Thursday, November 26, 2020

Does the AstraZeneca Vaccine Also Stop Covid Transmission?

Vaccines can prevent symptoms, but some can also keep people from spreading infection. 

That’s critical, and no one knows if the new vaccines do it.


ADAM ROGERS WIRED SCIENCE11.25.2020
 

PHOTOGRAPH: PAULO SOUSA/GETTY IMAGES


THREE MONDAYS IN a row have now yielded three apparently effective and safe vaccines against the pandemic disease Covid-19. Amid an unprecedented peak in cases in the United States and Europe, with US deaths pushing 250,000 and the country showing uncontrolled spread of the virus, that ain’t bad news.

But slightly hidden in that non-bad news was news even less bad. This week’s entrant, a vaccine from the drug company AstraZeneca and researchers at Oxford University, came with tantalizing hints of a particular capability that would, if it bears out, make a huge difference in fighting the pandemic. The makers of the two other vaccines in play have reported only evidence that their drugs keep people from getting sick—which is to say, fewer vaccinated people have moderate to severe symptoms and test positive for infection. The vaccines do this very well. But researchers working on the AstraZeneca version said they also had signs of reduced transmission, of people spreading the disease from one person to another. The AstraZeneca results have some perplexing elements, for sure, but if the transmission thing holds up, it’s going to matter. A lot.

Here’s what’s known (or at least announced) so far: The first two vaccines to complete their large-scale trials, one from the drug companies Pfizer and BioNTech and the other from Moderna, are a new kind of medicine. They use bits of genetic material called messenger RNA, in this case a sequence that codes for a part of the virus called a spike protein. That protein helps the SARS-CoV-2 virus attack people’s cells; the mRNA, enfolded in proprietary bubbles of fat, teaches the human immune system to fight the virus instead. Pfizer’s version has an efficacy of above 90 percent, says a company press release; a Moderna press release says its efficacy is 94.5 percent. If those results hold when more data becomes public, these vaccines would be extraordinary.

The one from AstraZeneca is a little more traditional, putting the gene for that spike protein into a sort of stealth carrier called a vector—in this case, an adenovirus that usually infects chimpanzees, modified so that it can’t replicate anymore. The company’s results—again, maddeningly, delivered via press release rather than peer-reviewed science—are a little more confusing. AstraZeneca is running different studies around the world, each with slightly different methodologies, which makes them hard to compare. But if you dump them all into the same pool, as AstraZeneca seems to have done, its two-dose regimen seems to have an efficacy of around 60 percent. That seems not great, though it’s higher than the 50 percent, plus or minus, that the US Food and Drug Administration was looking for. And in a group accidentally given a half-dose for the first shot and a full dose for the second, efficacy went up to 90 percent. Nobody knows why, and it is not good statistics to just average together a study done right with a study done wrong, re-analyzed after the fact.

But for the moment let’s not look this gift adenovirus in the mouth. The press release on the AstraZeneca vaccine from the Oxford side included this bulleted finding: “Early indication that vaccine could reduce virus transmission from an observed reduction in asymptomatic infections.” An Oxford immunologist told the news section of the journal Nature that some of the people in the UK part of the trial actually were testing themselves regularly for infection with the virus, and that different infection rates in the placebo and vaccine groups suggested that the drug was also blocking transmission of the disease. Researchers at Oxford also told reporters Monday that testing showed the vaccinated group in the UK had fewer asymptomatic infections, which means they'd be less likely to unwittingly spread the disease themselves.

Again: unpublished data, no details, no peer review, science-by-press-release. That ain’t good. But big, as political writers sometimes say, if true. People infected with the virus but without symptoms—asymptomatic spreaders—seem to be a reason the disease is pandemic-y. Nobody’s sure how big a reason, though.

Lots of other respiratory viruses overlap symptoms and transmission—sometimes the symptoms themselves, like coughing, are the way the virus gets from an infected person to others. The time between infection and symptoms, called the incubation period, doesn’t last long. “We know with flu, the incubation period is relatively short, and people may shed virus for a day or so,” says Arnold Monto, an epidemiologist at the University of Michigan who chairs the FDA’s Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee, which helps make decisions on approving new vaccines. “We can infect a ferret with flu and they get sick, but if they’re not coughing or doing whatever ferrets do when they’re symptomatic, they don’t transmit as well.”

The assumption that this was also true for Covid-19 provided the stitching for a lot of pandemic protection cosplay—like temperature checks and symptom surveys. “A lot of the things we did early were based on the fact that with traditional SARS, there was not a whole lot of transmission from asymptomatic individuals,” Monto says. “Symptomatic people tend to transmit more than asymptomatic people for respiratory infections. We think that’s probably true with Covid, but it is becoming more clear that asymptomatic people are also involved in transmission.”

The problem is, a Covid-19 vaccine that only prevents illness—which is to say, symptoms—might not prevent infection with the virus or transmission of it to other people. Worst case, a vaccinated person could still be an asymptomatic carrier. That could be bad. More younger people tend to get the virus, but more older people tend to die from it; socioeconomic status and ethnicity also have an impact on death rates. Some people have relatively light symptoms; other people have symptoms that hang on for months. And perhaps most importantly, a vaccine is the only way to reach herd immunity without a bloodbath. As politicized as the notion has become, herd immunity is essentially the sum of direct protection—what you might get if you’re vaccinated—and indirect protection, safety afforded by the fact that people around you aren’t transmitting the disease to you because they either already had the disease themselves or because they got vaccinated against it. If vaccinated people can still be asymptomatic spreaders, that means less indirect protection for the herd.

That really matters, because there isn’t enough vaccine to go around. Not yet, anyway. Some groups of people will go first. The characteristics of the available vaccines would, in a perfect world, determine who those people should be. One that only prevented illness might go first to the elderly, in whom severe illness is more likely to lead to death. One that prevented infection and transmission might go to essential workers and frontline caregivers. “Part of our worry is, we want to get it right in the early allocation phase, making sure we’re targeting the vaccine as best as you can,” says Grace Lee, a professor of pediatrics at Stanford School of Medicine and a member of the CDC’s Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices. “If the only thing it did was protect against severe disease, you’d want to look at the population that has severe disease and only use it there, and nowhere else.”

