South Africa: New Clinics Built Near Pretoria but Years Later They Are Still Not Open
22 MARCH 2022
GroundUp (Cape Town)By Mosima Rafapa
People in Shoshanguve and Hammanskraal are struggling to access health services while newly built facilities stand idle
Two clinics built for townships north of Pretoria have stood unopened for years.
Residents say they are struggling to access health care services as a result.
Red tape and land acquisition issues are blamed for the delays at the clinics in Soshanguve and Hammanskraal.
Residents in Soshanguve and Hammanskraal in Pretoria are frustrated that two newly-built clinics are taking years to open.
In the meantime, residents are struggling to access health services and many are having to pay for taxis to go to clinics further afield.
Boikhutsong clinic in Soshanguve
Construction of the New Boikhutsong Clinic in Soshanguve started in May 2017 and was meant to be completed in 2018. There is a building but GroundUp saw construction vehicles still on site last week.
Spokesperson for the Gauteng Department of Infrastructure Development Bongiwe Gambu said the anticipated date of opening is now the end of March. She blamed issues around land acquisition and red tape.
According to Gambu, the City of Tshwane initially donated the land to the province, but it later rescinded all land donations made to the province and in September 2021 the City council resolved to rather sell the land to the province. The provincial government's property management unit is "currently in a process to finalise the land acquisition process with the City", Gambu said.
In November 2021, during a protest by the Democratic Nursing Organisation of South Africa (DENOSA), the chairperson of the Boikhutsong clinic committee Tebogo Mokonyane demanded that the clinic be opened by February 2022.
The old -- but still used -- clinic, within walking distance of the new clinic, is in a building donated "by a white couple in 1994" according to Mokonyane. "It used to be sort of a resort, hence the rondavel that serves as our filing room," he explained.
He said the clinic serves many areas and informal settlements and cannot cope. "Our patients are forced to queue outside when it rains or in the scorching sun," he said.
GroundUp spoke to Dorah Magano, who said she had arrived at 6:50am and had still not been helped by 1pm. "I haven't eaten anything and I'm on chronic medication," she said.
France Baloyi, clinician and acting manager at Boikhutsong clinic, said, "The clinic was earlier this year found to be non-compliant by occupational health and safety regulators ... The rooms are small; there's so much congestion; there's no proper ventilation. The air-conditioning units are dysfunctional. One of the consulting rooms has been partitioned into two. It serves as an emergency room and for family planning. It is so hot that nurses and patients are feeling serious discomfort."
Mandisa Shiceka Clinic in Hammanskraal
The Mandisa Shiceka Clinic in Hammanskraal also remains closed even though construction started in 2017 and was completed in 2019. Efforts to get a response from Gambu as to why this was the case were unsuccessful, but Ward 49 Councillor Adam Mashapa (ANC) said the delays were also caused by problems with land acquisition from the City.
GroundUp met a staff member who said the old clinic was demolished before the new clinic was even built. Then prefab containers had to be brought in and a large tent. The staff member said it had been chaotic.
This prefab/tent clinic mostly stopped operating in June 2021, with most patients transferred to other facilities. The tent clinic now only provides chronic medication and mental health services.
There is a doctor who is assessing chronic patients and renewing their expired scripts, according to Kwara Kekana, spokesperson for Gauteng Department of Health MEC Dr Nomathemba Mokgethi.
Kekana said the clinic was closed because the temporary structures could no longer safely accommodate the number of patients.
"The staff from Mandisa Shiceka Clinic were redeployed to Jubilee Gateway Clinic, Themba Community Health Centre and Suurman Clinic. Some of the staff members are deployed to the Covid vaccination site, with a limited number still available at Mandisa Shiceka Clinic for some services," said Kekana.
"Plans to open the new facility are at an advanced stage and will be shared with the community once concluded, in the near future," said Kekana.
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Tuesday, March 22, 2022
Afghan minister who fled the Taliban now drives Uber to feed his family
Khalid Payenda said he was ‘grateful’ for the opportunity to work after exhausting his savings
Approximately 23 million of the country’s 39.8 million citizens are experiencing acute hunger, according to the United Nations assistance mission (UNAMA).
UNAMA warns that 100 percent of female-led households do not have enough to eat as the Taliban’s takeover means that women have been unable to earn a living to support their families.
“Since the beginning of the year, roughly 13,000 newborns have died from malnutrition and hunger-related diseases in Afghanistan,” echoed Birgit Schwarz, a senior official from Human Rights Watch.
“That is on average more than 170 babies every single day. The country needs a functioning Central Bank. Aid is not enough.”
Infectious diseases are also spreading rapidly in the country, where millions of people have been internally displaced and immunisation programs have been disrupted due to the conflict.
Since January 2021, there have been over 48,000 cases of measles reported and 250 deaths. Over 95 percent of fatalities are among children under the age of five. Many infants have already had their immune systems weakened by malnutrition.
UNICEF has warned that more than 13 million children remain in dire need of international assistance and it has requested a further £1.5 billion to meet the healthcare and education needs of the Afghan people.
Khalid Payenda said he was ‘grateful’ for the opportunity to work after exhausting his savings
SOUTH ASIA CORRESPONDENT
22 March 2022 •
Khalid Payenda resigned days before Kabul fell to the Taliban and then fled to the United States fearing for his safety
CREDIT: AFP/BRENDAN SMIALOWSKI
Afghanistan’s former finance minister has been driving an Uber in Washington DC to support his family, as new figures show over 13,000 newborns have died since January from hunger-related diseases.
Khalid Payenda, who resigned days before Kabul fell to the Taliban in August and then fled to the United States fearing for his safety, told the Washington Post that he was “grateful” to work for the ride hailing app after exhausting his savings.
He earns roughly £115 for a six hour shift – money he uses to supplement the £1,520 he earns per semester teaching at Georgetown University in Washington DC to support his wife and four children.
“It’s like a part of my life is a story someone else told me and that I have not lived,” said Mr Payenda, when asked about his role in Afghanistan under the previous democratically-elected Afghan President, Ashraf Ghani.
“It eats at you inside. Right now, I don’t have any place. I don’t belong here, and I don’t belong there. It’s a very empty feeling.”
Mr Ghani also fled the country in the wake of the Taliban takeover and now resides in exile in the United Arab Emirates.
Meanwhile, the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan continues to deteriorate and activists warn that it risks being overshadowed by the war in Ukraine.
Afghanistan’s former finance minister has been driving an Uber in Washington DC to support his family, as new figures show over 13,000 newborns have died since January from hunger-related diseases.
Khalid Payenda, who resigned days before Kabul fell to the Taliban in August and then fled to the United States fearing for his safety, told the Washington Post that he was “grateful” to work for the ride hailing app after exhausting his savings.
He earns roughly £115 for a six hour shift – money he uses to supplement the £1,520 he earns per semester teaching at Georgetown University in Washington DC to support his wife and four children.
“It’s like a part of my life is a story someone else told me and that I have not lived,” said Mr Payenda, when asked about his role in Afghanistan under the previous democratically-elected Afghan President, Ashraf Ghani.
“It eats at you inside. Right now, I don’t have any place. I don’t belong here, and I don’t belong there. It’s a very empty feeling.”
Mr Ghani also fled the country in the wake of the Taliban takeover and now resides in exile in the United Arab Emirates.
Meanwhile, the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan continues to deteriorate and activists warn that it risks being overshadowed by the war in Ukraine.
Approximately 23 million of the country’s 39.8 million citizens are experiencing acute hunger, according to the United Nations assistance mission (UNAMA).
UNAMA warns that 100 percent of female-led households do not have enough to eat as the Taliban’s takeover means that women have been unable to earn a living to support their families.
