Finland must reject deportation bill aimed at stopping migration: Human rights chief

Draft law raises ‘significant human rights concerns,’ says Council of Europe's commissioner for human rights

Leila Nezirevic |18.06.2024 - 


LONDON

The Council of Europe's Commissioner for Human Rights, Michael O'Flaherty, has urged the Finnish government to reject a bill aimed at stopping “instrumentalized” migration, saying the draft legislation raises several significant “human rights concerns," local media reported Monday.

Helsinki introduced a draft law that would enable it to stop migrants coming from Russia to its eastern border and from seeking asylum in what it says could be a basis for a European-level solution.

If the bill passes, the government could decide to block the entry of asylum seekers on its border and deport them to a place where “applications for international protection are accepted,” Prime Minister Petteri Orpo recently told reporters.

Last Tuesday, the government announced that the bill has been given to parliament for consideration.

The law proposal would need the support of five-sixths of MPs and would be in force for a one-year period and once backed by lawmakers, would enable Finland to open border checkpoints on the European Union’s and NATO’s longest frontier with Russia, according to national broadcaster YLE.

Since last November, Finnish authorities have reputedly accused Moscow of carrying out a suspected "hybrid attack" and purposefully assisting undocumented migrants in crossing into the Nordic country, which Russia denied.

Following the accusations, the border crossing points on the land between Finland and Russia remain closed until further notice.

O'Flaherty said the proposed legislation "raises a number of significant human rights concerns, including with regard to the principle of non-refoulment, collective expulsion and effective remedies, among others," YLE reported.

The commissioner emphasized that the bill relies on national security grounds, but he also pointed out that "such grounds can never be invoked to justify refoulment."

"While member states are given a certain margin of appreciation with regard to the restriction of certain rights on grounds of national security, invocation of national security cannot be used as a carte blanche," O'Flaherty was quoted as saying by the broadcaster.

The human rights chief also warned that if Helsinki was to adopt the draft law, it would set a precedent for other countries, "including those with a less developed practice of upholding human rights."

In a letter sent to the government, he asked Finnish MPs not to adopt the bill and to instead deal with the issue of instrumentalized migration by engaging with domestic and international partners, according to YLE.

Last month, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) criticized Helsinki’s deportation law, which it said would set a dangerous precedent.

The UNHCR warned that preventing people seeking international protection from entering the country violates refugee and human rights rules.

"As we have witnessed at several European borders, pushback procedures put people at risk, too often leading to serious injuries or even death," Philippe Leclerc, the UNHCR's Regional Director for Europe, said in a press release.

Finland, which shares a 1,340-kilometer (832-mile) border with Russia and has eight official border crossings, became the 31st member of NATO in April last year, ending decades of military non-alignment as a result of Russia's war in Ukraine, which began on Feb. 24, 2022.

Orban regime interfered in high-profile tax fraud case, claims former tax investigator

Lajos Tiszolczi says he was told informally that he posed a risk to national security. / bne IntelliNewsFacebook

TwitterLinkedInTelegramFlipboardFeedly

By Tamas Csonka in Budapest June 18, 2024

A former tax investigator of the Hungarian Tax Office (NAV) says that high-level political orders led to the halt of an investigation against a prominent businessman, who months later established an alleged spoiler political party to further divide the opposition in the 2022 general elections.

Opposition parties say the case exposes the inner workings of the Orban regime and how the government intervenes directly in the work of investigative bodies to undermine the rule of law.

The investigation against Gyorgy Gattyan was unexpectedly terminated in the autumn of 2021 despite being close to prosecution, Lajos Tiszolczi told Hungary’s leading online political news channel Partizan on June 17.

Gattyan, who was recently ranked as Hungary’s fifth-wealthiest person with a net worth of €1bn, had a tax debt of HUF20bn (€50mn).

In the interview, the former tax official said that he learned from at least two separate sources that three people with very close government connections intervened in favour of Gattyan, who had for years fought the tax office in court after his assets were frozen in Hungary when he was ordered to pay tens of billions of tax debts. The businessman relocated much of his businesses to Luxembourg in the mid-2010s, but he continued to challenge the tax office in court. 

Tiszolczi and others working on the case were sidelined before the case was finally closed.

A few months later, Gattyan announced the launch of a new political movement, Megoldas Mozgalom (Solution Movement) running on a quasi-centrist platform with a focus on boosting digitalisation in Hungary, allegedly to lure undecided voters away from opposition parties.

Polls at the end of 2021 suggested a tight race ahead of the 2022 general elections, as the opposition ran on a joint ticket against the incumbent conservative nationalists for the first time. A number of bogus parties popped up before the election to distract voters, but unlike small, fringe parties, Megoldas Mozgalom put significant amounts of funding into its campaign.

The ruling party also unleashed an unprecedented pre-election spending splurge, including the refund of personal income tax to families and the payment of the 13-month payments to secure its victory.

Fidesz seemed to have overestimated the threat posed by the joint opposition, as it won by the biggest margin since first sweeping to power with a two-third majority in 2010. Gatttyan's fringe party barely passed the 1% threshold, which meant it did not have to reimburse hundreds of millions of campaign money.

