Showing posts sorted by date for query Castro. Sort by relevance Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by date for query Castro. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Friday, May 31, 2024

Solve, Struggle, Invent


How Things Fall Apart: What Happened to the Cuban Revolution
by Elizabeth Dore.
Apollo, 341 pp., £10.99, August 2023, 978 1 80328 381 4

The Tribe: Portraits of Cuba
by Carlos Manuel Álvarez, translated by Frank Wynne and Rahul Bery.
Fitzcarraldo, 336 pp., £12.99, May 2022, 978 1 913097 91 2

LRB

In​ 1968, Fidel Castro invited an American anthropologist called Oscar Lewis to interview Cubans about their lives. Lewis was famous for an oral history project, conducted in a Mexico City slum, which he had turned into a book called The Children of Sánchez (1961). By recounting a poor family’s struggles and hustles, legal and otherwise, Lewis angered the country’s ruling party, which still described itself as ‘revolutionary’. The Mexican Revolution, like the Cuban Revolution after it, wasn’t supposed to have an end date. But after major gains, including redistributing land to landless farmers, it had been ‘interrupted’, as the historian Adolfo Gilly later put it. Lewis exposed the revolution’s unfinished business, and didn’t shy away from discussing the sexual peccadilloes of the poor. The Spanish-language edition of Children of Sánchez was published in 1964, but thanks to a lawsuit claiming the material was ‘obscene and denigrating’, the book wasn’t freely available in Mexico for several years.

When Castro invited Lewis to Cuba, he had only been in power for a decade. People on the island – at least those who weren’t yet plotting an exit to the United States – still referred to the events of 1959 without irony as the ‘triumph of the revolution’. Castro told Lewis he could make an ‘important contribution to Cuban history’ by creating an ‘objective record of what people feel and think’. ‘This is a socialist country,’ he is said to have told Lewis. ‘We have nothing to hide. There are no complaints or grievances I haven’t already heard.’ Lewis hired a team of sociologists and started interviewing people in Havana.

Three decades later, with Castro still at the helm, another American scholar, Elizabeth Dore (who worked in the UK for much of her life), began planning a similar project: to interview Cubans about their lives and the way they felt about the revolution. Dore had funding and a rotating cast of about a dozen interviewers, but she didn’t have permission. In How Things Fall Apart, Dore, who died in 2022, describes doing the rounds in Havana, visiting officials who might help. ‘Your project is beautiful,’ one deputy minister who asked to remain anonymous told her. ‘I’d like to help. But remember Oscar Lewis. In Cuba, oral history is taboo.’

Lewis and his team spent eighteen months interviewing Cubans, but in 1970 the Communist Party shut down the project. Raúl Castro accused him of working for the CIA. A likelier explanation is that word got back to the Castro brothers that the interviewees were complaining too much. Party officials ejected Lewis from the island soon after Fidel announced that his much ballyhooed ‘zafra de los diez millones’ – a push to harvest a record-breaking ten million tonnes of sugar – was going to fall short. The zafra campaign was supposed to turn around the Cuban economy; office workers had been conscripted into the cane fields, along with supporters of the revolution from abroad who flew in to help. The target was missed by one and a half million tonnes and massive economic dislocation resulted because other activity on the island had come to a halt.

Some of the material from Lewis’s interviews was published after his death in 1977. In Four Men: Living the Revolution, an Oral History of Contemporary Cuba, some of the slum-dwellers he had interviewed in Havana praised the revolution, while others confessed that they were struggling to escape poverty despite their best efforts to become socialist new men. ‘Life is only a ball of shit and you must put up with it and live as best you can,’ one of them told Lewis.

When Dore began to plan her oral history project in the early 2000s, Cuba’s economy was once again in crisis. This had much to do with the US embargo. At first, the US had been suspicious of but ambivalent about the Cuban Revolution. Fidel Castro had overthrown a US-backed dictator, but Fulgencio Batista had been widely hated on the island, and it wasn’t yet clear that Castro was a communist. Two years later, by the time he announced that ‘I am a Marxist-Leninist, and will be one until the end of my life,’ the US had turned decisively against him. It announced an embargo in 1962: US businesses or those majority-owned by American citizens were prohibited from conducting trade with Cubans. The embargo remains in place, the longest-lasting in the modern world, and a dead hand on the Cuban economy.

