Friday, May 31, 2024

Tower of Power



 
 MAY 31, 2024

Facebook

 Johann Sebastian Bach’s last pupil, Johann Gottfried Müthel (1728–88) spent the final two decades of his life as a church organist in the Baltic city of Riga, far to the northeast of the three central German cities (Erfurt, Gotha, and Leipzig in the Lutheran—and Bach family—heartland) and two Bavarian ones (bi-confessional Augsburg and Catholic Munich) brought to sounding life in Tanya Kevorkian’s vigorously researched, resonantly detailed, and often tuneful book, Music and Urban Life in Baroque Germany. The organ that Müthel presided over in Riga’s Petruskirche rose some three stories up the west wall and was an orchestra unto itself. Kevorkian’s previous book, Baroque Piety: Religion, Society, and Music in Leipzig, 1650–1750 (Routledge, 2016) was animated by the sometimes unruly churchgoing practices and behaviors of Bach’s time; in the present book, she confirms that, whatever the artistic imperatives of the organist, his main purpose was to bring order to full-throated and often chaotic congregational singing. To fulfill this task, his instrument had to be loud. But, as Kevorkian also shows, it was not just the organ that organized people: a multi-layered “mix”—as modern sound designers might say—shaped temporal, social, and political structures, sonically enmeshing people from different classes, neighborhoods, professions, and religious persuasions.

Müthel was also a renowned player of the clavichord, hailed by its devotees as the most expressive keyboard. It was also the quietest. Intent on having his ruminative fantasies undisturbed by the clattering of carts over cobblestones and kindred urban annoyances, Müthel refused to play his clavichord for friends except when snow blanketed the city. The blaring of trumpets and tolling of bells would also likely have perturbed Riga’s resident keyboard genius when sharing his intimate musical secrets. Other musicians and townsfolk less eccentric, or perhaps just less egotistical than Müthel also knew how boisterous the baroque city could be. Those moderns who yearn for the imagined calm of urban life in the Age of Bach, will be sonorously disabused of this notion by Kevorkian’s often entertaining and always thought-provoking study.

Even the snowstorms wished for by Müthel couldn’t mute the trumpet-playing tower guards (Türmer). From the balconies of church towers, these municipal musicians provided unobstructed aerial accompaniment for processions, announced the approach of a monarch’s carriage, cheered the arrival of holidays, and provided the essential quotidian service of, in Kevorkian’s apt phrase, “marking collective time” The Erfurt tower guards also blew a simpler horn than a trumpet every quarter of an hour, and these smaller brass instruments were used in the other cities too. A Munich tower guard instruction from 1650 described this operative’s main duty as “herald[ing] the day with trumpeting.” In Leipzig, and elsewhere, that day apparently started with a Lutheran chorale at either 2 or 3 a.m., though for some the tune merely bifurcated the night. Either way, the music provided a kind of city-wide alarm clock jingle heard by all residents. Sunset and the mid-morning height of the business day in mercantile Leipzig were also heralded. These hymns heard from on high not only divided the day into its constituent parts but reminded all that they lived in a theocracy, even as encroaching modernity and the joys of consumption—including music—inexorably eroded church control.

Kevorkian is keenly attentive to the demands of musical work and is adept at placing us in these musicians’ buckled shoes. The snow yearned for by some clavichordists would require the Türmer to blow from church towers high above the city in bitingly cold weather, making it painfully difficult for the him to “shape his lips.” Whatever the climatic conditions, tower guards may have played “relatively simple tunes,” but, writes Kevorkian, “the stakes were high” (63). All in town could—indeed, should—hear these chorales that were known by heart by almost everyone.

In Leipzig, some of the closest ears belonged to the city music director, Johann Sebastian Bach, and his wife, the talented professional singer, Anna Magdalena. Their apartment was next to the tower of St. Thomas Church. Anna Magdalena’s father and her three brothers were all trumpeters. Her husband also counted tower guards on his side of the family tree. In one of many memorable scenes, Kevorkian’s first page conjures Anna Magdalena listening discerningly to the nearby trumpeter delivering his evening chorale. Augsburg employed one Catholic and one Lutheran tower guard, each playing for the weddings and other occasions of those of their own confession. Only when two trumpets were called for did they join in a harmonious duet.

The lives of these many, indefatigable laborers are evoked not just with archival rigor but with human feeling. The Augsburg trumpeters petitioned the city council to allow them to have their wives join them in their tower rooms, thus allowing the men to fulfill, as the 1549 document cited by Kevorkian puts it, their “marital duty.” The council granted the request, but just once a month. By 1749 their successors were permitted to descend from their posts and go home between 7 and 9 p.m. each day. Slow was the progress of musical labor rights.

Down on the streets, watchmen called out the half-hour through the night by singing out the time, blowing a horn, or sounding a noisemaker. Complaints were inevitable, and protocols enjoined these mobile timekeepers and proto-policemen to make their voices as pleasing as possible. During the day, shoppers jangled coins and haggled with vendors, hawkers shouted and sang; the cacophony reached a crescendo during trade fairs. Some of these tunes, like those of a certain scissor sharpener, made their way into picturesque compositions like one by Sebastian Knüpfer, a predecessor of Bach as director of music in Leipzig.

As these cities got richer after the devastations of the Thirty Years’ War, more and more forms of leisure spread into the night; with the increase of musical entertainments in coffee houses and taverns, the sounds of people and song not only filled these interiors but spilled out onto the street. In other civic and domestic spaces, we encounter celebrations intimate and outsized: weddings (a major source of income for municipal musicians) and the ensuing afternoon feasts; town council investitures; grand commemorations lofted to the autocrats of the age. The middle of the eighteenth century also saw the rise of what would become the public concert, most prominently in Leipzig, and Kevorkian suggests that, as musical sound was increasingly transformed into an art to be revered, its “proper” place became the concert hall. Music faded from squares and towers.

Even during the heyday—and night—of baroque civic music, concerted works in church and elsewhere, including organ music and the more elaborate ensemble pieces presented by city musicians from the balcony of townhalls, were forbidden during the official periods of mourning that followed the death of monarchs. Bells, too, could project public joy or dolor. Silence enforced awed reverence for the departed but also cleared sonic space so that celebratory music for the new ruler could resound all the more triumphantly when it came at last. Yet, if music could be both an expression of, and salve for, sadness, then denying ears and souls this balm strikes one now—and perhaps more than a few then—as cruel.

Music performed from the church tower was usually relatively simple stuff. Far more involved were some of those works heard down below, especially come Sunday morning. As Kevorkian demonstrates, J. S. Bach cannily deployed Leipzig’s Town Musicians (Stadtpfeifer) not just for musical reasons but also in support of his political and personal maneuverings. She draws our attention to a series of concerted vocal works (“concerted” meaning a choir and/or soloists heard along with independent instrumental parts) from 1730, a fraught period for the director of music. Bach was then at odds with some members of the city council, and his job hung in the balance. Purposefully deploying the full might of the civic musicians in complex music from his pen gave sounding force to his artistic skill and professional prerogatives. After performing a demanding brass part in Bach’s cantata, Preise dein Glücke, gesegnetes Sachsen (BWV 215), the Leipzig trumpeter Gottfried Reiche succumbed to the smoke from festive torches lighting the nocturnal celebration put on in the town square for the new Saxon elector, Frederick Augustus III on 6 October 1734. Sound could not only uplift and energize but also, as now, harm.

