Friday, May 31, 2024

Wild Resistance
Adorno's Asthetics 

Owen Hatherley

Without Model: Parva Aesthetica
by Theodor Adorno, translated by Wieland Hoban.
Seagull, 177 pp., £19.99, June 2023, 978 1 80309 218 8

Adorno​ is easily parodied. Photos on social media show him frog-like, myopic and bald, denouncing the willing consumption of dross, the personal embodiment of a refusal to ‘let people enjoy things’. Another meme features Reverend Lovejoy from The Simpsons derisively brandishing a copy of Minima Moralia: ‘You ever sat down and read this thing?’ (In the original, it’s the Bible the reverend is holding up to ridicule.) Others use an image of Adorno in a one-piece swimsuit at the beach, looking as if he’s quietly enjoying himself – a more winsome George Costanza. These memes are surely made by people who had to study Adorno at university. They will probably have read the depressive aphorisms of Minima Moralia and some fragments from Dialectic of Enlightenment on the ‘culture industry’; a few unfortunates will have had to tackle the thickets of Aesthetic Theory or Negative Dialectics. Along with the parodies come received ideas: Adorno the grouch, Adorno the scourge of mass media, Adorno the mandarin Marxist; or, as Ben Watson puts it in his counterweight, Adorno for Revolutionaries (2011), Adorno as ‘a kind of German T.S. Eliot without the practical cats’.

Adorno’s aesthetics are extreme. ‘He is an easy man to caricature,’ Watson writes, ‘because he believed in exaggeration as a means of telling the truth.’ But he was no misanthrope. A melancholic, certainly, but also a utopian socialist whose work is motivated above all by a horror of suffering – of the working classes, of European Jews, of animals – and an unending if faint hope that it could one day be ended. He is frequently, and rightly, upbraided for his wildly ignorant essays on jazz, but these are by no means all there is to know about his views on the culture industry. He was a defender of ‘high art’ or, as he preferred, of the avant-garde, with certain figures – Beckett, Kafka, Schoenberg – appearing again and again as touchstones, and he was cautionary in response to his friend Walter Benjamin’s views on the utopian potential to be found in cinema, radio and advertising. In a letter he wrote to Benjamin in August 1936, Adorno defines his own position as being where the extremes of art – the very lowest, the very highest – touch, but not where they meet in the middle. ‘Both bear the stigmata of capitalism, both contain elements of change,’ and ‘both are torn halves of an integral freedom, to which however they do not add up.’ The adversary was the work that stood in between, the tasteful, the middlebrow: Adorno would ‘naturally never and nowhere’ endorse ‘the middle term between Schoenberg and the American film’. The fact remains, though, that Adorno’s work includes thousands of pages on the ‘high’ part of that dipole, and very little on the ‘low’.

Without Model is Adorno at his most relaxed, a sequence of short, sometimes fragmentary texts on aesthetics – a ‘Parva Aesthetica’ – assembled by the author in late life and published in 1967, two years before he died. Much of it hasn’t appeared before in English, which is unusual for a writer whose work has, like Benjamin’s, been scoured for repackagable leftovers. Adorno took a lot of care over what he did and didn’t publish, in a manner which often reflected his desire to stay under the radar politically after he emigrated from Frankfurt in 1934, ending up in Los Angeles after stints in Oxford and New York. Unlike his comrades Ernst Bloch or Hanns Eisler, Adorno never considered the possibility of building a life in the ‘other’ Germany to the east. His decision in 1949, as McCarthyism was taking hold, to leave the US and restart the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research meant making an accommodation with a just as fervently anti-communist Federal Republic. He and Max Horkheimer had already censored themselves in Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944), using carefully coded terms for class struggle and capitalism; subsequently Adorno took his name off the (excellent) book he had written with Eisler on cinema music, Composing for the Films (1947). Eisler went on to write the DDR’s national anthem, while Adorno’s trenchant opposition to ‘committed’ or ‘engaged’ modern art dovetailed nicely with the trends of the time. Where American artists like Philip Guston or Jackson Pollock had once made murals that might decorate a new post office or public housing project, now they were painting abstracts that could appear in the lobby of an office block. Some recently excavated work – such as Towards a New Manifesto, an explicitly Marxist exchange of aphorisms with Horkheimer from 1956 – makes clearer the socialist politics Adorno preferred to obscure for reasons of comfort and self-preservation: it’s clear why they didn’t want it published.