The zafra was Fidel’s last-ditch attempt to sustain an independent export industry. Two years after its failure, he joined the Soviet economic bloc and relied on special trade agreements that kept Cuba afloat for the next three decades. The regime also continued its attempts to remake social life. This entailed getting women into the workforce and dispensing with bourgeois decadence: at every marriage ceremony, the couple were required to vow to ‘share equally in the duties of home, family and socialism’, as Ada Ferrer writes in Cuba: An American History (2021). Not all Cuban men were enthusiastic about sharing the housework in the name of the revolution and there was plenty of carping. No need for an outsider to jot it all down. Lewis never returned.

Dore first arrived in Cuba as a graduate student in 1972, fresh from New York City. Had she been a decade older, she might have swung a machete as part of the zafra, given her attraction to revolutionary idealism. She says she always hoped to record life histories in Cuba but first completed other projects, working as an adviser for the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, writing a book about that country’s transition to capitalism and editing a collection of essays on gender in Latin America. Anthropologists often work in Cuba without official authorisation, but since Dore had something large-scale in mind, and since she intended to employ a team of Cubans, she sought permission. After many refusals, she secured a meeting with Raúl’s daughter Mariela: a colleague had told her that Mariela had ‘a reputation for fighting lost causes’, including on behalf of gay and lesbian Cubans. With Mariela’s help, Dore’s project was approved in 2005 and launched with some pomp at the University of Havana. Clips were broadcast on state television. ‘People interested in Cuba often make the mistake of thinking too much about Fidel Castro,’ Ferrer writes. Dore wouldn’t make that error. Over fourteen years, she and her team interviewed 124 Cubans, returning to many of them several times.

She selected a broad range of interviewees: men and women from the countryside and the city, from various social classes and racial backgrounds – though after the ‘triumph of the revolution’, race and class were not supposed to be relevant. She interviewed a former art student who remembered the relative social equality of the Soviet-funded years with great nostalgia. There was enough cash for a group of friends to go out to the famous ice-cream parlour Coppelia, and split the tab according to their means. During the 1980s, the egalitarianism of the early decades of the revolution was eroded by innovations like ‘free market stores’, where better-off Cubans could buy things not included in their state rations, such as jeans and evaporated milk. Dore notes that even then the ratio between the highest and lowest pay was only 4:1 (my note in the margin: ‘I would like to live in this society for a change’). According to Anthony DePalma in The Cubans: Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times (2020), one Cuban who studied in Ukraine during this period was proud that she and her cohort all travelled with the same blue cardboard suitcases and all wore the same brand of shapeless underwear.* She was shocked when her roommate from the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan asked her if she owned a pair of ‘American jeanskis’. A bad communist, she thought.

The revolution was supposed to sweep away not just social class but racial discrimination. (Cuba received more than twice as many enslaved people as the US, and has a large population of African origin.) Reviving the unfulfilled goals of 19th-century Cuban nationalists such as Antonio Maceo, whose struggle was not just anticolonial but antiracist, Fidel said in 1961 that his government had ‘eradicated’ racism on the island. Not all Cubans got the memo. According to Ferrer, ‘job centres advertised for workers of “good appearance”, a euphemism for white.’ Black women still worked as domestic servants in white households. But mentioning racism was taboo, and race was one of the touchiest subjects in Dore’s interviews. During their first encounter, one Afro-Cuban told her he had failed the entrance exam for a prestigious art school, but only after ten years of interviews did he become comfortable with attributing his unfinished education, at least in part, to racial discrimination.

The creeping return to inequality in Cuba is the main theme of Dore’s book, hastened by the disastrous economic downturn after the collapse in 1991 of the Soviet Union, which had been providing Cuba with up to $5 billion a year in subsidies. After its fall, outsiders speculated that the Cuban regime would also collapse and the island would transition, quickly or slowly, to capitalism. But then interested countries have always persuaded themselves that revolutionary Cuba would collapse if it came under enough pressure.

Instead, Castro announced a Special Period in Times of Peace and called for extraordinary sacrifices. On the streets, jokes about the state economy outlived the Soviet Union: ‘They pretend to pay us and we pretend to work.’ Healthcare and education were still free, but there was little food and no oil to run electric generators. Beef was nowhere to be found, chicken and pork became rare, and coffee was ground with dried peas to bulk up the volume. Even rum, sometimes known as ‘Vitamin R’, became scarce. Cubans fried chopped grapefruit peel to fill themselves up. DePalma reports that women broke open old batteries and used the black paste inside as hair dye. There was no fuel for buses and all of Havana cycled round on clunky bicycles imported from China.

To survive the Special Period, some Cubans were forced to resolver, luchar, inventar (solve, struggle, invent) – euphemisms for petty theft. In the 1990s, the social understanding of theft changed so much that this was considered necessary, even sporting, as long as the injured party was the state and not an acquaintance or neighbour. The best gig in Havana was to work as a waiter in a tourist hotel with an all-you-can-eat buffet. After the tourists had finished, leftover ham, packets of butter and canned tuna – all of which had vanished from state-run stores – were spirited away by hotel staff and sold on the black market.