Kevorkian tells us that the decline of urban music began with the ravages of the Seven Years’ War in the middle of the eighteenth century and continued apace under the forced economies of the Napoleonic Era. Industrialization and mechanization finished off the tower guards. An attempt to collect the last of their tunes was made in the early twentieth century, but the project was abandoned with the outbreak of World War I. Kevorkian notes that in a few German towns of the present reenactors serve up a tiny, tepid taste of the baroque urban symphony—just not at 3 a.m.

DAVID YEARSLEY is a long-time contributor to CounterPunch and the Anderson Valley Advertiser. His latest book is Sex, Death, and Minuets: Anna Magdalena Bach and Her Musical NotebooksHe can be reached at  dgyearsley@gmail.com

Canada's Bill C-63: Good Politics, (Mostly) Empty Policy

A duty to act responsibly will only work when the product itself isn’t causing harm.


Blayne Haggart
June 5, 2024
Canada's Bill C-63 takes a light touch to regulating online platforms to reduce harms, the author argues. (Illustration/REUTERS)


Over the past three years, Canada’s attempts to regulate large online companies have been something of a bloodsport. In May 2021, a cross-section of Canadian internet activists and scholars accused the federal government of flirting with authoritarianism. The response by many critics to specific legislation — Bill C-11, the Online Streaming Act, and Bill C-18, the Online News Act — was no less heated: cries of “Liberal censorship” and that the government had empowered itself “to control what Canadians can see and say online,” thereby enabling its bureaucrats to act like Nazis and Soviet apparatchiks and ushering in an era of “digital totalitarianism.” All this, about laws that do little more than bring online companies into a decades-old Canadian cultural policy regime and require large online platforms to negotiate payments to the news media companies.

Given this recent history, the Liberal government is surely ecstatic about the relatively muted response to
Bill C-63, its long-awaited, much-delayed legislation to regulate harms caused by social media companies. Since the Online Harms Act was introduced in February, most criticism has focused not on its ostensible subject but on several unrelated, unexpected amendments that would, among other things, expand the number of offences that can be brought under the rubric of hate crime. Intentional or otherwise, these amendments have acted like a legislative lightning rod for the rest of the bill.

But there’s another reason why the actual social media regulation part of Bill C-63 hasn’t gotten critics’ blood boiling. Outside of a couple of important but narrow issues, the Online Harms Act really doesn’t do that much. There hasn’t been much opposition because there’s not much here to oppose. Take out those troublesome amendments and this is a bill designed to pass easily by offering the smallest possible political target.

But this comity comes at a steep price.


Overly Narrow Scope


To start, the bill’s list of in-scope harms is far more limited than it could be, both politically and substantively. It defines as “harms” only seven specific heinous activities, most of which are already clearly illegal: intimate content communicated without consent; content that sexually victimizes a child or revictimizes a survivor; content that induces a child to harm themselves; content used to bully a child; content that foments hatred; content that incites violence; and content that incites violent extremism or terrorism.‍

The bill’s teeth are reserved for only two categories: intimate content communicated without consent (so-called revenge porn) and content that sexually victimizes a child or revictimizes a survivor. These are the only cases where the proposed regulator is to be given the power to compel a social media company to take content down (within 24 hours).

The rest of the bill proposes a slightly modified version of the self-regulation status quo. People can complain to the regulator about what they see or read — such as material affecting children, or hate speech — but the company would still be allowed to decide whether such content should be taken down. Companies would only be required to have clear and transparent complaint processes, and, in the case of children, measures to protect them from bullying and self-harm. (Terrorism and child sexual abuse material are also part of the bill. Again, this is content that even an ardent civil libertarian would have trouble defending.)

This focus on harms to children implicitly leaves adults out of scope on the central issue of online bullying and harassment. Which is a problem, because online harassment isn’t something that stops when you graduate high school. And it’s not something that many adults can just deal with on their own. Adults — in particular, women, racialized and queer individuals, and other marginalized individuals and groups — have been at the forefront in calling out the often devastating consequences of online harassment, much of which doesn’t rise to the legal level of hate speech but is nonetheless socially and individually harmful. Yet the legislation doesn’t go there.

Consider the extensive list of harms related to technology-facilitated gender-based violence enumerated by the Women’s Legal Education & Action Fund (LEAF). Would abuse such as online mobbing or swarming and trolling be covered by this legislation? Are those hate speech? It doesn’t appear so. In any case, the legislation only requires that the company have a plan to deal with complaints following a self-determined transparent process.

On its face, this bill embraces a “positive freedoms” approach to speech that emphasizes the need for equality, in order to secure free-expression rights for all. Such an approach correctly recognizes that the absence of rules itself chills the speech of marginalized individuals and groups and reinforces the position of the powerful.

So, it’s disappointing that the bill appears primarily concerned with going too far in protecting marginalized Canadians. The bill explicitly states that it “does not require the operator to implement measures that unreasonably or disproportionately limit users’ expression on the regulated service” but doesn’t include a direction of equal strength related to promoting equality.

The result is legislation that doubles down on exactly the speech-chilling approach that creates the need for a law like this in the first place.

The legislation does reintroduce the ability of Canadians to file complaints about online hate speech with the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal (although University of Windsor law professor Richard Moon comments that this process would likely either overwhelm the tribunal or be so selectively used as to render the process moot). But compared with measures taken in other jurisdictions, it’s thin gruel.

Australia’s Online Safety Act, for example, does not restrict its protections to children, and it can direct a service to remove content that meets a legal threshold. What’s more, it covers more than social media platforms, including search engines and electronic messaging services (the latter of which can reach as many people as a social media network).

Daycares or Cigarette Companies?

Overall, the bill takes a light touch to regulation: much of it is focused on improving researchers’ access to data, and the transparency and accessibility of social media companies’ flagging and complaints mechanisms. Companies are also required to provide digital safety plans outlining how they’re meeting their obligations under the legislation.

The legislation’s spirit is captured by its motivating concept, the “duty to act responsibly”: that companies need to consider how their product will affect their users. The regulator can dictate changes but, for the most part, it’s up to the company to decide what to do.

And here we come to the fundamental flaw with Bill C-63: it treats social media companies like daycare providers, when they’re actually more akin to cigarette makers.

A light-touch duty to act responsibly makes sense for for-profit daycares. They deliver a socially desirable product but may face pressures to cut corners and compromise their product. The regulator’s challenge is therefore to ensure that these companies deliver the child care they have agreed to provide, with acceptable quality and safety. They need to create guardrails to keep everyone in bounds. Here, self-regulation and concepts such as duty of care, supplemented with some punitive measures, can make a lot of sense.

Now, consider tobacco companies. If anyone argued they could be regulated by a duty to act responsibly toward their customers, they’d be laughed out of town, yes? Because the problem with tobacco is the product itself, which eventually kills people, if used as intended.

There’s a direct conflict between the public interest in limiting the sale and consumption of tobacco for health reasons and these companies’ economic interest in selling as many cigarettes as possible, despite the health risks. They thus have had enormous incentives to resist and dodge any restraint on their core business, including by burying critical in-house research (sound familiar?).

In such a sector, light regulation, or self-regulation, will yield only cosmetic changes.
Regulating the Business Model

The harms from social media companies — violent hate speech to the point of helping to foment genocide, harassment and discrimination, encouraging children to self-harm — are not aberrations. These harms are inherent to their data-harvesting, surveillance-based, for-profit advertising business models. (This argument ignores those social media networks designed to circulate socially harmful content, for whom a duty to act responsibly is even less tenuous as a regulatory strategy.)