The former NAV official also recalled that Finance Minister Mihaly Varga dismissed high-ranking NAV officials in the summer of 2021, including the head of the tax authority.

After leaving NAV, Tiszolczi applied for a job at the Integrity Authority, the anti-fraud body tasked with overseeing EU funds set up by the government in late 2022 to meet demands set by Brussels to access locked development funds. The job post was withdrawn and he was told informally that he posed a risk to national security.

After the publication of the interview, the party chairman of Megoldas Mozgalom tendered his resignation and journalists working at a small online news site, financed by Gattyan, were dismissed.

The businessman is also involved as a financier of Teqball, invented by members of Gattyan's party. It combines the elements of football and table tennis, played on a special curved table. Teqball is gaining popularity worldwide and is even aiming for inclusion in the Olympics. Gattyan had secured state grants to help the expansion of the innovation abroad.

A Political Landslide in Hungary Challenges Orbán’s Regime and the EU

Dr. András Rácz
Jun 18, 2024

License
All rights reserved
Copyright owner
IMAGO / EST&OST

Viktor Orbán, expecting a far-right surge, previously framed the recent European Parliament election as a “revolutionary moment for Brussels.” Instead, it turned out to be a revolutionary moment against him at home. The new Tisza party of Péter Magyar, a former ruling party appointee, practically eradicated the traditional opposition forces in Hungary and weakened Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz. This has consequences not only for the country’s domestic politics but also its role in the EU.
PDF


DGAP Memo No. 13, June 18, 2024, 3 pp.
application/pdf166.17 KB


On June 9, European Parliament (EP) elections were held in Hungary together with municipal ones. According to the results, Péter Magyar’s Tisza party fundamentally reshaped the political landscape and swept away most of the traditional opposition parties. Tisza gained 29.69 percent of all votes cast in the EP elections, ranking second behind the 44.62 percent of Fidesz, the worst result of Fidesz in any EP elections. Meanwhile, other opposition parties got a lot weaker. Some – like the Socialists; the liberal Momentum; the right-centrist, formerly radical Jobbik; and several smaller formations – lost practically all their EP voters. This forecasts that these parties will hardly survive the upcoming 2026 national elections, which may well be a bipolar struggle between Orbán’s Fidesz and its main challenger, Péter Magyar’s Tisza.

On the municipal and local level, Tisza participated only to a very limited extent because the short time of its existence did not permit it to have enough candidates. Yet the general trend there was the same: significant parts of the population turned away from both Viktor Orbán and traditional opposition parties and instead favored non-systemic forces. In Budapest, the incumbent opposition mayor, Gergely Karácsony, preserved his position. It should be noted, however, that he only won very narrowly over Dávid Vitézy, a candidate who ran as an independent although he was supported by Fidesz. In the Budapest assembly, the Tisza party gained ten seats, equal to Orbán's Fidesz.

These were the first elections in which Péter Magyar’s newly institutionalized political force, the Tisza party, participated. Tisza is an acronym, composed of parts of the Hungarian words “respect” (tisztelet) and “freedom” (szabadság), as well as the name of the country’s second-largest river. The party has a right-centrist political agenda with a strong focus on anti-corruption. It employs an often-populist rhetoric about the need to replace the old political elites of both the government and the opposition. This agenda resonates extremely well among large segments of the Hungarian population and managed to activate at least half a million voters who had previously been politically passive and disillusioned. The formerly dormant party, taken over by Péter Magyar in April 2024, is on the rise throughout the entire country with a rapidly growing number of activists.

Hungary Shifting to the Right in the European Parliament

The most important change after the June election is that the entire Hungarian representation in the European Parliament shifted toward the Right. Hungary holds 21 seats there. According to the final results, Viktor Orbán’s coalition, the Fidesz-Christian Democrats, will have 11 of them in the new EP. Although this is two mandates fewer than the 13 they gained in 2019, Fidesz is still the absolute winner among Hungary’s political parties.

The Tisza party received seven mandates, which is an unprecedentedly strong result from a newly established party. The leftist-populist Democratic Coalition party of former Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány lost half of its previous four seats. Neither the Socialist party nor the Jobbik passed the five percent threshold. This was also true for the liberal Momentum, which had two seats between 2019 and 2024. Instead, the far-right, anti-Western, and pro-Russian Our Homeland (Mi Hazánk) party made it into the EP by gaining one seat.

Regarding their membership in the political groups of the new European Parliament, the European People’s Party (EPP) is already negotiating with Péter Magyar about the Tisza party joining its ranks. Manfred Weber, its president, openly invited Magyar into the EPP.

The loss of the seats of the two members of European Parliament (MEPs) from Momentum fits into the trend of liberal political parties getting weaker in this election. The fallout also extends to Renew Europe, the parliamentary group to which Momentum belongs. Meanwhile, the MEP from the far-right Our Homeland party will most probably join the Identity and Democracy (ID) group, thus contributing to the strengthening of forces hostile to the EU and NATO. Still, the rightist-conservative “revolution” in the EP that Orbán expected did not materialize. This election only made his own Fidesz party weaker.