In a stylish set of profiles now collected in a book, the Cuban journalist and novelist Carlos Manuel Álvarez describes the black market of this period:


At the Technical University of Havana José Antonio Echeverría – the CUJAE, the most important technological university in the country – most of the students in apartments 28 and 42 of building 34 were from the province of Matanzas, and thanks to a profitable trafficking business, all those from Matanzas, without exception, were earning twenty to thirty times the average monthly wage of a Cuban state worker. In a couple of years, they would be qualified engineers and traffickers. A sure-fire combination.

Álvarez, who was born in 1989, notes that his generation was the first to grow up knowing that the advantages of the revolution, including free education, wouldn’t guarantee them a decent living. The black market and trafficking businesses run by students represented major cracks in the revolutionary way of life. He has harsh things to say about his country, noting ‘our Cold War mindset, our deeply ideological, sentimental education, a boundless bureaucracy, a ravaged social infrastructure’, but also writes about what the revolution promised and lost sight of. ‘Solidarity is a sacrifice,’ he says, ‘and consists of making other lives better by making your own worse. It is a logic that runs contrary to the logic of success, and even that of instinct, which is why it is in such short supply.’

In 1994, to stave off economic freefall, Fidel introduced a two-tier currency: the nearly worthless local peso and the new ‘convertible’ one, pegged to the US dollar. The year before, he had also made it legal for Cubans to possess dollars. This created a new form of economic inequality that still persists: a social hierarchy divided not by inherited social class or profession but by access to convertible pesos or, even better, family in the US able to send dollar remittances. At the same time, Cuba changed its foreign investment laws to enable Europeans to invest in the tourist industry. Speciality stores sold appliances, foreign clothing (American jeanskis) and food not available at state stores, which only took Cuban pesos. ‘There are some people,’ Álvarez writes, ‘who believe a monument should be erected to the salseros and the jineteras – the dancers and the prostitutes – who, being the only reliable sources of foreign currency, saved 1990s Cuba from utter disaster.’

In order​ to write about ‘ordinary Cubans’, or to gather oral histories, interviewees must be able to speak freely. But has there been freedom of speech in revolutionary Cuba? It depends on who is trying to speak, about what and when. Castro put the boundaries around freedom of speech for intellectuals like this: ‘Within the revolution, everything. Against the revolution, nothing.’ The Padilla Affair, directed by Pavel Giroud and released in 2022, concerns the case of Heberto Padilla, a poet accused of writing ‘critical and ahistorical literature’ and imprisoned for ‘betrayal of the homeland’ in 1971. The film includes archive footage of his forced ‘confession’, a mea culpa that looks very much like a show trial. He had been tortured. Writers and journalists who want to stay on the island still face restrictions about what they can say. Álvarez calls Cuba’s state newspaper, Granma, ‘one of the most discreet newspapers in the world, which isn’t exactly ideal for a newspaper’. He runs a much more outspoken magazine, El Estornudo (great name: ‘The Sneeze’). Like so many independent journalists, he has now moved abroad.

Another count against freedom of speech are the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution. These neighbourhood defence groups are often headed by busybodies eager to rat out opponents of the party. But the bite has gone out of them since the 1990s, when they organised egg-throwing and sometimes stone-throwing at people planning to emigrate to the US. Some Cubans used to stroke an imaginary beard when criticising Castro, rather than utter his name, but others spoke openly about the regime’s flaws as well as its achievements. The poet Rafael Alcides told Álvarez that he had been in love with the dream of the revolution, and with Castro. ‘One of the greatest things he did, one of the most beautiful, was the literacy programme. And giving land to farmers. Who wouldn’t agree with that?’ (In 1961, the Year of Education, 300,000 Cubans volunteered to travel to remote rural areas and succeeded in teaching 700,000 people to read and write. The teachers showed up to revolutionary marches carrying giant pencils.) ‘Anyway, it was a wonderful time, honestly ... you don’t take the money, you take the glory. We were rebuilding the world.’ But in the same interview, shortly before Castro’s death in 2016, Alcides told Álvarez that ‘there are only two dissidents in Cuba: Fidel and Raúl Castro. The rest of us agree that this isn’t working.’

