The Ukraine crisis and media systems:
Comparison of UK and Russian media coverage
Thesis submitted in accordance with the
requirements of the University of Liverpool for the
degree of Doctor in Philosophy
By
Zixiu Liu
September 2019
Abstract
University of Liverpool
Zixiu Liu
Doctor of Philosophy
September 2019
https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/3071360/1/200712005_Sep2019.pdf
The Ukraine crisis and media systems: Comparison of UK and Russian media
coverage
ABSTRACT
This study uses a mixed-methods approach to examine the framing of the
Ukraine crisis from 30 November 2013 to 28 February 2015 by the news media in
Russia and the UK. Drawing upon the broader framework of media systems theory
(Hallin & Mancini, 2004, 2012a; Vartanova, 2012), the thesis identifies and analyses
how different media outlets from hybrid and liberal political regimes played a role in
the reporting of the Ukraine crisis. The comparative analysis of the news coverage
encompasses three news sectors from Russia and the UK that differ culturally,
economically, and geopolitically: RT, The Moscow Times, and Pravda.ru from
Russia and the BBC, The Guardian, and Mail Online from the UK.
The study poses four research questions. The first and main question explores
the extent to which the Russian and British news media coverage of the Ukraine
crisis supports or refutes current media systems theory. The second and third
questions relate to the attention paid and the actual frames used by the different
media outlets from Russia and the UK, respectively. The final question focuses on
the difference (if any) between the framing of the crisis in Russia and the UK, thus
feeding into the analysis in response to the main research question.
Following Godefroidt et al.’s (2016) methodological framework using
generic, diagnostic and prognostic frames, the findings suggest that first, the Russian
media dedicated more attention to the Ukraine crisis than the British media,
reflecting the geopolitical interest of the Russian government. Second, both the
Russian (RT and Pravda.ru in particular) and the British media tended to use a
human-interest angle extensively in discussing the conflict, although in different
light. While the former put forward the idea of humanitarianism, the latter stressed
the importance of Ukraine’s sovereignty. The media’s articulations of humanitarian
sentiments, however, revealed an overarching illiberal trend, by naturalising and
justifying their host countries’ involvements in the crisis. The manufacturing consent
thesis (Herman & Chomsky, 1988) is useful in explaining the media performance in
both the hybrid regime (Russia) and the liberal democracy (the UK). Finally, the
study found The Moscow Times from Russia to be critical of the country’s policy on
Ukraine, thus supporting the Statist Commercialised model (Vartanova, 2012). On
the other hand, the study, to some extent, refuted the Liberal model (Hallin &
Mancini, 2004). The level of journalistic professionalism could not be substantiated
as high as the liberal model suggests to be, mainly due to a lack of in-depth analysis
especially when discussing Russia and President Vladimir Putin. Despite the fact that
the British media were more likely to explain the roots of and the possible solutions
to the Ukraine crisis than the Russian media, the former overall were identified as
delivering an anti-Russia hyperbole in their one-sided coverage of the Ukraine
conflict.
Table of Contents
Table of Contents.......................................................................................................... i
List of Tables............................................................................................................... vi
List of Figures............................................................................................................. ix
List of Abbreviations................................................................................................... xi
Abstract ...................................................................................................................... xii
Acknowledgements...................................................................................................xiii
Introduction.................................................................................................................. 1
Research Rationale ................................................................................................... 2
Original Contribution ............................................................................................... 5
Structure of the Thesis.............................................................................................. 7
Chapter 1 .................................................................................................................... 11
Media Systems and War Coverage ............................................................................ 11
1.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 11
1.2 Media and Democracy...................................................................................... 13
1.2.1 Five functions of the media in democracy................................................. 13
1.3 The Media Systems .......................................................................................... 21
1.3.1 The political contexts: liberal vs. hybrid regimes...................................... 21
1.3.2 The media systems of liberal democracies. ............................................... 23
1.3.3 The media systems of hybrid regimes. ...................................................... 29
1.4 Media and Conflict........................................................................................... 34
1.4.1 The manufacturing consent thesis.............................................................. 36
1.4.2 The CNN effect theory. ............................................................................. 53
1.4.3 Media coverage of the Ukraine crisis. ....................................................... 64
1.5 Conclusion........................................................................................................ 71
Chapter 2 .................................................................................................................... 72
British and Russian Media ......................................................................................... 72
ii
2.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 72
2.2 British Media: Liberal Model........................................................................... 73
2.3 Russian Media: Statist Commercialised Model ............................................... 77
2.3.1 Major transformations in media industry from 1990s to 2000s................. 79
2.3.2 Economic and political factors. ................................................................. 83
2.4 Conclusion........................................................................................................ 86
Chapter 3 .................................................................................................................... 87
The Ukraine Crisis ..................................................................................................... 87
3.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 87
3.2 The Ukraine Crisis............................................................................................ 87
3.3 Conclusion........................................................................................................ 94
Chapter 4 .................................................................................................................... 95
Methodology .............................................................................................................. 95
4.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 95
4.2 Theoretical Backgrounds.................................................................................. 97
4.2.1 Qualitative analysis.................................................................................... 98
4.2.2 Framing analysis. ..................................................................................... 100
4.3 The Case Study – The Ukraine Crisis ............................................................ 117
4.4 The Sample..................................................................................................... 118
4.4.1 The choice of periods............................................................................... 118
4.4.2 The choice of media sources.................................................................... 122
4.4.3 The choice of keywords........................................................................... 126
4.5 The Implementation in the Case of Ukraine................................................... 127
Step 1: Producing a coding scheme. ................................................................. 127
Step 2: Collecting data...................................................................................... 128
Step 3: Analysing data. ..................................................................................... 130
Step 4: Analysing the results. ........................................................................... 131
iii
4.6 Conclusion...................................................................................................... 133
Chapter 5 .................................................................................................................. 134
Findings – Russian Media........................................................................................ 134
5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 134
5.2 Press Attention ............................................................................................... 135
1
st period: 30. 11. 2013 – 26. 02. 2014. ............................................................ 135
2
nd period: 27. 02. – 20. 03. 2014. .................................................................... 136
3
rd period: 21. 03. – 17. 07. 2014...................................................................... 138
4
th period: 18. 07. 2014 – 28. 02. 2015............................................................. 139
5.3 Framing of the Ukraine Crisis........................................................................ 140
1
st period: 30. 11. 2013 – 26. 02. 2014. ............................................................ 140
2
nd period: 27. 02. – 20. 03. 2014. .................................................................... 148
3
rd period: 21. 03. – 17. 07. 2014...................................................................... 156
4
th period: 18. 07. 2014 – 28. 02. 2015............................................................. 169
5.4 Conclusion...................................................................................................... 182
Chapter 6 .................................................................................................................. 184
Findings – British Media.......................................................................................... 184
6.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 184
6.2 Press Attention ............................................................................................... 184
1
st period: 30. 11. 2013 – 26. 02. 2014. ............................................................ 184
2
nd period: 27. 02. – 20. 03. 2014. .................................................................... 186
3
rd period: 21. 03. – 17. 07. 2014...................................................................... 187
4
th period: 18. 07. 2014 – 28. 02. 2015............................................................. 189
6.3 Framing of the Ukraine Crisis........................................................................ 190
1
st period: 30. 11. 2013 – 26. 02. 2014. ............................................................ 190
2
nd period: 27. 02. – 20. 03. 2014. .................................................................... 197
3
rd period: 21. 03. – 17. 07. 2014...................................................................... 205
iv
4
th period: 18. 07. 2014 – 28. 02. 2015............................................................. 216
6.4 Conclusion...................................................................................................... 227
Chapter 7 .................................................................................................................. 229
Comparison between the Russian and the British Media Coverage of the Ukraine
Crisis ........................................................................................................................ 229
7.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 229
7.2 Press Attention ............................................................................................... 230
1
st period: 30. 11. 2013 – 26. 02. 2014. ............................................................ 230
2
nd period: 27. 02. – 20. 03. 2014. .................................................................... 231
3
rd period: 21. 03. – 17. 07. 2014...................................................................... 232
4
th period: 18. 07. 2014 – 28. 02. 2015............................................................. 232
7.3 Framing the Ukraine Crisis ............................................................................ 235
1
st period: 30. 11. 2013 – 26. 02. 2014. ............................................................ 235
2
nd period: 27. 02. – 20. 03. 2014. .................................................................... 242
3
rd period: 21. 03. – 17. 07. 2014...................................................................... 248
4
th period: 18. 07. 2014 – 28. 02. 2015............................................................. 255
7.4 Conclusion...................................................................................................... 261
Chapter 8 .................................................................................................................. 264
Discussion ................................................................................................................ 264
8.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 264
8.2 Manufacturing Consent .................................................................................. 264
8.2.1 One good vs. one bad alternative: economy. ........................................... 266
8.2.2 Legitimise ‘ours’ & delegitimise ‘theirs’: morality................................. 268
8.2.3 Good vs. evil............................................................................................ 270
8.2.4 Both-side construction. ............................................................................ 281
8.3 The Media Systems of Hybrid and Liberal Regimes ..................................... 283
8.3.1 The statist commercialised model............................................................ 283
v
8.3.2 The liberal model. .................................................................................... 287
8.4 Conclusion...................................................................................................... 293
Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 296
General Summary of the Study ............................................................................ 297
Original Contribution ........................................................................................... 304
Limitations of the Study....................................................................................... 309
Suggestions for Further Studies ........................................................................... 312
References................................................................................................................ 314
Appendices............................................................................................................... 371
Saturday, August 15, 2020
Vienna a cell phone rang, and a new mother shouted in Polish across the room. The next ... As Russia's neighbor Ukraine drew closer to the European Union, Russia invaded the country and annexed some of its territory in 2014. By 2015 ... Some of the philosophy books that matter today were written by Ilyin, who died. FREE BOOK AS PDF
NEO-FASCISM AND THE STATE:
THE NEGOTIATION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY IN MODERN RUSSIA
by
HANNA BARANCHUK
Under the Direction of M. Lane Bruner, PhD
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1087&context=communication_diss
A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the College of Arts and Sciences Georgia State University 2017
ABSTRACT
The present dissertation is a study of the process of national identity renegotiation in
modern Russia. More specifically, I analyze the use of the word fascism in contemporary
Russian discourse. Developing a blend of Kenneth Burke’s theory of human motives and Jacques
Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory of the subject, I compare the psycho-rhetorical narratives of the
four distinct parties - Vladimir Putin, state-sponsored “anti-fascists” (Nashi), independent antifascists (Antifa), and neo-fascists - which fight over the usage of the word fascism in their
attempts to renegotiate the meaning of Russianness. While explicating the mechanism of national
identity construction, Lacan’s theory, as I argue, does not help distinguish among various visions
of the nation. Therefore, I build upon Burke’s classification of symbolic frames (comedy,
tragedy, epic, elegy, satire, the burlesque, and the grotesque) to differentiate among alternative
fantasy-frames (Lacanian fantasy and Burkean frame) as more or less politically dangerous and
ethically sophisticated. As the reading of the four psycho-rhetorical narratives shows, the vision
of Russia proposed by Russian neo-fascists dangerously approximates the Russian idea promoted
by the state and pro-Putin “anti-fascists.”