It is not yet clear which political group Orbán’s party will join. Now having 11 MEPs, Orbán is a comparatively less valuable partner to any political group than he was in 2019 when he had two mandates more. Hence, his ambitions about forging a united Euroskeptic political group in the EP under his leadership were made even more unrealistic than they already had been. This is particularly true because Orbán has not become any less toxic as a coalition partner. Not only does Hungary have prevailing rule of law problems, but it also maintains close ties to Russia and China, the latter illustrated by the 3-day visit of China’s President Xi Jinping to Budapest in mid-May. Hence, it is far from evident that the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), dominated by Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, would risk losing other members for the sake of Orbán’s 11 seats. Meanwhile, if Orbán joined the ID, where the extreme-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) sat until May 2024 and intends to return, he would risk further damaging Hungary’s already strained ties with Berlin. If not invited by the ECR, it may well happen that Orbán waits out the end of the Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the European Union in December 2024 before starting to push for joining any other political groups to avoid any unnecessary tensions.

 
Hungary Is Preparing for a Low-Profile, Constructive EU Presidency

The reshuffling of the Hungarian political landscape does not affect the plans of the upcoming Hungarian EU Presidency. Unlike in France or Belgium, the relative weakening of the government did not result in early elections. Hence, the Hungarian government will continue to prepare for taking over the EU presidency in July 2024 and conducting it in an orderly manner.

In Hungary’s political system, EU affairs are run by a separate ministry that is led by János Bóka, an experienced, constructive technocrat. Bóka has served as Viktor Orbán’s “EU sherpa” for years and enjoys the prime minister’s trust. The fact that EU affairs belong to a dedicated ministry may well help mitigate the problems originating from the unusually close ties of Hungary’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Péter Szijjártó, with Russia.

 
Rule of Law Procedure Will Become More Complicated

In the longer run, the restructuring of Hungary’s political representation in the European Parliament may still complicate the EP’s work related to Budapest. The reason is that the incoming MEPs from Péter Magyar’s Tisza party, unlike the previous MEPs from the Socialists and Momentum whom they are replacing, are fairly critical of the rule of law procedure. One of their core objectives is to restart the flow of EU funds to Hungary – a goal that they share with the agenda of Orbán.

Therefore, it will become more complicated for the EP to rely on the work of Hungarian MEPs in maintaining and supporting the rule of law procedure with continuous updates and assessments. In the previous EP, the two Momentum MEPs, Anna Donáth and Katalin Cseh, played a pioneering rule in doing so. In the new setup, however, there will be no Hungarian MEP able or willing to continue this work.

Germany Needs to Prepare for the Erosion of the Orbán System

The sudden rise of the Tisza party is another indicator of the gradual weakening of Viktor Orbán’s regime. Hungary’s low economic growth paired with its still high inflation, high budget deficit, and low wages stands in sharp contrast with how the elites close to Orbán keep accumulating wealth by misusing state funds. In addition to being challenged by the country’s economic troubles, the regime lost two prominent politicians this spring in an unprecedentedly serious scandal related to pedophilia. Consequently, both President Katalin Novák and Minister of Justice Judit Varga had to resign – the latter had been tapped to lead the EP list of Fidesz. These EP elections again demonstrated that resistance is growing against Orbán and his party within Hungarian society and that, despite the regime’s overwhelming domestic propaganda apparatus, it is less and less able to defuse these tensions.

Still, the Hungarian political system has been designed for prioritizing stability. The next parliamentary elections are scheduled to take place in spring 2026. Hence, unless Orbán decides to go for early elections – which he is unlikely to do, as he would most probably lose his current constitutional supermajority – Hungary will still be run by the Fidesz government for at least two more years. Growing domestic, economic, and foreign policy tensions are unlikely to reach any explicit breaking point; instead, a continued, gradual degradation is likely in the overall efficiency of governance in Hungary. The weakening Orbán system is highly likely to keep leveraging on its remaining veto positions in the European Union to demonstrate power at home and possibly get much-needed financial concessions from the EU. This will make Budapest an increasingly complicated partner in matters of common EU foreign policy.


BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA

Rácz, András. “A Political Landslide in Hungary Challenges Orbán’s Regime and the EU.” DGAP Memo 13 (2024). German Council on Foreign Relations. June 2024. https://doi.org/10.60823/DGAP-24-40836-en.
LICENSE
CC BY-NC-SA 4.0
PROGRAM
Center for Order and Governance in Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia


Dr. András Rácz
Senior Research Fellow, Center for Order and Governance in Eastern Europe, Russ…

Meloni has not-so-quietly continued her crusade against women’s and LGBT rights

written by Micaela Bongi

• Published on  June 18, 2024

The guests got the royal treatment: breathtaking locations, renowned chefs, all Italian style. And so did the hostess: it seems we are willing to turn a blind eye (or both) when it comes to the finer details of Giorgia’s (mother and Christian) version of “Italian style.”

The text backtracking on abortion and LGBTQ+ rights was eventually signed by the G7 gathered in Puglia with hardly a care, despite initial resistance from the U.S. and Macron’s “regret.” So we should simply pretend that nothing has changed from the text signed in Hiroshima last year: this suits everyone, each with their own domestic troubles. It especially suits the Italian premier, who gets a win by not having to back down. It’s an old story, one that keeps repeating.