Adorno never fully committed to the West in the Cold War – whereas Horkheimer supported the war in Vietnam on ‘yellow peril’ grounds – but he knew on which side his bread was buttered. He taught a generation of German Marxists in Frankfurt during the 1950s and 1960s, but his relationship with the left was scarred after he refused, unlike his close friend Herbert Marcuse, to support the German university protests of the late 1960s. On one occasion in January 1969, he called the police in to deal with students occupying his seminar room. A few months later, in a packed lecture hall, he was heckled by students demanding that he engage in ‘self-criticism’, and when three women students invaded the podium to stage a Busenaktion, baring their breasts and sprinkling petals over his head, he fled.

Adorno’s commitment to being without a ‘model’ – a Leitbild – is rooted in one of his most appealing dislikes, for the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. ‘In keeping with the still widespread ontological trend’, Adorno writes in his introduction, he could choose to ‘waffle something more or less veiled about eternal artistic values’, but prefers instead to stress the messy, the unfinished and the fragmentary. He yokes the language of Heidegger and the existentialists to the economy: ‘the word “values”, which has become fashionable since Nietzsche to refer to insubstantial norms that are divorced from humans’, was, he asserts, ‘not by chance taken from the sphere of objects par excellence, namely that of economic exchange’. Instead, the ‘small aesthetics’ in Without Model will defend ‘the zone that conformism seeks to proscribe as experimental’, which for Adorno, as ever, ‘is the last refuge of the possibility of aesthetic truth’.

Aside from two long pieces – one on the Baroque, one on ‘functionalist’ architecture – the essays and fragments here lack the intensity and difficulty of the two grand works he was writing at the time, Negative Dialectics (1966) and the never completed Aesthetic Theory (1970). Compared to the vast threshing machine of the latter, with its ten-page paragraphs and formidable bleakness, these pieces can appear, to use a term that Adorno would have held in contempt, almost ‘accessible’. There is a short retrospective essay on ‘The Culture Industry’, reprising arguments from Dialectic of Enlightenment. In it, Adorno takes specific issue with the notion that he was mounting a defence of ‘high culture’. Rather, capitalist mass media have created a version of ‘high art ... stripped of its seriousness by aiming for effect, while low art, having been tamed and civilised, loses the wildly resistant quality that inhabited it before society gained total control’. Some who don’t share Adorno’s prejudices about Black music have found value in his work when applied to free jazz or punk or jungle – kinds of music that have been nothing if not ‘wildly resistant’.

Once or twice, Adorno even makes an attempt at humour, as in ‘Non-Conciliatory Proposal’, in which he imagines the formation and actions of a union of German hotel painters (generally Adorno is funnier in moments of vituperation rather than jest). The piece may have been prompted by the amount of time Adorno, in his sixties, was spending on holiday. There are several travel sketches, which may have been attempts to emulate Benjamin’s shard-like essays on Naples, Moscow or Marseille, but are devoted instead to more conventional well-to-do holiday destinations – Tuscany, Switzerland, Paris, Vienna. They are wholly lacking in the visionary, transfiguring quality of Benjamin’s depictions of place. In snatches, they shine some light on the life of a writer deeply hostile to biography. Adorno’s mother, whose maiden name he took as his pen name (his father’s name was Wiesengrund), was a professional opera singer for the Habsburg court. The piece here on the Baroque Bavarian town of Amorbach records his memory of hearing euphemistic talk of a court gardener’s abuse of his daughter: ‘As a schoolboy, I thought the words “decent” and “chaste” meant something highly unseemly, probably because they were mostly used in the context of indecent acts.’ Otherwise, he is sad to find, after spending time in America, where every town looks the same, that in rural Germany every town looks the same too.

These pieces are as bourgeois as any example of travel writing from the time, and there is little in Adorno’s discussion of Lucca that a much lesser intellect wouldn’t have discovered on finding both poverty and grandeur in a small Italian city. He can’t understand why people should be emigrating from somewhere so beautiful for the wastes of North America or Argentina, ‘when the opposite should be the case’. One aphorism records ‘faces that look as if they were made for great, possibly tragic destinies, but which are probably simply rudiments left over from the times when there really was such a thing, assuming there ever actually was’.