“Since the beginning of the year, roughly 13,000 newborns have died from malnutrition and hunger-related diseases in Afghanistan,” echoed Birgit Schwarz, a senior official from Human Rights Watch.
“That is on average more than 170 babies every single day. The country needs a functioning Central Bank. Aid is not enough.”
Infectious diseases are also spreading rapidly in the country, where millions of people have been internally displaced and immunisation programs have been disrupted due to the conflict.
Since January 2021, there have been over 48,000 cases of measles reported and 250 deaths. Over 95 percent of fatalities are among children under the age of five. Many infants have already had their immune systems weakened by malnutrition.
UNICEF has warned that more than 13 million children remain in dire need of international assistance and it has requested a further £1.5 billion to meet the healthcare and education needs of the Afghan people.
UK
TWO YEARS OF TRACKING COVID-19 GOVERNMENT POLICIES
22 March 2022
Photo by Davyn Ben on Unsplash
The Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT), the Blavatnik School’s unique global resource that provides comparative, real-time information on government responses to COVID-19, turns two this week.
Powered by a global community of dedicated volunteers, the tracker records real-time policies related to containment, economic support, health, and vaccination in 187 countries and over 200 subnational jurisdictions.
We launched the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker in March 2020 – a few days after the World Health Organization declared coronavirus a pandemic – thanks to the resourcefulness of Blavatnik School students and faculty who were quick to grasp the importance of keeping track of government policies aimed at containing the spread of the virus. It is now the only continuously updated global dataset on non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) used by governments and policymakers, researchers, the media and the general public the world over.
“Two years into the pandemic, we need comparative information on policy responses as much as ever. What will the “new normal” look like? How will countries respond, if at all, to new surges or variants? As the pandemic has progressed, policy responses have continued to evolve, and we have expanded the data we track accordingly, most recently adding vaccine ‘mandates’ and differentiated data for vaccinated and non-vaccinated,” said Thomas Hale, principal investigator and Associate Professor at the Blavatnik School.
A research note focused on the broad patterns of government responses over the first two years of the pandemic is available now.
The Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker is critical for decision-makers today, providing real-time data to dashboards and models maintained by the UN, WHO, World Bank and many individual governments and businesses. Our data is the most widely used source for researchers seeking to model the progression of the pandemic in order to understand its effects on human health, the economy, or other outcomes of interest.
The project is also critical for future decision-making. By providing a consistent, systematic timeline of this unfolding crisis and, combined with aligned survey data, insight into changes in how our societies have responded, the tracker also provides a key evidence base for efforts to build back from the pandemic, and to build resilience to future ones.
THE MOST-CITED DATASET OF COVID-19 POLICY DECISIONS IN THE WORLD, AND THE ONLY ONE STILL PUBLISHING NEW DATA IN 2022
In research, the data in our main repository are downloaded dozens of times each hour. To date, the dataset has over three thousand academic citations recorded on Google Scholar. While we are primarily a data-driven project, our team has also published high-impact articles in journals like Nature Human Behaviour and the Journal of the American Medical Association.
The data also attracts enormous interest from the public and has been featured in The New York Times, Financial Times, BBC, Al Jazeera, The Economist, National Geographic, O Globo, El Paìs, Le Monde, The Globe and Mail, Asahi Shimbun, and the Washington Post – to name just a few.
Perhaps most importantly, the data is used directly by governments, international organisations, and public health agencies to inform their real-time decisions on COVID-19 responses and the feedback we get is that our data is vital to their work.
"This data tells us what options are out there, and we can see innovation as we look at them options and we will learn which ones work in which health systems" – Dame Sally Davies, former Chief Medical Officer for England
"I really commend the work on government responses" – Dr David Nabarro, Special Envoy of WHO, Director-General on COVID-19
Some examples of our contributions:
UK Cabinet Office: We have been supporting the products of their International Comparator Joint unit, who provide updates to the government and Prime Minister. We provide fortnightly updates on trends and patterns and fortnightly trends and ad hoc ‘deep dive’ data reports on specific topics, for example education.
The ESRC International Public Policy Observatory (IPPO): We provide monthly global evidence scans on COVID-19 related policy issues using our data. Topics include: online education, gender-based COVID-19 recovery plans, income support measures, ad hoc measures for places disproportionately hit by COVID-19, adult re-skilling.
UNDP – The Vaccine Dashboard: Together we created the initial data survey to assess the equity in the accessibility and distribution of COVID-19 vaccines around the globe. Looking at 245 countries/nations/jurisdictions, we were able to map out how easily or not vaccines were available, what quantities, and in some cases, the cost per dose that countries had negotiated either directly with manufacturers or through COVAX. Numerous sources of data are used and imported through the dashboard, as well as our Stringency Index, and our H5 indicator (investments into vaccines).
WHO – Global Preparedness Monitoring Board (GPMB): We developed a 12-page memo on the political barriers to COVID-19 response that informed the 2021 Global Preparedness Monitoring Board annual report. The OxCGRT team identified political barriers that have hindered COVID-19 responses and made suggestions on how to overcome such barriers
As long as the pandemic continues to shift and evolve – and therefore the policy responses that governments make – there will be a need for our data. But producing the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker is an immense effort. At the core of the project, we have a global team of citizen scientists: over 1000 trained volunteers, working in more than 90 languages, have contributed data to the project so far. We are grateful to each and every one of them, and to our small but global staff team who coordinate this effort.
So the team is currently seeking funding to maintain the tracker going for the next 18 months, and to bolster their ability to use the data to better prepare for the future.
“While at the start of the pandemic the most urgent policy-informing questions pertained to how policies related to case and death rates, over time the list of important questions have grown and become more complex, as educational and job losses, vaccine hesitancy and protests have become more prominent concerns,” said Toby Phillips, executive director of the project.
TWO YEARS OF TRACKING COVID-19 GOVERNMENT POLICIES
22 March 2022
Photo by Davyn Ben on Unsplash
The Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT), the Blavatnik School’s unique global resource that provides comparative, real-time information on government responses to COVID-19, turns two this week.
Powered by a global community of dedicated volunteers, the tracker records real-time policies related to containment, economic support, health, and vaccination in 187 countries and over 200 subnational jurisdictions.
We launched the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker in March 2020 – a few days after the World Health Organization declared coronavirus a pandemic – thanks to the resourcefulness of Blavatnik School students and faculty who were quick to grasp the importance of keeping track of government policies aimed at containing the spread of the virus. It is now the only continuously updated global dataset on non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) used by governments and policymakers, researchers, the media and the general public the world over.
“Two years into the pandemic, we need comparative information on policy responses as much as ever. What will the “new normal” look like? How will countries respond, if at all, to new surges or variants? As the pandemic has progressed, policy responses have continued to evolve, and we have expanded the data we track accordingly, most recently adding vaccine ‘mandates’ and differentiated data for vaccinated and non-vaccinated,” said Thomas Hale, principal investigator and Associate Professor at the Blavatnik School.
A research note focused on the broad patterns of government responses over the first two years of the pandemic is available now.
The Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker is critical for decision-makers today, providing real-time data to dashboards and models maintained by the UN, WHO, World Bank and many individual governments and businesses. Our data is the most widely used source for researchers seeking to model the progression of the pandemic in order to understand its effects on human health, the economy, or other outcomes of interest.
The project is also critical for future decision-making. By providing a consistent, systematic timeline of this unfolding crisis and, combined with aligned survey data, insight into changes in how our societies have responded, the tracker also provides a key evidence base for efforts to build back from the pandemic, and to build resilience to future ones.