That’s almost certainly not going to be the situation. The vaccines will probably all have some effect on transmission. But right now no one knows how much, or which one is better, or for whom—because so far only AstraZeneca has even a hint of data studying the problem.

(How good is that data? Well, about that: Ann Falsey, a physician at the University of Rochester School of Medicine who’s leading the US portion of the AstraZeneca vaccine trial, told me via email that “the Oxford study press release hinted at some transmission data, but I am not privileged to that data so I really can’t offer much to say.” A few hours after this story first published, Falsey emailed to add that her study and the Oxford one "are funded and run separately.“ Spokespeople for AstraZeneca didn’t return my requests for more information. Neither did anyone at Moderna. Jerica Pitts, a spokesperson at Pfizer, did, but with nothing yet to report. “In the coming months we will test participants’ blood samples for antibodies that recognize a part of the virus that is not in the vaccine. If fewer participants in the vaccine group than in the placebo group develop such antibodies, we will have evidence that the vaccine can prevent infection as well as disease,” Pitts wrote me in an email. “We do not yet have those data.”)

Different levels of protection against transmission could make a big difference in how well a vaccine will tamp down the pandemic. As part of the work of the vaccines committee that Lee is on, disease modelers spun out scenarios for the use of a vaccine that stopped 95 percent of transmission, versus one that stopped no transmission at all. (You can see some of the results starting on the 19th slide in this deck.) Given to high-risk adults and people older than 65 when incidence of the disease is rising, a vaccine that blocked infection (and therefore also transmission) could avert twice as many deaths as one that kept people from getting sick but allowed transmission.

That’s a model; in real life the differences won’t be so stark, because all the vaccines will almost certainly have some effect on transmission. The fact is, no one’s really sure how asymptomatic transmission works. It might be due to “expiratory particles” given off during talking and breathing, so maybe a vaccine that reduces symptoms would also reduce that. Or maybe just cutting down a person’s “viral load,” or the amount of virus they are carrying, also cuts the amount they can transmit. Maybe a vaccine that confers mucosal immunity, keeping the snot in someone’s nose and lungs free of virus, would lessen how much that person can send virus spreading into the universe. “Big-picture principle stuff would be: It’d be great if it eliminated transmission by eliminating asymptomatic carriers,” Lee says. “It would be great, if that weren’t true, for it to reduce your viral load, and that would in essence reduce your transmissibility.”


This wouldn’t be the first time that different vaccines had different effects. Some researchers have hypothesized that a recent resurgence of pertussis—whooping cough, a respiratory bacterial infection—might be due to a switch to a new vaccine that doesn’t address asymptomatic transmission. (That’s not the only hypothesis, but just stick with me for a second.) A model built by Sam Scarpino, director of the Emergent Epidemics Lab at Northeastern University, suggested that a switch back to the old formulation would lead to a significant drop in deaths and illnesses. Given the speed and severity of the Covid-19 pandemic, the importance of this effect could be even greater. “Especially in a country like the US with so much vaccine hesitancy, and coupled with how severe the disease can be especially in older adults, transmission block is a huge deal,” Scarpino says. “We don’t have any reason to think the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines won’t block transmission. It’s just not what has actually been measured, and something we aren’t likely to find out until we either start mass vaccination and/or they release more detailed information on the study locations—and epidemiologists start looking for effects of herd immunity.”



This absence of data on transmission was, to be clear, on purpose. The FDA laid out to vaccine makers what it was going to be looking for back in the summer, when the pandemic looked like it was peaking and hospitals were full of people on ventilators. The most important problems to focus on were severe illness and safety—because back then researchers were worried about the possibility of antibody-dependent enhancement, a rare side effect of viral illnesses in which vaccine-made tweaks to the immune system could actually cause worse problems later. And remember that Covid testing shortage? It applied to people in vaccine trials, too, which made it hard to do the kind of regular infection checks that the AstraZeneca UK wing was apparently able to do.

Which means nobody yet has transmission data beyond AstraZeneca’s vague hints. That’s suboptimal. The millions of people who may well start getting vaccinated as soon as December will also be a kind of Phase IV trial, an aftermarket test group in which scientists can observe what the vaccine does to transmission of the disease in the real world. “I do think we’re going to need that information over time,” Lee says. “But I feel like in this part of the pandemic, given the context we’re living in right now, it does feel like making vaccination a key component of protection of the population is going to be an important tool.”

It’d be better for planning to have that information in advance. But it’s not a deal breaker. “Could we refine that tool to optimize getting data? Yes, absolutely. Are we going to have that data? No. Are we going to stop and wait for that data? No,” Lee says. “Clearly, at this point the benefits of being able to protect part of the population are going to outweigh the downsides of not having perfect information.” Just because the news isn’t all good doesn’t mean it isn’t actionable.


Adam Rogers writes about science and miscellaneous geekery. Before coming to WIRED, Rogers was a Knight Science Journalism Fellow at MIT and a reporter for Newsweek. He is the author of The New York Times science bestseller Proof: The Science of Booze.

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The AstraZeneca Covid Vaccine Data Isn't Up to Snuff

PHOTO-ILLUSTRATION: SAM WHITNEY; GETTY IMAGES

THE MAKERS OF a third coronavirus vaccine announced positive results in clinical trials on Monday, setting off yet another round of excited news reports. This one, produced by a partnership between a University of Oxford research institute, its spinout company Vaccitech, and the pharmaceutical company AstraZeneca, does not need to be stored at freezing temperatures and would be cheaper and easier to produce than the high-efficacy vaccines produced by BioNTech-Pfizer and Moderna. Indeed, according to an initial write-up in The New York Times, Oxford-AstraZeneca’s is “expected to be relied upon heavily across the globe, to help curb a pandemic that has killed more than 1.3 million people.”

Sounds like great news, right? Monday’s press release from AstraZeneca presents “convincing evidence that [the vaccine] works,” said Science. But not everyone has been convinced. The price of AstraZeneca’s shares actually dropped on the news, and an analysis from an investment bank concluded, “We believe that this product will never be licensed in the US.” Over at STAT News, Anthony Fauci cautioned that we’ll need to see more data before coming to a conclusion. The skeptics have strong reasons to be concerned: This week’s “promising” results are nothing like the others that we’ve been hearing about in November—and the claims that have been drawn from them are based on very shaky science.