INDEX WORDS: Neo-fascism, National identity, Nationalism, Neo-fascists, Nashi, Antifa,
Putin, Russia, Burke, Lacan, Psycho-rhetorical criticism
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................. v
1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 1
2 THE TRAGICOMEDY OF THE NATION .......................................................... 19
2.1 Ideological Criticism as a Psycho-Rhetorical Enterprise .............................. 20
2.2 The Two Lacks as the Birthplace of Subjectivity........................................... 35
2.3 The Mirror Stage and the Study of National Identity Construction............ 42
2.4 The Neurotic Structure of National Subjectivity ........................................... 50
2.4.1 The Formula of the Subject.......................................................................... 53
2.5 Fantasy as an Attitude of the National Subject.............................................. 60
2.6 The Objet a and Symptoms............................................................................... 62
2.7 Attitude and Fantasy-Frames: A Lacanian-Burkean Ethical Framework . 70
2.8 The Imaginary and the Symbolic Levels of a Psycho-Rhetorical Analysis of
the Nation 87
2.8.1 The Imaginary: A Symptom as a Linguistic Motive.................................... 90
2.8.2 The Symbolic: The Objet a as the Ultimate Motive and the Four Discourses
94
2.9 The Critical Vigor of a Lacanian-Burkean Theory of National Identity
Construction .......................................................................................................................... 114
3 THE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL SUBJECT: THE RUSSIANS AND THE
RUSSIAN IDEA........................................................................................................................ 119
vii
3.1 The Rewriting of History as an Ethical Enterprise...................................... 119
3.2 The Russian Idea ............................................................................................. 128
4 THE TRAGIC NARRATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN NEO-FASCIST MASTER178
4.1 The Reciprocity of Russian Neo-Fascism and the Russian Idea................. 179
4.2 Fascism, Pathology, Irrationality, and Ethics .............................................. 191
4.3 The Success and Failure of Russian Neo-Fascism........................................ 212
4.4 The Tragic Imagery of Russian Neo-Fascism............................................... 222
4.5 The Triumph of the Symbolic Master ........................................................... 255
5 THE MANY FACES OF TRUE AND PURPORTED ANTI-FASCISM IN
MODERN RUSSIA................................................................................................................... 267
5.1 Nashi as an Ideological Mouthpiece of the Kremlin .................................... 268
5.1.1 Nashi’s Tragic “Anti-Fascism”.................................................................. 280
5.1.2 Nashi’s Competitive “Democracy”............................................................. 321
5.2 The Comic National Fantasy of Independent Anti-Fascists (Antifa) as the
Agent of the Analyst’s Discourse ......................................................................................... 330
5.3 Vladimir Putin’s Russian Idea as a Tragic Response to Actual and
Perceived Fascism ................................................................................................................. 351
6 CONCLUSION....................................................................................................... 372
WORKS CITED............................................................................................................ 387
1
1 INTRODUCTION
On November 4, 2005, for the first time in the history of the country, Russians observed
National Unity Day.1
The holiday was supposed to celebrate “the best features and qualities of
the Russian national character,” “traditions of mutual help,” and “sensitivity to the pain and
misfortunes of others.”
2 Yet, the spirit of the holiday was far from a display of compassion,
goodness or unity. Instead, National Unity Day was marked by fear and anger triggered by socalled Russian Marches (or Right Marches) – demonstrations organized by neo-fascist, ultranationalist and anti-immigrant activists in major cities in Russia. Major targets of the discontent
voiced by organizers and participants of the Russian Marches have been the churki (literally
translated as “wooden stubs”), or knuckleheads, as extreme nationalists derogatorily refer to
non-Slavic Muslim labor immigrants from former Soviet republics in Central Asia, the South
Caucasus, and Russian republics in the North Caucasus.3
In Moscow more than 2,000 members of ultra-right organizations “marched” from the
statue of Griboedov in Chistye Prudy to the Slavic Square, chanting “Russia is against
occupants,” “The Russians are coming,” “Russia belongs to us,” “Glory to the Empire,” “Russia
is everything, others are nothing,” “Russia is for Russians, Moscow is for Muscovites,” and
“Sieg Heil!”
4
In 2013 the Russian March attracted around 6,000 participants, who openly urged
for violent actions against non-Slavic population of Russia.5
THE NEGOTIATION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY IN MODERN RUSSIA
by
HANNA BARANCHUK
Under the Direction of M. Lane Bruner, PhD
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1087&context=communication_diss
A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the College of Arts and Sciences Georgia State University 2017
ABSTRACT
The present dissertation is a study of the process of national identity renegotiation in
modern Russia. More specifically, I analyze the use of the word fascism in contemporary
Russian discourse. Developing a blend of Kenneth Burke’s theory of human motives and Jacques
Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory of the subject, I compare the psycho-rhetorical narratives of the
four distinct parties - Vladimir Putin, state-sponsored “anti-fascists” (Nashi), independent antifascists (Antifa), and neo-fascists - which fight over the usage of the word fascism in their
attempts to renegotiate the meaning of Russianness. While explicating the mechanism of national
identity construction, Lacan’s theory, as I argue, does not help distinguish among various visions
of the nation. Therefore, I build upon Burke’s classification of symbolic frames (comedy,
tragedy, epic, elegy, satire, the burlesque, and the grotesque) to differentiate among alternative
fantasy-frames (Lacanian fantasy and Burkean frame) as more or less politically dangerous and
ethically sophisticated. As the reading of the four psycho-rhetorical narratives shows, the vision
of Russia proposed by Russian neo-fascists dangerously approximates the Russian idea promoted
by the state and pro-Putin “anti-fascists.”
INDEX WORDS: Neo-fascism, National identity, Nationalism, Neo-fascists, Nashi, Antifa,
Putin, Russia, Burke, Lacan, Psycho-rhetorical criticism
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................. v
1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 1
2 THE TRAGICOMEDY OF THE NATION .......................................................... 19
2.1 Ideological Criticism as a Psycho-Rhetorical Enterprise .............................. 20
2.2 The Two Lacks as the Birthplace of Subjectivity........................................... 35
2.3 The Mirror Stage and the Study of National Identity Construction............ 42
2.4 The Neurotic Structure of National Subjectivity ........................................... 50
2.4.1 The Formula of the Subject.......................................................................... 53
2.5 Fantasy as an Attitude of the National Subject.............................................. 60
2.6 The Objet a and Symptoms............................................................................... 62
2.7 Attitude and Fantasy-Frames: A Lacanian-Burkean Ethical Framework . 70
2.8 The Imaginary and the Symbolic Levels of a Psycho-Rhetorical Analysis of
the Nation 87
2.8.1 The Imaginary: A Symptom as a Linguistic Motive.................................... 90
2.8.2 The Symbolic: The Objet a as the Ultimate Motive and the Four Discourses
94
2.9 The Critical Vigor of a Lacanian-Burkean Theory of National Identity
Construction .......................................................................................................................... 114
3 THE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL SUBJECT: THE RUSSIANS AND THE
RUSSIAN IDEA........................................................................................................................ 119
vii
3.1 The Rewriting of History as an Ethical Enterprise...................................... 119
3.2 The Russian Idea ............................................................................................. 128
4 THE TRAGIC NARRATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN NEO-FASCIST MASTER178
4.1 The Reciprocity of Russian Neo-Fascism and the Russian Idea................. 179
4.2 Fascism, Pathology, Irrationality, and Ethics .............................................. 191
4.3 The Success and Failure of Russian Neo-Fascism........................................ 212
4.4 The Tragic Imagery of Russian Neo-Fascism............................................... 222
4.5 The Triumph of the Symbolic Master ........................................................... 255
5 THE MANY FACES OF TRUE AND PURPORTED ANTI-FASCISM IN
MODERN RUSSIA................................................................................................................... 267
5.1 Nashi as an Ideological Mouthpiece of the Kremlin .................................... 268
5.1.1 Nashi’s Tragic “Anti-Fascism”.................................................................. 280
5.1.2 Nashi’s Competitive “Democracy”............................................................. 321
5.2 The Comic National Fantasy of Independent Anti-Fascists (Antifa) as the
Agent of the Analyst’s Discourse ......................................................................................... 330
5.3 Vladimir Putin’s Russian Idea as a Tragic Response to Actual and
Perceived Fascism ................................................................................................................. 351
6 CONCLUSION....................................................................................................... 372
WORKS CITED............................................................................................................ 387
1
1 INTRODUCTION
On November 4, 2005, for the first time in the history of the country, Russians observed
National Unity Day.1
The holiday was supposed to celebrate “the best features and qualities of
the Russian national character,” “traditions of mutual help,” and “sensitivity to the pain and
misfortunes of others.”
2 Yet, the spirit of the holiday was far from a display of compassion,
goodness or unity. Instead, National Unity Day was marked by fear and anger triggered by socalled Russian Marches (or Right Marches) – demonstrations organized by neo-fascist, ultranationalist and anti-immigrant activists in major cities in Russia. Major targets of the discontent
voiced by organizers and participants of the Russian Marches have been the churki (literally
translated as “wooden stubs”), or knuckleheads, as extreme nationalists derogatorily refer to
non-Slavic Muslim labor immigrants from former Soviet republics in Central Asia, the South
Caucasus, and Russian republics in the North Caucasus.3
In Moscow more than 2,000 members of ultra-right organizations “marched” from the
statue of Griboedov in Chistye Prudy to the Slavic Square, chanting “Russia is against
occupants,” “The Russians are coming,” “Russia belongs to us,” “Glory to the Empire,” “Russia
is everything, others are nothing,” “Russia is for Russians, Moscow is for Muscovites,” and
“Sieg Heil!”
4
In 2013 the Russian March attracted around 6,000 participants, who openly urged
for violent actions against non-Slavic population of Russia.5
Russia’s ‘New’ Tools for
Confronting the West
Continuity and Innovation in
Moscow’s Exercise of Power
Research Paper
Keir Giles
Russia and Eurasia Programme | March 2016
BEFORE THE US ELECTION
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/2016-03-russia-new-tools-giles.pdf
Russia’s ‘New’ Tools for Confronting the West
1 | Chatham House
Contents
Summary 2
1. Introduction 4
Context 4
What was new in Crimea? 5
2. Russian ‘Hybrid Warfare’? 6
NATO and hybridity 7
Nothing new 8
‘Hybrid’ viewed from Russia 9
3. The New Russian Army 13
Russia’s military transformation 14
The new Russian soldier 16
Rearmament prospects 17
Implications for neighbours 19
Military intimidation 21
The military outlook 24
The National Defence Control Centre 25
4. The Old Information War 27
Adaptation by trial and error 27
Success or failure? 31
The unimportance of truth 37
Influence – political and economic 40
Consequences 41
Cyber, trolls and bots 44
5. Trigger Points 47
Western responses 49
6. Policy Implications 54
Political 54
Military 55
Strategic communications and media 58
Intelligence and assessment 61
Cyber and information security 62
Deterrence 64
7. Final Word 69
About the Author 70
Acknowledgments 71
Russia’s ‘New’ Tools for Confronting the West
2 | Chatham House
Summary
• In the last two years, Russia has demonstrated its return to an assertive foreign policy by
successful military interventions in Ukraine and Syria. The capabilities it employed to do so
surprised the West, despite being well advertised in advance and their development described in
detail by the Russia-watching community in Western nations.
• The distinctive Russian approach to operations in Ukraine gave rise to an impression among
some observers that its military had employed fundamentally new concepts of armed conflict.
The widespread adoption of phrases such as ‘hybrid warfare’ and ‘Gerasimov doctrine’
reinforced this perception of novelty, and was indicative of a search for ways to conceptualize –
and make sense of – a Russian approach to conflict that the West found at first sight unfamiliar.
• Nevertheless, the techniques and methods displayed by Russia in Ukraine have roots in
traditional Soviet approaches. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia’s military academics have
displayed an unbroken and consistently developing train of thought on the changing nature of
conflict and how to prevail in it, including – but certainly not limited to – the successful
application of military power. As a result, despite modern technological enablers, Russia’s
intentions and actions throughout the Ukraine conflict have been recognizable from previous
decades of study of the threat to the West from the Soviet Union. Today, as in the past, Western
planners and policy-makers must consider and plan not only for the potential threat of military
attack by Russia, but also for the actual threat of Moscow’s ongoing subversion, destabilization
and ‘active measures’.
• Two specific tools for exercising Russian power demand close study: the Armed Forces of the
Russian Federation; and the state’s capacity for information warfare. In both of these fields,
Russia’s capabilities have developed rapidly in recent years to match its persistent intentions.