THE MOST-CITED DATASET OF COVID-19 POLICY DECISIONS IN THE WORLD, AND THE ONLY ONE STILL PUBLISHING NEW DATA IN 2022
In research, the data in our main repository are downloaded dozens of times each hour. To date, the dataset has over three thousand academic citations recorded on Google Scholar. While we are primarily a data-driven project, our team has also published high-impact articles in journals like Nature Human Behaviour and the Journal of the American Medical Association.
The data also attracts enormous interest from the public and has been featured in The New York Times, Financial Times, BBC, Al Jazeera, The Economist, National Geographic, O Globo, El Paìs, Le Monde, The Globe and Mail, Asahi Shimbun, and the Washington Post – to name just a few.
Perhaps most importantly, the data is used directly by governments, international organisations, and public health agencies to inform their real-time decisions on COVID-19 responses and the feedback we get is that our data is vital to their work.
"This data tells us what options are out there, and we can see innovation as we look at them options and we will learn which ones work in which health systems" – Dame Sally Davies, former Chief Medical Officer for England
"I really commend the work on government responses" – Dr David Nabarro, Special Envoy of WHO, Director-General on COVID-19
Some examples of our contributions:
UK Cabinet Office: We have been supporting the products of their International Comparator Joint unit, who provide updates to the government and Prime Minister. We provide fortnightly updates on trends and patterns and fortnightly trends and ad hoc ‘deep dive’ data reports on specific topics, for example education.
The ESRC International Public Policy Observatory (IPPO): We provide monthly global evidence scans on COVID-19 related policy issues using our data. Topics include: online education, gender-based COVID-19 recovery plans, income support measures, ad hoc measures for places disproportionately hit by COVID-19, adult re-skilling.
UNDP – The Vaccine Dashboard: Together we created the initial data survey to assess the equity in the accessibility and distribution of COVID-19 vaccines around the globe. Looking at 245 countries/nations/jurisdictions, we were able to map out how easily or not vaccines were available, what quantities, and in some cases, the cost per dose that countries had negotiated either directly with manufacturers or through COVAX. Numerous sources of data are used and imported through the dashboard, as well as our Stringency Index, and our H5 indicator (investments into vaccines).
WHO – Global Preparedness Monitoring Board (GPMB): We developed a 12-page memo on the political barriers to COVID-19 response that informed the 2021 Global Preparedness Monitoring Board annual report. The OxCGRT team identified political barriers that have hindered COVID-19 responses and made suggestions on how to overcome such barriers
As long as the pandemic continues to shift and evolve – and therefore the policy responses that governments make – there will be a need for our data. But producing the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker is an immense effort. At the core of the project, we have a global team of citizen scientists: over 1000 trained volunteers, working in more than 90 languages, have contributed data to the project so far. We are grateful to each and every one of them, and to our small but global staff team who coordinate this effort.
So the team is currently seeking funding to maintain the tracker going for the next 18 months, and to bolster their ability to use the data to better prepare for the future.
“While at the start of the pandemic the most urgent policy-informing questions pertained to how policies related to case and death rates, over time the list of important questions have grown and become more complex, as educational and job losses, vaccine hesitancy and protests have become more prominent concerns,” said Toby Phillips, executive director of the project.
ANGOLA
Tackling one of the world's highest teenage pregnancy rates, to give girls a better future22 March 2022
Stela Varela, 28, is an activist for the Youth Support Centre, which is sponsored by the Safeguard Young People (SYP) programme in Huila, Angola. © UNFPA Angola
MITCHA NEIGHBORHOOD, Lubango – “I have had doors closed in my face many times, but my desire to bring knowledge to young people and adolescents in order to avoid unwanted pregnancy has no end,” said Stela Varela, 28, an activist for the Youth Support Centre (CAJ) and a beneficiary of the Safeguard Young People (SYP) programme.
I have had doors closed in my face many times, but my desire to bring knowledge to young people and adolescents to avoid unwanted pregnancy has no end.
Ms. Varela applies the knowledge she has acquired in her seven years as an activist in her neighbourhood of Bairro da Mitcha, on the outskirts of the city of Lubango, in the province of Huíla. Helping her community – especially girls and young women – fills her with pride.
Young women contributing to a better world
The biggest difficulty she faces is a lack of willingness among women to discuss the challenges of unintended pregnancy. It is not uncommon for her to be rejected when approaching a community to raise awareness on the negative effects of teenage pregnancy, for instance, or for mothers to refuse to let their teenaged daughters attend her behaviour change lectures.
I'm not going to give up on the girls.
While a lack of information and education may be the root cause that limits parents from being able to talk openly with their teenaged children about sexual and reproductive health, Ms. Varela remains undeterred. “I'm not going to give up on the girls. Getting them to participate in my lectures is my biggest challenge,” she said.
MITCHA NEIGHBORHOOD, Lubango – “I have had doors closed in my face many times, but my desire to bring knowledge to young people and adolescents in order to avoid unwanted pregnancy has no end,” said Stela Varela, 28, an activist for the Youth Support Centre (CAJ) and a beneficiary of the Safeguard Young People (SYP) programme.
I have had doors closed in my face many times, but my desire to bring knowledge to young people and adolescents to avoid unwanted pregnancy has no end.
Ms. Varela applies the knowledge she has acquired in her seven years as an activist in her neighbourhood of Bairro da Mitcha, on the outskirts of the city of Lubango, in the province of Huíla. Helping her community – especially girls and young women – fills her with pride.
Young women contributing to a better world
The biggest difficulty she faces is a lack of willingness among women to discuss the challenges of unintended pregnancy. It is not uncommon for her to be rejected when approaching a community to raise awareness on the negative effects of teenage pregnancy, for instance, or for mothers to refuse to let their teenaged daughters attend her behaviour change lectures.
I'm not going to give up on the girls.
While a lack of information and education may be the root cause that limits parents from being able to talk openly with their teenaged children about sexual and reproductive health, Ms. Varela remains undeterred. “I'm not going to give up on the girls. Getting them to participate in my lectures is my biggest challenge,” she said.
Students participating in an SYP-sponsored training session. © UNFPA Angola
Challenging one of the world's highest teen pregnancy rates
Angola has one of the highest teenage pregnancy rates in the world. With a contraceptive prevalence rate of 14 per cent and an unmet need for family planning among girls aged 15-19 of 43 per cent, teenage pregnancies continue to be taboo. This is the reason for the silence she experiences from the families she approaches in Mitcha's neighbourhoods.
Underlying factors for the high rate of teen pregnancies include limited knowledge of family planning, inadequate availability of commodities, limited access to skilled health workers, and insufficient household resources allocated to sexual and reprodutive health. Teen pregnancy increases the existing vulnerability of girls, as pregnancy is often an impediment to continuing education, exemplified by the low literacy rates of only 37 per cent for young women aged 15 to 24.
Challenging one of the world's highest teen pregnancy rates
Angola has one of the highest teenage pregnancy rates in the world. With a contraceptive prevalence rate of 14 per cent and an unmet need for family planning among girls aged 15-19 of 43 per cent, teenage pregnancies continue to be taboo. This is the reason for the silence she experiences from the families she approaches in Mitcha's neighbourhoods.
Underlying factors for the high rate of teen pregnancies include limited knowledge of family planning, inadequate availability of commodities, limited access to skilled health workers, and insufficient household resources allocated to sexual and reprodutive health. Teen pregnancy increases the existing vulnerability of girls, as pregnancy is often an impediment to continuing education, exemplified by the low literacy rates of only 37 per cent for young women aged 15 to 24.