The problems start with the fact that Monday’s announcement did not present results from a single, large-scale, Phase 3 clinical trial, as was the case for earlier bulletins about the BNT-Pfizer and Moderna vaccines. Instead, Oxford-AstraZeneca’s data came out of two separate studies: one in the UK that began in May, and another in Brazil, which got started at the end of June. These two studies were substantially different from one another: They didn’t have standardized dosing schemes across the trials, for one thing, nor did they provide the same “control” injections to volunteers who were not getting the experimental Covid vaccine. The fact that they may have had to combine data from two trials in order to get a strong enough result raises the first red flag.

Consider that leading vaccine makers—including AstraZeneca—issued a scientific-rigor-and-integrity pledge back in September, in which they promised to submit their products for approval or emergency use authorization only “after demonstrating safety and efficacy through a Phase 3 clinical study that is designed and conducted to meet requirements of expert regulatory authorities such as FDA.” Note the wording here: These companies did not suggest that they might claim to have demonstrated efficacy through multiple, distinct clinical studies, combined together to get enough data. They said they would use a Phase 3 study—as in, one big one. Yet AstraZeneca has already applied on the basis of this data for approval in Canada, and has plans to do the same in Britain, Europe and Brazil. The company also says it will use the data to apply for emergency use authorization in the US.

The Food and Drug Administration’s guidance for Covid-19 vaccines does allow for emergency use authorization based on interim analyses, but the same document says this must be supported by a minimum level of vaccine efficacy “for a placebo-controlled efficacy trial.” Again: it refers to a trial. That is exactly what BNT-Pfizer and Moderna did. Both released the FDA-approved blueprints for their trials—called trial protocols—weeks ahead of time, with details of the calculations and statistical rules that they’d use to determine when to perform an interim analysis and how much certainty could be attached to those results. When BNT-Pfizer’s discussions with the FDA led to changes in this plan, BNT-Pfizer explained why, and released an updated protocol. That’s scientific rigor, and it matters a lot. When a vaccine-maker specifies the rules of the game before the results start coming in, we can check their work and be confident in what they tell us at the end. We can make sure they haven’t cherry-picked the data.

How did Oxford-AstraZeneca end up with this patched-together analysis instead of data from a single, large trial?

The Oxford-AstraZeneca story is very different, though. Presumably, neither of the two trials from which they combined data could have provided a clear answer on the vaccine’s efficacy on its own. To make things worse, Oxford-AstraZeneca reported only the results for certain subgroups of people within each one. (For perspective on this: The two subgroups chosen leave out perhaps half the people in the Brazilian trial.) Meanwhile, one of their key claims is that giving half a dose of the vaccine on the first injection, followed by a standard dose on the second one, led to better outcomes—but neither of these trials had been designed to test this hypothesis. In fact, it’s since emerged that the half-dose/full-dose option started out as a mistake, and one that was only caught when some people in the study didn’t have the usual high rate of adverse effects.

There were other dosing issues, too, that haven’t been explained even though dosing is the centerpiece of the press release. There are many different regimens in these trials—the UK study has more than two dozen arms, meaning the volunteers were divided into that many groups according to age and how much of the vaccine would be administered and when. The doses are measured by the number of altered viral particles they contain, and the developers decided that the standard dose would be 5 x 1010 viral particles. But for many of those arms in the UK trial—as well as everyone who got the vaccine in the Brazilian trial—publicly available trial information shows that the standard dose could be between 3.5 and 6.5 × 1010 viral particles. The lower end of that range isn’t far off from a half-dose.

How did Oxford-AstraZeneca end up with this patched-together analysis instead of data from a single, large trial? After all, this vaccine went into Phase 3 testing before either BNT-PFizer’s or Moderna’s did. But in the UK, where that testing started, the Covid-19 outbreak happened to be receding. That meant results would be coming in very slowly.

A month later, a second Phase 3 trial for the vaccine started in Brazil. That one was for healthcare workers, for whom the risk of being exposed to Covid was far higher than it was for the people in the UK trial. But the two trials had other substantive differences. In the UK, for example, the volunteers who did not get the experimental Covid vaccine were injected with meningococcal vaccine; in Brazil, those in the comparison group were given a saline injection as a placebo.

Meanwhile, BNT-Pfizer and Moderna began Phase 3 trials for their coronavirus vaccines on the same day in July: Both planned to include 30,000 volunteers at the time, and both trial plans were approved by the FDA. Oxford-AstraZeneca then announced they, too, would run a 30,000-person trial in the US.

But that research on the Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine quickly fell behind the others’. The US trial was approved by the FDA, but it didn’t start recruiting people until the end of August; and just a week later, it was put on hold so the FDA could investigate a serious adverse event in the UK trial. It wasn’t clear what caused the volunteer to get sick, but the FDA did not give the all-clear for Oxford-AstraZeneca’s US trial to resume until Oct. 23. By then the protocol for the trial had been publicly released. It says the plan is to inject the vaccine in two standard doses, a month apart; and two people will be vaccinated for every one who gets a placebo saline injection.

So here we are at the end of November. BNT-Pfizer and Moderna have offered up a masterclass in how to do major vaccine trials quickly in a pandemic, while Oxford-AstraZeneca has, for the moment, only an assortment of smaller ones ready to look at.

But wait, more red flags! Last week, Oxford-AstraZeneca published some results from earlier in the development of the UK trial. That paper included a trial protocol for the UK study, attached as an appendix. Deep in that document, and apparently overlooked by reporters and commentators, was an eyebrow-raising suggestion: Under a section marked “Interim and primary analyses of the primary outcome,” the trialists outline a plan to combine and analyze data from four clinical trials (only half of which are Phase 3), carried out in different ways on three different continents. The plan, they wrote, was to pull out results only for the people across these four trials who had gotten "two standard-dose vaccines," and then pool those together for what's called a meta-analysis.

The appendix doesn’t say when this became the plan. We don’t even know if the Oxford-AstraZeneca team followed it. In fact, it’s impossible to know, at this point, just how many analyses these researchers have run, and on which data. That’s a scientific red flag with flashing lights. (Again it’s useful to compare this work to the BNT-Pfizer and Moderna trials, where the analyses were clearly spelled out ahead of time for everyone to see.) All we know for sure is that on Monday, Oxford-AstraZeneca announced results of a different interim analysis that included only volunteers from the two trials in the UK and Brazil. As we’ve seen, this analysis was not limited to the people who got two standard doses of the vaccine.