Indeed, companies have tended to be cavalier about online harms, however these are defined, because the social-media platforms that are the ostensible focus of regulation are often not their actual business. As Shoshana Zuboff correctly argues in her book, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, these platforms are merely façades for the business of harvesting data, which the companies can use for advertising or, in effect, sell.

In a data-driven economy, the goal is to collect all the data, all the time. With social media, this is done by working to capture and monetize attention, no matter how socially objectionable or damaging the content. And as every newspaper publisher knows, conflict, scandal and mayhem drive sales.

When it comes to regulation, restrictions on companies’ ability to maximize data harvesting, even when done to limit social harms, are deemed an existential threat to the bottom line. These companies are thus incentivized to work around regulations designed to make their networks healthier for users.

In fact, social media itself isn’t the problem; the present business model is. If these companies made their money differently, through display ads, or subscription fees, or government subsidies, they would place greater emphasis on running user-friendly social networks. They would be more like daycares, because they’d be in the business of providing social media services. Unfortunately, in the world as it currently exists, the actual content on these platforms is secondary to the data they gather and monetize.

A duty to act responsibly will only work when the product itself isn’t causing harm. When the product itself is the problem, you have to directly regulate these companies’ actual business — in this case by restricting their ability to collect and monetize all the data, all the time.

Of course, this is easier said than done. Policy makers and academics rarely discuss the possibility of indirectly addressing these issues via economic policy — such as through taxing data collection and personalized advertising, banning personalized advertising, or requiring that people pay directly for social media services. And while an economic approach would sidestep thorny speech issues, there’s no doubt these companies would make this a battle for the ages.

The difficulty of the fight, however, doesn’t obviate its necessity. Exploring economic regulation would represent a much-needed policy advance in this area.

In fairness, the ability to compel action to deal with (again, a limited set) of harms raises the possibility that the regulator could end up somewhat regulating the business model. Maybe. We can’t be certain because, as University of Ottawa law professor Michael Geist has pointed out, so much in Bill C-63 is left up for the regulator to decide.

We’ll only know the actual meaning of this duty to act responsibly (as it relates to a very narrow list of harms and so long as it doesn’t unduly restrict free expression) once the regulator sets its threshold for intervening in a company’s internal affairs and the measures it is prepared to order and enforce. And all this is conditional on the regulator’s ability to compel notoriously pigheaded companies (which have absorbed billion-dollar fines without blinking) to obey. To state it mildly, the stage is not set for success.

The Best We Can Do?


Despite these criticisms, there are good things in this legislation. While the focus on sexual victimization content is far too limited, it is nonetheless an important move that will help real people.

And the proposed regime does hold glimmers of potential. Most notable is the necessary creation of a regulator and ombudsperson who will have significant leeway to investigate and act, including to compel a company to adopt certain measures in pursuit of the legislation’s (limited) objectives. The legislation also seems to leave the door open for the regulator to expand its mandate to focus on (undefined) “safety” issues beyond the specific harms delineated in the bill.

Furthermore, the fixes I’ve suggested throughout — rebalancing the legislation toward equality rights, bringing adults, and not just children, under measures regarding online bullying and harassment; and an Australian-style expansion of the legislation’s scope — should, and can, be addressed in committee hearings.

Overall, this legislation creates a regulator with the potential to do good, if it is well-funded and staffed by suitably ambitious people. But it is a series of half measures. What’s most needed is for the government to fully embrace equality and freedom from domination as prerequisites for true freedom of expression.

When one considers the severity of the challenge and the years spent on this issue, it’s hard not to be critical. Bottom line: This politically expedient, unambitious legislation fails to address the very real needs of so many Canadians. Some things should be worth fighting over.

The opinions expressed in this article/multimedia are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIGI or its Board of Directors.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Blayne Haggart  is a CIGI senior fellow and associate professor of political science at Brock University in St. Catharines, Canada. His latest book, with Natasha Tusikov, is The New Knowledge: Information, Data and the Remaking of Global Power.


We asked ChatGPT for legal advice – here are five reasons why you shouldn’t

THE CONVERSATION
Published: May 31, 2024 


At some point in your life, you are likely to need legal advice. A survey carried out in 2023 by the Law Society, the Legal Services Board and YouGov found that two-thirds of respondents had experienced a legal issue in the past four years. The most common problems were employment, finance, welfare and benefits and consumer issues.

But not everyone can afford to pay for legal advice. Of those survey respondents with legal problems, only 52% received professional help, 11% had assistance from other people such as family and friends and the remainder received no help at all.

Many people turn to the internet for legal help. And now that we have access to artificial intelligence (AI) chatbots such as ChatGPT, Google Bard, Microsoft Co-Pilot and Claude, you might be thinking about asking them a legal question.

These tools are powered by generative AI, which generates content when prompted with a question or instruction. They can quickly explain complicated legal information in a straightforward, conversational style, but are they accurate?

We put the chatbots to the test in a recent study published in the International Journal of Clinical Legal Education. We entered the same six legal questions on family, employment, consumer and housing law into ChatGPT 3.5 (free version), ChatGPT 4 (paid version), Microsoft Bing and Google Bard. The questions were ones we typically receive in our free online law clinic at The Open University Law School.

We found that these tools can indeed provide legal advice, but the answers were not always reliable or accurate. Here are five common mistakes we observed:
1. Where is the law from?

The first answers the chatbots provided were often based on American law. This was often not stated or obvious. Without legal knowledge, the user would likely assume the law related to where they live. The chatbot sometimes did not explain that law differs depending on where you live.

This is especially complex in the UK, where laws differ between England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. For example, the law on renting a house in Wales is different to Scotland, Northern Ireland and England, while Scottish and English courts have different procedures to deal with divorce and the ending of a civil partnership.

If necessary, we used one additional question: “is there any English law that covers this problem?” We had to use this instruction for most of the questions, and then the chatbot produced an answer based on English law.
2. Out of date law

We also found that sometimes the answer to our question referred to out of date law, which has been replaced by new legal rules. For example, the divorce law changed in April 2022 to remove fault-based divorce in England and Wales.

Some responses referred to the old law. AI chatbots are trained on large volumes of data – we don’t always know how current the data is, so it may not include the most recent legal developments.
Seeking advice from a lawyer is probably a better option than using AI, if you can access it. Redpixel.pl/Shutterstock
3. Bad advice

We found most of the chatbots gave incorrect or misleading advice when dealing with the family and employment queries. The answers to the housing and consumer questions were better, but there were still gaps in the responses. Sometimes, they missed really important aspects of the law, or explained it incorrectly.

We found that the answers produced by the AI chatbots were well-written, which could make them appear more convincing. Without having legal knowledge, it is very difficult for someone to determine whether an answer produced is correct and applies to their individual circumstances.

Even though this technology is relatively new, there have already been cases of people relying on chatbots in court. In a civil case in Manchester, a litigant representing themselves in court reportedly presented fictitious legal cases to support their argument. They said they had used ChatGPT to find the cases.

Read more: Generative AI is changing the legal profession – future lawyers need to know how to use it

4. Too generic

In our study, the answers didn’t provide enough detail for someone to understand their legal issue and know how to resolve them. The answers provided information on a topic rather than specifically addressing the legal question.