At a local school, Ms. Varela leads a youth empowerment session, sponsored and monitored by the Safeguard Young People programme, with girls aged between 11 and 23 years old. © UNFPA Angola
The country has 10 million girls and women of reproductive age and, although 75 per cent of girls attend primary school, this proportion drops to around 16 per cent at secondary education level, which coincides with the age of first menstruation. High fertility rates and high levels of teenage pregnancy increase the risk of maternal mortality.
In this context, behaviour change interventions are key to empowering young women and men to make better decisions to protect themselves. The SYP programme in Angola will reach 60,000 youths with training on sexual and reproductive health, trauma resilience and job skills, while providing an enabling environment by strengthening medical posts and training for health professionals.
Working with SYP
Through UNFPA's Safeguarding Young People (SYP) programme, sponsored by the Netherlands and implemented in partnership with the Government of Angola, Ms. Varela participates in youth empowerment sessions with girls aged between 11 and 23 years old at schools. The programme was designed to address the sexual and reproductive health needs and reproductive rights of adolescents and youth.
My biggest dream as an activist is to be able to see these girls I work with today have a better future.
SYP empowers adolescents and youth to lead healthy lives, protect themselves from sexually transmitted infections (STIs) including HIV, unwanted pregnancy, unsafe abortion, early marriage, GBV and harmful practices. SYP promotes inclusion, gender equality norms and protective behaviours.
“My biggest dream as an activist is to be able to see these girls I work with today have a better future. [To see them] graduate, have a good academic background, get married and set up their homes,” says Ms. Varela.
The country has 10 million girls and women of reproductive age and, although 75 per cent of girls attend primary school, this proportion drops to around 16 per cent at secondary education level, which coincides with the age of first menstruation. High fertility rates and high levels of teenage pregnancy increase the risk of maternal mortality.
In this context, behaviour change interventions are key to empowering young women and men to make better decisions to protect themselves. The SYP programme in Angola will reach 60,000 youths with training on sexual and reproductive health, trauma resilience and job skills, while providing an enabling environment by strengthening medical posts and training for health professionals.
Working with SYP
Through UNFPA's Safeguarding Young People (SYP) programme, sponsored by the Netherlands and implemented in partnership with the Government of Angola, Ms. Varela participates in youth empowerment sessions with girls aged between 11 and 23 years old at schools. The programme was designed to address the sexual and reproductive health needs and reproductive rights of adolescents and youth.
My biggest dream as an activist is to be able to see these girls I work with today have a better future.
SYP empowers adolescents and youth to lead healthy lives, protect themselves from sexually transmitted infections (STIs) including HIV, unwanted pregnancy, unsafe abortion, early marriage, GBV and harmful practices. SYP promotes inclusion, gender equality norms and protective behaviours.
“My biggest dream as an activist is to be able to see these girls I work with today have a better future. [To see them] graduate, have a good academic background, get married and set up their homes,” says Ms. Varela.
Russian-Ukrainian war a blow to Colombo's economy
by Arundathie Abeysinghe
Impact on tea exports, tourism and foreign currency crisis. A prolonged clash risks stopping exports altogether, not least because of rising energy prices in Europe. At the moment no wheat, sunflower oil, iron and steel products are arriving from Russia and Ukraine.
Colombo (AsiaNews) - The Russian invasion of Ukraine threatens Sri Lanka's tea exports, the national tourism industry (which was recovering after the pandemic) and will push up inflation. The energy sector, as elsewhere in the world, is also at risk. According to analysts, the economic consequences of the war risk bankrupting the country.
The invasion ordered by Putin has also aggravated the dollar crisis and stopped the arrival of Russian and Ukrainian tourists, the most numerous to visit the island. The Sri Lanka Tourism Development Authority told AsiaNews that about 20,000 Ukrainians and Russians had arrived in Sri Lanka by January 2022, accounting for more than a quarter of the total number of visitors.
The Ukrainian tourists were the first post-Covid travellers to Sri Lanka to bring in much-needed foreign currency, a report that had bounced around various media outlets last year, accompanied by allegations that the travellers had also brought a new strain of coronavirus to the island. Thousands of Ukrainian and Russian tourists are currently stranded in Sri Lanka, unable to use their credit cards because international banks have suspended transactions with Russia.
Economists report that Sri Lankan tea exports to Russia have fallen from 46 million kg in 2013 to 27 million kg in 2021. Despite this negative trend, demand for 'Ceylon Tea' played a significant role for the Sri Lankan economy until January this year, before the start of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
In 2021, Sri Lanka exported 4.2 million kg of tea to Ukraine, in line with exports over the past seven years. According to sources at the Colombo Tea Traders Association, it is possible that "everything will come to a standstill", that there will be a complete halt to tea exports as "we may not be able to ship goods to Russia, Ukraine,or other Eastern European states such as Lithuania".
According to Sri Lankan tea planters, a prolonged conflict would have a "severe" impact on trade in their products, while the loss of value of the ruble and the exclusion of Russian banks from the Swift international payments system will be a major "blow to the Sri Lankan economy".
Several exporters told AsiaNews that because of the sanctions imposed by Western countries, the tea market is also likely to be affected, to the point that "there may be a possibility of not trading with Russia".
Russia and Ukraine buy about 18% of the black tea produced in Sri Lanka. Similarly, 45% of the island's wheat imports come from the two parties to the conflict. More than 50% of imports of soya, sunflower oil and pulses also come from Ukraine. Moscow and Kyiv are also important suppliers of semi-finished products of iron and steel, asbestos, copper (cathodes) and potassium chloride for fertilisers.
If the crisis between Ukraine and Russia continues for much longer, the prices of fuel and raw materials in Sri Lanka are likely to rise further, putting pressure on consumers' pockets. At the same time, inflationary pressures in Western markets, especially in Europe, caused by high energy prices and delays in supply chains, threaten to depress consumer purchasing power, reducing demand for Sri Lankan exports. Currently, Europe is an important destination for Sri Lankan exports of garments, tea, spices and seafood.
by Arundathie Abeysinghe
Impact on tea exports, tourism and foreign currency crisis. A prolonged clash risks stopping exports altogether, not least because of rising energy prices in Europe. At the moment no wheat, sunflower oil, iron and steel products are arriving from Russia and Ukraine.
Colombo (AsiaNews) - The Russian invasion of Ukraine threatens Sri Lanka's tea exports, the national tourism industry (which was recovering after the pandemic) and will push up inflation. The energy sector, as elsewhere in the world, is also at risk. According to analysts, the economic consequences of the war risk bankrupting the country.
The invasion ordered by Putin has also aggravated the dollar crisis and stopped the arrival of Russian and Ukrainian tourists, the most numerous to visit the island. The Sri Lanka Tourism Development Authority told AsiaNews that about 20,000 Ukrainians and Russians had arrived in Sri Lanka by January 2022, accounting for more than a quarter of the total number of visitors.
The Ukrainian tourists were the first post-Covid travellers to Sri Lanka to bring in much-needed foreign currency, a report that had bounced around various media outlets last year, accompanied by allegations that the travellers had also brought a new strain of coronavirus to the island. Thousands of Ukrainian and Russian tourists are currently stranded in Sri Lanka, unable to use their credit cards because international banks have suspended transactions with Russia.
Economists report that Sri Lankan tea exports to Russia have fallen from 46 million kg in 2013 to 27 million kg in 2021. Despite this negative trend, demand for 'Ceylon Tea' played a significant role for the Sri Lankan economy until January this year, before the start of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
In 2021, Sri Lanka exported 4.2 million kg of tea to Ukraine, in line with exports over the past seven years. According to sources at the Colombo Tea Traders Association, it is possible that "everything will come to a standstill", that there will be a complete halt to tea exports as "we may not be able to ship goods to Russia, Ukraine,or other Eastern European states such as Lithuania".
