EMOTIONAL PLAGUE

Schools across US hit with dozens of false shooting, bomb threats. Experts say it's a 'cruel hoax'




Jeanine Santucci, USA TODAY
Sun, September 18, 2022 at 4:00 AM·6 min read

Across the country, dozens of schools went on lockdown. Students and teachers hid in classrooms. Police searched campuses. Parents panicked.

Each time, there was no threat. Officials say there's been a wave of false reports of school shootings and threats of violence over the last several days. USA TODAY found at least 30 active shooter false alarms and threats made at schools last week.

Authorities haven't publicly said the incidents are related, but experts say these intentional false reports have similarities. Their origins can be difficult or impossible to trace, but waves of false alarms are often the work of disgruntled pranksters trying to disrupt school or malicious bad actors trying to sow fear. And such hoaxes seem to increase around this time of year with students returning to classrooms.

"A red flag... is when you start seeing a chunk of these very similar threats in multiple cities in one area or region or state, and then others in another state. It's usually a red flag for what they call swatting," said Kenneth Trump, a school safety expert.

"Swatting" is making a hoax call to law enforcement to deliberately cause a large police or SWAT team response. Sometimes, an individual does it to single out someone specific, but the calls can also be done in waves as a trend to seemingly random targets.

MORE ON SHOOTINGS: Mass killings database reveals trends, details and anguish in every US event since 2006

INCREASED VIOLENCE: Shots fired in US schools spiked dramatically last year, gun violence report finds
False school shooting reports in Florida, California and more

In Texas on Tuesday, Houston authorities received a call that said two shooters were rampaging Heights High School and 10 students had been shot. Police did a room-by-room search of the school. They found no trace of a shooting.

Similar false reports happened at several other schools in Texas and California that day.

On Wednesday, threats made on social media temporarily shuttered schools in the Thorndale Independent School District in central Texas, Eisenhower High School outside of Houston and a false shooting report put a Fresno, California high school on lockdown.

The same thing happened Thursday in Santa Barbara, California where another false shooting report was phoned in, and in Northampton, Massachusetts, where a school received a bomb threat on social media.

False shooting reports were also called in about schools in Florida, Arkansas, Oregon, Illinois, Kansas and Oklahoma.

Fear among students, parents during hoaxes

Seventeen-year-old Ray High School junior Amaris Sanchez talks on the phone outside the school after police responded to a false report of an active shooter on Friday, Sept. 16, 2022. The report prompted a lockdown before police determined it was false, and students were released early.

Amaris Sanchez, 17, was in English class at W.B. Ray High School in Corpus Christi, Texas, on Friday when the school went on lockdown after police got a call about an active shooter on campus. It turned out to be false.

“I was mentally preparing myself, you know, whatever happens,” Sanchez told the Corpus Christi Caller Times, part of the USA TODAY Network. “It was a very scary moment because you don’t know what was going to happen. I didn’t know at the moment if I was going to be OK.”

Belen Alaniz, a parent of two children at South Fort Myers High School in Florida where a false shooting report was made Friday, told the Fort Myers News-Press, part of the USA TODAY Network, she left work immediately when she heard about a shooting on campus.

"The first thought was leaving work and I didn't care," Alaniz said. "I told my manager, 'I'm leaving,' and I ran out the door. I didn't even clock out because that's how afraid I was."
FBI probing possible connections in slew of threats

Local FBI field offices in a few states are working with police to determine whether there is a connection between some of the threats.

“We’re working with local authorities and our field offices nationwide to determine if there is a link. Obviously, any hoax threat to a school can have serious consequences for students, teachers and others, as well as first responders, and can be prosecuted as a crime," said Laura Eimiller, a spokesperson for the FBI's Los Angeles field office.

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In the wake of the elementary school shooting in Uvalde, Texas, that killed 19 fourth-graders and their two teachers, schools and families across the country are on high alert and in a constant state of anxiety over school safety, Trump said. "People are on edge," he said.

Many of the recent false alarms have fallen into two categories, said Trump, who said he has no relation to the former president and heads the Cleveland-based National School Safety and Security Services.

In some cases, threats are made by members of the local community, oftentimes teenagers or young adults who are disgruntled with the school or who might be trying to pull a prank or get out of a test.

"They're not realizing that once you press send, you can't put the threat back into the smartphone," Trump said. "And then when the ton of bricks hits, as happens in many other teen bad decisions, in this case, you're getting significant consequences."