One might recall that on September 11, 2023, the website of the Prime Minister’s office announced that “on the occasion of her visit to the State of Qatar,” Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni met with Emir Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani to “strengthen the excellent bilateral and personal relations” between them. During their talk, they spoke about “the major opportunities for collaboration for our businesses.”

And yet, just two years before, in July 2021, the same Giorgia Meloni – of course, before she was triumphantly installed as Prime Minister – had some accusatory words: “In the Draghi government, there is great inconsistency and hypocrisy on the issue of the fight against homophobia. I will present a bill in Parliament in which I will ask the government to stop any form of trade agreement with countries where homosexuality is a crime, such as Qatar. Hypocrisy bothers me a lot.”

The contradictions that political leaders fall into when they move from opposition to government are a well that never runs dry. However, the current Prime Minister must hold the record on hypocrisy. Hiding behind whataboutism is a specialty for her and her ministers (“But what about the Khmer Rouge?”).

The truth is that in June 2021, the Draghi government had added its signature to a declaration by 13 European countries against the Hungarian anti-LGBTQ+ law, which banned so-called “homosexual propaganda” in schools, advertising and TV programs aimed at minors. This was the actual impulse behind Meloni’s reaction, which amounted to “What about Qatar?” Then, during the electoral campaign, the FdI’s Federico Mollicone readily embraced the Orbán doctrine with his own “What about Peppa Pig?” (a polar bear with two mothers appeared in one episode of the very popular cartoon).

It’s hardly worth mentioning that the Meloni government (together with Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) did not support the EU Commission’s subsequent appeal against the Hungarian law. Ursula von der Leyen had called the law “disgraceful” because it “puts homosexuality and gender reassignment on a par with pornography” and “uses the protection of children … as an excuse to severely discriminate against people because of their sexual orientation.”

On LGBTQ+ issues, the Meloni government has cut an unmistakable figure on several occasions, in Italy and across Europe: the crusade against the two mothers in the Peppa Pig cartoon during the electoral campaign was matched by the war against the real-life children of same-sex couples, against social transition in schools and against drugs for transgender teenagers. Sexual and emotional education remain taboo.

In May, Italy was among the several European countries (not quite the most enlightened bunch on the issue) that refused to approve the declaration on the advancement of human rights for LGBT+ people prepared by the Belgian rotating presidency of the EU Council, presented on the occasion of the International Day against Homophobia, Transphobia and Biphobia. It’s certainly a way to stand out.

And now, Italy offered its guests at Borgo Egnazia yet more revealing images, right on the eve of the Pride march in Rome. Giorgia’s FdI have been very worried these days because the fisticuffs in Parliament risked damaging the country’s pristine image in front of the world’s bigwigs. It’s a shame that the right-wing physical violence in Parliament simply reflects the cultural, social and political backwardness of the party led by the country’s first woman premier.

Italy refused to sign the European declaration on LGBT+ rights for the same reason it decided to water down the final document of the G7 in Puglia compared to the one in Hiroshima. It’s because the previous year’s text contained (same as the failed Zan decree) something Meloni & co. cast as their greatest enemy, “gender identity,” at the basis of the fictitious “gender ideology” invented by reactionary right-wingers across the world to justify homophobic and transphobic impulses and reassure the most backward and nostalgic part of their base and electorate (and it’s not just old timers, as the Fanpage investigation shows). Similarly, the word “abortion” and the reference to the role of education also disappeared from the final document of the Puglia G7.

Of course, the premier is claiming this is all fake news: no backtracking on abortion (even though pro-life groups are now being allowed into clinics), no wavering on LGBT rights. This is Giorgia Meloni, not some Vannacci, after all. And that’s clearly good enough for the outgoing president of the EU Commission, who, with her goal of a second mandate at the helm of the Union in sight, doesn’t seem worried about the Orban-like tendencies of one of her major partners in dialogue.

Is that self-contradiction? Hypocrisy? Sudden alarm at the supposed encroachment of “gender theory”? Or fear of the return of Peppa Pig causing her to miss out on a second term?

Il manifesto global

G7 Summit 2024: A Critical Analysis

The recent G7 summit in Italy concluded with an official statement that underscored
key takeaways and ongoing challenges.

BY PROF. ENGR. ZAMIR AHMED AWAN
JUNE 18, 2024

Image source: X @GiorgiaMeloni

The recent G7 summit in Italy concluded with an official statement that underscored key takeaways and ongoing challenges. While the summit aimed to address pressing global issues, it was evident that underlying political dynamics and strategic objectives, particularly regarding China and Russia, played a significant role. This analysis highlights the successes and shortcomings of the summit, as well as the broader geopolitical implications.

Key Takeaways from the G7 Summit

Focus on AI and Technology Regulation:

Italy, under Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, prioritized the regulation of artificial intelligence (AI). Pope Francis, a former chemist, made an unprecedented appearance to advocate for AI regulation, emphasizing its potential harms.

Italy’s temporary ban on ChatGPT in March 2024 showcased its proactive stance on AI scrutiny.

Outreach to Non-Western Nations:

The G7 attempted to broaden its engagement beyond Western democracies by inviting leaders from India, Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Algeria, Kenya, and Mauritania. This move aimed to bridge the “West vs. the Rest” gap, especially concerning the Ukraine crisis. It was an attempt to expand blocks beyond West and take some other emerging powers on board.