Those who criticise the revolution aren’t necessarily dissidents in the usual sense. Dore recounts a Cuban joke: ‘A dissident organisation had three members: one was a US agent, one was a Cuban agent and the third was a fool.’ But tourists who visit Cuba rarely hear people talking like the man Dore calls Juan: ‘Yesterday the revolution drove me crazy, absolutely crazy.’ There had been a march in downtown Havana and Castro had spoken. ‘He said: “Reading from the pamphlet I have in my hand the general opinion is ...” Well, if everyone thought the way the Comandante says we do it would be marvellous. The fact is everyone doesn’t think the same. What a joke.’

In 2018 the Cuban government passed Decree 349, which requires artists to seek advance permission for shows and performances. It provoked the largest free speech protests in Cuban history, known as the San Isidro movement. One of Castro’s slogans was ‘¡Patria o muerte – venceremos!’ (‘Homeland or death – we will win!’) In 2021, a group of Cuban rappers released a song called ‘Patria y vida’ (‘Homeland and Life’), which openly praised the San Isidro movement: ‘My people ask for liberty, not more doctrines/Now we don’t shout homeland or death but rather homeland and life.’ ‘Patria y vida’ became a huge hit, spreading across the island on thumb drives, becoming a slogan at the protests.

One of the leaders of the San Isidro movement, the performance artist Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara, was arrested several times on trumped-up charges. In 2020, Álvarez helped secure his release from jail. Soon afterwards, Álvarez was at the airport in Havana when he was taken aside by security officials. ‘So this was who they were,’ he thought, looking at the two men wearing dark green face masks. ‘I had seen them so often before, I ran into them on every street, every day of my life in Cuba.’ The officials conducted a half-hearted interrogation, asking how much he was paid for his Facebook posts and by whom. (Nothing, no one.) They asked how he knew Otero Alcántara. ‘It was they who had brought us together, obviously, though I’m not sure I told them that.’ They let him go, just in time to catch his plane. ‘The whole encounter seemed utterly anachronistic. This was 14 March 2020, a time when Stalinist aesthetics could be seen only as folklore.’ Otero Alcántara was soon back in prison, where he remains.

Since Dore started work on her book, the situation in Cuba has worsened considerably. People got through the Special Period thanks to tourist dollars and remittances. After Hugo Chávez came to power in 1999, Venezuela provided a major boost to the Cuban economy with oil subsidies and special trade agreements. But since 2014, following Venezuela’s own economic meltdown, no patron has stepped in to subsidise Cuba’s revolution. Hundreds of those who marched for freedom of speech are still in jail. New protests periodically break out, often over access to basic goods and food. Juan told Dore that


a Cuban’s greatest drama is worrying about what’s in the fridge, what to cook for dinner. It’s not the same as if you were to get home, open the fridge and there is chicken, shrimp, fish, eggs, beef and cooking oil. Then you’d have no worries. But when you don’t have anything, when there are scarcities, you say: ‘What can I do? What can I inventar, come up with, to stop my boy from crying? What can I put on the table?’ ... The Cuban people love food, partying, bachata, dancing and music. Take that away, and bam, you’ve got very little left.

When there is nothing left, people are forced to leave. Since the revolution’s earliest days, the loudest expression of Cuban free speech – at least in a register audible to foreign ears – has been migration. There are 1.4 million Cuban-born people in the US, most of them given asylum as escapees from communism. During one spike in arrivals, in 1980, nativists in Florida had bumper stickers that read: ‘Will the last American to leave Miami please bring the flag?’ Cuban refugees have been used as propaganda by various US administrations, especially Reagan’s. They chose freedom over communism! But things have changed. Now Cuban arrivals find themselves in the more challenging situation of being considered migrants.

In 2014, Barack Obama and Raúl Castro came to an agreement to normalise diplomatic relations. It wasn’t really noticed at the time that thawing relations would also mean phasing out special provisions for Cuban immigrants, who had previously been ‘paroled’, facing many fewer restrictions than other asylum seekers. In 2022, 225,000 Cubans were apprehended at the US-Mexico border, many more than arrived during the famous 1980 Mariel boatlift or the 1994 balsero crisis, which saw 35,000 Cubans make the journey across the Florida Straits on rafts. The vast majority of those leaving Cuba aren’t dissidents but simply people who can’t get enough to eat, can’t inventar their way out of worsening poverty. They seek asylum not as a result of repression but in order to navigate America’s broken immigration system – there is no other way to get permission to work.