According to Sri Lankan tea planters, a prolonged conflict would have a "severe" impact on trade in their products, while the loss of value of the ruble and the exclusion of Russian banks from the Swift international payments system will be a major "blow to the Sri Lankan economy".
Several exporters told AsiaNews that because of the sanctions imposed by Western countries, the tea market is also likely to be affected, to the point that "there may be a possibility of not trading with Russia".
Russia and Ukraine buy about 18% of the black tea produced in Sri Lanka. Similarly, 45% of the island's wheat imports come from the two parties to the conflict. More than 50% of imports of soya, sunflower oil and pulses also come from Ukraine. Moscow and Kyiv are also important suppliers of semi-finished products of iron and steel, asbestos, copper (cathodes) and potassium chloride for fertilisers.
If the crisis between Ukraine and Russia continues for much longer, the prices of fuel and raw materials in Sri Lanka are likely to rise further, putting pressure on consumers' pockets. At the same time, inflationary pressures in Western markets, especially in Europe, caused by high energy prices and delays in supply chains, threaten to depress consumer purchasing power, reducing demand for Sri Lankan exports. Currently, Europe is an important destination for Sri Lankan exports of garments, tea, spices and seafood.
Sudan denies reports on Russian Wagner presence in country
US, Britain, Norway say Wagner Group engaged in illicit activities in Sudan
Buhram Abdel-Men'em |22.03.2022
KHARTOUM, Sudan
The Sudanese government on Tuesday denied reports about the presence of Russian paramilitary Wagner Group in Sudan.
In a statement, the Foreign Ministry termed accusations by the ambassadors of the US, Britain and Norway on the Wagner's activities in Sudan as "a blatant interference in Sudan's domestic affairs."
On March 21, the Troika for Sudan – the US, Britain and Norway – said the Wagner Group was engaged in illicit activities that undermine the rule of law in Sudan.
"In Sudan, the Wagner Group, a Private Military Company closely linked to (Russian President Vladimir) Putin, spreads disinformation on social media and engages in illicit activities connected to gold-mining," the Troika said.
But the Sudanese ministry denied the claims, saying the three envoys are trying to drag Sudan into the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.
Russian private security companies such as Wagner, Patriot, Sewa Security Service and RSB are known to have a presence in Africa.
According to Bloomberg, the Wagner Group is engaged in military trainings and activities, as well as in protection of gold mines, in Angola, Libya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.
Writing by Ahmed Asmar
US, Britain, Norway say Wagner Group engaged in illicit activities in Sudan
Buhram Abdel-Men'em |22.03.2022
KHARTOUM, Sudan
The Sudanese government on Tuesday denied reports about the presence of Russian paramilitary Wagner Group in Sudan.
In a statement, the Foreign Ministry termed accusations by the ambassadors of the US, Britain and Norway on the Wagner's activities in Sudan as "a blatant interference in Sudan's domestic affairs."
On March 21, the Troika for Sudan – the US, Britain and Norway – said the Wagner Group was engaged in illicit activities that undermine the rule of law in Sudan.
"In Sudan, the Wagner Group, a Private Military Company closely linked to (Russian President Vladimir) Putin, spreads disinformation on social media and engages in illicit activities connected to gold-mining," the Troika said.
But the Sudanese ministry denied the claims, saying the three envoys are trying to drag Sudan into the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.
Russian private security companies such as Wagner, Patriot, Sewa Security Service and RSB are known to have a presence in Africa.
According to Bloomberg, the Wagner Group is engaged in military trainings and activities, as well as in protection of gold mines, in Angola, Libya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.
Writing by Ahmed Asmar
By Reuters
March 22, 2022,
General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, Deputy Head of the Sudan Transitional Military Council, attends the signing ceremony of the agreement on peace and ceasefire in Juba, South Sudan October 21, 2019. REUTERS/Samir Bol/
KHARTOUM (Reuters) - Sudan's foreign ministry on Tuesday denied the presence of Russian private military contractor Wagner Group in the country, in response to a statement by Western diplomats.
Representatives of the United States, United Kingdom and Norway wrote in a piece published in a Sudanese newspaper on Monday that the mercenary group with ties to Moscow "spreads disinformation on social media and engages in illicit activities connected to gold mining."
The Sudanese statement comes after one of Sudan's military leaders paid a high-profile visit to Russia on the eve of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
Sudan's foreign ministry accused the diplomats of trying to interfere in Sudanese affairs and of dragging the country "arbitrarily" into the Ukraine conflict.
"They alleged that the Russian Wagner security company was present in Sudan and carrying out training, mining, and other illegal activities... which the government of Sudan denies completely," the statement said.
Wagner Group has been tied by U.S. authorities to Russian businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin, who denies links to the company.
In 2020, the United States sanctioned M Invest and its subsidiary Meroe Gold which it said were controlled by Prigozhin and operating in Sudan.
A U.S. Treasury announcement at the time alleged that M Invest was a cover for Wagner forces in the country, helped develop plans to suppress protesters including through social media disinformation, and was awarded gold concessions
In December 2020 and May 2021, Facebook took down accounts it linked to the officially defunct Internet Research Agency, also linked by U.S. authorities to Prigozhin, that researchers say spread content supportive of General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, leader of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces.
Dagalo, who helped lead an October coup that ended a civilian-military power-sharing arrangement, met high-level Russian officials in Moscow on a trip that began on the eve of the invasion of Ukraine.
The following week, he said that Sudan was open to an agreement on a naval base with Russia or any other country.
(Reporting by Khalid Abdelaziz in Khartoum and Nafisa Eltahir in Sudan, Editing by William Maclean)
Copyright 2022 Thomson Reuters.
WHERE INFLATION COMES FROM
Record number of British manufacturers raising prices, says CBIBY PA NEWS AGENCY
Workers in a factory
The proportion of British manufacturers expecting to increase prices has jumped to its highest level since records began in 1975, according to data from the country’s biggest business group.
The latest monthly Confederation of British Industry (CBI) survey revealed planned price hikes over the next three months, underlining the rapidly increasing scale of inflation pressures on British firms.
It said its survey, which had responses from 229 businesses, showed a net balance of 80% of manufacturers are raising the price of orders booked for the next three months from March, compared with 77% last month.
The question, which was first asked in January 1975, deducts the number of firms saying they will raise prices from those saying they will lower them.
Manufacturers also reported an improvement in their order books for the month to a balance of 26, matching record levels from November.
Firms also told the CBI that output volumes continued to grow at a “robust pace” over the three months to March.
Anna Leach, CBI deputy chief economist, said: “This survey highlights strong order books and output growth, but the cost pressures facing manufacturers have been amplified by the conflict in Ukraine.
“The Government must use tomorrow’s spring statement to provide relief to both energy intensive industries and vulnerable consumers.
“To deliver a fundamental reset to UK growth, we need to see significant action to incentivise investment, a key driver of productivity growth and the only way to sustainably increase real wages.”
Tom Crotty, group director at Ineos and chair of the CBI manufacturing council, said: “It is positive to see that total order books remained strong in March, with export orders above normal to the greatest since extent since March 2019.
“Manufacturing output volumes also grew at a significant pace in the first three months of 2022.
“However, the Ukraine conflict has created further headwinds to an already challenging context for the manufacturing sector.”
Zambia’s democracy is still under attack
But now by President Hichilema, the man who vowed to rescue it.
President Hakainde Hichilema of Zambia meeting supporters. Credit: Hakainde Hichilema/Facebook.