Financial Sanctions on Russia:

A core issue was the proposal to use dividends from frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine. This proposal, initiated by Washington, faced opposition from European members and Japan. The debate highlighted the complexities of international financial sanctions and the geopolitical tug-of-war over their implementation. Some of the US allies were of opposite views and President Joe Biden failed to convince them.

Failures and Criticisms

Geopolitical Motives and US Hegemony:

The summit’s agenda appeared heavily influenced by the US’s strategic objectives to counter China and Russia, raising concerns about the G7 being used as a tool for US geopolitical dominance.

The exclusion of Russia since the 2014 G8 shrinkage to G7 and the recent focus on isolating China reflect a shift from economic cooperation to big-power rivalry.

Out of 7, six leaders were having domestic issue at home and were not strong enough to make a solid contribution at the Summit. President Biden, who is going to have a tough election by the end of this year, was losing his popularity within American voters. He might face very tough competition from former President Trump. He is equally unpopular globally for his irrational support to Israel and genocide in Gaza. Furthermore, during his tenure, Afghan debacle, Ukraine War, Gaza Genocide, and de-dollarization happened, making his presidency a weak and failure. French President is also going for election soon. Canadian Prime Minister, who is very much popular globally, but, may face very tough completion at home from opposition. Japanese Prime Minister is one of the weakest prime Minister in the history of Japan. German Chancellor is also facing domestic issues. I think only Italian Prime Minister was strong and enjoying full support of his people. Under this scenario, the six leaders were not in a strong position to contribute something solid at the G-7 summit.

Divisions Among G7 Members:

The inability to reach a consensus on using Russian assets for Ukraine highlighted fractures within the G7. European and Japanese resistance to US pressure revealed underlying tensions and differing priorities among member states.

The lack of agreement on this financial issue demonstrated the limits of G7’s cohesion and effectiveness in addressing complex global challenges. Some of the US allies were of opposite views and President Joe Biden failed to convince them.

Perception of Selective Human Rights Advocacy:

The summit’s approach to Russia’s financial assets raised questions about the selective application of human rights and international law. Critics argue that such actions undermine the credibility of Western institutions and set a dangerous precedent for future geopolitical conflicts.

The G7’s stance risks alienating non-Western countries, especially those involved in BRICS, by demonstrating a willingness to violate international norms for strategic gains.

Emerging Counterbalance: The Rise of BRICS

Expansion and Single Currency:

The BRICS bloc is gaining momentum as a counterbalance to the G7. The upcoming BRICS summit in Kazan, chaired by Russian President Vladimir Putin, aims to expand membership and create a single currency to facilitate economic relations amidst Western sanctions.

The development of an independent payment system for BRICS countries reflects a strategic move to reduce reliance on Western financial systems and mitigate the impact of sanctions.

Diverse and Open Partnership:

BRICS emphasizes an inclusive and non-bloc partnership, contrasting with the G7’s perceived elitism. This approach is attracting numerous countries, with around 30 seeking BRICS membership, indicating a shift towards a more multipolar global order.

Challenge to Western Hegemony:

The BRICS initiative to create a viable structure for economic cooperation and resilience against Western pressure signifies a growing challenge to US and Western hegemony. The group’s focus on mutual interests and equal dialogue contrasts sharply with the G7’s current trajectory.

Navigating Uncharted Waters

The G7 summit in Italy highlighted the group’s attempts to address global issues while navigating complex geopolitical landscapes. However, the summit also exposed the inherent contradictions and challenges within the G7, particularly its alignment with US strategic interests and the resulting divisions among members. The movement for European Sovereignty is gaining momentum too. As BRICS continues to emerge as a formidable counterbalance, the international community faces a shifting dynamic where traditional Western-led institutions must adapt to a more multipolar world order. There are almost 100 countries interested to join BRICS in the near future. The future of global cooperation will depend on the ability of these blocs to reconcile their differences and work towards inclusive, sustainable solutions.

Prof. Engr. Zamir Ahmed Awan

Prof. Engr. Zamir Ahmed Awan, Sinologist (ex-Diplomat), Non-Resident Fellow of CCG (Center for China and Globalization), National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), Islamabad, Pakistan.

Meloni gets her way at the G7: war, Mattei Plan and ‘sovereign rights’

written by Giovanna Branca

 Analysis. While the situation on the ground in Ukraine is more and more difficult, the document put together by the seven used the same watchwords we have often found in their speeches.

• Location

  BARI, Italy

• Published on

  June 18, 2024

At the G7 meeting, Ukraine was the number one issue, as shown by the special role given to President Zelensky, the bilateral meeting between him and Joe Biden, and the summit’s focus on Russian aggression.

It was the same with the seven leaders’ final statement: “We reaffirm our unwavering support for Ukraine for as long as it takes.”

Then again, Ukraine is the only point of the document on which the seven – and especially the host, Giorgia Meloni – have any concrete achievements to show: the €50 billion loan covered by the interest on frozen Russian sovereign wealth funds – dubbed “Era: Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration Loans for Ukraine” – and the 10-year bilateral agreement with the United States. Complementing all this was the condemnation of Russia’s “brutal and unjustifiable war of aggression,” and its “irresponsible” appeal to nuclear rhetoric.