Similarly, in ‘From Sils Maria’, written in 1957, Adorno wanders around the Engadin valley in Switzerland, gazes at the night sky in search of Sputnik, wobbling among the planets and stars, and makes such remarks as ‘when Piz da la Margna’ – one of the area’s most striking mountains – ‘wears her light shawl of mist, playful yet reserved, she is a lady who one can be sure would never travel to St Moritz to go shopping.’ He is unashamedly bourgeois in Paris too. ‘Scribbled at the Jeu de Paume’ is a sketch of what was then the most significant collection of Impressionist paintings, and of the Eiffel Tower, whose Babylonian grandeur from distance belies its appearance as a ‘grisly monster’ up close. He also writes divertingly on how, unlike their more doggedly ruralist German followers, the French Impressionists incorporated suburbia, railway bridges and artefacts of modernity into their pastoral scenes. These once jarringly contemporary features are by now visual artefacts of the ‘good old days’ which have been relocated to the late 19th century – something Adorno anticipates in describing the way the paintings of Monet or Pissarro ‘absorb’ the shocks of modernity. He pauses also to lament the fame of Toulouse-Lautrec as a product of the culture industry: ‘While everyone insists that commercial art can be great art too, its triumph over advertising benefits advertising.’ Eventually, with ‘Vienna, after Easter 1967’, all this fey drifting becomes infuriating, as he moans about the paving of paths in the Prater. The first line – ‘Viennese melancholy in 1967: the fact there is no more Viennese melancholy’ – made me giggle.

Adorno was opposed to biography by and large because he believed that a chronicle of the banal facts of a life made an artist’s work banal in turn. And it’s true that Adorno is seldom so boring as when he is telling you about his holidays. In these sketches he is quite honest about his own class position, and his sometimes conventional tastes when it came to culture outside his own fields of music and literature. In the ‘Vienna’ essay he freely confesses to a sympathy with the old Habsburg aristocracy, and aristocrats more generally – because intellectuals and aristocrats are both outside the system. ‘The way they live their lives,’ Adorno claims, ‘is not fully determined by the exchange principle.’ Adorno’s frenemies, such as Brecht or Eisler, would surely retort that this was a polite way of saying that both aristocrats and intellectuals are parasites.

‘On Tradition’ is more penetrating on the ways in which the culture of pre-industrial society survives in the ‘administered world’ and its culture industry. As Adorno would surely have been able to observe in his four years at Oxford in the mid-1930s, bourgeois society first destroys traditions, then displays their remnants as décor in order to create an illusory continuity. Accordingly, ‘as soon as they are worshipped by the cultural consciousness as relics, even genuinely traditional elements, major artworks of the past degenerate into components of an ideology that revels in the past so that nothing will change in the present.’ Much of this text restates Adorno’s anathemas on middlebrow culture, the very worst being art, architecture or music that tries to compromise between modernism and classicism. But also here is an aspect of Adorno’s thinking that is a near constant presence, though often missed: a sympathetic attention to what capitalist culture looks like to capitalism’s victims, for whom fake tradition becomes a form of consolation.


If someone suffers because of the omnipotence of the merely existent and yearns for what has never been, they may feel a greater affinity with a southern German market square than a reservoir dam, despite knowing how much the timber framework of the houses serves the conservation of stuffiness, the complement to mechanised ruin.

Against various kinds of futurism, he asserts that ‘forgetting is inhumane, because it means forgetting the accumulated suffering.’

This insight recurs in ‘Functionalism Today’, a lecture on modern architecture, which Adorno admits is not his specialism. Adorno’s aesthetics, especially after 1945, focused on a notion of ‘autonomous’ art, outside political commitment and outside the capitalist market, obeying its own rules, aggressive, dissonant, fragmentary, dedicated to speaking the unspeakable no matter how unpalatable it might be. This autonomy is invariably to some degree illusory – there is always a client, or sometimes, as in the Federal Republic, a government stipend – but in the case of architecture it is impossible, especially for public buildings and the urban reconstruction of the postwar era. For Adorno’s version of modernism, this presents a problem. ‘Because architecture is not exclusively autonomous, but at once purpose-bound, it cannot simply negate humans as they are, even though, being autonomous, it must do so.’ He admires Le Corbusier and, especially, Adolf Loos, but is made uncomfortable by the possibility that the astringency of their work might make people suffer when they don’t deserve to (unlike, for instance, concert or theatre audiences, who are fair game). In the manner of Dialectic of Enlightenment, he stresses that the ‘rationalism’ of modernist architecture can’t be wholly admirable in the service of a still basically irrational society. ‘To be sure, horror at technology is stuffy and reactionary, but that is not all it is. It is also a shudder at the violence that an irrational society inflicts on its forced members.’ It is because of this, rather than backwardness or degeneracy or cowardice, that people want to escape to fairy-tale castles; and Adorno faults Loos for apparently never having had this childhood dream.