The most visible demonstration of this has been the unprecedented near-total transformation of
Russia’s armed forces since 2008. This transformation and the accompanying rearmament
programme are continuing, and the Russian military is benefiting from ongoing ‘training’ under
real operational conditions in Ukraine and Syria.
• Russia has now demonstrated both the capacity of its conventional military capabilities and
willingness to use them. The trend of the past 10 years appears set to continue – the more Russia
develops its conventional capability, the more confident and aggressive it will become. Despite
the perception of Russian operations in eastern Ukraine as irregular warfare, it was a large-scale
conventional military cross-border intervention in August 2014 that brought to a halt the
previously successful Ukrainian government offensive, and stabilized the front line close to the
one currently holding under the Minsk agreements.
• This readiness to use military force will only have been heightened by the experience of
campaigning in Syria from October 2015 onwards. The February 2016 Syrian ceasefire
agreement, concluded on Russian terms, in particular confirms for Moscow once again that
Russia’s ‘New’ Tools for Confronting the West
3 | Chatham House
assertive military intervention is an effective means of achieving swift and positive foreign policy
results.
• Russia’s practice of information warfare has also developed rapidly, while still following key
principles that can be traced to Soviet roots. This development has consisted of a series of
adaptations following failed information campaigns by Russia, accompanied by successful
adoption of the internet. Misconceptions about the nature of Russian information campaigns,
and how best to counter them, remain widespread – in particular the notion that successful
countermeasures consist in rebutting obvious disinformation wherever possible. Russian
disinformation campaigns continue to be described in the West as failing due to the
implausibility of Russian narratives. But by applying Western notions of the nature and
importance of truth, this approach measures these campaigns by entirely the wrong criteria, and
fundamentally misunderstands their objectives.
• Russia continues to present itself as being under approaching threat from the West, and is
mobilizing to address that threat. Russia’s security initiatives, even if it views or presents them
as defensive measures, are likely to have severe consequences for its neighbours. Russia’s
growing confidence in pursuing its objectives will make it even harder for the West to protect
itself against Russian assertiveness, without the implementation of measures to resist Russian
information warfare, and without the availability of significant military force to act as an
immediate and present deterrent in the front-line states.
• In short, Russian military interventions and associated information warfare campaigns in the
past two years have not been an anomaly. Instead they are examples of Russia implementing its
long-standing intent to challenge the West now that it feels strong enough to do so. For Western
governments and leaders, an essential first step towards more successful management of the
relationship with Moscow would be to recognize that the West’s values and strategic interests
and those of Russia are fundamentally incompatible.
Confronting the West
Continuity and Innovation in
Moscow’s Exercise of Power
Research Paper
Keir Giles
Russia and Eurasia Programme | March 2016
BEFORE THE US ELECTION
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/2016-03-russia-new-tools-giles.pdf
Russia’s ‘New’ Tools for Confronting the West
1 | Chatham House
Contents
Summary 2
1. Introduction 4
Context 4
What was new in Crimea? 5
2. Russian ‘Hybrid Warfare’? 6
NATO and hybridity 7
Nothing new 8
‘Hybrid’ viewed from Russia 9
3. The New Russian Army 13
Russia’s military transformation 14
The new Russian soldier 16
Rearmament prospects 17
Implications for neighbours 19
Military intimidation 21
The military outlook 24
The National Defence Control Centre 25
4. The Old Information War 27
Adaptation by trial and error 27
Success or failure? 31
The unimportance of truth 37
Influence – political and economic 40
Consequences 41
Cyber, trolls and bots 44
5. Trigger Points 47
Western responses 49
6. Policy Implications 54
Political 54
Military 55
Strategic communications and media 58
Intelligence and assessment 61
Cyber and information security 62
Deterrence 64
7. Final Word 69
About the Author 70
Acknowledgments 71
Russia’s ‘New’ Tools for Confronting the West
2 | Chatham House
Summary
• In the last two years, Russia has demonstrated its return to an assertive foreign policy by
successful military interventions in Ukraine and Syria. The capabilities it employed to do so
surprised the West, despite being well advertised in advance and their development described in
detail by the Russia-watching community in Western nations.
• The distinctive Russian approach to operations in Ukraine gave rise to an impression among
some observers that its military had employed fundamentally new concepts of armed conflict.
The widespread adoption of phrases such as ‘hybrid warfare’ and ‘Gerasimov doctrine’
reinforced this perception of novelty, and was indicative of a search for ways to conceptualize –
and make sense of – a Russian approach to conflict that the West found at first sight unfamiliar.
• Nevertheless, the techniques and methods displayed by Russia in Ukraine have roots in
traditional Soviet approaches. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia’s military academics have
displayed an unbroken and consistently developing train of thought on the changing nature of
conflict and how to prevail in it, including – but certainly not limited to – the successful
application of military power. As a result, despite modern technological enablers, Russia’s
intentions and actions throughout the Ukraine conflict have been recognizable from previous
decades of study of the threat to the West from the Soviet Union. Today, as in the past, Western
planners and policy-makers must consider and plan not only for the potential threat of military
attack by Russia, but also for the actual threat of Moscow’s ongoing subversion, destabilization
and ‘active measures’.
• Two specific tools for exercising Russian power demand close study: the Armed Forces of the
Russian Federation; and the state’s capacity for information warfare. In both of these fields,
Russia’s capabilities have developed rapidly in recent years to match its persistent intentions.
The most visible demonstration of this has been the unprecedented near-total transformation of
Russia’s armed forces since 2008. This transformation and the accompanying rearmament
programme are continuing, and the Russian military is benefiting from ongoing ‘training’ under
real operational conditions in Ukraine and Syria.
• Russia has now demonstrated both the capacity of its conventional military capabilities and
willingness to use them. The trend of the past 10 years appears set to continue – the more Russia
develops its conventional capability, the more confident and aggressive it will become. Despite
the perception of Russian operations in eastern Ukraine as irregular warfare, it was a large-scale
conventional military cross-border intervention in August 2014 that brought to a halt the
previously successful Ukrainian government offensive, and stabilized the front line close to the
one currently holding under the Minsk agreements.
• This readiness to use military force will only have been heightened by the experience of
campaigning in Syria from October 2015 onwards. The February 2016 Syrian ceasefire
agreement, concluded on Russian terms, in particular confirms for Moscow once again that
Russia’s ‘New’ Tools for Confronting the West
3 | Chatham House
assertive military intervention is an effective means of achieving swift and positive foreign policy
results.
• Russia’s practice of information warfare has also developed rapidly, while still following key
principles that can be traced to Soviet roots. This development has consisted of a series of
adaptations following failed information campaigns by Russia, accompanied by successful
adoption of the internet. Misconceptions about the nature of Russian information campaigns,
and how best to counter them, remain widespread – in particular the notion that successful
countermeasures consist in rebutting obvious disinformation wherever possible. Russian
disinformation campaigns continue to be described in the West as failing due to the
implausibility of Russian narratives. But by applying Western notions of the nature and
importance of truth, this approach measures these campaigns by entirely the wrong criteria, and
fundamentally misunderstands their objectives.
• Russia continues to present itself as being under approaching threat from the West, and is
mobilizing to address that threat. Russia’s security initiatives, even if it views or presents them
as defensive measures, are likely to have severe consequences for its neighbours. Russia’s
growing confidence in pursuing its objectives will make it even harder for the West to protect
itself against Russian assertiveness, without the implementation of measures to resist Russian
information warfare, and without the availability of significant military force to act as an
immediate and present deterrent in the front-line states.
• In short, Russian military interventions and associated information warfare campaigns in the
past two years have not been an anomaly. Instead they are examples of Russia implementing its
long-standing intent to challenge the West now that it feels strong enough to do so. For Western
governments and leaders, an essential first step towards more successful management of the
relationship with Moscow would be to recognize that the West’s values and strategic interests
and those of Russia are fundamentally incompatible.
Modern Political Warfare
Current Practices and Possible Responses
by Linda Robinson, Todd C. Helmus, Raphael S. Cohen, Alireza Nader, Andrew Radin, Madeline Magnuson, Katya Migacheva
Related Topics:
Information Operations,
International Diplomacy,
Iran,
The Islamic State (Terrorist Organization),
Low-Intensity Conflict,
Psychological Warfare,
Russia,
Special Operations Forces
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1772.html
DOWNLOAD EBOOK FOR FREE
Full Document
PDF file
3.8 MB
Research Questions
What is political warfare?
How is it (or an appropriate analogous term) applied today?
How might the U.S. government, along with its allies and partners, most effectively respond to or engage in this type of conflict to achieve its ends and protect its interests?
The United States today faces a number of actors who employ a wide range of political, informational, military, and economic measures to influence, coerce, intimidate, or undermine U.S. interests or those of friends and allies; many of these measures are often collectively referred to as "political warfare." This report analyzes political warfare as it is practiced today by both state and nonstate actors, and provides detailed recommendations regarding the most effective ways that the U.S. government, along with its allies and partners, can respond to or engage in this type of conflict to achieve U.S. ends and protect U.S. interests.
The authors examine historical antecedents of political warfare and current-day practices through in-depth case studies of Russia, Iran, and the Islamic State. They use these cases to derive common attributes of modern political warfare. The authors then identify effective means for responding to these challenges. Drawing on documentary and field research as well as extensive semistructured interviews with practitioners in the U.S. government and elsewhere, they determine gaps in practices and capabilities for addressing political warfare threats. The report concludes with recommendations for countering political warfare by creating a more effective, coordinated, and cost-sensitive approach to effective statecraft, including specific measures for the U.S. State Department and the U.S. military, particularly the special operations community.
Key Findings
Characteristics of Modern Political Warfare
Nonstate actors can conduct political warfare with unprecedented reach.
Political warfare employs all the elements of national power.
Political warfare relies heavily on unattributed forces and means.
The information arena is an increasingly important battleground, where perceptions of success can be determinative.
Information warfare works in various ways by amplifying, obfuscating, and, at times, persuading. Compelling evidence supplied in a timely manner is the best antidote to disinformation.
Detecting early-stage political warfare requires a heavy investment of intelligence resources.
Political warfare can generate unintended consequences.
Economic leverage is increasingly the preferred tool of the strong.
Political warfare often exploits shared ethnic or religious bonds or other internal seams.
Political warfare extends, rather than replaces, traditional conflict and can achieve effects at lower cost.
Gaps in U.S. Information Capabilities and Practices
Strategic-level communications are high-profile and bureaucratically risky, characteristics that militate against speed and initiative.
The new Global Engagement Center (GEC), established by presidential executive order and located at the Department of State, focuses on third-party validators or influencers from the bottom up, whereas Military Information Support Operations (MISO) within the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) remain more focused on government top-down communications.
Interagency coordination and National Security Council guidance pertaining to message themes remain lacking.
Unattributed communications may have counterproductive effects that should be anticipated and mitigated.
Interagency coordination remains a fundamental challenge.
Effective Statecraft and Integration of Measures Short of War
The term political warfare is not ideal for a variety of reasons, chief among them its association with actual warfare. It may be more useful to think of effective statecraft and an integration of measures short of war as necessary aspects of the U.S. arsenal.
An integrated response to threats short of conventional war includes (1) the need for strategy, (2) the need for a whole-of-government approach to statecraft led by an appropriately enabled State Department, (3) the formulation and coordination of responses with and through other sovereign governments, allies, and partners, and (4) the improvement of military contributions to such an integrated approach.
Recommendations
To improve whole-of-government synergy, U.S. military commands, including all deployed headquarters, should as a matter of course include civilian departmental representatives in order to understand, coordinate with, and support U.S. State Department and other civilian program execution.
DoD, and special operations forces in particular, should incentivize and improve selection and training for military advisers serving at State Department headquarters, U.S. embassies, and other diplomatic posts to increase their effectiveness.
DoD, and special operations forces, should offer military planners to the State Department as the latter builds its own cadre of planners and integrates regional and functional bureau plans, to enable State to play a lead role in responses to political warfare.