Those consequences can include suspension, expulsion, criminal prosecution and serious fines. Just last week, authorities say teens were charged in Michigan and Florida for making school shooting threats.

The other category of swatting threats comes from malicious outside parties that often have no connection to the schools or the local communities. They can be generated from anywhere in the country or even internationally.

"The FBI is aware of the numerous swatting incidents wherein a report of an active shooter at a school is made. The FBI takes swatting very seriously because it puts innocent people at risk," the FBI said in a statement to USA TODAY.

Hoax threats drain resources, traumatize students and staff

Students and parents reunite at South Fort Myers High School after a threat of a gun was called in Friday afternoon. Lee County Sheriff's Office declared that there was no active shooter after officers searched the school. It was declared a "swatting" incident.

The false reports of active shootings can traumatize students and staff. They also drain significant resources from schools and local authorities.

"Non-credible school hoaxes are a serious offense that Los Angeles Unified takes seriously. Threats disrupt the educational environment, increase stress levels, and interfere with law enforcement's ability to protect schools from real dangers. It also poses a serious risk to our community, draining resources and occupying the time of critical first responders," the Los Angeles Unified School District said in a statement after a hoax report of shots fired at Hollywood High School last week.

The swatting threats can also pose a serious risk of injury. In 2017, California resident Tyler Barriss made a swatting call reporting a fake hostage situation after arguing with a fellow gamer playing "Call of Duty." He gave an address of an innocent, unrelated person who police ended up fatally shooting during their response. Barriss was sentenced to 20 years in prison.

An uptick in these types of calls isn't unusual this time of year, Trump said. There's also a spike in the spring, and a wave of copycat threats in the wake of any mass school shooting. But the last several days have seen a higher number of incidents.

"I don't like to use the word prank," Trump said. "It's not really a prank that we're seeing, it's really a cruel hoax."

This article originally appeared on USA TODAY: Schools hit with fake shooting threats across US; FBI probes possible link

Who believes the most "taboo" conspiracy theories? It might not be who you think

White men with graduate degrees, a new study finds, are highly likely to hold especially noxious beliefs

By PAUL ROSENBERG

SALON

Contributing Writer
PUBLISHED MAY 5, 2024

LONG READ

Elon Musk and Robert Kennedy Jr. (Photo illustration by Salon/Getty Images)

Like Henry Ford before him, Elon Musk has emerged as America’s top conspiracy spreader. But he’s hardly alone. Robert F. Kennedy Jr. is the conspiracy-theory candidate for president, and as Paul Krugman observed last summer, was attracting “support from some of the biggest names in Silicon Valley”:

Jack Dorsey, who founded Twitter, has endorsed him, while some other prominent tech figures have been holding fund-raisers on his behalf. Elon Musk, who is in the process of destroying what Dorsey built, hosted him for a Twitter Spaces event.

Krugman didn't focus on conspiracy theory as such but on something closely related: distrust of experts and skepticism about widely accepted facts. He described this tendency as the “brain rotting drug” of reflexive contrarianism, quoting economist Adam Ozimek.

That wasn’t exactly scientific, but a new paper entitled “The Status Foundations of Conspiracy Beliefs” by Saverio Roscigno, a PhD candidate at the University of California, Irvine, is. Its most eye-catching finding is the discovery of “a cluster of graduate-degree-holding white men who display a penchant for conspiracy beliefs” that are “distinctively taboo.”

Specifically, Roscigno writes, “approximately a quarter of those who hold a graduate degree agree or strongly agree” that school shootings like those at Sandy Hook and Parkland “are false flag attacks perpetrated by the government,” which is “around twice the rate of those without graduate degrees.” Results are similar for the proposition that the number of Jews killed in the Holocaust “has been exaggerated on purpose.”

Related
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These findings are striking for many reasons. Most obviously, they go against the common belief — long supported by research — that conspiracist beliefs are more common among lower-income and less-educated individuals. They also challenge the formulation popularized by Joseph Uscinski that "conspiracy theories are for losers," and should be understood as “alarm systems and coping mechanisms to help deal with foreign threat and domestic power centers” that “tend to resonate when groups are suffering from loss, weakness, or disunity.”