It’s possible that Adorno didn’t realise he was kicking at an open door. By the 1960s, many architects had rejected the technocratic metaphors of the 1920s in favour of more expressive, personal forms of modernism. Designers like Giancarlo De Carlo or Oscar Niemeyer were making statements remarkably similar to Adorno’s on the ‘two irreconcilable motives’ of modernist design, which are ‘parsimony – for where, if not among the norms of profitability, is it written that nothing should be wasted? – and the dream of a technified world liberated from the ignominy of labour’. But Adorno remained too much a modernist actually to advocate for a return either to classicism or to the formal histrionics of Expressionist or Art Nouveau architecture. Such ‘subjective’ design results ‘not in architecture but in film sets’, albeit ‘sometimes even good ones’, such as Hans Poelzig’s sets for The Golem (1920). In Aesthetic Theory, Adorno praised the Berlin Philharmonie of Hans Scharoun, usually regarded as a late Expressionist building, because for him it was ‘truly’ functionalist, in that its total devotion to acoustics created a form that was organic and irregular, rather than based on an inappropriate analogy with industry.

He had​ a lot more to say about film, including some extremely harsh words for most Hollywood product, and harsher words still for the movies of postwar Germany. This level of attention has sometimes been reciprocated. One of the major figures of the first wave of New German Cinema, Alexander Kluge, was a devoted student of Adorno, and later German modernist filmmakers, from (the French-born) Jean-Marie Straub and Danièle Huillet to Harun Farocki, have also been committed Adornians. ‘Transparencies on Film’ is the best-known piece in Without Model, since a previous translation was included in the never-out-of-print anthology The Culture Industry (1991), a book which curated an especially monolithic mandarin Adorno. The essay ends with a parodically lofty dismissal of all commercial cinema of the era, as Adorno asserts that in the mid-1960s, ‘the standardised Westerns and crime stories’ – Sergio Leone? Sam Fuller? – ‘are even worse than the official top products. In an integral culture, one can no longer even rely on the dregs.’

But this is merely a deflated coda to an otherwise open-ended essay. It begins by praising the New German cinema of Kluge and Volker Schlöndorff, specifically for its rough, jagged, ‘unfinished’ look. The text serves almost as a programme for lo-fi cinema, ranged explicitly against the big bangs of montage cinema (Vertov, Eisenstein) that Benjamin had praised three decades earlier – ‘there is reason to doubt the durability of a procedure that aims for shock value.’ Adorno has some reservations about Schlöndorff’s film from 1966 of Musil’s Young Törless, but his complaints are about the verbal rather than the visual, rooted in the perfectly defensible argument that literary language tends to sound clunky on the screen. About the visuals Adorno is enthusiastic. ‘The features of the comparatively awkward, inept work unsure of its effect are marked by the hope that the so-called mass media might become something qualitatively different,’ where ‘a comfortingly uncontrolled chance element’ comes in: ‘the imperfections in the complexion of a pretty girl become a corrective of the established star’s flawless skin.’ In a similarly optimistic vein, he observes that the tawdry French romantic dramas and sex comedies of the era have had the unintended effect of making young people in Catholic countries much more willing to display affection publicly. Here the culture industry ‘contains the antidote to its own lie; this is all that need be pointed out to save it.’

Another rare example of Adorno’s often stated but seldom demonstrated sympathy with unadulterated ‘low’ culture comes in ‘Chaplin Times Two’, a salute to the actor-director that recalls some of the passages on clowns and clowning that enliven Aesthetic Theory. Adorno doesn’t praise Chaplin, as was common at the time, as someone who ‘elevated’ slapstick into ‘high art’. He politely passes over the later ‘serious’ films, the ones without the Tramp character, arguing that ‘interpretations’ of Chaplin are ‘all the more unfair to him the more they elevate him’. He finds an aggression in Chaplin’s work, and the manner in which he gently but ruthlessly mocks and emulates the gestures of others. The real Chaplin, Adorno argues, ‘is not a victim but rather seeks victims, pounces on them, tears them apart’; he is ‘a Bengal tiger as a vegetarian’. He ends his sketch with the spectacular flex of recalling the occasion when he himself had the privilege of being imitated by Chaplin. At a party in Los Angeles, Adorno was introduced to an actor who had lost his hand in the war. In his embarrassment, as he moved to shake the actor’s metal claw, his ‘expression of horror’ changed ‘into an obliging grimace that must have been far more terrible’. Chaplin, who was there, immediately spotted his discomfort and replayed the entire scene in mime.