Interestingly, the AI chatbots were better at suggesting practical, non-legal ways to address a problem. While this can be useful as a first step to resolving an issue, it does not always work, and legal steps may be needed to enforce your rights.
5. Pay to play

We found that ChatGPT4 (the paid version) was better overall than the free versions. This risks further reinforcing digital and legal inequality.

The technology is evolving, and there may come a time when AI chatbots are better able to provide legal advice. Until then, people need to be aware of the risks when using them to resolve their legal problems. Other sources of help such as Citizens Advice will provide up to date, accurate information and are better placed to assist.

All the chatbots gave answers to our questions but, in their response, stated it was not their function to provide legal advice and recommended getting professional help. After conducting this study, we recommend the same.


Authors
Francine Ryan
Senior Lecturer in Law and Director of the Open Justice Centre, The Open University

Disclosure statement
Francine Ryan is affiliated with Clinical Legal Education Organisation https://www.cleo-uk.org/ as a trustee.

Elizabeth Hardie
Senior Lecturer, Law School, The Open University
Solve, Struggle, Invent


How Things Fall Apart: What Happened to the Cuban Revolution
by Elizabeth Dore.
Apollo, 341 pp., £10.99, August 2023, 978 1 80328 381 4

The Tribe: Portraits of Cuba
by Carlos Manuel Álvarez, translated by Frank Wynne and Rahul Bery.
Fitzcarraldo, 336 pp., £12.99, May 2022, 978 1 913097 91 2

LRB

In​ 1968, Fidel Castro invited an American anthropologist called Oscar Lewis to interview Cubans about their lives. Lewis was famous for an oral history project, conducted in a Mexico City slum, which he had turned into a book called The Children of Sánchez (1961). By recounting a poor family’s struggles and hustles, legal and otherwise, Lewis angered the country’s ruling party, which still described itself as ‘revolutionary’. The Mexican Revolution, like the Cuban Revolution after it, wasn’t supposed to have an end date. But after major gains, including redistributing land to landless farmers, it had been ‘interrupted’, as the historian Adolfo Gilly later put it. Lewis exposed the revolution’s unfinished business, and didn’t shy away from discussing the sexual peccadilloes of the poor. The Spanish-language edition of Children of Sánchez was published in 1964, but thanks to a lawsuit claiming the material was ‘obscene and denigrating’, the book wasn’t freely available in Mexico for several years.

When Castro invited Lewis to Cuba, he had only been in power for a decade. People on the island – at least those who weren’t yet plotting an exit to the United States – still referred to the events of 1959 without irony as the ‘triumph of the revolution’. Castro told Lewis he could make an ‘important contribution to Cuban history’ by creating an ‘objective record of what people feel and think’. ‘This is a socialist country,’ he is said to have told Lewis. ‘We have nothing to hide. There are no complaints or grievances I haven’t already heard.’ Lewis hired a team of sociologists and started interviewing people in Havana.

Three decades later, with Castro still at the helm, another American scholar, Elizabeth Dore (who worked in the UK for much of her life), began planning a similar project: to interview Cubans about their lives and the way they felt about the revolution. Dore had funding and a rotating cast of about a dozen interviewers, but she didn’t have permission. In How Things Fall Apart, Dore, who died in 2022, describes doing the rounds in Havana, visiting officials who might help. ‘Your project is beautiful,’ one deputy minister who asked to remain anonymous told her. ‘I’d like to help. But remember Oscar Lewis. In Cuba, oral history is taboo.’

Lewis and his team spent eighteen months interviewing Cubans, but in 1970 the Communist Party shut down the project. Raúl Castro accused him of working for the CIA. A likelier explanation is that word got back to the Castro brothers that the interviewees were complaining too much. Party officials ejected Lewis from the island soon after Fidel announced that his much ballyhooed ‘zafra de los diez millones’ – a push to harvest a record-breaking ten million tonnes of sugar – was going to fall short. The zafra campaign was supposed to turn around the Cuban economy; office workers had been conscripted into the cane fields, along with supporters of the revolution from abroad who flew in to help. The target was missed by one and a half million tonnes and massive economic dislocation resulted because other activity on the island had come to a halt.

Some of the material from Lewis’s interviews was published after his death in 1977. In Four Men: Living the Revolution, an Oral History of Contemporary Cuba, some of the slum-dwellers he had interviewed in Havana praised the revolution, while others confessed that they were struggling to escape poverty despite their best efforts to become socialist new men. ‘Life is only a ball of shit and you must put up with it and live as best you can,’ one of them told Lewis.

When Dore began to plan her oral history project in the early 2000s, Cuba’s economy was once again in crisis. This had much to do with the US embargo. At first, the US had been suspicious of but ambivalent about the Cuban Revolution. Fidel Castro had overthrown a US-backed dictator, but Fulgencio Batista had been widely hated on the island, and it wasn’t yet clear that Castro was a communist. Two years later, by the time he announced that ‘I am a Marxist-Leninist, and will be one until the end of my life,’ the US had turned decisively against him. It announced an embargo in 1962: US businesses or those majority-owned by American citizens were prohibited from conducting trade with Cubans. The embargo remains in place, the longest-lasting in the modern world, and a dead hand on the Cuban economy.

The zafra was Fidel’s last-ditch attempt to sustain an independent export industry. Two years after its failure, he joined the Soviet economic bloc and relied on special trade agreements that kept Cuba afloat for the next three decades. The regime also continued its attempts to remake social life. This entailed getting women into the workforce and dispensing with bourgeois decadence: at every marriage ceremony, the couple were required to vow to ‘share equally in the duties of home, family and socialism’, as Ada Ferrer writes in Cuba: An American History (2021). Not all Cuban men were enthusiastic about sharing the housework in the name of the revolution and there was plenty of carping. No need for an outsider to jot it all down. Lewis never returned.

Dore first arrived in Cuba as a graduate student in 1972, fresh from New York City. Had she been a decade older, she might have swung a machete as part of the zafra, given her attraction to revolutionary idealism. She says she always hoped to record life histories in Cuba but first completed other projects, working as an adviser for the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, writing a book about that country’s transition to capitalism and editing a collection of essays on gender in Latin America. Anthropologists often work in Cuba without official authorisation, but since Dore had something large-scale in mind, and since she intended to employ a team of Cubans, she sought permission. After many refusals, she secured a meeting with Raúl’s daughter Mariela: a colleague had told her that Mariela had ‘a reputation for fighting lost causes’, including on behalf of gay and lesbian Cubans. With Mariela’s help, Dore’s project was approved in 2005 and launched with some pomp at the University of Havana. Clips were broadcast on state television. ‘People interested in Cuba often make the mistake of thinking too much about Fidel Castro,’ Ferrer writes. Dore wouldn’t make that error. Over fourteen years, she and her team interviewed 124 Cubans, returning to many of them several times.

She selected a broad range of interviewees: men and women from the countryside and the city, from various social classes and racial backgrounds – though after the ‘triumph of the revolution’, race and class were not supposed to be relevant. She interviewed a former art student who remembered the relative social equality of the Soviet-funded years with great nostalgia. There was enough cash for a group of friends to go out to the famous ice-cream parlour Coppelia, and split the tab according to their means. During the 1980s, the egalitarianism of the early decades of the revolution was eroded by innovations like ‘free market stores’, where better-off Cubans could buy things not included in their state rations, such as jeans and evaporated milk. Dore notes that even then the ratio between the highest and lowest pay was only 4:1 (my note in the margin: ‘I would like to live in this society for a change’). According to Anthony DePalma in The Cubans: Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times (2020), one Cuban who studied in Ukraine during this period was proud that she and her cohort all travelled with the same blue cardboard suitcases and all wore the same brand of shapeless underwear.* She was shocked when her roommate from the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan asked her if she owned a pair of ‘American jeanskis’. A bad communist, she thought.