Military commanders should develop and maintain collaborative relationships with their civilian counterparts through regular visits and frequent communications to develop common understanding of and approaches to political-military conflict.
DoD should routinely seek to incorporate State Department regional expertise and the current insights of the U.S. country team into military plans in order to develop effective responses to political-military threats.
The special operations community should make it a high priority to improve and implement fully resourced, innovative, and collaborative information operations. MISO requires both increased manpower and new media training.
Military commanders and the State Department should identify critical information requirements for political warfare threats, and the intelligence community should increase collection and analysis capabilities that are dedicated to detecting incipient subversion, coercion, and other emerging threats short of conventional warfare.
DoD and the State Department should support deployment of special operations forces in priority areas deemed vulnerable to political warfare threats as an early and persistent presence to provide assessments and develop timely and viable options for countering measures short of conventional war.
NEWS DISCOURSE OF RUSSIAN INFORMATION WARFARE: THE CASE OF "SPUTNIK"
Anton Chernetskyi
Final Master Thesis
Journalism and Media Industries Study Program, state code 621P50002
Degree in Journalism
https://www.vdu.lt/cris/bitstream/20.500.12259/35074/1/anton_chernetskyi_md.pdf
VYTAUTAS MAGNUS UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND DIPLOMACY
PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT
CONTENTS
SUMMARY.....................................................................................2
SANTRAUKA.................................................................... 3
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 4
1. INFORMATION WARFARE AS THE MAJOR INSTRUMENT OF RUSSIA’S
MODERN HYRBID WARFARE .................................................................................................... 9
1.1. Understanding of Modern Russian Information Warfare in the era of Information
Society ............................................................................................................................................. 9
1.2. News as ideological discourse........................................................................................... 16
2. THE ROLE OF SPUTNIK IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN INFORMATION
WARFARE ...................................................................................................................................... 24
2.1. Sputnik as a political institution of Russian public diplomacy......................................... 24
2.2. Strategies and technologies of Sputnik ............................................................................... 31
3. SPUTNIK’S NEWS DISCOURSE AS DISCOURSE OF RUSSIAN INFORMATION
WARFARE ...................................................................................................................................... 40
3.1. Case study: Sputnik’s coverage of the Dutch referendum on EU-Ukraine Association
agreement ..................................................................................................................................... 40
3.2. Case study: Sputnik’s anti-Turkish information campaign after Turkey's downing of
Russian Su-24 warplane .............................................................................................................. 49
CONCLUSIONS.............................................................................................................................. 62
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................ 65
Literature...................................................................................................................................... 65
Sources.......................................................................................................................................... 69
2
SUMMARY
Pursuing its political aims, Russia develops more and more sophisticated power to
manipulate mass consciousness, introducing new techniques, which should be researched both quantitatively and qualitatively. In the recent years after annexation of Crimea in 2014 and escalation of the armed conflict in the Eastern Ukraine, it has been the main scientific problem of many contemporary researches. Since new technologies of information warfare are introduced by Russia constantly, and information continues, providing researchers with new material to be analyzed, the problem not only remains relevant but also requires some regular update.
Sputnik is one of the main tools, used by Russia in its information warfare. Launched less
than three years ago, it has been actively spreading disinformation and Russian narratives all over
the world.
This research on a topic ‘News Discourse of Russian Information Warfere: the Case of
‘Sputnik’ is aimed to provide new data on some major narratives in Russian news discourse, and, more importantly to explore how Sputnik’s discourse is shaped in accordance with them to help Kremlin to achieve its political goals by influencing international audiences’ opinion.
The main objectives are to understand the role and functions of Sputnik in Russian
information warfare, to identify contemporary Russian narratives in Sputnik’s news discourse, to describe strategies techniques and instruments, used by Sputnik to spread Russian narratives and influence international audiences, as well as analyze dynamics of Sputnik’s news discourse in the context of the concrete events and Kremlin’s policy.
To achieve these objects literature analysis, institutional networking analysis of Sputnik,
discourse analysis and qualitative content analysis of Sputnik’s were conducted, as well as two case studies were presented.
In the course of the research the better understanding of modern Russian information
warfare was acquired, Russian narratives were identified, techniques and instruments used by Sputnik were described.
Results of the research showed that Sputnik’s discourse is constructed in line with official
Kremlin’s position, and aimed to fulfill its political goals. Sputnik’s example showed that Russian media not only able to dramatically change public opinion in the way, beneficial for Kremlin, in the short periods of time, but also have a direct influence on international events. It was concluded that offensive strategy is more efficient in information warfare than defensive one, and some recommendations were formulated.
Fortress Russia:
Political, Economic, and Security Development
in Russia Following the Annexation of Crimea
and its Consequences for the Baltic States
Editor: Andis Kudors
The Centre for East European Policy Studies
University of Latvia Press
Rīga, 2016
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/baltikum/14114.pdf
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Andis Kudors
Introduction 5
Part I: Ideology
Dmitry Oreshkin
Putin’s Third Term Ideology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
Ainars Lerhis
Back to the USSR: A Selective Approach to Russian History 29
Part II: Politics
Simonas Algirdas Spurga and Nerijus Maliukevičius
Russian Media Politics Before and After the Annexation of Crimea . . . .49
Andis Kudors
Near the Fortress: Ukraine’s Echo in Political Relations between Russia
and the Baltic States 71
Sergey Utkin
The Eastern Vector in Russian Foreign Policy: Complimentary or
an Alternative to Europe? 91
Part III: Economics
Roman Dobrokhotov
The Economic Situation in Russia after the Annexation of Crimea and
its Influence on Russian Policy 111
Liudas Zdanavičius
Economic Development in Russia after 2014 and its Consequences
for the Baltic States 129
Part IV: Security
Aleksandr Golts
Russian Military Reform and its Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .151
Riina Kaljurand
The Annexation of Crimea and its Implications for the Baltic States’
Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .169
Andis Kudors
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .189
Notes on Authors 192
Anton Chernetskyi
Final Master Thesis
Journalism and Media Industries Study Program, state code 621P50002
Degree in Journalism
https://www.vdu.lt/cris/bitstream/20.500.12259/35074/1/anton_chernetskyi_md.pdf
VYTAUTAS MAGNUS UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND DIPLOMACY
PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT
CONTENTS
SUMMARY.....................................................................................2
SANTRAUKA.................................................................... 3
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 4
1. INFORMATION WARFARE AS THE MAJOR INSTRUMENT OF RUSSIA’S
MODERN HYRBID WARFARE .................................................................................................... 9
1.1. Understanding of Modern Russian Information Warfare in the era of Information
Society ............................................................................................................................................. 9
1.2. News as ideological discourse........................................................................................... 16
2. THE ROLE OF SPUTNIK IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN INFORMATION
WARFARE ...................................................................................................................................... 24
2.1. Sputnik as a political institution of Russian public diplomacy......................................... 24
2.2. Strategies and technologies of Sputnik ............................................................................... 31
3. SPUTNIK’S NEWS DISCOURSE AS DISCOURSE OF RUSSIAN INFORMATION
WARFARE ...................................................................................................................................... 40
3.1. Case study: Sputnik’s coverage of the Dutch referendum on EU-Ukraine Association
agreement ..................................................................................................................................... 40
3.2. Case study: Sputnik’s anti-Turkish information campaign after Turkey's downing of
Russian Su-24 warplane .............................................................................................................. 49
CONCLUSIONS.............................................................................................................................. 62
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................ 65
Literature...................................................................................................................................... 65
Sources.......................................................................................................................................... 69
2
SUMMARY
Pursuing its political aims, Russia develops more and more sophisticated power to
manipulate mass consciousness, introducing new techniques, which should be researched both quantitatively and qualitatively. In the recent years after annexation of Crimea in 2014 and escalation of the armed conflict in the Eastern Ukraine, it has been the main scientific problem of many contemporary researches. Since new technologies of information warfare are introduced by Russia constantly, and information continues, providing researchers with new material to be analyzed, the problem not only remains relevant but also requires some regular update.
Sputnik is one of the main tools, used by Russia in its information warfare. Launched less
than three years ago, it has been actively spreading disinformation and Russian narratives all over
the world.
This research on a topic ‘News Discourse of Russian Information Warfere: the Case of
‘Sputnik’ is aimed to provide new data on some major narratives in Russian news discourse, and, more importantly to explore how Sputnik’s discourse is shaped in accordance with them to help Kremlin to achieve its political goals by influencing international audiences’ opinion.
The main objectives are to understand the role and functions of Sputnik in Russian
information warfare, to identify contemporary Russian narratives in Sputnik’s news discourse, to describe strategies techniques and instruments, used by Sputnik to spread Russian narratives and influence international audiences, as well as analyze dynamics of Sputnik’s news discourse in the context of the concrete events and Kremlin’s policy.
To achieve these objects literature analysis, institutional networking analysis of Sputnik,
discourse analysis and qualitative content analysis of Sputnik’s were conducted, as well as two case studies were presented.
In the course of the research the better understanding of modern Russian information
warfare was acquired, Russian narratives were identified, techniques and instruments used by Sputnik were described.
Results of the research showed that Sputnik’s discourse is constructed in line with official
Kremlin’s position, and aimed to fulfill its political goals. Sputnik’s example showed that Russian media not only able to dramatically change public opinion in the way, beneficial for Kremlin, in the short periods of time, but also have a direct influence on international events. It was concluded that offensive strategy is more efficient in information warfare than defensive one, and some recommendations were formulated.
Fortress Russia:
Political, Economic, and Security Development
in Russia Following the Annexation of Crimea
and its Consequences for the Baltic States
Editor: Andis Kudors
The Centre for East European Policy Studies
University of Latvia Press
Rīga, 2016
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/baltikum/14114.pdf
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Andis Kudors
Introduction 5
Part I: Ideology
Dmitry Oreshkin
Putin’s Third Term Ideology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
Ainars Lerhis
Back to the USSR: A Selective Approach to Russian History 29
Part II: Politics
Simonas Algirdas Spurga and Nerijus Maliukevičius
Russian Media Politics Before and After the Annexation of Crimea . . . .49
Andis Kudors
Near the Fortress: Ukraine’s Echo in Political Relations between Russia
and the Baltic States 71
Sergey Utkin
The Eastern Vector in Russian Foreign Policy: Complimentary or
an Alternative to Europe? 91
Part III: Economics
Roman Dobrokhotov
The Economic Situation in Russia after the Annexation of Crimea and
its Influence on Russian Policy 111
Liudas Zdanavičius
Economic Development in Russia after 2014 and its Consequences
for the Baltic States 129
Part IV: Security
Aleksandr Golts
Russian Military Reform and its Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .151
Riina Kaljurand
The Annexation of Crimea and its Implications for the Baltic States’
Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .169
Andis Kudors
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .189
Notes on Authors 192
Friday, August 14, 2020
WW3.0
Turkey aimed the S-400 missile system against F-16s, and this angered Washington
By Boyko Nikolov On Aug 14, 2020
WASHINGTON, (BM) – American congressmen went into a rage over Turkey’s trials involving the Russian-made S-400 Triumph air defense system and American F-16 fighters, learned BulgarianMilitary.com citing RD.
Read more: Turkey promises allies to protect secrets of S-400 defense system and F-35 fighter
Turkey’s decision to conduct training exercises using the S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems and American-made F-16 fighters purchased from Russia caused a sharp reaction in the US Congress
This is reported by Defense News, citing its own sources. According to the newspaper, the American parliamentarians regarded this step of Ankara as a public “targeting” of the air defense system at the combat aircraft and announced a “threat” to other countries, which are armed with the aforementioned fighters.
Congressmen called these tests “provocation” and noted that the maneuvers took place the day after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to the White House.
The material also says that Ankara’s acquisition of Russian air defense systems caused the suspension of work on the modernization of F-16 fighters and jeopardized a deal between Turkey and Pakistan worth about $1.5 billion.