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Here's all the WIRED coverage in one place, from how to keep your children entertained to how this outbreak is affecting the economy.

There are other problems, too. In the press release, Oxford-AstraZeneca reports that two of the dosing regimens “demonstrated efficacy.” Presumably, none of the others did, but they didn’t give specifics. Of the only two regimens they reported, one (the mistaken first half-dose, followed by a full dose at least a month later) came in at 90 percent, and the other (two standard doses at least a month apart) achieved only 62 percent efficacy. You’ll see reports that the vaccine had 70 percent efficacy, on average; but that’s un-knowable, because we only have numbers on these two regimens, as opposed to everyone in the trials—and how they arrived at those percentages isn’t explained. As far as we know, some of this analysis could hinge on data from just a few sick people. That means the findings could be a coincidence, or they could be biased by other factors. For example, it has since been revealed that the people who received an initial half-dose—and for whom the vaccine was said to have 90-percent efficacy—included no one over the age of 55. That was not the case for the standard-dosing group, however, where the reported efficacy was 62 percent. This demographic difference could be more important than the change to the size of the first dose.

That’s not the end of the problems. Overall, the Oxford-AstraZeneca trials appear to include relatively few participants over the age of 55, even though this group is especially vulnerable to Covid-19. (People over 55 were not originally eligible to join the Brazilian trial at all.) Compare that to BNT-Pfizer’s trial, where 41 percent of the volunteers were over 55. The Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine also seems to produce relatively high rates of adverse events. If you want to dig further into this vaccine’s story and issues, I’ve laid out a more detailed rundown of the Oxford-AstraZeneca trials and sources here.

Now it’s over to drug regulatory agencies around the world. They have to make a decision about this vaccine that was once ahead of the pack, but for which there are still no reliable and rigorous results from a single, large phase 3 trial. If anything short of that standard is accepted for this vaccine, it will be easy to stoke already widespread fears about corners being cut. A loss of trust would affect more than this one vaccine.

Hilda Bastian (@hildabast) has a PhD in health science, and expertise in assessing the validity of evidence for health claims.



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Mysterious obelisk in US desert captures conspiracy theorists' imaginations

Issued on: 25/11/2020 
This video grab image obtained November 24, 2020 shows a mysterious metal monolith that was discovered in Utah after public safety officers spotted the object while conducting a routine mission. © Utah Department of Public Safety, Handout, AFP

Text by: NEWS WIRES

A mysterious metal obelisk found buried in the remote western United States desert has inflamed the imaginations of UFO spotters, conspiracy theorists and Stanley Kubrick fans around the world.

The shiny, triangular pillar -- which protrudes approximately 12 feet from the red rocks of southern Utah -- was spotted last Wednesday by baffled local officials counting bighorn sheep from the air.

After landing their helicopter to investigate, Utah Department of Public Safety crew members found "a metal monolith installed in the ground" but "no obvious indication of who might have put the monolith there."

"It is illegal to install structures or art without authorization on federally managed public lands, no matter what planet you're from," warned the agency in a tongue-in-cheek press release Monday.

News of the discovery quickly went viral online, with many noting the object's similarity with strange alien monoliths that trigger huge leaps in human progress in Kubrick's classic sci-fi film "2001: A Space Odyssey."

Others remarked on its discovery during a turbulent year that has seen the world gripped by the Covid-19 pandemic, and optimistically speculated it could have a different function entirely.

"This is the 'reset' button for 2020. Can someone please press it quickly?" joked one Instagram user.

"Up close it reads: 'Covid vaccine inside'" wrote another.

Although officials have refused to disclose the object's location out of fear that hordes of curious sightseers would flock to the remote wilderness, a Reddit user said they had managed to geo-locate the obelisk using surrounding rock formations.

Sharing the Google Earth location -- where a small structure can be seen, roughly six miles from the nearest road -- the user said the structure was first photographed by Google in 2016.

Bret Hutchings, the pilot who happened to fly over the obelisk, speculated that it had been planted by "some new wave artist."

Some observers pointed out the object's resemblance to the avant-garde work of John McCracken, a US artist who lived for a time in nearby New Mexico, and died in 2011.

On Tuesday a spokeswoman for his representative David Zwirner said it was not one of McCracken's works, but possibly by a fellow artist paying homage.

However later in the day Zwirner gave another statement in which he suggested the piece was indeed by McCracken, meaning it had lain undiscovered in the desert for nearly a decade.

"The gallery is divided on this," Zwirner said. "I believe this is definitely by John."

He added: "Who would have known that 2020 had yet another surprise for us. Just when we thought we had seen it all. Let's go see it."

Either way, Hutchings admitted it was "about the strangest thing I've come across out there, in all my years of flying."

"We were kind of joking around that if one of us suddenly disappears, then the rest of us make a run for it," he told local news channel KSLTV.

(AFP)

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Pain and glory: The extraordinary life of Diego Maradona

Issued on: 25/11/2020 - 

Text by: Benjamin DODMAN

One of sport’s most cinematic (anti)heroes, Diego Maradona died of a heart attack on Wednesday, aged 60. His rise and demise was the subject of a documentary by Asif Kapadia, the third and last instalment in a trilogy about child prodigies consumed by stardom.



The scene is June 22, 1986, at the Estadio Azteca in Mexico City. On a sweltering afternoon, 114,000 dazzled fans have just witnessed Maradona score the greatest goal in World Cup history – and the Argentine commentator is waxing lyrical.

“Cosmic kite, what planet are you from that you can leave so many Englishmen in your wake?” the sportscaster yelps, sobbing with joy at a feat celebrated across Argentina as revenge for the Falklands War. “Thank you God for football and for Maradona!”

Maradona’s glorious run past England’s hapless defenders is the stuff of legend, second only in fame to the goal he scored minutes earlier with his hand – the “hand of God”, as he coined it. The outrageous one-two, which sealed Argentina’s quarter-final win over their bitter rivals, would define his career: the brilliance and the trickery, the prodigy and the myth.