The revolution was supposed to sweep away not just social class but racial discrimination. (Cuba received more than twice as many enslaved people as the US, and has a large population of African origin.) Reviving the unfulfilled goals of 19th-century Cuban nationalists such as Antonio Maceo, whose struggle was not just anticolonial but antiracist, Fidel said in 1961 that his government had ‘eradicated’ racism on the island. Not all Cubans got the memo. According to Ferrer, ‘job centres advertised for workers of “good appearance”, a euphemism for white.’ Black women still worked as domestic servants in white households. But mentioning racism was taboo, and race was one of the touchiest subjects in Dore’s interviews. During their first encounter, one Afro-Cuban told her he had failed the entrance exam for a prestigious art school, but only after ten years of interviews did he become comfortable with attributing his unfinished education, at least in part, to racial discrimination.

The creeping return to inequality in Cuba is the main theme of Dore’s book, hastened by the disastrous economic downturn after the collapse in 1991 of the Soviet Union, which had been providing Cuba with up to $5 billion a year in subsidies. After its fall, outsiders speculated that the Cuban regime would also collapse and the island would transition, quickly or slowly, to capitalism. But then interested countries have always persuaded themselves that revolutionary Cuba would collapse if it came under enough pressure.

Instead, Castro announced a Special Period in Times of Peace and called for extraordinary sacrifices. On the streets, jokes about the state economy outlived the Soviet Union: ‘They pretend to pay us and we pretend to work.’ Healthcare and education were still free, but there was little food and no oil to run electric generators. Beef was nowhere to be found, chicken and pork became rare, and coffee was ground with dried peas to bulk up the volume. Even rum, sometimes known as ‘Vitamin R’, became scarce. Cubans fried chopped grapefruit peel to fill themselves up. DePalma reports that women broke open old batteries and used the black paste inside as hair dye. There was no fuel for buses and all of Havana cycled round on clunky bicycles imported from China.

To survive the Special Period, some Cubans were forced to resolver, luchar, inventar (solve, struggle, invent) – euphemisms for petty theft. In the 1990s, the social understanding of theft changed so much that this was considered necessary, even sporting, as long as the injured party was the state and not an acquaintance or neighbour. The best gig in Havana was to work as a waiter in a tourist hotel with an all-you-can-eat buffet. After the tourists had finished, leftover ham, packets of butter and canned tuna – all of which had vanished from state-run stores – were spirited away by hotel staff and sold on the black market.

In a stylish set of profiles now collected in a book, the Cuban journalist and novelist Carlos Manuel Álvarez describes the black market of this period:


At the Technical University of Havana José Antonio Echeverría – the CUJAE, the most important technological university in the country – most of the students in apartments 28 and 42 of building 34 were from the province of Matanzas, and thanks to a profitable trafficking business, all those from Matanzas, without exception, were earning twenty to thirty times the average monthly wage of a Cuban state worker. In a couple of years, they would be qualified engineers and traffickers. A sure-fire combination.

Álvarez, who was born in 1989, notes that his generation was the first to grow up knowing that the advantages of the revolution, including free education, wouldn’t guarantee them a decent living. The black market and trafficking businesses run by students represented major cracks in the revolutionary way of life. He has harsh things to say about his country, noting ‘our Cold War mindset, our deeply ideological, sentimental education, a boundless bureaucracy, a ravaged social infrastructure’, but also writes about what the revolution promised and lost sight of. ‘Solidarity is a sacrifice,’ he says, ‘and consists of making other lives better by making your own worse. It is a logic that runs contrary to the logic of success, and even that of instinct, which is why it is in such short supply.’

In 1994, to stave off economic freefall, Fidel introduced a two-tier currency: the nearly worthless local peso and the new ‘convertible’ one, pegged to the US dollar. The year before, he had also made it legal for Cubans to possess dollars. This created a new form of economic inequality that still persists: a social hierarchy divided not by inherited social class or profession but by access to convertible pesos or, even better, family in the US able to send dollar remittances. At the same time, Cuba changed its foreign investment laws to enable Europeans to invest in the tourist industry. Speciality stores sold appliances, foreign clothing (American jeanskis) and food not available at state stores, which only took Cuban pesos. ‘There are some people,’ Álvarez writes, ‘who believe a monument should be erected to the salseros and the jineteras – the dancers and the prostitutes – who, being the only reliable sources of foreign currency, saved 1990s Cuba from utter disaster.’

In order​ to write about ‘ordinary Cubans’, or to gather oral histories, interviewees must be able to speak freely. But has there been freedom of speech in revolutionary Cuba? It depends on who is trying to speak, about what and when. Castro put the boundaries around freedom of speech for intellectuals like this: ‘Within the revolution, everything. Against the revolution, nothing.’ The Padilla Affair, directed by Pavel Giroud and released in 2022, concerns the case of Heberto Padilla, a poet accused of writing ‘critical and ahistorical literature’ and imprisoned for ‘betrayal of the homeland’ in 1971. The film includes archive footage of his forced ‘confession’, a mea culpa that looks very much like a show trial. He had been tortured. Writers and journalists who want to stay on the island still face restrictions about what they can say. Álvarez calls Cuba’s state newspaper, Granma, ‘one of the most discreet newspapers in the world, which isn’t exactly ideal for a newspaper’. He runs a much more outspoken magazine, El Estornudo (great name: ‘The Sneeze’). Like so many independent journalists, he has now moved abroad.

Another count against freedom of speech are the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution. These neighbourhood defence groups are often headed by busybodies eager to rat out opponents of the party. But the bite has gone out of them since the 1990s, when they organised egg-throwing and sometimes stone-throwing at people planning to emigrate to the US. Some Cubans used to stroke an imaginary beard when criticising Castro, rather than utter his name, but others spoke openly about the regime’s flaws as well as its achievements. The poet Rafael Alcides told Álvarez that he had been in love with the dream of the revolution, and with Castro. ‘One of the greatest things he did, one of the most beautiful, was the literacy programme. And giving land to farmers. Who wouldn’t agree with that?’ (In 1961, the Year of Education, 300,000 Cubans volunteered to travel to remote rural areas and succeeded in teaching 700,000 people to read and write. The teachers showed up to revolutionary marches carrying giant pencils.) ‘Anyway, it was a wonderful time, honestly ... you don’t take the money, you take the glory. We were rebuilding the world.’ But in the same interview, shortly before Castro’s death in 2016, Alcides told Álvarez that ‘there are only two dissidents in Cuba: Fidel and Raúl Castro. The rest of us agree that this isn’t working.’

Those who criticise the revolution aren’t necessarily dissidents in the usual sense. Dore recounts a Cuban joke: ‘A dissident organisation had three members: one was a US agent, one was a Cuban agent and the third was a fool.’ But tourists who visit Cuba rarely hear people talking like the man Dore calls Juan: ‘Yesterday the revolution drove me crazy, absolutely crazy.’ There had been a march in downtown Havana and Castro had spoken. ‘He said: “Reading from the pamphlet I have in my hand the general opinion is ...” Well, if everyone thought the way the Comandante says we do it would be marvellous. The fact is everyone doesn’t think the same. What a joke.’