The agreement provided for the supply of 30 Turkish-made T129 attack helicopters to Islamabad with CTS800 engines manufactured under an American license. Recall that Turkey commented on the threats of the American authorities to impose sanctions for the purchase of the S-400, expressing the hope that Washington will act to strengthen the partnership, and not pursue a policy of restrictive measures against NATO allies.
Read more: Top 5 best anti-aircraft missile systems in the World
Earlier in Ankara it was reported that the United States had asked Turkey not to commission the S-400 complexes purchased from the Russian Federation.
Sources say Ankara has tested missile systems against stealth aircraft
In July this year media the Evening Courier and Fighter Jets World magazines said that Turkey has tested the delivered Russian S-400 Triumph on fifth-generation American fighters.
According the sources the test results did not disclosed, but judging by the lack of complaints, it can be assumed that the country is completely satisfied with the complexes.
We are talking about the Russian S-400 air defense systems deployed at the Myurt airbase. Triumphs were tested at least three times on American stealth. AviaPro news agency indicates that not only F-35 aircraft, but also more classified F-22s appeared in the detection range of systems.
Fifth generation fighters were sent to rotation in the Middle East through the Black Sea and directly Turkey. Their route ran approximately 170-200 kilometers from the Turkish Air Force Airbase Myurt. Therefore, the Turkish side had a great opportunity to test the complexes for aerodynamic purposes.
“The Russian Federation supplied Turkey with two batteries of the S-400 system from July to September. S-400s are currently based at Myrted Air Base, located near the Turkish capital. Tests are scheduled to continue until the end of the year” Fighter Jets World magazine informed.
Read more: Russia and Turkey will start joint production of S-400 defense system and transfer of technologies
The Turkish department reported that Russian systems are being deployed and tested. It is likely that they are already ready for combat duty.
Using both the S-400 and the F-35 can reveal military secrets
If Turkey acquired the S-400 alongside the F-35, the technology that makes that aircraft lethal could potentially be compromised.
NATO states use a tactical data link that allows military aircraft and even ships and ground troops to share their tactical pictures in near-real time. This is called Link 16. NATO aircraft also use Identification Friend or Foe systems, known as IFF, to identify friendly aircraft in the sky.
An IFF and Link 16 interrogator would have to be integrated into the S-400 system to allow the Turkish F-35, with the transponder, to fly within lethal range of the S-400.
This opens up all Link 16 and IFF tactical data link equipment to be compromised, a former radar and weapons expert said on background.
“With the F-35 flying in close proximity to the S-400 system, over time, you could collect sensitive stealth characteristics of this F-35 and learn its detailed stealth capabilities,” the experts said.
It looks like Turkey will want to buy more Russian S-400 missile systems
As we reported on June 2 the negotiations between Russia and Turkey on the delivery of the second set of S-400 Triumph anti-aircraft systems are in an advanced stage.
Read more: USA to Turkey: Because of the Russian S-400 Your Deliveries Associated with F-35 Have Been Suspended
“Negotiations are underway, this is a laborious process that requires a certain amount of time. But given the current restrictions in connection with the pandemic, it is not very grateful to predict the terms of concluding this contract,” the head of the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSMTC) Dmitry Shugaev said then.
Shugaev noted that at the moment the parties are awaiting the final decision of Turkey.
***
Follow us everywhere and at any time. BulgarianMilitary.com
Turkey aimed the S-400 missile system against F-16s, and this angered Washington
By Boyko Nikolov On Aug 14, 2020
WASHINGTON, (BM) – American congressmen went into a rage over Turkey’s trials involving the Russian-made S-400 Triumph air defense system and American F-16 fighters, learned BulgarianMilitary.com citing RD.
Read more: Turkey promises allies to protect secrets of S-400 defense system and F-35 fighter
Turkey’s decision to conduct training exercises using the S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems and American-made F-16 fighters purchased from Russia caused a sharp reaction in the US Congress
This is reported by Defense News, citing its own sources. According to the newspaper, the American parliamentarians regarded this step of Ankara as a public “targeting” of the air defense system at the combat aircraft and announced a “threat” to other countries, which are armed with the aforementioned fighters.
Congressmen called these tests “provocation” and noted that the maneuvers took place the day after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to the White House.
The material also says that Ankara’s acquisition of Russian air defense systems caused the suspension of work on the modernization of F-16 fighters and jeopardized a deal between Turkey and Pakistan worth about $1.5 billion.
The agreement provided for the supply of 30 Turkish-made T129 attack helicopters to Islamabad with CTS800 engines manufactured under an American license. Recall that Turkey commented on the threats of the American authorities to impose sanctions for the purchase of the S-400, expressing the hope that Washington will act to strengthen the partnership, and not pursue a policy of restrictive measures against NATO allies.
Read more: Top 5 best anti-aircraft missile systems in the World
Earlier in Ankara it was reported that the United States had asked Turkey not to commission the S-400 complexes purchased from the Russian Federation.
Sources say Ankara has tested missile systems against stealth aircraft
In July this year media the Evening Courier and Fighter Jets World magazines said that Turkey has tested the delivered Russian S-400 Triumph on fifth-generation American fighters.
According the sources the test results did not disclosed, but judging by the lack of complaints, it can be assumed that the country is completely satisfied with the complexes.
We are talking about the Russian S-400 air defense systems deployed at the Myurt airbase. Triumphs were tested at least three times on American stealth. AviaPro news agency indicates that not only F-35 aircraft, but also more classified F-22s appeared in the detection range of systems.
Fifth generation fighters were sent to rotation in the Middle East through the Black Sea and directly Turkey. Their route ran approximately 170-200 kilometers from the Turkish Air Force Airbase Myurt. Therefore, the Turkish side had a great opportunity to test the complexes for aerodynamic purposes.
“The Russian Federation supplied Turkey with two batteries of the S-400 system from July to September. S-400s are currently based at Myrted Air Base, located near the Turkish capital. Tests are scheduled to continue until the end of the year” Fighter Jets World magazine informed.
Read more: Russia and Turkey will start joint production of S-400 defense system and transfer of technologies
The Turkish department reported that Russian systems are being deployed and tested. It is likely that they are already ready for combat duty.
Using both the S-400 and the F-35 can reveal military secrets
If Turkey acquired the S-400 alongside the F-35, the technology that makes that aircraft lethal could potentially be compromised.
NATO states use a tactical data link that allows military aircraft and even ships and ground troops to share their tactical pictures in near-real time. This is called Link 16. NATO aircraft also use Identification Friend or Foe systems, known as IFF, to identify friendly aircraft in the sky.
An IFF and Link 16 interrogator would have to be integrated into the S-400 system to allow the Turkish F-35, with the transponder, to fly within lethal range of the S-400.
This opens up all Link 16 and IFF tactical data link equipment to be compromised, a former radar and weapons expert said on background.
“With the F-35 flying in close proximity to the S-400 system, over time, you could collect sensitive stealth characteristics of this F-35 and learn its detailed stealth capabilities,” the experts said.
It looks like Turkey will want to buy more Russian S-400 missile systems
As we reported on June 2 the negotiations between Russia and Turkey on the delivery of the second set of S-400 Triumph anti-aircraft systems are in an advanced stage.
Read more: USA to Turkey: Because of the Russian S-400 Your Deliveries Associated with F-35 Have Been Suspended
“Negotiations are underway, this is a laborious process that requires a certain amount of time. But given the current restrictions in connection with the pandemic, it is not very grateful to predict the terms of concluding this contract,” the head of the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSMTC) Dmitry Shugaev said then.
Shugaev noted that at the moment the parties are awaiting the final decision of Turkey.
***
Follow us everywhere and at any time. BulgarianMilitary.com
SÕJATEADLANE
Estonian Journal of Military Studies
VOLUME VI:
THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
CULTURAL, PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES SERIES
SERIES EDITORS:
ANDRES SAUMETS AND VLADIMIR SAZONOV
EDITED BY
VLADIMIR SAZONOV, ANDRES SAUMETS AND HOLGER MÖLDER
https://www.kvak.ee/files/2016/12/sojateadlane_2_www.pdf
INTRODUCTION: THE ROLE OF RUSSIAN INFORMATION
WARFARE ............................................................................................ 7
Vladimir Sazonov, Holger Mölder, Andres Saumets
PECULIARITIES OF RUSSIAN INFORMATION
OPERATIONS ...................................................................................... 13
Uku Arold
IDENTITY AND PROPAGANDA IN RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN
HYBRID WARFARE ........................................................................... 42
Sergii Pakhomenko, Catherine Tryma
AN ATTEMPT TO IDENTIFY HYBRID CONFLICT ..................... 54
Adam Wetoszka
RUSSIAN INFORMATION WAR AGAINST UKRAINIAN ARMED
FORCES IN 2014–2015: THE UKRAINIAN POINT OF VIEW ..... 66
Vladimir Sazonov, Igor Kopõtin
THE WAR OF NARRATIVES – PUTIN’S CHALLENGE TO
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY GOVERNANCE IN UKRAINE .. 88
Holger Mölder
THE EUROPEANIZATION OF FOREIGN POLICY IN
THE FACE OF THE RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION WAR ........... 114
Maili Vilson
KREMLIN PROPAGANDA: SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES
BY OTHER MEANS ............................................................................ 141
Yevhen Fedchenko
PERCEPTION OF THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS WITHIN
LATVIAN SOCIETY ........................................................................... 171
Ieva Bērziņa
6 SISUKORD
THE MOSCOW PATRIARCHATE AND THE CONFLICT
IN UKRAINE ....................................................................................... 206
Ain Riistan
WHAT IS MEMETIC WARFARE AND HOW DOES
IT THREATEN DEMOCRATIC VALUES? ...................................... 232
Dmytro Zolotukhin
BOOK REVIEW ................................................................................... 240
Vladimir Sazonov
CONTRIBUTORS ................................................................................ 242
Estonian Journal of Military Studies
VOLUME VI:
THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
CULTURAL, PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES SERIES
SERIES EDITORS:
ANDRES SAUMETS AND VLADIMIR SAZONOV
EDITED BY
VLADIMIR SAZONOV, ANDRES SAUMETS AND HOLGER MÖLDER
https://www.kvak.ee/files/2016/12/sojateadlane_2_www.pdf
INTRODUCTION: THE ROLE OF RUSSIAN INFORMATION
WARFARE ............................................................................................ 7
Vladimir Sazonov, Holger Mölder, Andres Saumets
PECULIARITIES OF RUSSIAN INFORMATION
OPERATIONS ...................................................................................... 13
Uku Arold
IDENTITY AND PROPAGANDA IN RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN
HYBRID WARFARE ........................................................................... 42
Sergii Pakhomenko, Catherine Tryma
AN ATTEMPT TO IDENTIFY HYBRID CONFLICT ..................... 54
Adam Wetoszka
RUSSIAN INFORMATION WAR AGAINST UKRAINIAN ARMED
FORCES IN 2014–2015: THE UKRAINIAN POINT OF VIEW ..... 66
Vladimir Sazonov, Igor Kopõtin
THE WAR OF NARRATIVES – PUTIN’S CHALLENGE TO
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY GOVERNANCE IN UKRAINE .. 88
Holger Mölder
THE EUROPEANIZATION OF FOREIGN POLICY IN
THE FACE OF THE RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION WAR ........... 114
Maili Vilson
KREMLIN PROPAGANDA: SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES
BY OTHER MEANS ............................................................................ 141
Yevhen Fedchenko
PERCEPTION OF THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS WITHIN
LATVIAN SOCIETY ........................................................................... 171
Ieva Bērziņa
6 SISUKORD
THE MOSCOW PATRIARCHATE AND THE CONFLICT
IN UKRAINE ....................................................................................... 206
Ain Riistan
WHAT IS MEMETIC WARFARE AND HOW DOES
IT THREATEN DEMOCRATIC VALUES? ...................................... 232
Dmytro Zolotukhin
BOOK REVIEW ................................................................................... 240
Vladimir Sazonov
CONTRIBUTORS ................................................................................ 242
The Great Energy DebateIs Nuclear Power the Solution to Climate Change?