Despite the dire situation in Cuba, some nostalgia for the language of the revolution lingers. Everyone knows the story of the Cuban Five: spies arrested by the FBI in 1998 for infiltrating an anti-Castro group in Florida. After they were imprisoned in the US, they became national heroes in Cuba. In 2014, three of them were released and returned to the island. The singer-songwriter Silvio Rodríguez, a revolutionary faithful, staged a free concert in Havana in their honour. After the performance, one of them grabbed the microphone and chanted the old slogans: ‘Viva Cuba libre!’ and ‘Seguimos en combate!’ But these were ‘obsolete mottos’, Álvarez writes, ‘things no one says anymore’. ‘What tone should we adopt when the speech patterns of fearless heroism have faded?’ he asks. ‘Those same speech patterns that were the backbone of our education.’

Even after kicking out Oscar Lewis, Fidel didn’t give up on the idea of an oral history of Cuban life under communism. In 1975 he asked his close friend Gabriel García Márquez, who was enamoured of the revolution, to write it. García Márquez worked on the project for a year, then gave up. He told friends that what Cubans said didn’t fit the book that he wanted to write.

Wednesday, May 29, 2024

END THE EMBARGO

US allows Cuban entrepreneurs conditional banking access


AFP
May 28, 2024


A delivery van from a US-based food remittance company drives on a street in Havana on May 22, 2024 - Copyright AFP/File Raul ARBOLEDA

Private sector entrepreneurs in Cuba will be able to establish US bank accounts which they can remotely access, US officials said Tuesday, in announcing an update to the country’s Cuba policy.

The new rules modify a longstanding embargo on Cuba, allowing conditional access to the US banking system among moves to support the private sector.

“These amendments will facilitate greater access to internet-based services for the Cuban people,” a senior US official told reporters.

They will also “provide the independent Cuban private sector greater access to international transactions and US banking services, including through online payment platforms,” the official added on condition of anonymity.

Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez criticized the measures as “limited,” saying “they do not reverse the cruel impact and economic suffocation” caused by the six-decade-old embargo imposed by Washington.

“These measures seek to create divisions within Cuban society,” Rodriguez wrote on X.

Under the changes, independent private sector entrepreneurs will be able to set up remotely accessed US bank accounts for authorized transactions.

According to US officials, this should help to facilitate the import of food, equipment and other goods that support Cuban people.

US authorities have also reinstated authorization allowing for transactions that start and end outside the country but pass through the US financial system.

In May 2022, US President Joe Biden’s administration vowed to encourage the growth of Cuba’s private sector, including by supporting greater access to US internet services and e-commerce platforms.

As of 2021, Cuban entrepreneurs could establish private small- and medium-sized enterprises — after these were banned for almost six decades in favor of state-owned enterprises.

Some 11,000 private companies have since been registered, said US officials.

Cuba’s centrally planned economy is in its deepest crisis since the end of Soviet subsidies in the 1990s.

“The Cuban economy is a shambles and there is rising public frustration with the arthritic dictatorship,” said Benjamin Gedan, director of the Latin America program at the Wilson Center.

“Greater internet access would offer business opportunities and new tools for Cubans to work together to communicate their legitimate grievances,” he said.

Authorities said that the latest announcement excludes prohibited Cuban government officials such as military officers.

The amendment also comes shortly after the Biden administration removed Cuba from a list of countries that it says do not cooperate fully on counterterrorism.

Cuba was on the list alongside Iran, North Korea, Syria and Venezuela.

U.S. announces changes to give private sector, small businesses in Cuba more financial support

It would also bolster access to U.S. internet-based services, part of limited but timely measures that officials said would help give the island’s budding small businesses a leg up.


A person waves a Cuban flag during a gathering in Havana, Cuba on May 1.Ariel Ley / AP file

May 28, 2024, 
By Reuters

WASHINGTON/HAVANA — The U.S. Treasury Department on Tuesday announced regulatory changes to allow more American financial support for Cuba’s nascent private sector and bolster access to U.S. internet-based services, limited but timely measures that officials said would help give the island’s budding small businesses a leg up.

The United States said it would permit small entrepreneurs on the Communist-run island to open and access U.S. bank accounts from Cuba for the first time in decades, following prohibitions put in place shortly after Fidel Castro’s 1959 revolution.

The measures would also allow Cuban entrepreneurs to use U.S.-based social media platforms, online payment sites, video conferencing and authentication services, previously unavailable to the sector and a major hurdle currently facing small businesses on the island.

The moves aim to fulfill the Biden administration’s long-delayed pledge to help Cuba’s budding entrepreneurs, giving its small but fast-growing private sector deference despite the Cold War-era U.S. embargo that has for decades complicated financial transactions by the Cuban government.

“Today we’re taking an important step to support the expansion of free enterprise and the expansion of the entrepreneurial business sector in Cuba,” a senior U.S. official told reporters on Tuesday.

The Cuban government did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the policy changes.