The extraordinary case of Dr Diego and Mr Maradona is the subject of a documentary by Britain’s Asif Kapadia, which screened out of competition at the Cannes Film Festival last year.

The director has described “Diego Maradona” as the third and last instalment in a trilogy about child prodigies who struggled with fame. It follows “Senna”, his documentary on the racecar driver who died at 34 in a crash, and Oscar-winning “Amy”, about singer-songwriter Amy Winehouse and her tragic death at 27.

Maradona ultimately outlived them both, by a considerable margin, though for much of the past three decades his life seemed to be hanging by a thread.

'I’m after the glory, not the money'

A cinematic anti-hero, football's great prestidigitator was something of a Cannes habitué in his own right.

In 2015, a Maradona lookalike starred in Paolo Sorrentino’s “Youth”, a meditation on aging. His juggling display, bouncing a tennis ball with still-agile feet while dragging his humongous belly around the court, was a delight to watch. Years before, the man himself hit the red carpet for a screening of Emir Kusturica’s biopic “Maradona by Kusturica” – which, as the title suggested, was as much about the director as the footballer.

With Kapadia, Maradona’s remarkable life is in more dependable hands. His documentary focuses on the footballer’s Neapolitan years, from his arrival as a godsend to his cocaine-fuelled downfall.



“I’m after the glory, not the money,” says a still-young Maradona, early on in the film, as he quits mighty Barcelona for Italian laggards Napoli in the summer of 1984. Back then, the Italian club were yet to win a title and the city and its people were the butt of every racist joke in the country (to this day, rival fans still taunt them with chants of “Vesuvius, wash them with fire”).

It was a preposterous career move, unthinkable today. But Maradona and Naples proved to be a perfect match, sharing the same humble origins, intoxicating passion, and rebellious streak. El pibe de oro (the golden boy) soon lifted the team’s fortunes and restored the city’s pride – becoming, in the process, a hero, a saint and a god.

Kapadia’s film opens with breathtaking footage of Maradona’s first arrival at the San Paolo stadium, crammed with 85,000 delirious fans. The pandemonium is exhilarating and overwhelming, as is the two-month-long rumpus that follows Napoli’s very first title win three years later. Never before had a sport star aroused such levels of devotion and hysteria (at one point a nurse takes a sample of his blood to a local church to mix it with relics of San Gennaro, the city’s patron saint).

Always a delight to be in his company. 🙌🏻 https://t.co/SfTo8SLqlR— Gary Lineker (@GaryLineker) November 25, 2020

But the flipside of fame and the dark side of Naples soon catch up with Maradona. He has a child out of wedlock (which he refuses to recognise), frequents the Camorra (the local mafia), and becomes a cocaine addict. And when Argentina knock Italy out of the 1990 World Cup at the San Paolo stadium – of all places – the country turns against him. He is a fallen god, and the backlash is vicious.

Kapadia has uncovered an extraordinary wealth of documentary material, from black-and-white footage of Maradona as a little boy knocking a ball around in the slums of Buenos Aires to an audio recording of his phone conversation with his elated mother shortly after Argentina won the World Cup.

His film follows a familiar pattern, distinguishing between Diego – the shy, insecure and good-natured kid who supported his family from the age of 15 – and Maradona – the god-like public persona he became. A beautiful homage to the most exceptional footballer of all time, it will leave viewers dazzled by the football, the passion and the aura, but yearning to dig deeper into the man’s inner turmoil.

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Wednesday, November 25, 2020




Professor Anne Rasa, scientist who revealed the complex social structure in mongoose colonies – obituary

Her studies in Kenya revealed that no other mammalian society has such a high degree of mutual caring and division of labour
By Telegraph 
24 November 2020 


She retired to a farm in the Kalahari which she turned into a sanctuary for animals including meerkats


Professor Anne Rasa, who has died aged 80, was an ethologist (expert in animal behaviour) whose studies of the social behaviour of the dwarf mongoose in the Taru Desert, Kenya, were published in numerous papers and books including the popular Mongoose Watch: A Family Observed (1985).

Having studied the animals in captivity in Germany, she went to live in the desert to follow a group in the wild, concluding that no other mammalian society, bar that of humans, has such a high degree of mutual caring and division of labour.

Each mongoose group, she found, is led by a matriarch who chooses her own mate and is the only female allowed to rear young. Her mate leads the group into battle, teaches the young to forage and has the job of preventing illicit sex among other group members, a role made problematic by the fact that during the five days the matriarch is in season, he mounts her more than 2,000 times. Other group members are allocated jobs as guards, babysitters, peacemakers and so on.

“They woo, worry, rage and play; form friendships and sexual liaisons; practice deception and persuasion; and at times behave with striking thoughtfulness for others,” Anne Rasa wrote.

Each mongoose group, she found, is led by a matriarch who chooses her own mate and is the only female allowed to rear young


This thoughtfulness manifested itself, for example, in the group’s treatment of a member who became ill with chronic kidney disease and lost the ability to climb. The entire group gave up their preference for sleeping on elevated objects and joined their sick friend on the ground. When foraging, they slowed their search for food so that the afflicted mongoose could keep up.

Olwen Anne Elisabeth Phillips was born on April 28 1940, in the Rhondda Valley, Wales, the daughter of squadron leader Richard Phillips and his wife Olwen. After taking a BSc from Imperial College she won a Nato scholarship to research aggression in tropical fish. She took an MSc from the University of Hawaii, followed, in 1970, by a PhD from London University.

From 1970 to 1974 she worked at the Max-Planck Insitute of Behavioural Psychology under Konrad Lorenz. It was there that she decided to study the dwarf mongoose after she learnt that nothing was known about the species.

From 1975 to 1981 she was a scientific assistant at Marburg University, and then moved to the University of Bayreuth with a scholarship to carry out her field studies on dwarf mongoose in the Taru Desert. Lorenz wrote the forward to Mongoose Watch.

In the late 1980s Anne Rasa moved to Pretoria University in South Africa as an associate professor of ethology.

There she began research on yellow mongooses in the Kalahari Desert; she concluded that diet determines whether they live as solitary animals or in a group. When eating large food items such as birds, snakes and geckos, it was better for them to hunt alone: “But if you specialise in grubs, you need someone to watch your back as birds of prey are mongooses’ main predator.”