In 2018 the Cuban government passed Decree 349, which requires artists to seek advance permission for shows and performances. It provoked the largest free speech protests in Cuban history, known as the San Isidro movement. One of Castro’s slogans was ‘¡Patria o muerte – venceremos!’ (‘Homeland or death – we will win!’) In 2021, a group of Cuban rappers released a song called ‘Patria y vida’ (‘Homeland and Life’), which openly praised the San Isidro movement: ‘My people ask for liberty, not more doctrines/Now we don’t shout homeland or death but rather homeland and life.’ ‘Patria y vida’ became a huge hit, spreading across the island on thumb drives, becoming a slogan at the protests.

One of the leaders of the San Isidro movement, the performance artist Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara, was arrested several times on trumped-up charges. In 2020, Álvarez helped secure his release from jail. Soon afterwards, Álvarez was at the airport in Havana when he was taken aside by security officials. ‘So this was who they were,’ he thought, looking at the two men wearing dark green face masks. ‘I had seen them so often before, I ran into them on every street, every day of my life in Cuba.’ The officials conducted a half-hearted interrogation, asking how much he was paid for his Facebook posts and by whom. (Nothing, no one.) They asked how he knew Otero Alcántara. ‘It was they who had brought us together, obviously, though I’m not sure I told them that.’ They let him go, just in time to catch his plane. ‘The whole encounter seemed utterly anachronistic. This was 14 March 2020, a time when Stalinist aesthetics could be seen only as folklore.’ Otero Alcántara was soon back in prison, where he remains.

Since Dore started work on her book, the situation in Cuba has worsened considerably. People got through the Special Period thanks to tourist dollars and remittances. After Hugo Chávez came to power in 1999, Venezuela provided a major boost to the Cuban economy with oil subsidies and special trade agreements. But since 2014, following Venezuela’s own economic meltdown, no patron has stepped in to subsidise Cuba’s revolution. Hundreds of those who marched for freedom of speech are still in jail. New protests periodically break out, often over access to basic goods and food. Juan told Dore that


a Cuban’s greatest drama is worrying about what’s in the fridge, what to cook for dinner. It’s not the same as if you were to get home, open the fridge and there is chicken, shrimp, fish, eggs, beef and cooking oil. Then you’d have no worries. But when you don’t have anything, when there are scarcities, you say: ‘What can I do? What can I inventar, come up with, to stop my boy from crying? What can I put on the table?’ ... The Cuban people love food, partying, bachata, dancing and music. Take that away, and bam, you’ve got very little left.

When there is nothing left, people are forced to leave. Since the revolution’s earliest days, the loudest expression of Cuban free speech – at least in a register audible to foreign ears – has been migration. There are 1.4 million Cuban-born people in the US, most of them given asylum as escapees from communism. During one spike in arrivals, in 1980, nativists in Florida had bumper stickers that read: ‘Will the last American to leave Miami please bring the flag?’ Cuban refugees have been used as propaganda by various US administrations, especially Reagan’s. They chose freedom over communism! But things have changed. Now Cuban arrivals find themselves in the more challenging situation of being considered migrants.

In 2014, Barack Obama and Raúl Castro came to an agreement to normalise diplomatic relations. It wasn’t really noticed at the time that thawing relations would also mean phasing out special provisions for Cuban immigrants, who had previously been ‘paroled’, facing many fewer restrictions than other asylum seekers. In 2022, 225,000 Cubans were apprehended at the US-Mexico border, many more than arrived during the famous 1980 Mariel boatlift or the 1994 balsero crisis, which saw 35,000 Cubans make the journey across the Florida Straits on rafts. The vast majority of those leaving Cuba aren’t dissidents but simply people who can’t get enough to eat, can’t inventar their way out of worsening poverty. They seek asylum not as a result of repression but in order to navigate America’s broken immigration system – there is no other way to get permission to work.

Despite the dire situation in Cuba, some nostalgia for the language of the revolution lingers. Everyone knows the story of the Cuban Five: spies arrested by the FBI in 1998 for infiltrating an anti-Castro group in Florida. After they were imprisoned in the US, they became national heroes in Cuba. In 2014, three of them were released and returned to the island. The singer-songwriter Silvio Rodríguez, a revolutionary faithful, staged a free concert in Havana in their honour. After the performance, one of them grabbed the microphone and chanted the old slogans: ‘Viva Cuba libre!’ and ‘Seguimos en combate!’ But these were ‘obsolete mottos’, Álvarez writes, ‘things no one says anymore’. ‘What tone should we adopt when the speech patterns of fearless heroism have faded?’ he asks. ‘Those same speech patterns that were the backbone of our education.’

Even after kicking out Oscar Lewis, Fidel didn’t give up on the idea of an oral history of Cuban life under communism. In 1975 he asked his close friend Gabriel García Márquez, who was enamoured of the revolution, to write it. García Márquez worked on the project for a year, then gave up. He told friends that what Cubans said didn’t fit the book that he wanted to write.
A Little of This Honey


Shylock’s Venice: The Remarkable History of Venice’s Jews and the Ghetto
by Harry Freedman.
Bloomsbury, 247 pp., £20, February, 978 1 3994 0727
4

Erin Maglaque

In his book​ 16 ottobre 1943, Giacomo Debenedetti describes the deportation of Rome’s Jews to the death camps. When the soldiers came in the early evening, everyone in the neighbourhood was at home.


The Jews of the Regola quarter were still in the habit of going to sleep early. Shortly after dark they were all in their homes. Perhaps the memory of an ancient curfew is still in their blood; from the time, when at the first fall of shadow, the gates of the ghetto screeched shut with an inviolable monotony that routine had perhaps rendered gentle and familiar to them, a reminder that night was not a time for Jews.

Does Jewish time run in a circle or a line? ‘Monotony is the most beautiful or most atrocious thing,’ Simone Weil wrote. ‘The most beautiful if it is a reflection of eternity – the most atrocious if it is the sign of an unvarying perpetuity.’ There is the beautiful eternity of faith. And then there is the unvarying perpetuity of an ancient persecution, which – in Debenedetti’s telling – left the Regola’s Jews vulnerable to a new atrocity.

It’s hard to recognise change when history threatens always to bend in a circle. In Rilke’s story ‘A Scene from the Venetian Ghetto’, the narrator is hazy on chronology. When was the ghetto, when were its people? ‘I also cannot tell you when [this story] took place. Perhaps under the Doge Alvise Mocenigo IV, but it could also have been a little earlier or a little later.’ The exiles, the diasporas, the ghettos: repeated down the generations, the religious year itself structured by their commemoration. Who’s to say if one was a little earlier or a little later?

The Venetian ghetto was founded by Senate decree on 29 March 1516. The doge was Leonardo Loredan. ‘No God-fearing subject of our state,’ the Senate declared, ‘would have wished them, after their arrival, to disperse throughout our city, sharing houses with Christians and going wherever they chose by day and night, perpetrating all those misdemeanours and detestable and abominable acts which are generally known and shameful to describe.’ By July, all the Jews of Venice were living in the ghetto, an area of the Cannaregio. The two gates were shut from dusk until dawn, guarded by Christian sentries. Boats patrolled the canals that ringed the ghetto. The Jews paid the wages of their own jailers.