In crafting the measures, U.S. officials, who briefed reporters on condition of anonymity, signaled they had sought to balance the goal of bolstering the private sector with a desire to avoid benefit to Cuban authorities.

President Joe Biden took office in January 2021 with hopes high in Cuba for a reversal of a harsh Trump-era approach, but Cuba’s crackdown on protests during the summer of that year prompted the administration to keep pressure on Havana.

The new measures would exclude Cuban officials, military officers and other government “insiders,” with the aim of minimizing resources available from the benefits to the Cuban government, the officials said.

Republican U.S. Representative Maria Elvira Salazar, a Cuban American lawmaker from South Florida, quickly criticized the Democratic administration’s announcement.

“The Biden Admin is now giving the ‘Cuban private sector’ access to the U.S. financial system,” she said in a post on X. “This would make a mockery of American law, considering no progress has been made toward freedom on the Island and repression has intensified.”

Cuba has long blamed the embargo — a tangled web of U.S. laws and regulations that complicates financial transactions by the Cuban government — for decades of economic crisis that have left it with little choice recently but to open its economy to small private business.

Such businesses — for decades taboo in Communist-run Cuba — are now booming on the island.

New Cuban laws put in place in 2021 have seen the establishment of upwards of 11,000 small businesses as of May, the government has said, ranging from corner grocers to plumbing, transportation and construction businesses.

Those businesses employ upwards of 15% of Cuban workers and accounted for around 14% of gross domestic product, according to economy ministry statistics from late 2023.

The regulations announced on Tuesday also authorize U.S. banks to once again process so-called “U-Turn” fund transfers, allowing them to move money for Cuban nationals — including payments and remittances — so long as senders and recipients are not subject to U.S. law.

Such measures are a step in the right direction, said John Kavulich, president of the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, but he noted a “glaring omission” in the policy: Cuban businesses are still handicapped by a requirement that they use banks in third countries to move their money.

“As long as financing, investment, and payments need to be routed through third countries, the Biden-Harris Administration will be constraining precisely the activity it professes to support,” Kavulich said in an email.

There was no sign that Tuesday’s announcement could foreshadow a more significant easing of U.S. sanctions and other restrictions on Cuba, beyond the modest steps that Biden has already taken since he became president.

Some analysts have attributed Biden’s cautious handling of Cuba issues to his concern that a softened approach to Havana could hurt him politically among strongly anti-communist Cuban American voters in Florida, a key swing state that he lost to Trump in the 2020 election.

The U.S. officials declined to say whether the administration was conducting a formal review of Cuba’s continuing presence on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism.


 

Cuban May Day rally demonstrates resilience in the face of the illegal US blockade

“As the sun rose over the Malecon, the seafront was transformed into a bright sea of banners, flags, and the noise of hundreds of thousands of people – the atmosphere was a clear & exceptionally powerful reminder of the resilience of the Cuban people under the illegal blockade”

By Fraser McGuire

Earlier this month I had the incredible opportunity to travel to Cuba as part of the young Trade Unionists May Day Brigade, organised with the Cuba Solidarity Campaign. The brigade included attending the annual May Day celebrations in Havana and participating in a conference on international solidarity with delegates from more than 30 countries across 5 continents.

Youth Trade Union Delegation to Cuba for May Day 2024.

When our group arrived in Havana on May 1st it was 4am. There were still several hours before sunrise, yet already the streets were packed with thousands of people who had travelled from across the country to take part in the May Day demonstration. As the sun rose over the Malecon, the seafront was transformed into a bright sea of banners, flags, and the noise of hundreds of thousands of people – the atmosphere was a clear and exceptionally powerful reminder of the resilience of the Cuban people under the illegal blockade enforced by the United States.

Delegates from trade unions and political groups across the world had travelled to Havana to attend the May Day celebrations and extend gratitude and solidarity to the Cuban people. Many of the international visitors gathered near one end of the huge demonstration at the José Martí Anti-Imperialist Platform – which is directly opposite the US embassy. The demonstration was also attended by Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez as well as Raúl Castro and other senior government and trade union figures.

The next day we attended the international solidarity conference in Havana, which was addressed by speakers including President Díaz-Canel and the Deputy Foreign Minister, as well as trade union delegates and representatives from the Progressive International and other Latin American nations. A central theme of the conference was a defiant rejection of US interference in Latin America – from intervention in Haiti to the occupation of Guantanamo Bay and the suffering caused by economic sanctions against the people of Cuba and Venezuela.

President Díaz-Canel touched on the hypocrisy of the US regarding the ongoing genocide in Gaza. In the ‘land of free’ which imposes economic restrictions on nations across the world it deems ‘unfree’ can we witness the full repressive force of the state mobilised to injure and arrest thousands of students calling for peace.