Roscigno’s findings don’t refute previous formulations so much as reframe them by adding greater nuance. For example, he finds that conspiracy beliefs are more common both among the less educated and less affluent, on the one hand, and the more educated and more affluent on the other. Secondly, he identifies the subjective group experience of threat as a key element, rather than objective “loser” status.

Even more important, his paper reveals how much more we have to learn about conspiracy theories from a rigorous social science approach. Conspiracy theory is much more mainstream, varied and ubiquitous than previously assumed, and there’s much more to be learned from studying it as an integral part of the sociological landscape. Like the recently published paper I previously covered here, this model breaks with dualistic approaches that in some sense mirror what we find troubling about conspiracism — that is, painting the world in black-and-white rather than in many shades of gray. I recently spoke with Roscigno by Zoom about his findings and where they might lead. This transcript has been edited for clarity and length.

Your paper has a dramatic finding regarding "a cluster of graduate-degree-holding white men” who tend to embrace conspiracy beliefs that are "distinctly taboo." But that's just the tip of the iceberg, because there's a whole host of questions that raises, including the role of sociology in this research, not just psychology. What led you to do the research behind this paper — what kind of questions, concerns or interests were driving you?

One of the things that motivated me was precisely the observation that sociologists hadn't really been part of the conversation. I've been interested in this topic for a while. I grew up spending a lot of time online, seeing a lot of conspiratorial stuff, having a lot of conversations with my friends about that kind of stuff. In the past couple of years, it seems like a lot of it has hit the mainstream. I remember when QAnon stuff first started fermenting online. I remember seeing posts where people were analyzing and trying to break down these “Q drops,” and sending them to my brother, like “What's what's going on here? This is something totally new.”

When I got to grad school, I thought, well, there's got to be some sociologists doing work on this. I definitely found a cluster of cultural sociologists starting to do some really interesting stuff that inspired me a lot. I also found the work of people like Joseph Uscinski and others in political science who had been doing some work and some theorization that I thought could be pulled into building a sociological approach to this.

What did you think you might learn in doing this study?

The basic question was just which groups of people tend to hold which conspiratorial beliefs. Maybe it seems like an overly basic question, but I was really struggling to find anybody in the literature that had engaged it. There's a lot of talk about who believes conspiracies in general, but there's less attention to how different groups might be sympathetic to different claims. And I had observed in my time online that some conspiracy spaces are older or younger, in some there's more white people or more women, and I wanted to know what the variation was. That was the starting point, and then building a more sociological approach to the topic, looking at inequality and demographic variation, and then moving on to other questions.

So what did you find that confirmed that basic sociological intuition that there were significant differences, and what did you find that surprised you?

The belief "that school shootings like Sandy Hook and Parkland are false-flag attacks ... and that the number of Jews killed by the Nazis has been exaggerated on purpose — these two particular claims are disproportionately held by white graduate-degree-holding men."

The one pattern I really highlight is, as you said, that there's this cluster of graduate-degree-holding white men who are more favorable towards almost all the beliefs that are listed. But there are some that they are much more favorable toward, where there's a larger gap between them and those without graduate degrees. I describe these as "taboo claims." Specifically, that school shootings like those at Sandy Hook and Parkland are false-flag attacks perpetrated by the government, and the other one is that the number of Jews killed by the Nazis during World War II has been exaggerated on purpose. These two particular claims are very disproportionately held by white graduate-degree-holding men.

In addition, if you look a little bit deeper into some of the other survey research and even my own data, you can also see a concentration of medical-themed conspiracy beliefs among African-Americans, and among the less educated. Those were the two points of variation that I have been able to highlight. I suspect there are many more. But here the goal of the paper was just to demonstrate that variation exists. It wasn't to capture all of it.

That second variation is unsurprising, given that African Americans have been very ill-treated by the medical establishment. If you told most white people about the Tuskegee experiment 20 or 30 years ago, they'd think that was a conspiracy theory. But the finding about this group of more educated white men was more surprising. What have you speculated the reasons might be?

The most convincing explanation I found is that essentially this is about access dynamics. The typical theoretical focus when it comes to conspiracy beliefs tends to be toward attitudes or dispositions. I think the role of attitudes is relevant here, and I think these attitudes are fueled by a perception of threat among graduate-degree-holding white men. Maybe they see social changes that are going on, they hear how the tone of certain conversations is changing, they see how the job market is changing. So there's a perception of threat. That's where you get the attitudes.