It is on the subject of music that Adorno remains most respected, and most despised. Music is the art form he cared about most and the subject of his most controversial ideas. (It’s perhaps telling that while Beckett, the only literary figure he praised as much as he praised Schoenberg, had a friendly correspondence with Adorno, Schoenberg regarded him with bafflement and contempt.) The pieces on music here include ‘Obituary for an Organiser’, an affectionate remembrance of Wolfgang Steinecke, the critic and teacher who after 1945 founded the modernist musical festivals and courses out of which emerged the Darmstadt School of fearlessly exploratory music. Adorno, usually unforgiving on such matters, passes silently over Steinecke’s career as a critic in the Third Reich, and credits him with the creation of ‘a school of uncompromising music ... whose intransigence can bear comparison with the Second Viennese School of Schoenberg’. By the 1960s, Adorno had retreated somewhat from his fierce rejection of all that was not atonal. Where once he seemed to think that Stravinsky deserved no better than to provide the musical setting for the dancing hippos in Disney’s Fantasia, by 1967 he was praising his parodic neoclassical style as an analogue to Surrealism. The obituary for Steinecke is similarly ecumenical: ‘The slogans emanating from Darmstadt – serial, pointillist, aleatory, post-serial, informal music – are often mutually irreconcilable. And yet there is a common impulse that lives in all of them.’

The opposite of that impulse was revivalism, which Adorno detected especially in the renewed interest in Baroque music (a view he also expressed in ‘Bach Defended against His Devotees’, an essay in Prisms, another self-selected collection of essays, from 1955). In ‘The Misused Baroque’, he makes plain his lack of interest in the typologies of style that had marked so much of German art history (most famously, Wölfflin’s Renaissance and Baroque), pointing out the ubiquity of mediocre Baroque churches and altarpieces littered around Germany, which he sees mirrored in the ‘musical factories’ of Baroque composers such as Georg Philipp Telemann. One can take or leave all this, but what’s more significant is the depiction of a ‘high’ culture debased and banalised by the culture industry: ‘When a harpsichord or clavichord chirrups on the radio and the instruments accompany it with their diligently repetitive motifs, the illuminated sign saying Baroque Music flashes brightly, like religion with organ sounds or jazz for squawking syncopations.’

Similarly, in Germany and Austria, ‘areas without factories, especially those characterised by reasonably unshaken Catholicism, take on a monopolistic character through their scarcity and themselves become luxury goods, a complement to the industrialism in whose midst they flourish. Their Baroque has become a poster of total culture for tourist purposes, and this damages its own beauty.’ This fallen status is presumably why he struggles to say much of interest in his travel sketches of Amorbach and Vienna.

Without Model ends with ‘Art and the Arts’, another restatement of the political pessimism and artistic optimism that characterised Adorno’s late career. He takes pride in the question so often directed at his electronic, atonal, choral, concrète favourites, among them Kagel, Stockhausen and Ligeti: ‘Is that still music?’ ‘Today,’ Adorno argues in 1967, ‘the avant-garde takes [this] narrow-minded question ... at its word, sometimes answering it with a music that indeed no longer aims to be such.’ As an example he offers Ligeti’s ‘very important, highly crafted Atmosphères’, a piece from 1961 which ‘no longer knows any individual notes that can be distinguished in the usual sense’. In 1935, Adorno pronounced anathema not on Hollywood cinema or atonal music, but on whatever might try to combine the two and thereby dilute the force and extremism of both. Just before he died, cinemas in Frankfurt will have been screening Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey, where Atmosphères plays against a black screen at the film’s opening, before the cosmic monolith appears to a group of hominids at the ‘Dawn of Man’. Kubrick uses the recording as a short cut to express the ineffable, the impossible to understand, the mystical, the eternal. In its middlebrow pomposity, its massively expensive technological flash, and its aspi

The State of the American Middle Class

Who is in it and key trends from 1970 to 2023

How we did this
Terminology

The share of Americans who are in the middle class is smaller than it used to be. In 1971, 61% of Americans lived in middle-class households. By 2023, the share had fallen to 51%, according to a new Pew Research Center analysis of government data.