When Hakainde Hichilema August 2021 election, many hoped the assault on democracy that had his predecessor Edgar Lungu’s rule would come to an end. While in opposition, Hichilema had presented himself as a reform-minded politician determined to restore the rule of law, launch an anti-corruption campaign, strengthen democratic institutions, and protect human rights.
Nearly seven months into his five-year term, however, the new president is turning out to be a major disappointment. A pattern of worrying developments suggest that democracy is not returning to Zambia despite what many seem to believe.
Maintaining the anti-democratic status quo
Since taking office, Hichilema’s administration has shown little appetite to change the laws that enabled the authoritarian tendencies of his predecessor.
These include the law on defamation of the president, which makes it an offence to publish “any defamatory or insulting matter…with intent to bring the President into hatred, ridicule, or contempt”. This crime, punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment, has been widely interpreted and used to deter legitimate criticism. It has undermined media freedom, led to the arrest of critical voices and, , created a culture of self-censorship.
Another such law is the , which was hurriedly enacted by the Lungu administration on the eve of last year’s election. It violates the right to privacy by allowing the authorities to tap ICT devices, effectively turning everyone into a suspect, and confiscate electronics without proper procedural safeguards.
Finally, the Public Order Act (POA) requires any person who intends to convene a public meeting to “give police at least seven days’ notice” and other details. This colonial-era law has been used by successive administrations to the rights to assembly and free speech. Under Lungu in particular, opposition meetings and demonstrations were repeatedly curtailed under the pretext of this act. Violations are punishable by up to six years’ imprisonment.
In opposition, Hichilema vowed to the first two of these statutes immediately and reform the POA on assuming office. Under Zambian law, repealing an act of parliament requires a simple majority, and the governing United Party for National Development (UPND) holds 99 of the National Assembly’s 164 seats. In power, however, Hichilema has shown a studied disinterest in fulfilling these promises.
Undermining the media
Under Lungu, numerous critical media outlets were shut down. The Post, Zambia’s leading independent newspaper since the re-introduction of multiparty democracy in 1991, was forcibly closed in June 2016, less than two months before a general election, under the pretext of a disputed tax bill. Prime TV, the country’s leading private television station, was forcibly closed in April 2020 in the “public interest”, although no specific charges were laid out.
Hichilema’s administration is yet to close any media stations, but it has overseen four worrying developments.
First, the government has a 16% Value Added Tax on newspaper sales, for both print and electronic copies. This move is widely seen as targeted at three private newspapers, since state-owned publications face no consequences for failure to meet their tax obligations. With the economy performing poorly and media outlets already struggling, this move threatens to raise the price of newspapers out of the reach of more Zambians and collapse the industry.
Second, the government has continued with the Lungu-era harassment of the private media. This January, the private TV station KBN published of a phone conversation between Hichilema’s political aide, Levy Ngoma, and permanent secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs, Josephs Akafumba. In it, the two were heard plotting to use state institutions to undermine the opposition Democratic Party ahead of a by-election. Ngoma suggested the scheme was sanctioned by the president and vice-president.
Authorities initially claimed the audio was fake. When this failed, they accused the journalists of having tapped the pair’s phones. Instead of interrogating Ngoma and Akafumba, police the reporters who had leaked the conversation. In what has become characteristic fashion, Hichilema, who no longer holds press conferences and has adopted Lungu’s unwanted legacy of addressing the country through press aides and on airport tarmacs, spoke through deafening silence.
Third, officials have intimidated independent media. Last month, the UPND MP Heartson Mabeta News Diggers, arguably the most influential private newspaper, with closure after the publication ran a story quoting the UPND secretary general saying . In a country reeling with record unemployment, the public backslash was huge, especially after the paper published the recording of the interview. Mabeta accused the newspaper of malice and warned that it risks meeting same fate as The Post if it did not change course. No one from the government or the UPND distanced themselves from the MP’s threats.
Fourth, the UPND has emulated its predecessor’s legacy of denying coverage to opposition parties in the state-run media. In opposition, Hichilema to stop this culture by transforming the state media into genuine public platforms, establishing legal safeguards for editorial independence, and reviewing legislation that undermine their governance structures and leave them vulnerable to political interference. In power, however, it has been business as usual.
Assaulting free speech
As under Lungu, the assault on free speech under Hichilema has gone beyond just the media.
In December 2021, for instance, police arrested opposition Patriotic Front (PF) official Raphael Nakacinda after he advised the oft-traveling Hichilema to “” and address the high cost of living. In January 2022, police arrested Morris Lungu, a 42-year-old taxi driver, on a charge of defamation for saying that . And, last month, 24-year-old Saliya Laisha was arrested following allegations she accused Hichilema of having sacrificed six youths, who died in unclear circumstances while on a boat cruise on Lake Kariba, .
These arrests on charges of defamation have a chilling effect on even those who are not targeted as they show the costs of criticising officials. Many would prefer to self-censor than risk months or even years in protracted legal cases. The casualty is free speech and poor citizen participation in governance.
Dismantling the opposition
Given how opposition parties were continuously obstructed by Lungu, it was expected that Hichilema would behave differently. This has not been the case so far.
On 15 March 2022, for instance, the Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly 30 opposition lawmakers from parliament for 30 days. This followed their peaceful protest in November 2021, when the PF MPs noted that the finance minister had referenced constitutional provisions that no longer exist and asked for these anomalies to be corrected. When this request was rejected, the lawmakers converged in front of the Speaker’s mace, leading to a suspension of business for about 20 minutes. On resumption, the finance minister corrected the error and the debate proceeded peacefully.
Two MPs from the ruling party, however, then asked the Speaker if it was acceptable for the opposition MPs to remain in parliament when they had . They claimed, without evidence, that “the only permissible means for Members to express displeasure was by walking out of the House”. The Speaker’s decision, reserved to a later date, was finally delivered on 15 March.
Protests are a commonplace tactic in multiparty democracies, and the form they can take is hardly prescribed anywhere. To treat the action by the PF MPs as a major offence highlights Zambia’s new slant towards repression in which any dissent is prohibited. The Deputy Speaker has the authority to reprimand lawmakers for misconduct, but she failed to establish how their protest amounted to contempt rather than legitimate protest, and why the warranted the maximum punishment of a month-long ban and suspended salaries.
If the 30 MPs challenge their suspension, the matter is unlikely to be decided before the expiry of the ban due to the slow pace of the courts. In December 2021, for instance, 9 PF MPs filed an urgent legal challenge to the Speaker’s decision to ban them from taking their seats before election petitions in their constituencies are resolved. The Constitutional Court only ruled on the matter today, three months on, siding with the PF complainants. The Deputy Speaker may well have factored these timings into her calculations.
The ongoing suspension of 39 of the PF’s 51 MPs suggests an organised effort to weaken the main opposition or intimidate it into submission. It also means there is effectively no opposition party in the currently.
The suspensions also appear to be motivated by a desire for revenge. In June 2017, the then PF-aligned Speaker 48 UPND lawmakers for boycotting Lungu’s state of the nation address. At the time, Hichilema and the UPND condemned the move as a brazen assault on democracy.
The recent onslaught on democratic rights under Hichilema has not attracted much outrage. This is largely because broad sections of civil society and international (mainly Western) actors support the new government, think it is too early to criticise the new administration, or simply consider the PF as undeserving of sympathy given its own terrible record on similar issues. When Shebby Chilekwa, a PF member and suspect in a murder investigation, recently that he had been tortured by the police while in detention and showed his scars, not even major human rights bodies expressed outrage.