Now the other side is the access. There's a couple of things that could be going on, but it's hard to believe that Sandy Hook was perpetrated by the government unless you've heard that claim made in some level of detail, not just seeing reporting about Alex Jones but hearing somebody really make that claim. It's even hard if you don't know what a false-flag attack is. So I suspect that graduate-degree-holding white men, particularly via online channels, are are more likely to encounter this information, more likely to run into it. We also know from scholarship on rumor that certain rumors tend to be concentrated in certain demographic networks. There's a rumor that will primarily be spread within white networks or Black networks, and that's what's going on here.

I think it's also important to take survey results about something as deep as beliefs with a grain of salt. A question I get a lot when I present this research is, “Oh, they don't really believe that, do they?” That's not really a question that a survey can necessarily answer. At the very least, we know they are checking off a survey box way more often. So if we read it with that interpretation, we can maybe say that this is kind of a transgressive act. They’re saying, “I know that I'm supposed to be checking off the other box, but I'm going to check off this one.” To me, it's demonstrating a kind of transgressive expertise, a special access to what Michael Barkun calls “stigmatized knowledge.”

So that sets off two things for me. One is the question of how you would go about digging deeper into that, testing if that's true. Related to that, it seems that survey research could be improved to ask people whether they have communicated these beliefs to others, are they deeply held beliefs that help them make sense of other things, questions like that. Have you given any thought to that?

"A question I get a lot when I present this research is, 'Oh, they don't really believe that, do they?' That's not a question that a survey can necessarily answer."

Some of those things can be ascertained through survey research. I like the idea of asking, "Have you ever spoken to somebody about this?" or "Is this something you hold privately?" But I'm wary that survey research will give us all the answers we need. If you really want to figure out if somebody really believes something, I think you have to talk to them. You have to learn about how they live their life. You have to learn about their social relationships. It’s just like if we were studying religious beliefs. I think you have to engage at a deeper level to figure out whether that is true belief.

There's a lot of room for improvement on surveys, though. One of the biggest rooms for improvement in surveys is on the issue of prompt selection. It seems that this pattern that I noticed didn't get noticed before because nobody was asking these taboo questions on the surveys. Mostly they ask questions about COVID, and maybe a few other things. But if the prompts substantively change the findings of the survey, and nobody seems to be giving much conscious consideration about which prompts are included, there's definitely room for improvement.

You also found similar, though less dramatic, gaps between the highly educated and less educated for four other unpopular beliefs. So there's seemingly a general predisposition to conspiracy beliefs there. What other factors do you think might be involved?

I've gone back and forth, but I think there’s something I've decided on. There's this question of whether it's that they prefer unpopular [beliefs], or is it a question of, like, these things are taboo? They know these things are transgressive, they know these things violate a deep social norm. I'm pretty sure it's the taboo.

But this can be pretty easily tested. There are beliefs that are very unpopular but are not particularly taboo. If you ran a survey that included something like belief in a flat earth, if I'm right we wouldn't expect white grad-degree men to be high on that. When I say “taboo,” I basically mean that if you said something like this in public you would face some kind of social sanction. If I told my co-workers that I thought the earth was flat, they might laugh at me. If I told my co-workers that I thought the Holocaust was exaggerated, it would be a very different story.

Do you have some thoughts on what research you might be able to do to make more sense of this?

One thing that could be done is looking at a really wide variety of prompts and seeing what kinds of patterns are going on. In this one, I'm working with 15 claims and trying to draw a common thread. If you worked with a much larger set of prompts — I know some of those data sets exist — I think it would let you articulate that a little bit more clearly.
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But that's only one way to approach the issue of typology. You could start at the point of "there's a group of people that tends to hold these beliefs," and try to describe those particular claims. You could also start by looking at the claims and trying to find narrative threads between them. You could also define the claims by the relation to some authority, which is kind of what I'm doing with the taboo stuff. So I'm not quite sure how to address that yet.

You also found roughly equivalent subsets of respondents who held both of those claims [about school shootings and the Holocaust] and who disagreed with both, providing a convenient comparison. They differed in terms of extremism and social media use. So what can you say about those differences and how they interrelated?

