthquake and a wave, but not of this magnitude. In result Japan temporarily turned off all nuclear power plants, which covered a third of the country’s electricity demand.
In view of these events, many countries started to reconsider investments in nuclear energy. Germany decided to completely phase out nuclear energy and chose high emission coal and gas as its reserve capacity sources. However, this does not mean nuclear energy does not pose a threat to the society. Yet, it is difficult to assess the real level of risk it poses.
Playing on emotions
The society has fallen victim to disinformation on radioactivity. Fake news about the consequences of the fire in Ukraine have spread causing panic in some places. Despite the statements made by, e.g. the National Atomic Energy Agency, the majority of the people still don’t believe there is no threat. The reports by France’s Institute for Radiological Protection (IRSN) have not even reached us. Stanisław Żaryn, the spokesman for the Minister-Special Services Coordinator, reported on this disinformation campaign. “The message was based on the actual fires in Ukraine and fed on the historical associations with the power plant in Chernobyl, used official and unofficial, including private, information channels, used authorities on the subject and their “hidden sources,” e.g. friends/scientists/employees of institutions responsible for Poland’s security,” he informed.
The report drafted by Poland’s intelligence community has clearly showed that the goal of disinformation campaign was to spread panic and create informational chaos in Poland. It also spread gossip about the relations between Poland and Ukraine, built ground to continue to manipulate the Polish society, undermine trust in Poland’s state institutions and weaken the credibility of information and, most importantly, “generate negative emotions around nuclear energy.”
Poland’s energy sector and policies aiming at making its energy security independent of Russia are being attacked by Kremlin propagandists. News articles on websites on the energy sector are used by Russian-language media for manipulation, which happened to BiznesAlert.pl as well. The goal of the manipulations is to cause specific reactions, among others, to discourage people from nuclear energy.
Social acceptance should be a priority
In order to change how nuclear energy is perceived one should focus on social issues instead of technological aspects. The race on the international nuclear energy market is on, new generation power plants are under construction, but so what?
The second piece of the puzzle – social approval for the atom – is missing. The architects of energy security should focus on fostering a dialogue with the society. The approval ratings for nuclear power plants have dropped in many democracies, which is why the role of nuclear power in the international energy economy has been significantly limited. Whereas nuclear energy may provide a stable energy supply to Poland and let us meet the EU climate policy goals. Even if Warsaw was able to fund a nuclear investment, the plant would not be built without a widespread public support. Nuclear science professor Michael W. Golay wrote about this already in 2001 in his article „On social acceptance of nuclear power”. Public support minimizes the risk that a construction of a nuclear facility would be a partisan project where one party decides to invest in it, but when it loses power the plans change. Such a scenario is possible in Poland.
The society has fallen victim to disinformation on radioactivity. Fake news about the consequences of the fire in Ukraine have spread causing panic in some places. Despite the statements made by, e.g. the National Atomic Energy Agency, the majority of the people still don’t believe there is no threat. The reports by France’s Institute for Radiological Protection (IRSN) have not even reached us. Stanisław Żaryn, the spokesman for the Minister-Special Services Coordinator, reported on this disinformation campaign. “The message was based on the actual fires in Ukraine and fed on the historical associations with the power plant in Chernobyl, used official and unofficial, including private, information channels, used authorities on the subject and their “hidden sources,” e.g. friends/scientists/employees of institutions responsible for Poland’s security,” he informed.
The report drafted by Poland’s intelligence community has clearly showed that the goal of disinformation campaign was to spread panic and create informational chaos in Poland. It also spread gossip about the relations between Poland and Ukraine, built ground to continue to manipulate the Polish society, undermine trust in Poland’s state institutions and weaken the credibility of information and, most importantly, “generate negative emotions around nuclear energy.”
Poland’s energy sector and policies aiming at making its energy security independent of Russia are being attacked by Kremlin propagandists. News articles on websites on the energy sector are used by Russian-language media for manipulation, which happened to BiznesAlert.pl as well. The goal of the manipulations is to cause specific reactions, among others, to discourage people from nuclear energy.