The Venetian ghetto is still visually distinctive. The Jews could not expand outwards, so they built upwards, constructing precarious terraces seven or eight storeys high, using partitions to divide apartments into ever smaller units. Rilke writes: ‘And their city, which was not on the sea, thus grew slowly towards the sky, as into another sea.’ It’s distinctive, too, in providing the illusion of a living history: black-hatted men still stride across the campo of the ghetto, buy pastries at Gam Gam, the kosher restaurant. It’s easy to feel you’ve stepped back a few centuries. But the men are Chabad-Lubavitchers, mostly from the US and Israel, who invite secular and non-Orthodox Jewish tourists to a seder. (One online testimonial from an American tourist: ‘Perfect place to go if you want to get in touch with your Neshama! Warm, welcoming and delicious food!’)

What was the ghetto, in the fullness of Jewish history? Its historians argue that it was both an open-air prison and a bright spot in the darkness of early modern European antisemitism. Spain and Portugal expelled their Jews, or forced them to convert. In Rome they were subjected to weekly preaching by Catholics seeking to convert them, sometimes at the end of a baton. The Venetian government confined Jews to a ghetto, but did not expel them; they were forced to wear a yellow head-covering, but allowed to worship. The ghetto is both a symbol of persecution and a symbol of tolerance, at least insofar as the attitudes of the time allowed. But as Debenedetti remarked, the ghetto is not only a physical place or a symbol but an archaic memory, of a time when the Jews went to bed early.

Renaissance Venetians were pragmatic, compensating perhaps for the original whimsy of building a city on the sea. They needed credit and the Jews could provide it; Church prohibitions against usury meant that Christians’ moneylending activities were restricted and covert. There were a handful of very rich Jewish bankers in Venice, but most moneylending took place in pawnbrokers’ shops, catering to ordinary Venetians needing access to ordinary credit. When Venetians wanted cash, they took along a piece of furniture or clothing and pawned it as security on a short-term loan. Venice strictly regulated the rate of interest that Jewish moneylenders and pawnbrokers could charge, and taxed them steeply. Venetians recognised not only that they needed the Jews to keep cash flowing, but that they could charge them for the privilege.

Just because Venetians needed Jews didn’t mean they liked the proximity. In the late medieval era, the Jews were confined to Mestre, a small town just across the lagoon, until in 1509 much of the Venetian mainland state was lost during the War of the League of Cambrai. Jews came to Venice for shelter, as one student at the Padua yeshiva put it, ‘carrying their possessions bundled up in their garments ... in fear of their lives, vulnerable to every blow and mishap’. The patrician diarist and senator Marino Sanudo – the Serenissima’s Samuel Pepys – recorded in 1515 that resentment of the Jews had reached fever pitch. Even during Holy Week, ‘they do whatever they want,’ he complained; the preacher ‘thunders against them’, concluding that ‘it is all right to take everything the Jews have and put it towards the defence of the state, since they are our servants.’

Two weeks later, a proposal to segregate the Jews came before the Senate. The next year, the Senate decreed the foundation of the ghetto in the far northwest of the city, and a few hundred people moved into its cramped quarters, their rent higher by a third than the rate paid by the previous Christian tenants. Every morning, the ghetto gates opened. At the centre of the ghetto was the wide, unpaved campo; ringed around it were pawnshops, butchers, a bakery, a tavern. The community was self-governing, a ghetto republic within the Most Serene Republic: the Jews looked after their own finances, legislation, security, sanitation. Jewish confraternities emerged to feed and clothe the poor, to care for orphans and the sick. The earliest inhabitants of the ghetto were from Italy and Germany, and were called the Tedeschi; they were joined by Levantine Jews from Ottoman lands and by Ponentines, Jews who had been expelled from the Iberian peninsula. Within the ghetto republic, each community negotiated its own charters and obligations to the Venetian state; each maintained its own customs and devotional practices.

Historians have characterised the Venetian ghetto as porous, sharing a name but not a character with the better-known ghettos of 20th-century Europe. Sure, the gates were shut at night, the canalside jetties sealed. When the ghetto tenement towers reached nine storeys high, the Venetians ordered that the windows be boarded up because they didn’t like the feeling of being looked at. But people came and went. Jewish doctors were permitted to leave at all hours to treat Christian patients. Jewish musicians and dancers performed across the city and didn’t wear yellow caps. It wasn’t technically allowed, but Christians enjoyed watching plays in the ghetto and attending Jewish weddings. Giorgio Moretto, a Christian, had an affair with a Jewish woman called Rachel. He wore a yellow cap in the ghetto and even ate matzah at the Passover seder.

What did God think of all this interfaith traffic? The Senate offered Jews only temporary residency charters, so the question came up every few years. In 1519, when the first licence expired, the Senate heard both sides of the argument. Look at Naples: it welcomed the Jews expelled from Spain and its fortunes have precipitously declined. After Portugal expelled its Jewish community, it was rewarded by the discovery of vast riches: a sea route to India and access to the spice trade. But hadn’t Portugal’s refugee Jews been taken in by the Ottoman Empire, and hadn’t it gone on to conquer Syria and Egypt? In the end, questions of divine punishment and favour proved less compelling than cold hard cash. The Venetians wanted to build big expensive ships and they didn’t want to levy higher taxes on their own citizens. So they renewed the Jews’ charter, on steeper terms.

In its earliest decades, the Venetian ghetto became known as a centre for Hebrew scholarship and printing. Daniel Bomberg wasn’t Jewish, but he worked with Felice da Prato, the son of a rabbi, to print the first Hebrew Bible with medieval rabbinic commentaries, and employed Jewish scholars from the ghetto in his print shop. Jews corrected texts, cut type, laid out galleys; Bomberg even convinced the Senate to let pressworkers exchange their yellow caps for black ones. One Jewish scholar, Elia Levita, worked in Bomberg’s shop, replacing another Jewish scholar who had converted to Christianity: ‘May his soul be bound up in a bag full of holes,’ Levita swore. Together, Bomberg and Levita printed an Aramaic-Hebrew dictionary and the Masoret Hamasoret, a compendium of the correct spelling and notation of every word in the Hebrew Bible. Levita also worked as a tutor to Christian humanists who took a scholarly interest in the Torah. He did it for the money, though he recognised it wasn’t strictly kosher. He couldn’t help picking up some Christian theology along the way. ‘If I tasted a little of this honey, should I die?’

By the middle of the 16th century, the reforming zeal of the Catholic Church had made Levita’s relaxed attitude unthinkable. In 1553, the Talmud was condemned by the Congregation of the Inquisition, which ordered that every copy be burned. Books were piled up on the Piazza San Marco and set alight. One rabbi wrote later of the ‘continual fire which was not extinguished. I fixed these days for myself, each year, to fast, weep, and mourn, for this day was as bitter to me as the burning of the House of our God.’ Another day added to a crowded calendar of mourning. In 1568, the Senate’s blasphemy censors, the esecutori, began a campaign against all Hebrew books, claiming that ‘the perfidy of many Jews is such that they seek with diverse means to subvert our true and holy Christian faith.’ The state fined publishers, banished copies of Hebrew texts, burned yet more books on the piazza. With the Talmud banned and burned, what was left? The ghetto became a centre, instead, for the study of the Kabbalah, an esoteric tradition mostly ignored by Catholic censors.