I already mentioned the question of access. I think social media use gets at that access question. Those who agree report higher levels of social media use by every platform, particularly by anonymous image boards like 4chan and 8chan. So at the very least, if we think about people stumbling into these beliefs kind of accidentally, if you're on 4chan more often you're a lot more likely to run into one of these. In addition, there's some interesting work being done on information-seeking strategies online, and some sociologists have pointed out that people with different social positions have different strategies that may lead to different results. So a possibility relative to social media is that white men with graduate degrees, when they're doing research, the steps they’re taking may be different from some other groups, so they're more likely to end up at a certain point.

Relative to political extremism, that's a bit more complicated. There's definitely some exciting research that's going on about radical political beliefs and their relationship to conspiracy beliefs. Something I want to point out is that the white grad-degree men who agree are way more on the political edges, which maybe is to be expected. They're identifying as extremely liberal or extremely conservative way more often. We get this U-shape. These two taboo claims, at least according to this measure, are not right-wing phenomena. There is a big cluster of people that identify as very liberal and agree with these things as well. I suspect this measure isn't picking up on everything it could be. In the time that I've spent in politically radical spaces online and within the conspiracy milieu, the way people identify politically — there's a lot of variety to it, and “liberal” and “conservative” descriptors may not resonate with a lot of these people. But at the very least we know that people on the political fringes tend to be more charitable towards these claims.

"White grad-degree men who agree [with 'taboo' claims] are way more on the political edges, which maybe is to be expected. They identify as extremely liberal or extremely conservative way more often. We get this U-shape."

Over time, erosion of social trust seems to be related to a rise in conspiratorial beliefs. It would make sense, just in terms of people who feel skeptical of the existing system, for that to show up more, regardless of whether they are left-wing or right-wing. Do you have any thoughts about that?

This is something else I think that sociologists have to bring to the table: What's with the structural context of these situations? There's some evidence that countries with higher levels of social inequality, higher levels of corruption, tend to demonstrate or report higher rates of these beliefs. We know that it's tied to structural conditions. The collapse of institutional trust is a huge piece of this. If you look at graphs of trust in the federal government over time, or trust in the press over time, they're really at historic lows.

That has to play some role. Because when we talk about conspiracy beliefs, in the simple definition we’re talking about claims of elites doing something in private, but we’re also talking about something that counters the official narrative. So in a situation where historically few people trust the producers of the official narratives — in part the government, in part the press — we would expect people to be more doubtful of those things.

But when we talk about social trust, I don't necessarily think belief in conspiracies means a low level of social trust in general. I think it means a low level of trust in particular institutions. But in order to believe a conspiracy you have to hear it. It's probably from somebody you know, and you have to trust them when they tell you that. There's a rumor scholar, Gary Fine, who says that when trust in institutions is questioned, trust in informal networks is revealed. So there is a social trust that exists. It's much more decentralized. It's not in a particular institution and it’s social trust, rather than institutional.

One thing your paper suggested to me was looking at how beliefs in conspiracy theories co-vary, meaning what beliefs go together or tend to negate each other, and how that might change across status lines. I was specifically interested in those white male graduate-degree holders. Are there any beliefs that they accept less than other people? Do you have enough data to look at that yet?

I think enough data exists that we can probably answer that, but I don't know for sure. In this particular data set, there are none that they were less likely to believe in. For very mainstream beliefs — the idea that “one percent” of economic elites control the government and economy, the idea that Jeffrey Epstein was murdered — these are beliefs held by 50% of the general population and also held by about 50% of white men with graduate degrees. In this data there wasn't a single belief that these white male graduate-degree holders were less interested in. That was stunning to me. I was actually very surprised by that..

But it's possible. We have these two types that I'm describing, the medical ones and the kind of taboo ones. It's possible there may be some medical ones that white men with graduate degrees are less likely to agree with. But it is hard to say, because this data clearly suggests that graduate degree holders are more into all of these claims.

We spoke earlier about “prompt selection” and things that perhaps aren't being asked about. Do you have anything specific in mind?

There's a lot of things that aren't being asked, definitely more than are being asked. At least in this paper, my starting point is the simple definition of the conspiracy belief which is, again, basically that a group of elites are plotting something in private. If that's our conceptualization, then the universe of possible things to ask about is massive.

For instance, if that's our conceptualization, why don't we ever ask about institutionally verified conspiracies? For instance, Watergate fits that definition just fine, COINTELPRO fits that definition just fine, Tuskegee fits that definition just fine. To me there seems to be a mismatch, an unacknowledged element to the definition, which is that it has to counter some official narratives. But even if we include that second part in conceptualization, there’s still tons and tons of stuff.