Social acceptance should be a priority
In order to change how nuclear energy is perceived one should focus on social issues instead of technological aspects. The race on the international nuclear energy market is on, new generation power plants are under construction, but so what?
The second piece of the puzzle – social approval for the atom – is missing. The architects of energy security should focus on fostering a dialogue with the society. The approval ratings for nuclear power plants have dropped in many democracies, which is why the role of nuclear power in the international energy economy has been significantly limited. Whereas nuclear energy may provide a stable energy supply to Poland and let us meet the EU climate policy goals. Even if Warsaw was able to fund a nuclear investment, the plant would not be built without a widespread public support. Nuclear science professor Michael W. Golay wrote about this already in 2001 in his article „On social acceptance of nuclear power”. Public support minimizes the risk that a construction of a nuclear facility would be a partisan project where one party decides to invest in it, but when it loses power the plans change. Such a scenario is possible in Poland.
Time to move on
Public support could be generated through educating the people on why Poland needs nuclear energy, how nuclear facilities work and what are the potential threats. Fear makes things look twice as bad as they are until one learns about the facts. However, a fact-based discussion on this topic is still not taking place in Poland. In fact, the issue of nuclear power most often crops up in the context of the Chernobyl disaster – recently in relation to the fires in the forest surrounding the closed plant and the alleged radioactive cloud that was supposed to have come to Poland. Instead, a different cloud – a fog of misinformation and fear mongering about nuclear contamination – reached our borders.
This is why it is extremely important to educate the society on where to look for verified information. Of course, we could just build the nuclear power plant without asking the people for their approval. However, such an approach doesn’t always pay off. All the more that the Chernobyl demons, instead of staying in the concrete sarcophagus in Ukraine will continue to haunt Poland and its nuclear program.
Public support could be generated through educating the people on why Poland needs nuclear energy, how nuclear facilities work and what are the potential threats. Fear makes things look twice as bad as they are until one learns about the facts. However, a fact-based discussion on this topic is still not taking place in Poland. In fact, the issue of nuclear power most often crops up in the context of the Chernobyl disaster – recently in relation to the fires in the forest surrounding the closed plant and the alleged radioactive cloud that was supposed to have come to Poland. Instead, a different cloud – a fog of misinformation and fear mongering about nuclear contamination – reached our borders.
This is why it is extremely important to educate the society on where to look for verified information. Of course, we could just build the nuclear power plant without asking the people for their approval. However, such an approach doesn’t always pay off. All the more that the Chernobyl demons, instead of staying in the concrete sarcophagus in Ukraine will continue to haunt Poland and its nuclear program.
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Nuclear energy is feared in Belarus, but there won’t be another Chernobyl
Nuclear energy is feared in Belarus, but there won’t be another Chernobyl
For many years numerous experts have been concerned about Belarus’s plans to build a nuclear power plant. Safety issues as well as the political impact of the investment on countries in the CEE region are at the top of the list. However, in retrospect it looks like this is yet another project that will not meet its expected and ambitious goals – writes Mariusz Marszałkowski, editor at BiznesAlert.pl
The plant – Russian or Belarusian?
The Belarusian nuclear power plant (NPP) is located 18 kilometers (ca. 11 miles) away from Ostrovets (aka Astravyets), 4 km (2.5 miles) away from the border with Lithuania and 55 km (34 km) away from Vilnius, its capital city. It will have two units equipped with two III generation WWER-1200 reactors in accordance with the AES-2006 model. The total capacity of the NPP will be 2400 MW. The idea to construct the plant appeared after the 2007 energy dispute with Russia. Investors expected that producing power at an NPP will significantly reduce Belarus’s energy dependency on Russian gas, which is the main fuel for power generation in Belarus.