Paul Dorfman and Staffan Qvist both want to save the climate.
Paul Dorfman and Staffan Qvist both want to save the climate.
But one of them wants to rid the world of nuclear reactors while the other wants to build more of them.
We brought them together for a debate.
Interview Conducted by Philip Bethge und Rafaela von Bredow
14.08.2020, DER SPIEGEL
Dorfman, left, is opposed to nuclear. Qvist, right, is for it. Foto:
Horst Friedrichs / DER SPIEGEL
Dorfman, 64, of University College London, is founder and chair of the Nuclear Consulting Group, a collection of experts and activists working on nuclear energy and radiation medicine, nuclear proliferation and the sustainability of energy systems.
Qvist, 34, completed his Ph.D. in nuclear engineering at the University of California at Berkeley and has since been conducting research in the U.S. and Sweden on the safety and economics of nuclear power. He currently runs an energy consultancy firm in Great Britain. He is the author of the book "A Bright Future: How Some Countries Have Solved Climate Change and the Rest Can Follow” together with the economist Joshua Goldstein.
DER SPIEGEL: Mr. Qvist, do lobbyists view the climate crisis as an opportunity to reframe dangerous nuclear energy as a technology that could save us?
Qvist: Well, I would take objection to the framing of that question, because it suspects anyone who finds arguments in favor of nuclear power of being a lobbyist - and devalues his arguments. And there are good, factual arguments, such as nuclear power being an energy source which does not produce any greenhouse gas emissions during operation. Which has additional benefits of not being dependent on the weather. The fact that it is climate friendly is indisputably one of the main reasons we should look at nuclear power as a part of the energy system.
DER SPIEGEL 34/2020
The article you are reading originally appeared in German in issue 34/2020 (August 14, 2020) of DER SPIEGEL.
DER SPIEGEL: How do you see it, Mr. Dorfman?
Dorfman: Why should anyone build a nuclear power plant? Renewables are much cheaper. The climate crisis is going to hit us hard and quicker than we planned for - but this actually speaks against nuclear power.
DER SPIEGEL: Why?
Dorfman: Climate change poses a number of unique challenges to humanity. One of the most difficult is that we have to be carbon neutral as soon as the middle of the century. Now, the unfortunate reality is that you could not build enough reactors fast enough even to replace the existing reactors that will reach the end of their lifetime before 2050.
DER SPIEGEL: So Germany made the right decision to phase out nuclear energy?
Dorfman: Absolutely. There is still no final repository for nuclear waste and economically viable operation is impossible. Many safety questions are unresolved. Even utilities in Germany are clear and blunt: They say they would not even consider getting back into nuclear. The only political party that is against the shutdown is the partly extreme-right-wing AfD, and AfD also denies climate change.
Qvist: I do not know German politics, but just because the wrong people agree with you doesn't mean the cause is wrong. To me, the German phase-out is a terrible decision, one of the worst decisions for the environment and the climate that anyone has ever made. One study shows that the phase-out led to the death of more than 1000 people every year – not even accounting for the millions of tons of CO2 that have been released. And the phase-out isn't even done yet!
DER SPIEGEL: Let us explain this briefly: You're referring to the fact that because of the nuclear phase-out, we're burning more coal. And many people are being killed by coal smoke and its pollutants - sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, mercury, arsenic?
Qvist: Exactly.
A mothballed reactor in Stade: "One of the worst decisions for the environment and the climate that anyone has ever made." Foto: Robert Grahn / euroluftbild.de / picture alliance / dpa
DER SPIEGEL: The phase-out led to massive investments in clean energy, including wind and solar, which wouldn’t have happened without that decision.
Qvist: True, Germany has done fantastic things for the climate, being an early investor that plunged a lot of money into wind and solar. Germany should be lauded for doing that, as well as for developing a lot of technologies that we need for the low-carbon future. This decision, however, to prematurely shut down nuclear power plants really is a blotch on the scorecard.
DER SPIEGEL: How so?
Qvist: By 2025, Germany will have spent more than 500 billion euros ($591 billion) on its energy transition. The result has been climbing prices for electricity, CO2 emissions have hardly dropped at all and Germany’s energy mix remains climate unfriendly. In 2022, when the last reactors will be decommissioned, problems will become even worse. At Germany’s rate of adding clean energy, it would take the world more than a century to decarbonize. And the existing nuclear plants in Germany are not even uneconomical. They're wonderfully operating plants. Some of them.
Dorfman: Hang on, let’s talk about the ageing nuclear plant issue here…
Qvist: …some of the plants that will be shut down, like Emsland and Grohnde, are probably the best operated power plants of any kind that have ever been run on planet Earth. Shutting them down is an affront to good engineering, to climate, to people, to the environment, to humanity!
Dorfman: The opposite is true. Ageing nuclear plants pose a very real risk of serious accidents. They have little or no defense against terrorist attack, aircraft crashes and climate-change impact such as sea level rise, which weren't thought about when these reactors were designed.
DER SPIEGEL: Still, we have to decarbonize the energy system as soon as possible to prevent catastrophic consequences. How do we get there?
Qvist: The popular answer is renewables, but wind and solar alone at a reasonable system cost is a fantasy. They are becoming cheaper, but they are not available around the clock, and batteries that could power entire cities for days or weeks show no sign of materializing any time soon. But we actually have proven models for rapid decarbonization: France and my home country of Sweden decarbonized their grids decades ago - and Germany emits almost eight times as much carbon dioxide per kilowatt hour as France and more than 40 times as much as Sweden. But above all: over 40 percent more than the EU average.
DER SPIEGEL: Mr. Dorfman, the CO2 footprint of people living in France or Sweden is indeed only half that of Germans. Why is theirs not a model for the world?
Dorfman: Because it is not a sustainable solution. The key about nuclear is the cost of the bill. Take France: The majority of the French fleet is in relatively serious trouble. They don’t have modern safety measures such as core catchers.
DER SPIEGEL: When they no longer meet the standards, they need to be retrofitted. Isn’t that enough?
Dorfman: But partial retrofitting can do little to change this. An almost complete rebuild would be needed just to get through compliance with today’s safety standards.
DER SPIEGEL: So France and Sweden will run into a really big problem in 20 years?
Dorfman: Yes. They will very, very soon. While France has committed itself to reducing the share of nuclear energy in electricity production to 50 percent by 2035, the estimated cost of the reactor fleet life extension in France is about 50 to 100 billion. And Sweden’s booming wind power is surpassing its capped nuclear fleet this year. We must not build new nuclear plants but shut down old plants as fast as possible.
Qvist: I disagree. The German and the French nuclear plants are producing cheap and stable electricity. The absolute fastest option for decarbonizing the energy sector is not to shut them down.
DER SPIEGEL: And do what instead?
Qvist: Use a combination of renewables and nuclear - the most cost-effective combinations you can find of all low-carbon sources. In the world today we have around 20 electricity grids that are zero-carbon year-round. More than half of those are very poor countries that have one or two big hydroelectric power plants and use very little electricity. That’s not a model anyone could follow. Then you have three or four countries with renewable systems that are based on geographical luck. Norway is a good example. They have ample hydro power. Or Iceland: They have both geothermal power in the ground and hydro power. Costa Rica is similar. But then you have four regions that are already across the finish line in terms of decarbonized power without completely relying on luck. Those four systems are Sweden, France, Switzerland and Ontario in Canada, all of them relying on a combination of renewables and nuclear.
Dorfman: The market seems to think otherwise. U.K. offshore wind projects are projected to produce electricity at 47 pounds per megawatt hour. The current projected electricity price for Hinkley Point C, a new nuclear plant being built in the UK, is 109 pounds per megawatt hour. The difference is just astonishing, isn’t it?
DER SPIEGEL: Other so-called Generation 3 plants are currently under construction, including Olkiluoto in Finland and Flamanville in France. Mr. Qvist, all of them are hugely expensive, years behind schedule, and without massive subsidies, they would not exist. Do they really make sense?
Qvist: Europe has not built any nuclear power plants for a very long time, it’s not very surprising that the first of their kind get expensive.
Dorfman: You can say that Olkiluoto was first of a kind, but this isn’t true for Flamanville, which is also years behind. If the French can't build to cost and time, then where can you build? Nuclear is now conclusively shown to be seriously more expensive than renewables.
DER SPIEGEL: Which figures are you thinking of?
Dorfman: The rating agency Standard & Poor’s reports that investment in renewables is at $350 billion per year. For nuclear, it fell to 17 billion last year. And this trend is likely to continue. The International Energy Agency reports an annual global growth of 35 percent in solar and 17 percent in wind energy. Nuclear growth is less than 1 percent! The only way that you're seeing new nuclear being built is with vast public subsidy, in China, in Russia, and amazingly, as a mad outlier, in the U.K. Nuclear plants cost so much; they take so long to build that they really cannot help us to slow down climate change. Renewables, on the other hand, get cheaper all the time.
Qvist: In every case where nuclear power was shut down, renewables have not filled the gap. Why is Germany not decarbonized, although it is going full-on with renewables? Its CO2 emissions intensity from electricity production is many times higher than that of France and Sweden, and its electricity costs to consumers are also vastly higher. You cannot find a better climate investment than maintaining and modernizing the existing European reactor fleet to keep it in operation.
DER SPIEGEL: Although 54 reactors are currently being built worldwide, the share of nuclear energy in electricity-generation is only ten percent and will continue to decline. If the nuclear renaissance you are praising was happening, why aren’t more countries expanding their capacities?
Qvist: The reasons are economics and fear. In recent decades, the United States and some European countries created ever more complicated reactors, with ever more safety features in response to public fears. This has driven up costs. China and South Korea can build reactors right now at one-sixth the current cost of what they are in the United States. In the longer term, dozens of start-ups are developing new reactors that can be mass-produced, potentially generating electricity at lower cost than fossil fuels. The key is standardization and repetition.
Dorfman: That’s a pipe dream, none of these innovations have worked so far. France’s sodium-cooled ASTRID-reactor for example has been cancelled.
Solar power plant in Nevada: "Renewables and energy efficiency reduce emissions more and faster." Foto: E+ / Getty Images
Interview Conducted by Philip Bethge und Rafaela von Bredow
14.08.2020, DER SPIEGEL
Dorfman, left, is opposed to nuclear. Qvist, right, is for it. Foto:
Horst Friedrichs / DER SPIEGEL
Dorfman, 64, of University College London, is founder and chair of the Nuclear Consulting Group, a collection of experts and activists working on nuclear energy and radiation medicine, nuclear proliferation and the sustainability of energy systems.
Qvist, 34, completed his Ph.D. in nuclear engineering at the University of California at Berkeley and has since been conducting research in the U.S. and Sweden on the safety and economics of nuclear power. He currently runs an energy consultancy firm in Great Britain. He is the author of the book "A Bright Future: How Some Countries Have Solved Climate Change and the Rest Can Follow” together with the economist Joshua Goldstein.
DER SPIEGEL: Mr. Qvist, do lobbyists view the climate crisis as an opportunity to reframe dangerous nuclear energy as a technology that could save us?
Qvist: Well, I would take objection to the framing of that question, because it suspects anyone who finds arguments in favor of nuclear power of being a lobbyist - and devalues his arguments. And there are good, factual arguments, such as nuclear power being an energy source which does not produce any greenhouse gas emissions during operation. Which has additional benefits of not being dependent on the weather. The fact that it is climate friendly is indisputably one of the main reasons we should look at nuclear power as a part of the energy system.
DER SPIEGEL 34/2020
The article you are reading originally appeared in German in issue 34/2020 (August 14, 2020) of DER SPIEGEL.
DER SPIEGEL: How do you see it, Mr. Dorfman?
Dorfman: Why should anyone build a nuclear power plant? Renewables are much cheaper. The climate crisis is going to hit us hard and quicker than we planned for - but this actually speaks against nuclear power.