Another example of the UPND undermining the opposition occurred this January. Days before the Kabwata parliamentary by-election, a candidate from a small opposition party, the United Progressive Party (UPP), announced his “” from the race under highly dubious circumstances. Given the UPP had nothing to gain from this surprise move, many speculate the UPND induced this move for two reasons.
The first would have been to facilitate a new election date when Hichilema would have been available to campaign for his party’s candidate. Some argue that the president’s failure to dedicate ample time to a previous in October 2021 cost the ruling party the seat. The second reason suggested was to allow the UPND to change its candidate, Andrew Tayengwa, following internal party opposition to his rule.
As it was, any possible plan almost failed to come to fruition as the Electoral Commission to postpone the by-election, arguing that the UPP candidate had not resigned – a move that would have required re-organising the election – but merely withdrawn from the race. A few days later, however, the electoral body claimed to have received a letter from the UPP candidate, who had otherwise disappeared, categorically stating he had indeed from the party. The Electoral Commission postponed the poll to 3 February.
For this delayed by-election, the UPND re-adopted Tayengwa – perhaps afraid its ruse would be too obvious otherwise – but deployed Hichilema alongside several cabinet ministers to literally camp out in Kabwata constituency. The ruling party beat the PF, while the UPP failed to run, explaining that it had expended its resources in the previous campaign.
This episode suggests that as well as pressuring state institutions to directly get involved in an internal party matter – the same tactics once used against the UPND – the ruling party is instigating divisions within opposition parties and over-stretching their meagre resources in the same way the PF did while in government. Opposition parties with little power are potentially being used to manipulate electoral law to suit Hichilema’s party. Again, the UPND is using the same tactics as the PF, but without the consequences of criticism from civil society and international actors.
Weakening civil society
Over the years, Zambia’s democracy has benefited from a robust and effective capable of checking the power of the government. Such actors assumed principled positions that aligned with those adopted by the UPND when in opposition. The election of Hichilema has affected the effectiveness of civil society in two main ways.
The first is that many of the critical voices from academia, civil society and the church who spoke truth to power under Lungu have failed to remain impartial since Hichilema’s election. Previously neutral voices have become part of the choir of praise or gone silent. Others have been into government through appointments to parastatal boards, public bodies such as human rights commissions, or presidential advisory entities. One or two have applied for positions that can only be conferred by the president and are therefore unlikely to speak out unless their bids fail. Some remain in the long queue for appointments to public office, including diplomatic service.
The second is that previously effective civil society organisations that were seen as having aligned themselves to Lungu, such as the , now lack legitimacy to critique the actions of Hichilema. The result is a weakening civil society and the ironic situation in which the PF, the party that almost collapsed the country’s democratic institutions, finds itself slowly becoming the new defender of the public interest.
Hichilema has shown himself to be out of his depth on many key issues. He only appears positive in contrast to the disastrous Lungu, but as memories of the PF’s terrible record fade, the new president’s shortcomings may dawn on more people. If the public become with the UPND, voters are more likely to see the PF differently, especially if the former governing party manages to resolve its leadership question and comes out of its elective conference united. If Hichilema’s political position becomes threatened, he may resort to bribery, repression, or both. Unless civil society wakes up soon or new progressive voices emerge, Zambia’s democracy may return to the same position it was in under Lungu.
Nurturing corruption
Hichilema has demonstrated a lack of commitment to fighting corruption in three main ways.
The first is the lack of example. Despite being elected a platform of anti-corruption, accountability and transparency, Hichilema has so far failed to disclose the value of his assets. Along with Lungu, he is the only major party nominee and president to do so.
This is especially concerning as Zambian presidents have generally used state power to accumulate wealth. In less than 16 months in power, for instance, Lungu’s net worth from K10.9 million ($0.62million) in 2015 to K23.7 million ($1.34 million) when he ran for re-election in 2016. He refused to reveal his net worth ahead of last year’s vote, perhaps due to fears that knowledge of his opulence would increase calls for the removal of his immunity if he lost the election. Although there is no evidence to suggest Hichilema has started stealing public funds or using public office to promote his private interests, his reluctance to publish his net worth is concerning given his .
The second is that over six months in office, Hichilema’s has been chaotic at best and non-existent at worst. The grand corruption of the Lungu era is well known yet not a single member of the former regime has been taken to court on serious corruption charges. Hichilema continues to accuse PF leaders of having presided over a corrupt administration, but mostly to delegitimise the opposition party’s reputation rather than to signal plans to prosecute those who looted public funds. Moreover, members of the kleptocratic networks that were deeply involved in high-level corruption under Lungu have since and cultivated new allies in the governing party.
The third is that Hichilema has ignored accusations of the corruption in his own government. When opposition parties presented evidence showing executive involvement in an fertiliser contract awarded to one of the president’s business associates, for instance, Hichilema kept quiet. The president has also from his commitment to delink the presidency from the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), the holding company of all parastatal bodies in the country. In opposition, Hichilema condemned Lungu and, earlier, Michael Sata for their failure to amend the IDC Act, which allows the president to chair the board of the parastatal, providing opportunities for patronage or corruption and undermining corporate governance. In power, Hichilema no longer sees anything wrong with this arrangement.
Failure to tackle political violence
Under Lungu, political violence around election was commonplace. The perpetrators were usually PF supporters, while UPND supporters were typically the victims. The police rarely arrested PF cadres but were quick to unleash brutality on opposition members, occasionally culminating in fatalities.
Again, Hichilema pledged to end this culture of political violence, but if the two by-elections since his election are any indicator, very little has changed. The polls in both Kaumbwe, Eastern Province, Kabwata, Lusaka, featured that saw suspected UPND cadres opposition supporters. As under the PF, none of the culprits were arrested even when the victims identified the perpetrators and formally lodged reports to the police. The political violence in Kabwata was even preceded by from senior UPND members, none of whom has been arrested or reprimanded by the party’s leadership.
The false narrative of democratic resurgence
Although it may have slightly improved under Hichilema, Zambia’s democratic trajectory remains most concerning. Based on its early track record, the Hichilema administration has shown a lack of willingness to make to strengthen accountable, democratic governance. As a result, Zambian institutions will remain as susceptible to manipulation as they were under Lungu.
The recent narrative of a democratic resurgence in Zambia does not adhere to the reality, one that has seen the intimidation of independent media, the arrest of critics for insulting the president, the use of state institutions to undermine the opposition, the weakening of civil society, and the continued corruption in government. Contrary to what many are saying, Zambia is not returning to democracy. Not yet.
THE SEARCH FOR IMMORTALITY
Chinese scientists, int'l counterparts breed youngest human cells in vitro
19:22 UTC+8, 2022-03-22
An international team led by Chinese scientists has successfully produced the youngest human cells in vitro, which may pave the way for advances in organ regeneration.
The study published Tuesday in the journal Nature announced the discovery of a rapid, controllable method to convert stem cells into bona fide 8-cell embryo-like cells, without relying on genetic engineering.
A team of researchers from China, Britain and Bangladesh converted pluripotent stem cells, or an "adult" version of early embryonic cells, back to a more "juvenile" version of cells with developmental potential, tantamount to fertilized eggs in their Day 3 developmental stage.
Totipotent 8-cell stage embryo-like cells recreate the embryonic state of a fertilized egg after only three divisions, making them the youngest human cells acquired in vitro ever known, said Li Wenjuan, from the Chinese Academy of Sciences, who is one of the corresponding authors of the paper.
Cells described as "totipotent" mean that they have the potential to create all types of cells within embryonic and extra-embryonic tissues, according to the researchers.
"These cells can not only differentiate into placental tissue but also potentially develop into more mature organs," Li said.
The researchers also transplanted the 8-cell stage cells subcutaneously into adult mice, and those cells developed into complex teratomas, according to the study.