However, it was already in 2009 when it turned out that the diversification plan had failed. In fact it resulted only in changing the country’s energy mix proportions by adding Russian uranium to the list. This happened because Minsk chose Russia’s Atomstroyexport as the plant’s main construction company. The works started in June 2012 and the casting of the concrete for the first unit kicked off in November 2013. In 2014 the construction of the second unit commenced. The cost was USD 11 billion out of which USD 10 billion was bankrolled by a credit line from Russia awarded for 10 years. Belarus is obliged to start repaying the debt as of 2021 in installments of USD 1 billion every year. At the end of 2020 the government in Minsk tried renegotiating the loan deal because the project was delayed. On 11 of February Russia’s finance ministry said that renegotiations were out of the question. Minsk wanted to postpone the repayment deadline and decrease the interest rate.
Incidents hidden away from the public
Lithuania is the biggest opponent of the project. In Vilnius’s opinion the power plant is not being constructed in accordance with global safety and transparency standards. Even the location of the project, which is very close to the border with Lithuania is problematic. Vilnius is also accusing Belarus of not being transparent and open about the incidents that have occurred during the construction.
At least a dozen incidents took place on the construction site which claimed the lives of at least 5 workers. The 5-year delay is also a testament to the level of incompetence of the people involved in the project. According to an executive order issued by president Lukashenko in January 2008, the first unit was supposed to have been launched in 2016, the other one in 2018. The deadlines for the investments have been postponed a number of times. The current deadline for the first reactor is the first quarter of 2020, for the second one it’s the end of 2020.
One of the worst accidents occurred when a 330-ton reactor vessel was dropped from a height of 4 to 5 meters while hanging on a crane. This happened a day before it was supposed to have been installed during an official ceremony with state representatives. The event was cancelled. The Belarusian authorities denied this ever happened for a very long time, only after an outcry from the Western media did they officially admit the mishap did take place. Still they stressed that it did not impact the safety of the investment. Due to international pressure it was decided to replace the vessel with a new one. Earlier in April 2016 the building where the control room was, collapsed. In February 2018 the technical exercise of the reactor’s emergency shutdown caused a short circuit, which started fire in the switchboard and the control room. Neither this accident nor the other ones were reported by the authorities. However, when activists and the media revealed the mishaps, the authorities brushed them off claiming they were irrelevant to the general safety of the plant. In May 2019 another fire took place, this time in a tunnel under the first reactor. A container with solvent caught fire and when employees failed to extinguish it, the in-house firemen appeared within minutes and handled the situation. Belarus confirmed this indeed happened, but the acknowledgment was made on 12 February 2020.
According to experts from Lithuania’s intelligence agency the high number of accidents is caused by the fact that the contractors are under pressure from Belarus’s top politicians who want to speed up the project. The other reason is that the investment is underfinanced and costs are cut wherever possible. However, this opinion doesn’t necessarily hold water. Two other nuclear power plants in Europe that are currently under construction – Finland’s Olkiluoto and France’s Flamanville have significantly bigger delays than Ostrovets. However, the difference between them and Belarus’s case is transparency and the scale of issues surrounding the investments. A lot of the mishaps in Ostrovets could have been avoided if it wasn’t for the carelessness of the construction workers and the disregard towards basic safety rules, e.g. last year’s fire was started by an employee smoking a cigarette near a container filled with solvent.
International concerns
In a 2012 report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) warned that Belarus’s regulatory body that is formally responsible for the investment lacks technical competencies and sufficient political independence to supervise the construction of a nuclear power plant. After another audit by the IAEA in 2016, the Belarusian government did not publish the agency’s post-audit report. Probably because the document was critical of how the investment was managed.
In July 2014 the Ministerial Conference of the Aarhus Convention decided that the Belarusians failed to comply with the requirements of the Convention because they did not provide an environmental impact assessment, nor did they investigate the plant’s impact on ground waters in Lithuania and on the Neris river, which flows through Vilnius and is an important source of potable water for Lithuanians. Moreover, there is a risk that the NPP may negatively impact water level in the Neris which, because of dry summers, is not that high in the first place. The river’s ecosystem may also be altered if hot water previously used for cooling the reactors is dumped into the stream. Access to sufficient water amounts necessary to cool the installation is yet another serious issue the entire project is facing.