A bar chart showing that Share of Americans in the middle class has fallen since 1971

As a result, Americans are more apart than before financially. From 1971 to 2023, the share of Americans who live in lower-income households increased from 27% to 30%, and the share in upper-income households increased from 11% to 19%.

Notably, the increase in the share who are upper income was greater than the increase in the share who are lower income. In that sense, these changes are also a sign of economic progress overall.

But the middle class has fallen behind on two key counts. The growth in income for the middle class since 1970 has not kept pace with the growth in income for the upper-income tier. And the share of total U.S. household income held by the middle class has plunged.

Moreover, many groups still lag in their presence in the middle- and upper-income tiers. For instance, American Indians or Alaska Natives, Black and Hispanic Americans, and people who are not married are more likely than average to be in the lower-income tier. Several metro areas in the U.S. Southwest also have high shares of residents who are in the lower-income tier, after adjusting for differences in cost of living across areas.

Our report focuses on the current state of the American middle class. First, we examine changes in the financial well-being of the middle class and other income tiers since 1970. This is based on data from the Annual Social and Economic Supplements (ASEC) of the Current Population Survey (CPS), conducted from 1971 to 2023.

Then, we report on the attributes of people who were more or less likely to be middle class in 2022. Our focus is on their race and ethnicityagegender, marital and veteran statusplace of birthancestryeducationoccupationindustry, and metropolitan area of residence. These estimates are derived from American Community Survey (ACS) data and differ slightly from the CPS-based estimates. In part, that is because incomes can be adjusted for the local area cost of living only with the ACS data. (Refer to the methodology for details on these two data sources.)

This analysis and an accompanying report on the Asian American middle class are part of a series on the status of America’s racial and ethnic groups in the U.S. middle class and other income tiers. Forthcoming analyses will focus on White, Black, Hispanic, American Indian or Alaska Native, Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander and multiracial Americans, including subgroups within these populations. These reports are, in part, updates of previous work by the Center. But they offer much greater detail on the demographic attributes of the American middle class.

Following are some key facts about the state of the American middle class:

Who is middle income or middle class?

Households in all income tiers had much higher incomes in 2022 than in 1970, after adjusting for inflation. But the gains for middle- and lower-income households were less than the gains for upper-income households.

A bar chart showing that Incomes of upper-income U.S. households increased the most of any income tier from 1970 to 2022

The median income of middle-class households increased from about $66,400 in 1970 to $106,100 in 2022, or 60%. Over this period, the median income of upper-income households increased 78%, from about $144,100 to $256,900. (Incomes are scaled to a three-person household and expressed in 2023 dollars.)

The median income of lower-income households grew more slowly than that of other households, increasing from about $22,800 in 1970 to $35,300 in 2022, or 55%.

Consequently, there is now a larger gap between the incomes of upper-income households and other households. In 2022, the median income of upper-income households was 7.3 times that of lower-income households, up from 6.3 in 1970. It was 2.4 times the median income of middle-income households in 2022, up from 2.2 in 1970.

The share of total U.S. household income held by the middle class has fallen almost without fail in each decade since 1970. In that year, middle-income households accounted for 62% of the aggregate income of all U.S. households, about the same as the share of people who lived in middle-class households.

A line chart showing that Share of total U.S. household income held by the middle class has plunged since 1970

By 2022, the middle-class share in overall household income had fallen to 43%, less than the share of the population in middle-class households (51%). Not only do a smaller share of people live in the middle class today, the incomes of middle-class households have also not risen as quickly as the incomes of upper-income households.  

Over the same period, the share of total U.S. household income held by upper-income households increased from 29% in 1970 to 48% in 2022. In part, this is because of the increase in the share of people who are in the upper-income tier.

The share of overall income held by lower-income households edged down from 10% in 1970 to 8% in 2022. This happened even though the share of people living in lower-income households increased over this period.

The share of people in the U.S. middle class varied from 46% to 55% across racial and ethnic groups in 2022. Black and Hispanic Americans, Native Hawaiians or Pacific Islanders, and American Indians or Alaska Natives were more likely than others to be in lower-income households.