The experiment was facilitated by the single-cell sequencing technology developed by Shenzhen-based BGI-Research. Ethical review had given clearance to the relevant study.
Source: Xinhua Editor: Chen Huizhi
Satellite photos show Yemen rebels hit Saudi oil site again
By Jon Gambrell | AP
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In this satellite photo from Planet Labs PBC, damage is seen after an attack by Yemen’s Houthi rebels targeting Saudi Aramco’s North Jiddah Bulk Plant in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, Tuesday, March 22, 2022. Yemen’s Houthi rebels this week struck the exact same oil storage tank in the Saudi Arabian city of Jiddah that they previously hit some two years earlier, satellite photos show. (Planet Labs PBC via AP)
DUBAI, United Arab Emirates — Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi rebels this week struck the same oil storage tank in the Saudi Arabian city of Jiddah they had previously hit a year and a half ago, satellite photos showed Tuesday.
Satellite photos by Planet Labs PBC, analyzed by The Associated Press, show the damage on Sunday to the North Jiddah Bulk Plant, which sits just southeast of the city’s international airport, a crucial hub for Muslim pilgrims heading to Mecca.
That same storage tank — owned by the state oil behemoth Saudi Arabian Oil Co., known as Saudi Aramco — was hit by what the Houthis described as a cruise missile in a November 2020 attack.
Sunday’s attack has renewed questions about the kingdom’s ability to defend itself from Houthi fire as a yearslong war in the Arab world’s poorest country rages on with no end in sight. It also comes as Saudi Arabia issued an unusually stark warning that it is unable to guarantee its oil production won’t be affected by further attacks — which could push global energy prices even higher amid Russia’s war on Ukraine.
“There is little to suggest that the attack will have an immediate impact on oil supply,” said Torbjorn Soltvedt, an analyst with risk consultancy Verisk Maplecroft. “But there is no doubt Saudi Arabia is using it as an opportunity to put pressure on the U.S. at a testing time for U.S.-Saudi relations.”
Both Saudi government officials and Aramco did not respond to questions Tuesday.
The Houthi attack on Sunday represents one its most-intense barrages of the war, which has seen the kingdom launch punishing airstrikes in Yemen that have been criticized internationally for killing civilians. Among the targets was a petrochemicals complex in Yanbu on the Red Sea coast, which Saudi officials said led to a disruption of production for the world’s biggest oil exporter.
Another target was the North Jiddah Bulk Plant, which stores diesel, gasoline and jet fuel for use in Jiddah, the kingdom’s second-largest city some 285 kilometers (177 miles) southeast of Yanbu on the coast. It accounts for over a quarter of all of Saudi Arabia’s supplies and also supplies fuel crucial to running a regional desalination plant.
Saudi authorities earlier described the attack as causing a “limited fire in one of the tanks, (which was) brought under control without causing casualties.” The Houthis said they used Quds-2 land-attack cruise missile in the assault.
Planet Labs PBC photos, taken Monday, showed what likely was white, fire-suppressing material surrounding the tank, which appeared damaged on its southern-facing side. A new, detailed photo taken Tuesday showed that debris and material partially cleared away, with a hole clearly punched through the scorched tank.
At the time of the 2020 attack, the tank, which has a capacity of 500,000 barrels, held diesel fuel, according to a recent report by a U.N. panel of experts examining Yemen’s war. Repairing it after the last attack cost Aramco some $1.5 million.
The U.N. experts described the facility as a “civilian target,” which the Houthis should have avoided after the 2020 attack.
“While the facility also supplies the Saudi military with petroleum products, it is mostly supplying civilian customers,” the panel said. “If the plant had been out of service of a significant period, the impact on the kingdom’s economy as well as on the welfare of the residents of the Western region would likely have been significant.”
Cruise missiles and drones remain difficult to defend against, though the U.S. recently sent a significant number of Patriot anti-missile interceptors to Saudi Arabia to resupply the kingdom amid the Houthi attacks.
In September, the AP reported that the U.S. had removed its own Patriot and THAAD defense systems from Prince Sultan Air Base outside of Riyadh.
Follow Jon Gambrell on Twitter at www.twitter.com/jongambrellAP.
By Jon Gambrell | AP
DUBAI, United Arab Emirates — Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi rebels this week struck the same oil storage tank in the Saudi Arabian city of Jiddah they had previously hit a year and a half ago, satellite photos showed Tuesday.
Satellite photos by Planet Labs PBC, analyzed by The Associated Press, show the damage on Sunday to the North Jiddah Bulk Plant, which sits just southeast of the city’s international airport, a crucial hub for Muslim pilgrims heading to Mecca.
That same storage tank — owned by the state oil behemoth Saudi Arabian Oil Co., known as Saudi Aramco — was hit by what the Houthis described as a cruise missile in a November 2020 attack.
Sunday’s attack has renewed questions about the kingdom’s ability to defend itself from Houthi fire as a yearslong war in the Arab world’s poorest country rages on with no end in sight. It also comes as Saudi Arabia issued an unusually stark warning that it is unable to guarantee its oil production won’t be affected by further attacks — which could push global energy prices even higher amid Russia’s war on Ukraine.
“There is little to suggest that the attack will have an immediate impact on oil supply,” said Torbjorn Soltvedt, an analyst with risk consultancy Verisk Maplecroft. “But there is no doubt Saudi Arabia is using it as an opportunity to put pressure on the U.S. at a testing time for U.S.-Saudi relations.”
Both Saudi government officials and Aramco did not respond to questions Tuesday.
The Houthi attack on Sunday represents one its most-intense barrages of the war, which has seen the kingdom launch punishing airstrikes in Yemen that have been criticized internationally for killing civilians. Among the targets was a petrochemicals complex in Yanbu on the Red Sea coast, which Saudi officials said led to a disruption of production for the world’s biggest oil exporter.
Another target was the North Jiddah Bulk Plant, which stores diesel, gasoline and jet fuel for use in Jiddah, the kingdom’s second-largest city some 285 kilometers (177 miles) southeast of Yanbu on the coast. It accounts for over a quarter of all of Saudi Arabia’s supplies and also supplies fuel crucial to running a regional desalination plant.
Saudi authorities earlier described the attack as causing a “limited fire in one of the tanks, (which was) brought under control without causing casualties.” The Houthis said they used Quds-2 land-attack cruise missile in the assault.
Planet Labs PBC photos, taken Monday, showed what likely was white, fire-suppressing material surrounding the tank, which appeared damaged on its southern-facing side. A new, detailed photo taken Tuesday showed that debris and material partially cleared away, with a hole clearly punched through the scorched tank.
At the time of the 2020 attack, the tank, which has a capacity of 500,000 barrels, held diesel fuel, according to a recent report by a U.N. panel of experts examining Yemen’s war. Repairing it after the last attack cost Aramco some $1.5 million.
The U.N. experts described the facility as a “civilian target,” which the Houthis should have avoided after the 2020 attack.
“While the facility also supplies the Saudi military with petroleum products, it is mostly supplying civilian customers,” the panel said. “If the plant had been out of service of a significant period, the impact on the kingdom’s economy as well as on the welfare of the residents of the Western region would likely have been significant.”
Cruise missiles and drones remain difficult to defend against, though the U.S. recently sent a significant number of Patriot anti-missile interceptors to Saudi Arabia to resupply the kingdom amid the Houthi attacks.
In September, the AP reported that the U.S. had removed its own Patriot and THAAD defense systems from Prince Sultan Air Base outside of Riyadh.
Follow Jon Gambrell on Twitter at www.twitter.com/jongambrellAP.
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