Global South nations have stood firm in condemnation of the genocide in Gaza – in Latin America, Colombian President Gustavo Petro announced on May Day the ending of diplomatic ties with Israel, and Brazil has paused a deal with Israeli weapons manufacturer Elbit Systems. Cuba has not had diplomatic relations with Israel since 1973.

Everywhere we visited in Cuba there were signs of struggle from the US blockade, and of the impacts of the US classification of Cuba as a ‘state sponsor of terrorism’, a decision made under Trump which has been continued by the Biden administration. The blockade makes it increasingly hard to access food, fuel, and basic medical necessities, while the inclusion of Cuba on the state sponsors of terror list stops Cuba from having access to international banking systems.

The official wording of a US strategy document on the sanctions on Cuba includes the sentence “activities directed against the economy are intended to aggravate existing economic difficulties and thus to increase the level of disaffection… in the popular masses”. Seen up close, it becomes clear that the US blockade is a form of economic warfare against the Cuban people- a punishment for the removal of US backed dictator Fulgencio Batista more than 60 years ago.

As part of the May Day brigade, we had the opportunity to visit a Cuban hospital and speak to doctors and nurses working in Cuba’s inspirational healthcare system. The achievements of Cuba’s healthcare system under decades of embargo are nothing short of a miracle, weathering the covid pandemic with constricted access to crucial medical supplies, and training world-class doctors and scientists. One doctor told me that the successes were because, despite less access to resources, technologies, and international markets, the Cuban system puts patients and ordinary people right at the heart of its healthcare structures.

Despite the ever-growing international opposition and condemnation of the US blockade, solidarity with Cuba has never been more vital than now. The next US election may be one of the most significant in terms of the relationship between the US and Cuba, while the Biden administration has failed to relax the hardline attitude, a second Trump presidency could see sanctions tightened even further.

Solidarity isn’t just rhetoric and condemnation, but also must translate to material support and education. Across the UK we have seen trade union and grassroots support for groups like the Cuba Solidarity Campaign as well as meetings and film showings about the impacts of the US blockade on Cuban society. Cuba is a beacon of hope for many, yet it is also a lighthouse warning of the reality of US imperialism. Building and strengthening the movement to end the blockade has never been more necessary.


Monday, May 27, 2024

US Interventionists Busy in Bolivia as Political Crisis Looms 


 
 MAY 27, 2024
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Photograph Source: José Fuertes – https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

Delegates loyal to President Luis Arce dominated the 10th Congress of Bolivia’s Movement toward Socialism (MAS) Party held in El Alto in early May. They selected Grover García, chief of a governmental agency and formerly of a farmworkers’ union, to be MAS’s new leader, replacing former president Evo Morales in that capacity.

Another MAS gathering on June 10 takes place in Cochabamba to elect other Party leaders. One more, a “unity congress,” happens there on July 10, in territory friendly to Morales. He conditions his participation on the MAS Party and his own presidential candidacy for 2025 not being eliminated.

Division within the MAS Party is good news for the U.S. government. It had opposed MAS political power from the beginning of Morales’ progressive rule in 2006 until a U.S.-backed coup ousted him in 2019.

Morales, Bolivia’s first indigenous president, retained popular support throughout his tenure. His government overcame repeated attacks from oligarchic, racist, separatist, and U.S.-allied political forces based largely in Bolivia’s eastern departments, notable for rich oil and gas deposits and industrial-scale agriculture. MAS governments, with Luis Arce as minister of economy and public finance, achieved social advances, reduced poverty, nationalized oil and gas extraction and production, carried out land reform, and elevated the status of Bolivia’s majority indigenous population.

The U.S. government has eyed immense lithium deposits in Bolivia and expressed concern about Chinese economic inroads; a commentator notes that, as of 2017, “China has become the principal contractor and financing source for Bolivia’s state-led national development project.”

That President Luis Arce’s secured a 55% majority vote on October 19, 2020 to restore the MAS Party to power is also worrisome to Washington officials. His government in October 2022 mobilized popular support to defeat an opposition uprising led by reactionary politicians in Santa Cruz and other eastern departments. The victory elevated Arce’s appeal to government officials and MAS activists alike.

Division between the Party’s two wings, widening over two years, is highly visible. Highway blockades, strikes and demonstrations carried out by “radical factions of the MAS movement led by former President Evo Morales” played out between January and March. Rising inflation, reduced gas and oil production, falling currency reserves, and shortages of fuel and food add to MAS’s vulnerability.