While the situation on the ground in Ukraine is more and more difficult, the document put together by the seven used the same watchwords we have often found in their speeches in recent days, which seem to highlight rather than dispel a serious underlying concern about the future course of the conflict. Thus, we read insistent assurances that it’s not true that “time is on Russia’s side,” that “destroying infrastructure and livelihoods has no consequences for Russia,” or that “Russia can prevail by causing Ukraine to fail economically.”

The not-so-subtle threats against China, which is supplying technology to Moscow that is being used to build weapons, were a recurring theme, both in the long chapter on Kyiv as well as in the entire chapter on the Indo-Pacific, which, in the diplomatic language used on these occasions, Beijing is framed as the source of instability throughout the region, from Taiwan to the Philippines and North Korea – with the exception of Myanmar’s military junta, which was deemed to deserve blame all on its own.

Of course, there was no chance that the persecution of Muslims by the newly re-elected Indian government led by Narendra Modi would make it into the document, on the day the Indian prime minister came to Borgo Egnazia (and held a bilateral meeting with Meloni in the evening) along with the other leaders invited as part of the so-called “outreach” – trumpeted for days as proof that the G7 is not a private club intended only for the rich and predominantly white – including Turkey’s Erdogan, Argentina’s Javier Milei and Brazil’s Lula.

The second-most-prominent theme in the final document was Gaza. However, after the dutiful condemnation of the Hamas massacre, the words used in defense of the rights of civilians in the Strip, as well as in the Occupied Territories, were more milquetoast than those already uttered on several occasions by the president of the United States in an attempt to stem Benyamin Netanyahu’s murderous and unscrupulous advance into the Gaza Strip, where almost nothing remains standing.

“We fully endorse and will stand behind the comprehensive deal outlined by President Biden,” the document reads, “that would lead to an immediate ceasefire in Gaza, the release of all hostages, a significant and sustained increase in the flow of humanitarian assistance throughout Gaza, and an enduring end to the crisis, with Israel’s security interests and safety for Palestinian civilians in Gaza assured.”

That, of course, would be the panacea for all ills. “We are deeply concerned by the consequences on the civilian population of the ongoing ground operations in Rafah,” the seven lamented as the offensive has already been underway for weeks, “and the possibility of a full-scale military offensive that would have further dire consequences for civilians.” They also tut-tutted at settler violence and paid the usual fealty to a two-state solution. There are also a few sentences on the fears of the conflict widening, from the Houthi-patrolled Gulf of Aden to Lebanon and Iran: Tehran “must cease its destabilizing actions.”

In third place, Meloni managed to put her own pet project, the Mattei Plan for Africa, under the heading “Fostering Partnerships with African Countries”: “We will reinforce mutually beneficial and equitable cooperation with African countries and regional organizations.” Accordingly, the G7 “welcome the Mattei Plan for Africa launched by Italy.” The counterpart, and counterpoint, could be found several pages further, in the “Migration” section.

The G7 leaders reiterated the same vague three-point recipe as always: “focus on the root causes of irregular migration” (sounding as ambitious as ever), “efforts to enhance border management,” and “safe and regular pathways for migration.”

However, the real core of the policy shines through further down: “we will step up our efforts to prevent and address irregular migration, counter the illegal activities that facilitate it, and tackle the challenges it poses to individuals and societies. We affirm the sovereign right of states to control their borders, as well as their prerogative to govern migration within their jurisdiction.”

The stress on the “sovereign right” is another achievement by Meloni, while Biden is reeling from the consequences of his disgraceful executive order shutting down the southern border of the United States, abandoning countless promises in the process. All in all, the Italian prime minister had her way on all fronts.

Il manifesto global

The Specter of Neo-Fascism Is Haunting Europe

SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK

Jun 18, 2024

With mainstream parties and politicians already preparing to accommodate the far right following this month's European Parliament election, the axiom of post-World War II European democracy has been quietly abandoned. “No collaboration with fascists" is being replaced by a tacit acceptance of them.

LJUBLJANA – The surprise in this month’s European Parliament elections was that the outcome everyone expected really did come to pass. To paraphrase a classic scene from the Marx Brothers: Europe may be talking and acting like it is moving to the radical right, but don’t let that fool you; Europe really is moving to the radical right.

Anatomy of a Massacre
SHLOMO BEN-AMI considers what the 1860 massacre of Christians in Damascus can and cannot teach us about preventing genocide.


Why should we insist on this interpretation? Because most of the mainstream media has sought to downplay it. The message we keep hearing is: “Sure, Marine Le Pen, Giorgia Meloni, and Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) occasionally flirt with fascist motifs, but there is no reason to panic, because they still respect democratic rules and institutions once in power.” Yet this domestication of the radical right should trouble us all, because it signals a readiness by traditional conservative parties to go along with the new movement. The axiom of post-World War II European democracy, “No collaboration with fascists,” has been quietly abandoned.