In 1991 she returned to Germany as associate professor of ethology at the University of Bonn, where, as well as her continuing work on mongooses, she studied the desert beetle Parastizopus armaticeps, a monogamous species in which parents collaborate to rear their young.

After her retirement in 2000, she returned to South Africa, where she bought a farm at the southern end of the Kalahari Desert. She turned it into a nature reserve and sanctuary for rescuing and rehabilitating desert animals, mainly meerkats, many of them orphaned or confiscated from the illegal pet trade.

Her marriage to Ponciano Cruz Rasa was dissolved and she is survived by two daughters and a son.

Anne Rasa, born April 28 1940, died November 15 2020

Diego Maradona, one of the greatest footballers the game has ever seen – obituary

He won the World Cup and led Napoli to glory in Italy and Europe, but his life and career were tainted by scandals and character flaws
25 November 2020 • 

Diego Maradona following Argentina's World cup victory in 1986
CREDIT: AP Photo/Carlo Fumagalli


Diego Maradona, who has died following a cardiac arrest aged 60, was the most talented footballer of the 1980s, and in the estimation of many the most dominant player to have emerged since Pele; in a career never lacking in drama, he also proved himself a liar, a cheat and an egomaniac.

The sense of disappointment that accompanies Maradona’s name is not the familiar one engendered by a failure to fulfil potential in the manner of a Greaves or a Gascoigne. Although Maradona did not win as many trophies as he perhaps should have done, there was no argument among his peers that, at his peak, he proved himself the best footballer in the world. Instead, the disappointment stems from what Pele described as the gulf between Maradona’s greatness as a player and his stature as a person.

That distance was most sharply illustrated, to English eyes at least, during the 1986 World Cup in Mexico, when England played Argentina in the quarter-finals of the competition. Five minutes into the second half, with the score at 0-0, the ball was hooked back by an England player towards the goalkeeper, Peter Shilton.

As he rose to claim it, he was challenged by Maradona, who used his left hand to punch the ball into the net. The infringement was not spotted by the officials and, to English disbelief, the goal was given.















Maradona's infamous 'Hand of God' goal against England in the 1986 World Cup 
CREDIT: Bongarts/Getty Images

Four minutes later Maradona scored one of the finest goals ever seen. Receiving the ball just inside his own half, he began to bear down on the English goal, swerving round two defenders and shrugging off two more attempted tackles before sliding the ball past a sprawling Shilton. It was a piece of footballing magic that he was to repeat in the semi-final against Belgium as Argentina moved inexorably towards winning the World Cup.

After the England game Maradona refused to admit that he had scored the first goal by cheating, though he did share the credit: the goal had been scored, he told reporters, “a little with the head of Maradona and a little with the hand of God”.

There were many excuses for the manner in which he had scored: the Argentine tradition of viveza (cunning play); the desire to avenge the Falklands War of four years before. But there was none that could disguise the revelation that both goals were equally accurate expressions of a brilliant yet flawed personality. He had divine skill, but many of the basest aspects of humanity




















Maradona followed his 'Hand of God' goal a few minutes later with one of the finest individual goals ever seen 
CREDIT: AFP/Getty Images

Diego Armando Maradona was born at Avellaneda, across the river from Buenos Aires, on October 30 1960. His mother worked as a domestic, while his father, who was of native Indian descent, had a job crushing cattle bones for meal. The family had few means, and Diegito grew up in Villa Fiorito, one of the Argentine capital’s poorer shanties. At the age of two he was saved from drowning in the communal cesspit by the intervention of an uncle.

From early childhood it was clear that he had remarkable control over a football, and that this would offer not only himself but those who clung to his shirt-tails a way out of poverty. Inspired, he recalled, by George Best, by the age of 10 he was entertaining crowds with his tricks at half-time in First Division matches, and was coming up through the ranks of Argentinos Juniors, a well-established club.

Maradona in training in Argentina in 1980 
CREDIT: Allsport UK /Allsport

He had also encountered the first of a series of dubiously qualified doctors and dietitians who would play a significant role in his career; this one put him on a course of injections and pills which accelerated the maturing process of a physique which was then rather slight.

Maradona grew to be only 5ft 5in tall, but his squat 11st frame with its low centre of gravity had both tremendous strength and pace, making him highly difficult to tackle, especially when he was dribbling at speed, his forte. Left-footed (although good with both), he usually played in midfield, directing the game with a highly acute sense of strategy and regularly bursting forward to set up goals and to score himself.

At 15 Maradona made his first-team debut for Argentinos Juniors, becoming the youngest player ever to play in the top flight in Argentina. A year later he was in the national team and already a star, even though the coach, Cesar Menotti, decided not to pick him for the 1978 World Cup (which was held in Argentina and won by them) as he had doubts about Maradona’s ability to cope with defeat. The teenager responded by leading his compatriots to victory in the World Youth Championship the next year and, while on loan to Boca Juniors, steering them to the league title in 1980.

Argentina’s triumph in the World Cup had provided a tremendous boost to the nationalist junta then running the country. While senior figures such as Menotti felt that they had the freedom to question its repressive nature, Maradona, at a sensitive time in his career, appeared broadly to support it when asked; and though he had begun to attract attention from clubs as diverse as Barcelona and Sheffield United, he at first respected the regime’s wish that the country’s best players should not take their talents abroad.



His attitude changed, however, in 1982, during the World Cup held in Spain. There he saw uncensored news reports of the Falklands War, and in common with many Argentines rapidly became disillusioned with the junta, which had told its citizens that it was winning the conflict.

The tournament also represented a personal setback for Maradona. Having suffered at the feet of the Italian defenders, he lost his head when subjected to more of the same treatment by Brazil, and was sent off as Argentina surrendered the trophy they had won four years before. Maradona (rather like David Beckham 16 years later) was vilified at home, and with the junta toppling saw no reason not to accept an offer from Barcelona, who had bid a record £5 million. He was still only 21.

Barcelona’s hope was that Maradona would help the club recapture the success it had enjoyed a few years earlier, when its star player was Johan Cruyff. Maradona, however, found it harder to win over the club’s directors, principally because his private life soon became a byword for indulgence. The transfer had made him (and his extensive entourage) rich, but as no one was willing to rein in the golden goose, he quickly fell into bad company, debt and a cocaine habit.