The international community is also concerned about the NPP stress tests required by the European Commission. The requirement to conduct such tests was implemented after the Fukushima disaster. Belarus, together with six other non-EU countries agreed to conduct the stress tests at the Ostrovets NPP. However, the tests are deemed unreliable as they are to be conducted by Atomstroyexport which is responsible for the construction of the plant. The company is a subsidiary of Russia’s Rosatom. In February 2019 in a vote 30 to 6, the Espoo Convention decided that Belarus failed to explain to the international community “the justification of the selection of the Ostrovets site over the alternative sites” (Espoo’s Draft decision IS/1d). The decision was issued after Lithuania’s complaint filed in 2011.
Ostrovets as a political project
Ostrovets was a project with specific political goals from its inception. At first it was Minsk’s attempt at tackling Russia’s dominance over Belarus’s gas market. Then, after Minsk received a low-interest USD 10 billion loan from Russia the goal was turned on its head. Now the aim was to use the NPP to make Central and Eastern European countries dependent on Russian electricity. The NPP in Belarus together with the Baltic Nuclear Power Plant in the Kaliningrad Oblast were to create a tandem that would flood Poland and the Baltic states with power, thus blocking their attempts at setting free from Russia’s economic influence.
After Poland and Lithuania had decided not to purchase energy from the Kaliningrad NPP its construction was halted and Rosatom focused entirely on the project in Belarus, which was already underway. Poland and Lithuania announced they would not buy power from Ostrovets either. In 2018 Poland started to dismantle the 220 KV power link between Bialystok, Poland and Ros, Belarus that would otherwise enable Warsaw to import energy from Belarus. At the same time, Lithuania’s transmission system operator Litgrid signed a deal with Kaunas University of Technology in late 2019 to develop a technical system that would block power transmission from Belarus to Lithuania. Latvia’s position on the issue remains unclear, as it has not made any official decision on whether to buy or boycott the Ostrovets power. Riga’s vacillation shows that Russia’s Ostrovets scheme is still up in the air. However, things may change because Lithuania is lobbying its partners to draft a joint position on energy from the Belarusian plant.
However, the Ostrovets NPP does have some impact on one piece in this entire puzzle. It may hinder the process of synchronizing the Baltic States’ grid with the continental system. Currently under the BRELL agreement the Baltic grid is connected to the Soviet IPS/UPS system. However, before joining the EU in 2004 the Baltics agreed to synchronize with the European system by 2025. Once that happens it will be possible to dismantle the physical power links between Belarus and Lithuania and Latvia.
Moreover, the EU climate policy and especially the goal to reach carbon neutrality may turn out to be of more significance than solidarity with Lithuanians, especially if local power plants will not be modernized quickly enough. Estonia may be facing this problem most of all, because it fuels its power plants with bituminous sands, which emit a lot of CO2.
Russia’s profit, Belarus’s loss
Lithuania compares the Ostrovets NPP to the Chernobyl plant infamous for its 1986 accident, which contaminated with nuclear fallout a huge chunk of Europe. Ostrovets is facing similar concerns about following rules and safety procedures. The accidents and lack of transparency are creating justified unease about the safety of countries in the region. However, panic and anti-nuclear hysteria are not the answer. Rosatom cannot afford any damages to its image, so it will most probably make sure that another Chernobyl-like disaster won’t happen in Belarus. Such an accident could impact the company’s deals across the world. It is worth remembering that Russia’s nuclear know-how together with its arms and energy resources exports are important for the country’s finances and for its ambitions as a global superpower. In the end the project will be a burden for Belarus, which will be left with power it cannot sell and a loan it must repay.