One goal of the 10th MAS Party Congress was that of meeting constitutional requirements of orderly party function. Observers were on hand whose reports to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE in Spanish) would allow the Tribunal to certify the “resolutions of the Arcista conclave.” But an adverse ruling now and two more in the future would deprive the MAS Party of its “judicial personhood,” and rule out future election participation.

Democracy is at risk. Journalist Tatiana Castro claims social movements, “pillars that sustain the MAS in power,” are “fundamental for guaranteeing governability … [and] part of the democratic dynamics.”  Within the MAS Party itself, social movements are divided.

Those made up of urban residents and indigenous Aymara people of Bolivia’s high plateau region lean towards President Arce. Others supportive of Morales consist of federations of indigenous peoples in Bolivia’s tropical regions. Castro sees the two factions competing within the state apparatus not about ideology but over “perks, advantages, benefits, and nominations.”

President Luis Arce on May 18 warned that “the right is sharpening up for next year’s elections.” He denounced as “economic blockade” the Bolivian Senate’s recent refusal to authorize foreign loans. Meeting recently in the United States, extreme right-wing opposition politicians were “unifying against MAS,” he claims.

Morales warned that TSE recognition of the Arce-inclined El Alto Congress would signify “genocide against the indigenous movement.” He urged followers to “have patience,” to no longer resort to blocking highways, and to expect legal struggles.

Interviewed, Morales referred to an audio-recording of statements of U.S. chargé d’affaires in Bolivia, Debra Hevia. Her remarks, supposedly leaked on April 27, may be head here. They include mention that, “We have been working for a long time to achieve change in Bolivia, time is vital for us, but for it to be a real change, Evo and Arce have to leave power and close that chapter.”  A subsequent report attributes Hevia’s voice to artificial intelligence.

Weeks earlier, an inflammatory article from the same leaking platform, El Radar, had already reverberated across Latin America. It explains that, “Information leaked from the U.S. Embassy in Bolivia, systematized… by the Center for Multidisciplinary Geopolitical Studies (CEGM) reveals a new U.S. plan.” The article includes a document titled: “Latin America in the Eye of the Storm. Possible Victory of the United States and Recolonization of Latin America (Plan Simón Bolívar).”

The origin of the Plan is unclear. Our Internet search for the CEGM provided no information. Article and document cite serious threats to U.S. worldwide hegemony posed by China, India, the BRICS alliance itself, and by “economic power [for Latin America] through trade with the two Asiatic giants, China and India.”

As regards the article’s recommendations for Bolivia: “the strategy would be focused on its natural resources and on consolidation of a servile, rightwing government,” and on break-up of the MAS political movement. It mentions “Debra Hevia, the new U.S. chargé d’affaires, who has been meeting with different parties and organizations throughout the country.”

A report elsewhere on the supposed Simón Bolívar Plan accuses Hevia of “having initiated a new phase of hybrid war whose politics are those of ‘regime change’ within the framework of the presidential elections of 2025.” Diplomat Hevia serves in place of a U.S. ambassador, absent in Bolivia since 2008. Evo Morales expelled the last ambassador Philip Goldberg, alleging interventionist activities.

Among revealing aspects of Hevia’s work and history are these:

  • She worked at the State Department Operations Center that handles intelligence and counter-insurgency work.
  • Stationed in Nicaragua, she helped arrange for opposition groups to join the failed coup attempt against the Daniel Ortega government in 2018.
  • During an earlier stay in Bolivia she “sought to reconstruct the armed wing of the [fascist-inclined] Santa Cruz Youth organization” and arranged for funding the activities of Svonko Matkovik, “formerly jailed for anti-Morales terrorist activities.”
  • Hevia’s husband, a Bolivian, is a former DEA agent.  He must have “reunited with his contacts and old acquaintances” on return to Bolivia,speculates reporter Martin Agüero. Morales expelled the DEA from Bolivia for interventionist activities in 2008.

Uncertainties prevail. The origin of revealing leaks attributed to the U.S. Embassy is obscure. With elections approaching, the two wings of the MAS Party are far apart.

Declaring the recently-completed MAS Congress to be invalid, the TSE on May 23 rejected the election of Grover García as party leader, leaving Morales in charge. The TSE had previously invalidated the Congress held by the Morales faction in October 2023.

García told a reporter that Evo Morales afterwards had been urged to join the more recent Congress. Morales reiterates that the gathering set for July 10 in Cochabamba will be a “unity congress,” although the TSE is unlikely to rule in its favor. Understating the matter, La Razón news service sees the MAS as “caught up in a vicious cycle.”

W.T. Whitney Jr. is a retired pediatrician and political journalist living in Maine.