A bar chart showing Black, Hispanic, Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander and American Indian/Alaska Native people are more likely than others to live in lower-income U.S. households

In 2022, 39% to 47% of Americans in these four groups lived in lower-income households. In contrast, only 24% of White and Asian Americans and 31% of multiracial Americans were in the lower-income tier.

At the other end of the economic spectrum, 27% of Asian and 21% of White Americans lived in upper-income households in 2022, compared with about 10% or less of Black and Hispanic Americans, Native Hawaiians or Pacific Islanders, and American Indians or Alaska Natives.

Not surprisingly, lower-income status is correlated with the likelihood of living in poverty. According to the Census Bureau, the poverty rate among Black (17.1%) and Hispanic (16.9%) Americans and American Indians or Alaska Natives (25%) was greater than the rate among White and Asian Americans (8.6% for each). (The Census Bureau did not report the poverty rate for Native Hawaiians or Pacific Islanders.)

A bar chart showing Nearly 4 in 10 U.S. children lived in lower-income households in 2022, about half in the middle class

Children and adults 65 and older were more likely to live in lower-income households in 2022. Adults in the peak of their working years – ages 30 to 64 – were more likely to be upper income. In 2022, 38% of children (including teens) and 35% of adults 65 and older were lower income, compared with 26% of adults ages 30 to 44 and 23% of adults 45 to 64.

The share of people living in upper-income households ranged from 13% among children and young adults (up to age 29) to 24% among those 45 to 64. In each age group, about half or a little more were middle class in 2022.

Men were slightly more likely than women to live in middle-income households in 2022, 53% vs. 51%. Their share in upper-income households (18%) was also somewhat greater than the share of women (16%) in upper-income households.

A bar chart showing that Men, veterans and married Americans were more likely than their counterparts to live in middle- or upper-income households in 2022

Marriage appears to boost the economic status of Americans. Among those who were married in 2022, eight-in-ten lived either in middle-income households (56%) or upper-income households (24%). In contrast, only about six-in-ten of those who were separated, divorced, widowed or never married were either middle class or upper income, while 37% lived in lower-income households.

Veterans were more likely than nonveterans to be middle income in 2022, 57% vs. 53%. Conversely, a higher share of nonveterans (29%) than veterans (24%) lived in lower-income households.

A bar chart showing that Immigrants were more likely than the U.S. born to be lower income in 2022; people born in Asia, Europe or Oceania were most likely to be upper income

Immigrants – about 14% of the U.S. population in 2022 – were less likely than the U.S. born to be in the middle class and more likely to live in lower-income households. In 2022, more than a third of immigrants (36%) lived in lower-income households, compared with 29% of the U.S. born. Immigrants also trailed the U.S. born in the shares who were in the middle class, 48% vs. 53%.

There are large gaps in the economic status of American residents by their region of birth. Among people born in Asia, Europe or Oceania, 25% lived in upper-income households in 2022. People from these regions represented 7% of the U.S. population.

By comparison, only 14% of people born in Africa or South America and 6% of those born in Central America and the Caribbean were in the upper-income tier in 2022. Together they accounted for 8% of the U.S. population.

The likelihood of being in the middle class or the upper-income tier varies considerably with the ancestry of Americans. In 2022, Americans reporting South Asian ancestry were about as likely to be upper income (38%) as they were to be middle income (42%). Only 20% of Americans of South Asian origin lived in lower-income households. South Asians accounted for about 2% of the U.S. population of known origin groups in 2022.

A bar chart showing that Americans of South Asian origin are the most likely to be upper income; Hispanic origins are the least likely

At least with respect to the share who were lower income, this was about matched by those with Soviet, Eastern European, other Asian or Western European origins. These groups represented the majority (54%) of the population of Americans whose ancestry was known in 2022.

On the other hand, only 7% of Americans with Central and South American or other Hispanic ancestry were in the upper-income tier, and 44% were lower income. The economic statuses of Americans with Caribbean, sub-Saharan African or North American ancestry were not very different from this.

Education matters for moving into the middle class and beyond, and so do jobs. Among Americans ages 25 and older in 2022, 52% of those with a bachelor’s degree or higher level of education lived in middle-class households and another 35% lived in upper-income households.

A bar chart showing that The share of Americans in the middle- or upper-income tier rises sharply with education and employment

In sharp contrast, 42% of Americans who did not graduate from high school were in the middle class, and only 5% were in the upper-income tier. Further, only 12% of college graduates were lower income, compared with 54% of those who did not complete high school.