Scholarship and the occult rubbed up against each other in the ghetto: 17th-century Jewish thinkers published major works on interfaith relations; a reconstruction of the trial of Socrates; sermons strewn through with natural philosophy; works of mathematics and music and poetry. There was a musical society, the Accademia degli Impediti (impeded, that is, by the ghetto gates). But the ghetto’s association with kabbalistic study made it a magnet for the esoteric. The Venetian Inquisition uncovered all kinds of occult practices, including one – for catching a thief – that involved a bowl of water, candles, a virgin and the appearance of a white angel. Christians came to the ghetto to have their dreams interpreted. Messiahs turned up roughly once a century. In 1523, it was David Reubeni, a traveller who claimed to be David, son of Solomon, and had some success touring his act around Italy: he left Rome in a flutter of glittering streamers, embroidered with the words of the Ten Commandments in gilded thread. In the 17th century, it was Shabbetai Tzvi, who heralded the return of the Jews to their homeland. When Tzvi’s prophet, Nathan of Gaza, washed up in the ghetto, the rabbis interrogated him until he became ‘so ashamed in their presence that he could hardly speak’. The rabbis concluded that Nathan had been possessed by an evil spirit and sent him on his way.

The decline of Venice’s fortunes in the late 17th and 18th centuries inevitably entailed the decline of the ghetto’s economic and cultural life. The Venetian Republic’s failed war with the Ottomans over Crete created enormous debt; between 1669 and 1700, the ghetto paid something like 800,000 ducats in taxes and loans. When the Senate demanded another 150,000 in 1700, the Jews refused; they didn’t have it, and the Senate had to practically detain them in the ghetto to keep them from leaving Venice. In 1773, Salomon Treves, the scion of a Jewish banking family, rented a palazzo outside of the ghetto, a sign that if you were wealthy enough you might transcend the old laws. In 1827, Treves’s son Giuseppe bought the home of a formerly glorious Venetian patrician family, but in the meantime Napoleon had conquered Venice; in 1797 the ghetto gates were torn down on his orders.

Harry Freedman​ has written varied books about Jewish history and culture: on Leonard Cohen’s spiritual sources; the Talmud; the Kabbalah; Britain’s Jews. In Shylock’s Venice, he has taken a broad brush to the history of Venice’s Jews, producing a book of lightly informative anecdotes about various residents of the ghetto, or visitors to the ghetto, or fictional characters who lived in the ghetto. One of the most intriguing is Leon of Modena, a rabbi and cantor, poet, translator, historian and gambling addict, who began a diary aged 47, in 1618, after the death of his adored eldest son, Mordecai. He wrote optimistically of interfaith toleration and sceptically about the fanaticism for the Kabbalah in the ghetto. But his life was hard. ‘From the moment I entered the world,’ he wrote, ‘I had neither tranquillity nor quiet nor rest ... I await death, which does not come.’ His perfect eldest son was dead at 26; a ne’er-do-well second son with deep gambling debts absconded to Brazil; a third son was murdered before his eyes, the result of a feud with a Christian gang. Just after Leon reports Zebulun’s murder in his diary, he lists his only ‘source of comfort’: his many works of scholarship and translation. ‘My name will never be blotted out among the Jews or in the world at large, as long as the Earth remains.’

Perhaps the best cameo is made by Sara Copia Sullam. A talented poet and musician, Sullam started a literary salon in her home in 1618. She held meetings during the day, when the ghetto gates were open, for the Christian philosophers and intellectuals who wished to come. Almost immediately, the salon attracted trouble. A correspondent wrote her increasingly aggressive letters, accusing her of sleeping with men at the salon. Numidio Paluzzi, a poet and Sullam’s tutor, conspired with a friend to steal her jewels and cash – and then blamed the heist on an evil spirit. One of her critics wrote that she was more dangerous than Eve because she didn’t believe in the immortality of the soul, and argued that she should convert. Sullam wrote back, in verse:


Lord, with you at my side, I make ready
My defence, since I am abused and harassed
By a warrior who dares to deem faithless
A soul, by Your mercy, with faith made steady.

The only unaccountable presence in the book is the titular Shylock. Freedman attempts a half-hearted argument for a ‘real-life’ Shylock in 16th-century Venice: Anselmo del Banco, a prominent banker known in the ghetto as Asher Meshullam. In The Merchant of Venice, Shylock’s daughter, Jessica, steals jewels from her father and elopes with a Christian; Anselmo’s son Jacob also stole jewels and converted to Christianity. Coincidence? OK, there’s no smoking gun, but Freedman argues that ‘the possibility exists’ that Anselmo was Shakespeare’s model. Is it too cynical to think that Shylock is here only to lend his name to the title, to make Italian Jewish history legible to British readers?

Freedman has strung together these character sketches without much sense of what their collected lives might mean. (That’s not to say they aren’t interesting: the false messiahs alone could sustain a book.) But he approaches something like an idea when he discusses the cultural efflorescence of the ghetto. He suggests that its overcrowded conditions led to a kind of concentration of Jewish culture. ‘Had the Jews of the Serenissima not been corralled into a ghetto,’ he writes, ‘the stirrings of the Jewish Enlightenment in Venice would never have occurred.’ This aligns with the relatively positive view of the ghetto in contemporary scholarship. It was permeable. Its very existence was a formal recognition of Jews’ place in Venetian society. In the words of one of its foremost historians, Benjamin Ravid, ghettoisation led ‘in certain cases to an intensification of [Jewish] cultural life’. This is probably true, but it’s also true that when Napoleon’s army arrived in May 1797, there was an explosion of music, dancing, celebration; the gates were smashed to splinters by residents who chanted in the synagogue: ‘Long live brotherhood, democracy and the Italian nation.’

Freedman concludes with the deportation of 243 of the ghetto’s Jewish community by the Nazis, but wants a more cheerful last word. The ghetto today ‘is not a place of sadness’, he writes. ‘It is a vibrant destination, a must-see for tourists’: a pairing that remaining Venetians, battling against the ecological crisis of mass tourism, might see as a contradiction in terms. The Venetian ghetto is ‘perhaps the only group of streets anywhere in the world outside Israel which still retains half a millennium of unbroken Jewish history’. What does it mean for history to be unbroken? Is it that Jews have lived on those streets for five centuries? Jews have lived pretty much everywhere for five centuries. The Venetian ghetto is braided into the history not of Jewish territoriality but of diaspora: of the German, Spanish, Ottoman, Portuguese Jews who passed through, or settled down; who became, eventually, Venetian.

I started writing this review during Passover. ‘You have made it to the seder,’ the Jewish Voice for Peace Haggadah opens, ‘to this consecrated place where we tell and tell again stories of liberation.’ Is Jewish history a circle or a line? This Passover, more than any other, has been a time to question what the history of Jewish persecution and diaspora has meant, and what it means today. I can’t read the words ‘open-air prison’ and not think of Gaza before the genocide. I can’t read about the flourishing of Jewish intellectual life in the ghetto and not think about the Palestinian universities, archives, printing presses that have been bombed, about the university students and faculty around the world facing state repression for their acts of protest and witness. I can’t read Freedman’s suggestion that ‘when religious fundamentalism is in the ascendant, Jews serve as the whipping boy against whom all can unite,’ and not think of the way Israel’s fundamentalist government has wielded that sweeping theory of history as a brutal weapon. When I was a child, my sister and I hunted during the Passover seder for the afikomen: the customary piece of broken matzah, always hidden by my grandmother (one year, in the liquor cabinet). Once it is found, the broken pieces are reunited. We learn that oppression cannot be undone, that there is no such thing as an unbroken history. Only the possibility – this year, next year, every year – of repair.