DER SPIEGEL: Why?
Dorfman: Climate change poses a number of unique challenges to humanity. One of the most difficult is that we have to be carbon neutral as soon as the middle of the century. Now, the unfortunate reality is that you could not build enough reactors fast enough even to replace the existing reactors that will reach the end of their lifetime before 2050.
DER SPIEGEL: So Germany made the right decision to phase out nuclear energy?
Dorfman: Absolutely. There is still no final repository for nuclear waste and economically viable operation is impossible. Many safety questions are unresolved. Even utilities in Germany are clear and blunt: They say they would not even consider getting back into nuclear. The only political party that is against the shutdown is the partly extreme-right-wing AfD, and AfD also denies climate change.
Qvist: I do not know German politics, but just because the wrong people agree with you doesn't mean the cause is wrong. To me, the German phase-out is a terrible decision, one of the worst decisions for the environment and the climate that anyone has ever made. One study shows that the phase-out led to the death of more than 1000 people every year – not even accounting for the millions of tons of CO2 that have been released. And the phase-out isn't even done yet!
DER SPIEGEL: Let us explain this briefly: You're referring to the fact that because of the nuclear phase-out, we're burning more coal. And many people are being killed by coal smoke and its pollutants - sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, mercury, arsenic?
Qvist: Exactly.
A mothballed reactor in Stade: "One of the worst decisions for the environment and the climate that anyone has ever made." Foto: Robert Grahn / euroluftbild.de / picture alliance / dpa
DER SPIEGEL: The phase-out led to massive investments in clean energy, including wind and solar, which wouldn’t have happened without that decision.
Qvist: True, Germany has done fantastic things for the climate, being an early investor that plunged a lot of money into wind and solar. Germany should be lauded for doing that, as well as for developing a lot of technologies that we need for the low-carbon future. This decision, however, to prematurely shut down nuclear power plants really is a blotch on the scorecard.
DER SPIEGEL: How so?
Qvist: By 2025, Germany will have spent more than 500 billion euros ($591 billion) on its energy transition. The result has been climbing prices for electricity, CO2 emissions have hardly dropped at all and Germany’s energy mix remains climate unfriendly. In 2022, when the last reactors will be decommissioned, problems will become even worse. At Germany’s rate of adding clean energy, it would take the world more than a century to decarbonize. And the existing nuclear plants in Germany are not even uneconomical. They're wonderfully operating plants. Some of them.
Dorfman: Hang on, let’s talk about the ageing nuclear plant issue here…
Qvist: …some of the plants that will be shut down, like Emsland and Grohnde, are probably the best operated power plants of any kind that have ever been run on planet Earth. Shutting them down is an affront to good engineering, to climate, to people, to the environment, to humanity!
Dorfman: The opposite is true. Ageing nuclear plants pose a very real risk of serious accidents. They have little or no defense against terrorist attack, aircraft crashes and climate-change impact such as sea level rise, which weren't thought about when these reactors were designed.
DER SPIEGEL: Still, we have to decarbonize the energy system as soon as possible to prevent catastrophic consequences. How do we get there?
Qvist: The popular answer is renewables, but wind and solar alone at a reasonable system cost is a fantasy. They are becoming cheaper, but they are not available around the clock, and batteries that could power entire cities for days or weeks show no sign of materializing any time soon. But we actually have proven models for rapid decarbonization: France and my home country of Sweden decarbonized their grids decades ago - and Germany emits almost eight times as much carbon dioxide per kilowatt hour as France and more than 40 times as much as Sweden. But above all: over 40 percent more than the EU average.
DER SPIEGEL: Mr. Dorfman, the CO2 footprint of people living in France or Sweden is indeed only half that of Germans. Why is theirs not a model for the world?
Dorfman: Because it is not a sustainable solution. The key about nuclear is the cost of the bill. Take France: The majority of the French fleet is in relatively serious trouble. They don’t have modern safety measures such as core catchers.
DER SPIEGEL: When they no longer meet the standards, they need to be retrofitted. Isn’t that enough?
Dorfman: But partial retrofitting can do little to change this. An almost complete rebuild would be needed just to get through compliance with today’s safety standards.
DER SPIEGEL: So France and Sweden will run into a really big problem in 20 years?
Dorfman: Yes. They will very, very soon. While France has committed itself to reducing the share of nuclear energy in electricity production to 50 percent by 2035, the estimated cost of the reactor fleet life extension in France is about 50 to 100 billion. And Sweden’s booming wind power is surpassing its capped nuclear fleet this year. We must not build new nuclear plants but shut down old plants as fast as possible.
Qvist: I disagree. The German and the French nuclear plants are producing cheap and stable electricity. The absolute fastest option for decarbonizing the energy sector is not to shut them down.
DER SPIEGEL: And do what instead?
Qvist: Use a combination of renewables and nuclear - the most cost-effective combinations you can find of all low-carbon sources. In the world today we have around 20 electricity grids that are zero-carbon year-round. More than half of those are very poor countries that have one or two big hydroelectric power plants and use very little electricity. That’s not a model anyone could follow. Then you have three or four countries with renewable systems that are based on geographical luck. Norway is a good example. They have ample hydro power. Or Iceland: They have both geothermal power in the ground and hydro power. Costa Rica is similar. But then you have four regions that are already across the finish line in terms of decarbonized power without completely relying on luck. Those four systems are Sweden, France, Switzerland and Ontario in Canada, all of them relying on a combination of renewables and nuclear.
Dorfman: The market seems to think otherwise. U.K. offshore wind projects are projected to produce electricity at 47 pounds per megawatt hour. The current projected electricity price for Hinkley Point C, a new nuclear plant being built in the UK, is 109 pounds per megawatt hour. The difference is just astonishing, isn’t it?
DER SPIEGEL: Other so-called Generation 3 plants are currently under construction, including Olkiluoto in Finland and Flamanville in France. Mr. Qvist, all of them are hugely expensive, years behind schedule, and without massive subsidies, they would not exist. Do they really make sense?
Qvist: Europe has not built any nuclear power plants for a very long time, it’s not very surprising that the first of their kind get expensive.
Dorfman: You can say that Olkiluoto was first of a kind, but this isn’t true for Flamanville, which is also years behind. If the French can't build to cost and time, then where can you build? Nuclear is now conclusively shown to be seriously more expensive than renewables.
DER SPIEGEL: Which figures are you thinking of?
Dorfman: The rating agency Standard & Poor’s reports that investment in renewables is at $350 billion per year. For nuclear, it fell to 17 billion last year. And this trend is likely to continue. The International Energy Agency reports an annual global growth of 35 percent in solar and 17 percent in wind energy. Nuclear growth is less than 1 percent! The only way that you're seeing new nuclear being built is with vast public subsidy, in China, in Russia, and amazingly, as a mad outlier, in the U.K. Nuclear plants cost so much; they take so long to build that they really cannot help us to slow down climate change. Renewables, on the other hand, get cheaper all the time.
Qvist: In every case where nuclear power was shut down, renewables have not filled the gap. Why is Germany not decarbonized, although it is going full-on with renewables? Its CO2 emissions intensity from electricity production is many times higher than that of France and Sweden, and its electricity costs to consumers are also vastly higher. You cannot find a better climate investment than maintaining and modernizing the existing European reactor fleet to keep it in operation.
DER SPIEGEL: Although 54 reactors are currently being built worldwide, the share of nuclear energy in electricity-generation is only ten percent and will continue to decline. If the nuclear renaissance you are praising was happening, why aren’t more countries expanding their capacities?
Qvist: The reasons are economics and fear. In recent decades, the United States and some European countries created ever more complicated reactors, with ever more safety features in response to public fears. This has driven up costs. China and South Korea can build reactors right now at one-sixth the current cost of what they are in the United States. In the longer term, dozens of start-ups are developing new reactors that can be mass-produced, potentially generating electricity at lower cost than fossil fuels. The key is standardization and repetition.
Dorfman: That’s a pipe dream, none of these innovations have worked so far. France’s sodium-cooled ASTRID-reactor for example has been cancelled.
Solar power plant in Nevada: "Renewables and energy efficiency reduce emissions more and faster." Foto: E+ / Getty Images
AND KILL MORE BIRDS BY FRYING THEM ALIVE
Qvist: ASTRID is a failure, yes, but there are probably 30 new reactor designs being put forward right now, some of them with serious venture capital backing. You have, for example, the whole variety of so-called Small Modular Reactors, SMR.
DER SPIEGEL: They have nothing to do with the gigantic nuclear power plants of the past ...
Qvist: That's right, these are small conventional reactors that will be commercialized by the late 2020s. This is happening. NuScale, a U.S. company, is about to finalize its licensing process for its SMR and already has a customer. It would be insane to not give them a chance to see if they can deliver on their promises.
DER SPIEGEL: Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, excluded nuclear from EU’s new Green Deal...
Qvist: ...yes, and that is very, very damaging. Pressured by countries such as Germany, Luxembourg and Austria, the EU is torpedoing anything that could have a positive impact on nuclear.
Dorfman: For good reasons, to not harm the EU budget. Look, in the past, nuclear went bigger so that the costs would come down. It’s called economy of scale. Now, all of a sudden, you're saying that the economy of scale is not important and can be magically replaced by the economy of replication?
Qvist: Well, would you like to see those innovations succeed?
Dorfman: For me that’s not the point. There is just not the capacity to build sufficient nuclear plants to help us solve the climate crisis. Even if you're willing and able to overcome all the other unsolved problems - affordability, accidents, waste management, proliferation, and system inflexibility – we just do not have an unlimited amount of money.
DER SPIEGEL: The International Energy Agency has just acknowledged that the growth of renewable energies has slumped, as of late. Can the world still rely on them alone?
Dorfman: Look, we need to use the capital that we have for decarbonization in a way that gets the best emissions reduction for every euro spent in the shortest time. Nuclear is not competitive on both criteria. Renewables and energy efficiency reduce emissions more and faster. It's not a question of doing renewables and nuclear, it's a question of doing renewables or nuclear.
Qvist: Renewables and nuclear is a proven success story, renewables alone is not. Beyond decarbonizing today’s electric grid, we must replace fossil fuels in transportation, industry and heating. We must provide for the fast-growing energy needs of poorer countries and extend the grid to a billion people who now lack electricity. That’s just not possible without nuclear!
DER SPIEGEL: More than 80 percent of the world’s primary energy still stems from fossil sources. Wind and the sun provide less than 2 percent. Worldwide energy consumption 30 years from now is projected to be about 50 percent higher than it is today. How can we get there?
Dorfman: We need to create a green hydrogen economy with all its components, energy efficiency, storage and interconnectivity between electric grids. The last thing that you need in such a system is nuclear, because nuclear is either on, or it is off. It is very bad at what we call load following...
DER SPIEGEL: ... you’re talking about the process of flexibly starting them up and shutting them down when renewables fail.
Qvist: Obviously, wind and solar are wonderful. I am not here to be against anything. I’m for everything. But it is a fact that nuclear is the only scalable low-carbon heat source that we have. With that heat, we can provide district and industrial-process heating, and more effectively produce hydrogen. Things like that will make nuclear flexible for the grid while churning out 100 percent core power all the time.
Dorfman: Germany and other countries are eyeing new offshore wind farms dedicated to green hydrogen production. We don’t need nuclear to do this.
Qvist: But let's say you have a week of lull. You don't have much sun because its winter. You don’t have a lot of hydro. Where is your power coming from?
Dorfman: It’s a combination. We have to talk about hydrogen, interconnectors and load balancing. Even solar energy produced in the Sahara could be used to power parts of Europe. And we need storage…
Qvist: ... what kind of storage? If it's batteries, that’s just an unimaginable cost on a grid level. If it's hydrogen, you have to build electrolyzers and hydrogen storage. That’s what I mean when I talk about system costs. You have to pay for all these things.
DER SPIEGEL: Gas plants are very flexible. Why not use them in addition to renewables?