The message of this election is clear. The political divide in most EU countries is no longer between the moderate right and the moderate left, but between the conventional right, embodied by the big winner, the European People’s Party (comprising Christian democrats, liberal-conservatives, and traditional conservatives) and the neo-fascist right represented by Le Pen, Meloni, AfD, and others.

The question now is whether the EPP will collaborate with neo-fascists. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is spinning the outcome as a triumph of the EPP against both “extremes,” yet the new parliament will include no left-wing parties whose extremism is even distantly comparable to that of the far right. Such a “balanced” view from the EU’s top official sends an ominous signal.

When we talk about fascism today, we should not confine ourselves to the developed West. A similar kind of politics has been ascendant in much of the Global South as well. In his study of China’s development, the Italian Marxist historian Domenico Losurdo (also known for his rehabilitation of Stalin) stresses the distinction between economic and political power. In pursuing his “reforms,” Deng Xiaoping knew that elements of capitalism are necessary to unleash a society’s productive forces; but he insisted that political power should remain firmly in the hands of the Communist Party of China (as the self-proclaimed representative of the workers and farmers).

This approach has deep historical roots. For over a century, China has embraced the “pan-Asianism” that emerged toward the end of the nineteenth century as a reaction against Western imperialist domination and exploitation. As historian Viren Murthy explains, this project has always been driven by a rejection not of Western capitalism, but of Western liberal individualism and imperialism. By drawing on pre-modern traditions and institutions, pan-Asianists argued, Asian societies could organize their own modernization to achieve even greater dynamism than the West.

While Hegel himself saw Asia as a domain of rigid order that does not allow for individualism (free subjectivity), pan-Asianists proposed a new Hegelian conceptual framework. Since the freedom offered by Western individualism ultimately negates order and leads to social disintegration, they argued, the only way to preserve freedom is to channel it into a new collective agency.

One early example of this model can be found in Japan’s militarization and colonialist expansion before WWII. But historical lessons are soon forgotten. In the search for solutions to big problems, many in the West could be newly attracted to the Asian model of subsuming individualistic drives and the longing for meaning in a collective project.

Pan-Asianism tended to oscillate between its socialist and fascist versions (with the line between the two not always clear), reminding us that “anti-imperialism” is not as innocent as it may appear. In the first half of the twentieth century, Japanese and German fascists regularly presented themselves as defenders against American, British, and French imperialism, and one now finds far-right nationalist politicians taking similar positions vis-à-vis the European Union.

The same tendency is discernible in post-Deng China, which political scientist A. James Gregor classifies as “a variant of contemporary fascism”: a capitalist economy controlled and regulated by an authoritarian state whose legitimacy is framed in the terms of ethnic tradition and national heritage. That is why Chinese President Xi Jinping makes a point of referring to China’s long, continuous history stretching back to antiquity. Harnessing economic impulses for the sake of nationalistic projects is the very definition of fascism, and similar political dynamics can also be found in India, Russia, Turkey, and other countries.

It is not hard to see why this model has gained traction. While the Soviet Union suffered a chaotic disintegration, the CPC pursued economic liberalization but still maintained tight control. Thus, leftists who are sympathetic toward China praise it for keeping capital subordinated, in contrast to the US and European systems, where capital reigns supreme.

But the new fascism is also supported by more recent trends. Beyond Le Pen, another big winner of the European elections is Fidias Panayiotou, a Cypriot YouTube personality who previously gained attention for his efforts to hug Elon Musk. While waiting outside Twitter’s headquarters for his target, he encouraged his followers to “spam” Musk’s mother with his request. Eventually, Musk did meet and hug Panayiotou, who went on to announce his candidacy to the European Parliament. Running on an anti-partisan platform, he won 19.4% of the popular vote and secured himself a seat.

Similar figures have also cropped up in France, the United Kingdom, Slovenia, and elsewhere, all justifying their candidacies with the “leftist” argument that since democratic politics has become a joke, clowns might as well run for office. This is a dangerous game. If enough people despair of emancipatory politics and accept the withdrawal into buffoonery, the political space for neo-fascism widens.

Reclaiming that space requires serious, authentic action. For all my disagreements with French President Emmanuel Macron, I think he was correct to respond to the French far right’s victory by dissolving the National Assembly and calling for new legislative elections. His announcement caught almost everyone off guard, and it is certainly risky. But it is a risk worth taking. Even if Le Pen wins and decides who will be the next prime minister, Macron, as president, will retain the ability to mobilize a new majority against the government. We must take the fight to the new fascism as forcefully and as fast as possible.

THUMBNAIL LE PEN  Horacio Villalobos/Corbis/Getty Images


SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK
Writing for PS since 2022
33 Commentaries
Follow
Slavoj Žižek, Professor of Philosophy at the European Graduate School, is International Director of the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities at the University of London and the author, most recently, of Christian Atheism: How to Be a Real Materialist (Bloomsbury Academic, 2024).

After 489 days of hell, Ilaria Salis returns to freedom

written by Mario Di Vito

 Report. Now, a new story begins, featuring the honorable MEP Ilaria Salis, a member of the European Left.

• Published on

  June 18, 2024

As of Friday morning, 489 days after her arrest, Ilaria Salis was once again a free woman. Before noon, two police officers rang at the front door of the Budapest apartment where the Italian woman had been held in house arrest for just over three weeks and dismantled her ankle monitor, according to the latest ruling by Judge Joseph Sos.