Maradona with the World Cup in 1986
 CREDIT: Colorsport/REX/Shutterstock

Had the team’s fortunes been better on the pitch, his personal failings might have been overlooked; but while he played well on occasion, he often missed matches, failed to see eye to eye with his managers (even when Menotti was brought in), and then suffered a severe injury to his left ankle as the result of a foul by Andoni Goikoetxea, “the Butcher of Bilbao”. Thereafter the joint would become inflamed every time he played, and for the remainder of his career he needed to wear a larger-sized boot on his left foot.

Barcelona won the Copa de Reyes, or King’s Cup (the Spanish equivalent of the FA Cup) in 1983, but not the league or European honours the club thought its birthright; and when, at the end of the 1984 Cup final, Maradona provoked a brawl with the victorious Bilbao players in front of the royal box, the club moved to rid itself of his disruptive influence. With the assent of the new manager, Terry Venables, he was sold to Napoli for another world record sum of £10 million.

His purchase was a statement by the Italian club’s ambitious owners that it wished to challenge the footballing (and so, metaphorically, the economic) dominance of the north of the country. Maradona quickly felt at home in the city’s rumbustious, volatile ambience and in turn was treated by the Neapolitans as one of their own. In exchange, he brought the club its first league title, in 1987, together with the Coppa Italia, the Uefa Cup in 1989, and a second scudetto in 1990. Taken with Argentina’s World Cup victory in 1986, these were his best years in the game.

During the 1990 World Cup, which ended in defeat in the final to West Germany 
CREDIT: David Jacobs/Reuters


In 1990, however, his career began to implode. He had become prone to injury and to fluctuations in weight, but these the Italian fans had put up with. They had also come to terms with the birth of an illegitimate son, the result of a brief affair with a young local woman, Cristiana Sinagra. Then, with the World Cup being played in Italy, Maradona made a grave miscalculation.

Argentina reached the semi-final, against Italy, which was due to be played in Naples itself. Maradona appealed to the local tifosi to back his side against their national team as a gesture of southern defiance. The match was played instead in an atmosphere of hostile near-silence, and when Argentina contested the final in Rome against West Germany, his team was met with a hail of abuse. Argentina lost the match and the trophy, and Maradona lost the admiration of many Italians.

More particularly, his behaviour once back in Naples finally lost him the protection of the club, which had largely shielded him from investigation of his use of prostitutes and drugs and his friendships with senior members of the Camorra, the Neapolitan mafia. In 1991, when he was given a 15-month ban after testing positive for cocaine, they cut their ties with him. Although no one knew it, at 30 Maradona’s best playing days were over.

Maradona in 2018 
CREDIT: KIRILL KUDRYAVTSEV/AFP/Getty Images


He was by no means the first footballer to be caught with drugs, but by now his reputation was such that few clubs wanted to buy him, and those that were interested soon found him to be an over-pampered egoist. For his part, Maradona seemed to have lost the urge to prove himself in the game. After serving his ban, he played in Spain for Sevilla for a few months in 1992-93 before once more returning to Argentina in a huff.

Fifa then made every effort to persuade him to play in the 1994 World Cup, in the United States, such was his stature in the sport – and his importance to the commercial success of the tournament. Having trained separately from the Argentina squad, he arrived looking in magnificent condition, and in the first couple of matches he played superbly. But his mad-eyed rush to camera to celebrate a goal gave some commentators pause for thought, and a few days later came the not entirely unexpected news that he had tested positive for five different forms of the stimulant ephedrine.

Doping had been rife in Argentine football since at least the 1978 World Cup, and it was simply a matter of personal opinion as to whether one believed that Maradona had deliberately cheated or had been, as he was for much of his career, manipulated by someone around him who had a stake in his continued success. That he had always lacked the intellect or willpower to take charge of the business side of his life was perhaps the saddest of Maradona’s flaws.

The scandal and subsequent suspension finished him as a force in world football – but not in Argentina, where his standing was inviolate (even when he wounded four journalists with an air rifle in 1994, for which he later received a suspended jail sentence). He played two more patchy seasons for Boca Juniors before another brush with drugs finally ended his time in football in 1997. He had won 91 international caps and scored 34 goals; he had played 608 games in all, finishing with 314 goals.

For the next few years he promoted himself as a kind of unofficial sports ambassador (even addressing the Oxford Union), although much of the promotion seemed to be only of himself. By 2000 a bloated Maradona had put on 4st in weight; he had become addicted to Valium and was living in Cuba. He suffered from a hereditary cardiac condition and that year had a severe heart attack.















With Pope Francis in Rome in 2014 
CREDIT: Pier Marco Tacca/Getty Images


From 2004 onwards Maradona’s health became of real concern. He was taken to hospital that year after suffering a heart attack brought on by cocaine use, and in 2005 had to have gastric bypass surgery to address his ballooning weight. Looking slimmer, he returned to public life, first as the host of a chat show in Argentina and then in a coaching role with Boca Juniors. He also began to spend much of his time in Cuba, he and Fidel Castro being mutual admirers.

Whether it was the benign influence of El Jefe, or later of Hugo Chavez of Bolivia, or some other impulse, by 2008 Maradona claimed to have beaten his addictions. That year, having had brief coaching stints in the Middle East and Argentina, he was appointed manager of the national side.

Although this stemmed entirely from his standing with the fans, Maradona proved to have the wherewithal to propel the team through to qualification for the 2010 World Cup when that seemed unlikely. Unwisely, he subsequently vented in public his disregard for his critics in the media, which led to a ban. When Argentina went out of the tournament in the quarter-finals, the national association chose not to renew his contract.



Despite regular health scares and misadventures, he remained iconic within the sport. At the 2018 World Cup in Russia, Fifa reportedly paid him £10,000 for every match he was seen attending, although this backfired when his celebrations on camera at an Argentina victory turned vulgar shortly before his appearing to need medical attention.

Ultimately Maradona remained the boy from the barrios, and indeed – unlike the more emollient Pele – he made much of retaining what he saw as his common touch. It was both his Achilles’ heel and the source of his genius. For all the failings of his character, there was no disputing the joy his accomplishments with the ball had brought to fans of football all over the world.