"Why don't we ever ask about institutionally verified conspiracies? For instance, Watergate fits that definition just fine, COINTELPRO fits that definition just fine, the Tuskegee experiment fits that definition just fine."

I read a very interesting paper this past week. This came out as a content analysis of TikTok, but it’s specifically about the conspiracy theory that Taylor Swift is secretly gay, and she's closeted and dropping all these hints in her tracks. Maybe people will say that isn't a politically consequential conspiracy theory, but it’s within the realm of conspiracy claims by any definition.

I've even heard that and I don't follow Taylor Swift news at all. It's clearly out there.

Yeah, if I had to guess, if you polled the demographics it would disproportionately be women. So that makes me think, OK, a lot of studies emphasize that men are more into this stuff. Does that have something to do with the prompts that are selected for the surveys? How does that come into play?

I bring up the Taylor Swift example to demonstrate that the realm of things under this blanket is, like, so large that trying to generalize any kind of research findings to the entire world of claims about elites doing sneaky stuff ends up being very difficult. I suspect there are claims that graduate-degree holders are more into that we haven't quite figured out yet. I suspect there are claims that women are more into that we haven't really figured out. I'd like to see a lot more, a) alignment between the conceptualization and operationalization and b) experimentation within that. We have a big world of things that fit this conceptual framework.

We’ve talked a bit about “collective identity” as a useful concept and you've said “it applies to all varieties of conspiracy cultures." Could you expand on that?

To be totally sociological, collective identity is useful in understanding all kinds of cultures more generally. Within conspiracy cultures, there's a couple things going on. If we talk about rumors, if I tell you some finding before it's published, it feels like you're in the know, it feels like you have a piece of secret information. It's exciting, it feels good. It also creates a bond between people that I think can be part of identity. So that's one level.

There's also the level that gets to the question of institutional distrust. There's a general sense in this country that, you know, people like us — whatever “us” means — are being screwed over by elites in some faraway place. We can't really see what's happening over there, we're not in the rooms where these decisions are made. I think there's a very general sense of that. And who “people like us” ends up being defined by is, I think, very important, because different people are going to understand it in different ways. There’s a general sense that there's opaque power that's screwing us. We don't really know where it is, or what's happening. You hear that kind of sentiment a lot in this milieu.

There's also collective identity more overtly. If I make the claim that white people are being replaced in this country — which to me is one of the more consequential conspiracy claims — I'm invoking a very specific identity, saying, “Hey, we collectively are under threat and need to do something about it!” So some conspiracy claims, even in the claim themselves, name the in-group or name the out-group. It will say who the “we” are, who the mysterious “they” is. Identity plays a key role there as well.

What stands out for you as the next steps? What questions need answering that follow from what you've done so far?

"A lot of people in the conspiracy milieu feel like they're being studied from afar by people that aren't talking to them at all. I think that absolutely adds to the resentment. If you were an expert in Amish culture, you'd probably want to spend time talking to Amish people."

To me, a lot of the most interesting questions are about how, when and why these beliefs matter, which I do think are better suited to qualitative methods. There's been very little in the way of qualitative inquiry into conspiracy cultures, with the big exception of Jaron Harambam, whose work has been very inspiring to me. Back to this matter of collective identity, something he points out that I find intriguing is that there are all kinds of conflicts over identity, even within the conspiracy milieu. There are people who understand themselves as aiming to get new converts to the movement, and other people who understand themselves as basically having given up and clocked out. There's all kinds of variation within the community.

Also, part of my reasoning for wanting to do qualitative research is that I feel like a lot of people in the conspiracy milieu feel like they're being studied from afar by people that aren't talking to them at all. I think that absolutely adds to the resentment.

I saw a tweet recently from somebody who is loosely in these circles that basically said, “How come none of these conspiracy theory experts are even talking to us?” If you are an expert in Amish culture, you'd probably want to spend a lot of time talking to Amish people. If I were studying the student movements that are going on right now, I'd probably be down at the encampments hanging out. It's not like believers in conspiracies are a small or fringe minority group that's super-hard to access. Some of these claims are totally mainstream, and even for the more taboo ones that you might envision would be hard to do qualitative research into, they're concentrated among graduate-degree holders. So in some sense those of us in academia are exceptionally well positioned to engage these communities at a closer level. So I definitely would like to do qualitative research in the coming years.