Qvist: This works, but it’s a fossil energy source that emits a lot of CO2 and pollutes the air.
DER SPIEGEL: The idea is to eventually replace the fossil gas by synthesized gas produced from hydrogen.
Qvist: Again, you would have to invest in all the infrastructure, and you need to include that in the costs. We don't have a hydrogen economy yet. And by the way, do you think it would be safer than nuclear? I am not so sure.
DER SPIEGEL: Are you kidding?
Qvist: Not at all. Statistically, nuclear power is the safest form of large-scale energy humanity has ever used. Mining accidents or gas explosions kill people, sometimes in large numbers, and smoke from coal-burning kills us, as I’ve mentioned before, in enormous numbers. By contrast, in about 60 years of nuclear power, only three accidents have raised public alarm, Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima, and even during these catastrophic events not many people have been killed directly through radiation. I mean, we have hydroelectric power, which is a wonderful zero-carbon electricity source. But it has got a far worse safety record than nuclear. Dams burst, thousands of people have died.
Dorfman: The problem with nuclear is that, if and when it does go wrong, things go really, really go wrong. I'm an advisor to the Irish government on radiation risk. We commissioned a study that stated clearly that if there was severe contamination from a nuclear accident, it would largely bankrupt Ireland because of impacts on agriculture. So, reducing risk to body counts is really problematic.
DER SPIEGEL: But don’t we have to balance this risk against the existential risk of climate change?
Dorfman und Qvist with DER SPIEGEL reporters Philip Bethge (left) and Rafaela von Bredow (right) at University College London: "This is fear-mongering." Foto: Horst Friedrichs / DER SPIEGEL
Dorfman: The problem is that we all make different assumptions and come to different conclusions. Let’s stick to what we know, and that is that radiation is dangerous to human health. An influential study in Germany, the KiKK study, showed that clusters of leukemia cases in little children and infants were more likely to be found near nuclear plants…
Qvist: ... this study has been debunked because it did not fully assess factors other than radiation. There is just no correlation between radiation and leukemia close to nuclear plants.
Dorfman: Every radiation-protection organization in the world will tell you that there is no safe dose of radiation. And when you talk about a nuclear accident, you're not simply talking about cancers such as leukemias. You are talking about a whole raft of other things that happen way down the line, including probably genomic instability in generations to come. The complexity of the debate is mind-boggling. Why would you want to invest money in a such a highly dangerous technology? And I haven’t even started with the risks of nuclear waste.
Qvist: Civilian nuclear waste has never harmed anyone. We have stored it for 60 years in more than 30 countries and nothing happened. Highly radioactive nuclear waste is a tiny component in the vast mass of hazardous materials that we as a society produce, including toxic arsenic, mercury and lead, which last forever. And in the future, we will be able to burn nuclear waste as fuel in new types of reactors.
Dorfman: It's not that simple. We have high-level radioactive waste, intermediate and low-level waste. There is the idea that we can dig a deep hole and get rid of it. However, new research shows that the materials that the U.S. and other countries plan to use to store high-level nuclear waste will likely degrade faster than anyone previously knew.
Qvist: This is fear-mongering, I am sorry. How many people have died from civilian nuclear waste? None. It’s a solved problem. The Finnish nuclear regulatory agency has approved the plans for a repository near Olkiluoto. It is being built and will be ready soon…
Dorfman: … will it work? That’s still open to debate. We will only know in about a thousand years.
DER SPIEGEL: Mr. Dorfman, you are 64 years old, Mr. Qvist, you are 34. Do you think that our discussion is an intergenerational dispute?
Qvist: I believe so. In Sweden, for instance, you see the young generation being increasingly pro nuclear because they see it as an efficient measure against climate change. We see that once misconceptions are being fought by facts, opinions can change rapidly. In polls, only 11 percent have an anti-nuclear stance.
Dorfman: If you were to ask that question in Germany, you may well receive a very different answer. I don’t believe that it is a generational issue. Everybody's worried about climate change. The key is how we can respond to it. And therein lies the discussion.
Qvist: Just for kicks, I might agree with you.
DER SPIEGEL: Mr. Qvist, Mr. Dorfman thank you very much for this interview.
Qvist: ASTRID is a failure, yes, but there are probably 30 new reactor designs being put forward right now, some of them with serious venture capital backing. You have, for example, the whole variety of so-called Small Modular Reactors, SMR.
DER SPIEGEL: They have nothing to do with the gigantic nuclear power plants of the past ...
Qvist: That's right, these are small conventional reactors that will be commercialized by the late 2020s. This is happening. NuScale, a U.S. company, is about to finalize its licensing process for its SMR and already has a customer. It would be insane to not give them a chance to see if they can deliver on their promises.
DER SPIEGEL: Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, excluded nuclear from EU’s new Green Deal...
Qvist: ...yes, and that is very, very damaging. Pressured by countries such as Germany, Luxembourg and Austria, the EU is torpedoing anything that could have a positive impact on nuclear.
Dorfman: For good reasons, to not harm the EU budget. Look, in the past, nuclear went bigger so that the costs would come down. It’s called economy of scale. Now, all of a sudden, you're saying that the economy of scale is not important and can be magically replaced by the economy of replication?
Qvist: Well, would you like to see those innovations succeed?
Dorfman: For me that’s not the point. There is just not the capacity to build sufficient nuclear plants to help us solve the climate crisis. Even if you're willing and able to overcome all the other unsolved problems - affordability, accidents, waste management, proliferation, and system inflexibility – we just do not have an unlimited amount of money.
DER SPIEGEL: The International Energy Agency has just acknowledged that the growth of renewable energies has slumped, as of late. Can the world still rely on them alone?
Dorfman: Look, we need to use the capital that we have for decarbonization in a way that gets the best emissions reduction for every euro spent in the shortest time. Nuclear is not competitive on both criteria. Renewables and energy efficiency reduce emissions more and faster. It's not a question of doing renewables and nuclear, it's a question of doing renewables or nuclear.
Qvist: Renewables and nuclear is a proven success story, renewables alone is not. Beyond decarbonizing today’s electric grid, we must replace fossil fuels in transportation, industry and heating. We must provide for the fast-growing energy needs of poorer countries and extend the grid to a billion people who now lack electricity. That’s just not possible without nuclear!
DER SPIEGEL: More than 80 percent of the world’s primary energy still stems from fossil sources. Wind and the sun provide less than 2 percent. Worldwide energy consumption 30 years from now is projected to be about 50 percent higher than it is today. How can we get there?
Dorfman: We need to create a green hydrogen economy with all its components, energy efficiency, storage and interconnectivity between electric grids. The last thing that you need in such a system is nuclear, because nuclear is either on, or it is off. It is very bad at what we call load following...
DER SPIEGEL: ... you’re talking about the process of flexibly starting them up and shutting them down when renewables fail.
Qvist: Obviously, wind and solar are wonderful. I am not here to be against anything. I’m for everything. But it is a fact that nuclear is the only scalable low-carbon heat source that we have. With that heat, we can provide district and industrial-process heating, and more effectively produce hydrogen. Things like that will make nuclear flexible for the grid while churning out 100 percent core power all the time.
Dorfman: Germany and other countries are eyeing new offshore wind farms dedicated to green hydrogen production. We don’t need nuclear to do this.
Qvist: But let's say you have a week of lull. You don't have much sun because its winter. You don’t have a lot of hydro. Where is your power coming from?
Dorfman: It’s a combination. We have to talk about hydrogen, interconnectors and load balancing. Even solar energy produced in the Sahara could be used to power parts of Europe. And we need storage…
Qvist: ... what kind of storage? If it's batteries, that’s just an unimaginable cost on a grid level. If it's hydrogen, you have to build electrolyzers and hydrogen storage. That’s what I mean when I talk about system costs. You have to pay for all these things.
DER SPIEGEL: Gas plants are very flexible. Why not use them in addition to renewables?
Qvist: This works, but it’s a fossil energy source that emits a lot of CO2 and pollutes the air.
DER SPIEGEL: The idea is to eventually replace the fossil gas by synthesized gas produced from hydrogen.
Qvist: Again, you would have to invest in all the infrastructure, and you need to include that in the costs. We don't have a hydrogen economy yet. And by the way, do you think it would be safer than nuclear? I am not so sure.
DER SPIEGEL: Are you kidding?
Qvist: Not at all. Statistically, nuclear power is the safest form of large-scale energy humanity has ever used. Mining accidents or gas explosions kill people, sometimes in large numbers, and smoke from coal-burning kills us, as I’ve mentioned before, in enormous numbers. By contrast, in about 60 years of nuclear power, only three accidents have raised public alarm, Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima, and even during these catastrophic events not many people have been killed directly through radiation. I mean, we have hydroelectric power, which is a wonderful zero-carbon electricity source. But it has got a far worse safety record than nuclear. Dams burst, thousands of people have died.
Dorfman: The problem with nuclear is that, if and when it does go wrong, things go really, really go wrong. I'm an advisor to the Irish government on radiation risk. We commissioned a study that stated clearly that if there was severe contamination from a nuclear accident, it would largely bankrupt Ireland because of impacts on agriculture. So, reducing risk to body counts is really problematic.
DER SPIEGEL: But don’t we have to balance this risk against the existential risk of climate change?
Dorfman und Qvist with DER SPIEGEL reporters Philip Bethge (left) and Rafaela von Bredow (right) at University College London: "This is fear-mongering." Foto: Horst Friedrichs / DER SPIEGEL
Dorfman: The problem is that we all make different assumptions and come to different conclusions. Let’s stick to what we know, and that is that radiation is dangerous to human health. An influential study in Germany, the KiKK study, showed that clusters of leukemia cases in little children and infants were more likely to be found near nuclear plants…
Qvist: ... this study has been debunked because it did not fully assess factors other than radiation. There is just no correlation between radiation and leukemia close to nuclear plants.
Dorfman: Every radiation-protection organization in the world will tell you that there is no safe dose of radiation. And when you talk about a nuclear accident, you're not simply talking about cancers such as leukemias. You are talking about a whole raft of other things that happen way down the line, including probably genomic instability in generations to come. The complexity of the debate is mind-boggling. Why would you want to invest money in a such a highly dangerous technology? And I haven’t even started with the risks of nuclear waste.
Qvist: Civilian nuclear waste has never harmed anyone. We have stored it for 60 years in more than 30 countries and nothing happened. Highly radioactive nuclear waste is a tiny component in the vast mass of hazardous materials that we as a society produce, including toxic arsenic, mercury and lead, which last forever. And in the future, we will be able to burn nuclear waste as fuel in new types of reactors.
Dorfman: It's not that simple. We have high-level radioactive waste, intermediate and low-level waste. There is the idea that we can dig a deep hole and get rid of it. However, new research shows that the materials that the U.S. and other countries plan to use to store high-level nuclear waste will likely degrade faster than anyone previously knew.
Qvist: This is fear-mongering, I am sorry. How many people have died from civilian nuclear waste? None. It’s a solved problem. The Finnish nuclear regulatory agency has approved the plans for a repository near Olkiluoto. It is being built and will be ready soon…
Dorfman: … will it work? That’s still open to debate. We will only know in about a thousand years.
DER SPIEGEL: Mr. Dorfman, you are 64 years old, Mr. Qvist, you are 34. Do you think that our discussion is an intergenerational dispute?
Qvist: I believe so. In Sweden, for instance, you see the young generation being increasingly pro nuclear because they see it as an efficient measure against climate change. We see that once misconceptions are being fought by facts, opinions can change rapidly. In polls, only 11 percent have an anti-nuclear stance.
Dorfman: If you were to ask that question in Germany, you may well receive a very different answer. I don’t believe that it is a generational issue. Everybody's worried about climate change. The key is how we can respond to it. And therein lies the discussion.
Qvist: Just for kicks, I might agree with you.
DER SPIEGEL: Mr. Qvist, Mr. Dorfman thank you very much for this interview.
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