In the ruling, some 10 pages long in total, the judge referenced a ruling by the European Court of Justice that MEP status should be deemed to be in effect from the moment of election, without the need to wait for it to be officially formalized. Thus, as a result of the 176,000 votes she received as part of the Left Green Alliance (AVS) list, Salis has regained her freedom and was expected to return to Italy as early as Saturday: a moment of great happiness for her, and a slap in the face to those who have spent months lamenting how wrong it was to politicize the affair.

Ilaria turned 40 on Monday, and her parents had already bought tickets to go visit her in Hungary. Roberto Salis, her father, ended up leaving early and was already in Budapest on Friday.

“We’ll celebrate at home,” he said, his voice understandably shaking with emotion. “I’m going to pick her up and bring her back. I’m trying to arrange the trip back as fast as possible. I’ve been working behind the scenes, but I didn’t expect her to be released as early as today (on Friday, n. ed.). But then, the Hungarian lawyer called me to tell me that the police were on their way to release her.”

There were congratulations from Italian Ambassador Manuel Jacoangeli, who said in a press release that Salis had expressed her gratitude “for the great support she always received, starting from her time in prison.” The trial of the AVS MEP is officially suspended: it will continue when her term in Strasbourg ends, or perhaps sooner, although the road ahead looks complicated.

Hungary is expected to request the revocation of the immunity acquired by Ilaria Salis after the election; however, a decision on this has not been made, despite the solemn proclamations of Orbán’s spokesmen and the not-so-hidden hopes of much of the Italian right. Specifically, the process stipulates first of all that the Budapest prosecutor’s office must express its intention to pursue the case. At that point, the ball would pass to the Hungarian government, which would have to forward a request to the European Parliament, to be subjected to a floor vote. Even in the event that the majority should decide to authorize suspending her immunity, there is a further step: the Hungarian judicial authority would have to send a European arrest warrant to Italy, on which an Italian court of appeals would have the final say – namely, the Court of Milan, which has territorial jurisdiction over the matter in question.

Those who would decide would be the same judges who on March 28 denied Hungary’s request for the extradition of another Italian anti-fascist, Gabriele Marchesi, accused of the same crimes Ilaria Salis was charged with, namely assaulting some neo-Nazis in February 2023, as the “Day of Honor” commemorating the SS was taking place in Budapest. The reason for the Milan court’s rejection was the lack of clarity offered by Budapest about the situation in its prisons. In a number of letters she wrote from inside Gyorskocsi Utca Prison, Ilaria Salis described cramped and overcrowded rooms, rats and cockroaches, appalling sanitary conditions, rotten food and inmates put in chains. In January, the wider world got a glimpse of this reality when images were released of the Italian woman making her entrance into the courthouse in shackles and held on a leash by a guard.

This marked the beginning of a campaign that, first of all, succeeded in awakening the Italian government from its indifference to the affair (at least in part, that is, and not always with visible results), then managed to reach the Quirinale Palace, with President Sergio Mattarella going so far as to call Roberto Salis personally to express his support. And, finally, it led to the many votes for Ilaria last Sunday, contributing in no small measure to AVS’s electoral success.

Now, a new story begins, featuring the honorable MEP Ilaria Salis, a member of the European Left. Her work will focus first and foremost on prisoners’ rights and anti-fascism, which – as she told il manifesto – she considers to be “a culture that is living, heartfelt and in tune with the great issues of today: social inequality, discrimination, war and climate change.” It’s the start on a road to freedom to come.

Il manifesto global

 

EU’s tariff plan targeting Chinese EVs to undermine its own green transition: official

By

 Xinhua News Agency

The European Union’s plan to impose additional duties on imports of Chinese electric vehicles (EVs) will undermine its own green and low-carbon transformation and the global response to climate change, a Chinese official said Tuesday.

Li Chao, spokesperson of the National Development and Reform Commission, made the remarks at a press conference.

The European Commission on June 12 unveiled a preliminary decision to impose provisional tariffs on EVs imported from China after its anti-subsidy investigation. The pre-disclosed duties range from 17.4 percent to 38.1 percent, in addition to the standard 10 percent vehicle duty already in place.

Disregarding facts and rules and preconceiving outcomes, the investigation is actually weaponized and politicized, jeopardizing fair competition in the name of safeguarding it, Li said.

Practice has fully proved that shortsighted trade protectionism is not an option, Li added.

The proposed tariffs, if implemented, would not only harm Chinese enterprises but also impede the long-term healthy development of EU companies as well as disrupt and distort the global automotive industry and supply chains, including the section within the EU, Li warned.

He noted that such measures would not only harm the interests of EU consumers but also exacerbate the EU’s dependence on foreign fossil fuels as well as hinder EU’s green and low-carbon transformation efforts.

China supports auto companies of all countries in participating in fair competition and is dedicated to maintaining the stability of global automotive industry and supply chains, Li said.

He expressed the hope that the EU will think and act with prudence, respect basic economic laws and the rules of the World Trade Organization, heed calls from its own industry, and rectify its erroneous practices.