In 2004, Diego Maradona was divorced from his wife Claudia (née Villafane), his long-suffering childhood sweetheart, whom he married in 1989 and with whom he had two daughters, Dalma and Giannina. The latter married, and then divorced, the Manchester City and Argentina footballer, Sergio Aguero. Maradona’s son by Cristiana Sinagra, Diego Armando Jr, played for Italy’s Under-17 side.

Diego Maradona, born October 30 1960, died November 25 2020
#BANFURFARMING
Denmark faces new horror as bodies of culled mink rise from mass graves

Photos of the ghastly sight have set social media abuzz, with one Twitter user dubbing 2020 'the year of the zombie mutant killer minks'
 25 November 2020 • THE TELEGRAPH


The government ordered the culling of all Danish mink because of the coronavirus CREDIT: Ritzau Scanpix 

As if the Danish government's rushed decision to cull and bury more than 10 million minks wasn't a grisly enough story, thousands of the animals' bloated cadavers have begun to re-emerge from their shallow graves.

The phenomenon was reported by Denmark's state broadcaster DR on Tuesday after mink carcasses were spotted popping up to the surface at a mass burial site at a military training field on Sunday.

"It is an extraordinary situation," Thomas Kristensen, a press officer with Denmark's National Police, which is responsible for the mink burials, told state broadcaster DR.

"In connection with the decay, gasses form, which cause the whole thing to expand a little, and then in the worst case they get pushed out of the ground."

The environment ministry, which is regulating the burials said in a statement that the minks' return from the grave was a "temporary problem tied to the animals' decaying process".

Video footage shows mink 'rising from the grave' at the Holstebro military complex in Denmark CREDIT: Anders Davidsen / DR P4 Midt & Vest


The cadavers' eerie re-emergence has triggered a flurry of zombie jokes on Twitter.

"2020, the year of the zombie mutant killer minks," wrote online marketer Stefan Bøgh-Andersen.

"Run... The zombie minks are coming," wrote Nicolai Nelson.

Run... The zombie minks are cominghttps://t.co/1MTkpKGNUg— Nicolai Nielsen (@NicolaiTweets) November 24, 2020

Denmark earlier this month announced plans to cull all of its more than 15 million minks in the hope of wiping out a new vaccine-resistant mutation of Covid-19 which had developed in the country's mink farms.

The rushed cull decision has turned into a national scandal after Prime Minister Frederiksen's government acknowledged that it had no legal right to order a cull of minks not contaminated by the Covid-19 variant.

Denmark's agriculture minister has already admitted that the burial ground where the re-emerging bodies were spotted, outside the town of Holstebro in Western Jutland, was situated too close to a nearby lake.













The decaying mink are buried close to a lake CREDIT: Shutterstock 

The dead minks have been dug one metre down into the ground, and then covered with lime and a layer of earth, but according to Kristensen the earth around Holstebro had proven so sandy that more is needed to keep the carcasses down.

"One meter of soil is not just one meter of soil. It depends on what it is made of. So that’s why we’ve seen this happen," he said.

According to the country's environment ministry, the minks should also have been covered by at least 150 centimetres of earth.

Karsten Dahl Schmidt, the nearest neighbour to the grave, told DR that he worried that the liquids from the rotting bodies would seep into the nearby Boutrup Lake, which is a popular bathing spot.

"I dream that everything gets put back to how it was before," he said. "You cannot just do nothing here. You have to dig the minks back up and send them for incineration."



UK scientists warn of third wave of Covid after Christmas


Nazia Parveen
Wed, 25 November 2020, 
Photograph: Yui Mok/PA

Government scientists have warned the relaxation of coronavirus restrictions over Christmas could lead to a third wave of the pandemic, with increased transmission and unnecessary deaths.

Families across the UK will be able to gather in three-household groups of any size over Christmas, the government has announced, prompting warnings from scientists that the plan will almost inevitably result in a rise in the number of coronavirus cases.

The long-planned idea of “Christmas bubbles” – which ministers said would require people to make a “personal judgment” over the risk older relatives and others – was thrashed out in a meeting involving the four UK governments.

However, some scientists have warned strongly against encouraging families to mix indoors in winter. Two advisers to the government’s Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (Sage) have said the relaxation will lead to the NHS being overwhelmed

“Effectively what this will be doing is throwing fuel on the Covid fire. I think it will definitely lead to increased transmission. It is likely to lead to a third wave of infection, with hospitals being overrun, and more unnecessary deaths,” Prof Andrew Hayward told BBC Two’s Newsnight programme.

“We are still in a country where we have got high levels of infection with Covid, particularly in young people. Bringing them together for hours, let alone days, with elderly relatives, I think, is a recipe for regret for many families. With the vaccine on the way, if we are not very careful over Christmas we are really in danger of snatching defeat from the jaws of victory on this one.”uk cases

Prof Graham Medley, an expert in infectious disease modelling at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, said the relaxation could lead to further lockdown measures in the new year.

“I think it is inevitable that if a lot of people do take that risk, even if it is a small risk, then we will end up with a lot of people in hospital and potentially having to take measures in January to lock down again,” he said.

Medley advised people to isolate before visiting relatives and to remain “completely faithful” to any social bubble arrangements and weighing the risk of spreading the disease to those who are vulnerable.

Many politicians agreed with the scientists, with the mayor of Greater Manchester, Andy Burnham, also expressing fears about the NHS being overrun in the new year.

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“[The government] is allowing too much. They have given the green light for Christmas but what price will people have to pay. The government has not got the balance right. This is too much,” he told ITV’s Good Morning Britain. “They are worried about the headlines – that is what has driven this decision.”

But the Welsh first minister, Mark Drakeford, denied that the agreement to allow households to meet for Christmas was “headline seeking”.

“Our decision is based on the calculation that this is the safest way – not a completely safe way, not a risk-free way – but the safest way that we can offer,” he said. Drakeford said the decision to agree a relaxing of restrictions was to avoid a “free for all”.

“I think it was very clear to us from the advice we received at the Cobra meeting, but also from what we hear in Wales, that unless we found a formula that allowed people to get together over Christmas, people were very unlikely to be willing to stick to the current level of restrictions that we have here in Wales,” Drakeford told Good Morning Britain.

“So the choice was between a guided form of meeting over Christmas or people simply making their own solutions.”


The Guardian·