Not surprisingly, having a job is strongly linked to movement from the lower-income tier to the middle- and upper-income tiers. Among employed American workers ages 16 and older, 58% were in the middle-income tier in 2022 and 23% were in the upper-income tier. Only 19% of employed workers were lower income, compared with 49% of unemployed Americans.

A bar chart showing that More than a third of U.S. workers in technology, management, and business and finance occupations were in the upper-income tier in 2022

In some occupations, about nine-in-ten U.S. workers are either in the middle class or in the upper-income tier, but in some other occupations almost four-in-ten workers are lower income. More than a third (36% to 39%) of workers in computer, science and engineering, management, and business and finance occupations lived in upper-income households in 2022. About half or more were in the middle class.

But many workers – about one-third or more – in construction, transportation, food preparation and serving, and personal care and other services were in the lower-income tier in 2022.

About six-in-ten workers or more in education; protective and building maintenance services; office and administrative support; the armed forces; and maintenance, repair and production were in the middle class.

A bar chart showing that About a third of U.S. workers in the information, financial and professional services sectors were in the upper-income tier in 2022

Depending on the industrial sector, anywhere from half to two-thirds of U.S. workers were in the middle class, and the share who are upper income or lower income varied greatly.

About a third of workers in the finance, insurance and real estate, information, and professional services sectors were in the upper-income tier in 2022. Nearly nine-in-ten workers (87%) in public administration – largely filling legislative functions and providing federal, state or local government services – were either in the middle class or the upper-income tier.

But nearly four-in-ten workers (38%) in accommodation and food services were lower income in 2022, along with three-in-ten workers in the retail trade and other services sectors.

The share of Americans who are in the middle class or in the upper- or lower-income tier differs across U.S. metropolitan areas. But a pattern emerges when it comes to which metro areas have the highest shares of people living in lower-, middle- or upper-income households. (We first adjust household incomes for differences in the cost of living across areas.)

A bar chart showing that The 10 U.S. metropolitan areas with the largest shares of residents in the middle class in 2022

The 10 metropolitan areas with the greatest shares of middle-income residents are small to midsize in population and are located mostly in the northern half of the U.S. About six-in-ten residents in these metro areas were in the middle class.

Several of these areas are in the so-called Rust Belt, namely, Wausau and Oshkosh-Neenah, both in Wisconsin; Grand Rapids-Wyoming, Michigan; and Lancaster, Pennsylvania. Two others – Dover and Olympia-Tumwater – include state capitals (Delaware and Washington, respectively).

In four of these areas – Bismarck, North Dakota, Ogden-Clearfield, Utah, Lancaster and Wausau – the share of residents in the upper-income tier ranged from 18% to 20%, about on par with the share nationally.

A bar chart showing that The 10 U.S. metropolitan areas with the largest shares of residents in the upper-income tier in 2022

The 10 U.S. metropolitan areas with the highest shares of residents in the upper-income tier are mostly large, coastal communities. Topping the list is San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, California, a technology-driven economy, in which 40% of the population lived in upper-income households in 2022. Other tech-focused areas on this list include San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward; Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue; and Raleigh, North Carolina.

Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, Connecticut, is a financial hub. Several areas, including Washington, D.C.-Arlington-Alexandria and Boston-Cambridge-Newton, are home to major universities, leading research facilities and the government sector.

Notably, many of these metro areas also have sizable lower-income populations. For instance, about a quarter of the populations in Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk; Trenton, New Jersey; Boston-Cambridge-Newton; and Santa Cruz-Watsonville, California, were in the lower-income tier in 2022.

A bar chart showing that The 10 U.S. metropolitan areas with the largest shares of residents in the lower-income tier in 2022

Most of the 10 U.S. metropolitan areas with the highest shares of residents in the lower-income tier are in the Southwest, either on the southern border of Texas or in California’s Central Valley. The shares of people living in lower-income residents were largely similar across these areas, ranging from about 45% to 50%.

About 40% to 50% of residents in these metro areas were in the middle class, and only about one-in-ten or fewer lived in upper-income households.

Compared with the nation overall, the lower-income metro areas in Texas and California have disproportionately large Hispanic populations. The two metro areas in Louisiana – Monroe and Shreveport-Bossier City – have disproportionately large Black populations.

Note: For details on how this analysis was conducted, refer to the methodology.