Finally, what's the most important question I haven’t asked? And what's the answer?

I can tell you a question that I get whenever I present my research to my undergraduates, but I'm not going to answer it. I give this whole presentation and at the end they’re like, “What are the ones that you believe in?” That's not my role as a sociologist. [Laughs.] So that’s my favorite question.

UN experts urge all countries to recognise Palestinian statehood

Reuters
Mon, June 3, 2024 

Smoke rises following Israeli strikes during an Israeli military operation in Rafah


GENEVA (Reuters) - A group of United Nations experts called on Monday for all countries to recognise a Palestinian state to ensure peace in the Middle East.

The call came less than a week after Spain, Ireland and Norway officially recognised a Palestinian state, prompting anger from Israel, which has found itself increasingly isolated after nearly eight months of war in Gaza.

The experts, including the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Palestinian territories, said recognition of a Palestinian state was an important acknowledgement of the rights of the Palestinian people and their struggle towards freedom and independence.


"This is a pre-condition for lasting peace in Palestine and the entire Middle East – beginning with the immediate declaration of a ceasefire in Gaza and no further military incursions into Rafah," they said.

"A two-state solution remains the only internationally agreed path to peace and security for both Palestine and Israel and a way out of generational cycles of violence and resentment."

Israel's Foreign Ministry did not respond immediately to a request for comment.

With their recognition of a Palestinian state, Spain, Ireland and Norway said they sought to accelerate efforts to secure a ceasefire in Israel's war with Hamas in Gaza.

The three countries say they hope their decision will spur other European Union states to follow suit. Denmark's parliament later rejected a proposal to recognise a Palestinian state.

Israel has repeatedly condemned moves to recognise a Palestinian state, saying they bolster Hamas, the militant Islamist group that led the deadly Oct. 7 attack on Israel which sparked the Israeli offensive in the Gaza Strip.

The conflict has killed more than 36,000 Palestinians, according to Gaza's health ministry. Israel says the Oct. 7 attack, the worst in its 75-year history, killed 1,200 people, with more than 250 hostages taken.

(Reporting by Gabrielle Tétrault-Farber; Editing by Ed Osmond)



Photo of Palestinian flag flying at UN headquarters was taken in 2015, not 2024

Tommy WANG / AFP Hong Kong
Sun, June 2, 2024 

A photo of the Palestinian flag after it was raised at the United Nations headquarters in New York for the first time in September 2015 has resurfaced in social media posts that falsely claimed the flag was "finally flown" by the global body in May 2024. The old photo was shared against the background of the ongoing war in Gaza, which has revived a global push for Palestinians to be given a state of their own.

"Just today, the Palestinian flag was finally flown at UN Headquarters! History will always remember this as the momentous day when the flag of the State of Palestine was raised over UN Headquarters," read part of the simplified Chinese caption to a photo shared on Weibo on May 24, 2024.

The photo appears to show the Palestinian flag flying alongside the UN flag outside the headquarters of the international organisation in New York City.

Screenshot of the false Weibo post, captured on May 30, 2024

The same photo was shared alongside similar claims on X here and here.

The claim circulated seven months into the war in Gaza, which was sparked by Hamas' unprecedented October 7 attack on southern Israel that resulted in the deaths of 1,189 people, mostly civilians, according to an AFP tally based on Israeli official figures.

Israel's retaliatory offensive has killed at least 36,439 people in Gaza, mostly civilians, according to the Hamas-run territory's health ministry.

The Gaza bloodshed has revived calls for Palestinians to be given their own state.

Spain, Ireland and Norway formally recognised a Palestinian state on May 28 in a coordinated decision that infuriated Israel. The move brought the number of UN member states to have recognised a Palestinian state to 145 out of the 193.

However, the photo shared online is old -- it has circulated since September 2015.
2015 photo

Reverse image searches and subsequent keyword searches on Google found the picture was published by the German photo agency IMAGO on September 30, 2015 and credited to "IMAGO/Xinhua" (archived link).

Its caption read: "NEW YORK, Sept. 30, 2015 -- Palestinian flag (lower) flies together with the United Nations flag at the United Nations headquarters in New York, Sept. 30, 2015."

Below is a screenshot comparison of the falsely shared image (left) and the photo published on IMAGO's website (right):

Screenshot comparison of the falsely shared image (left) and the photo published on IMAGO's website (right)

The Palestinians raised their flag at the United Nations for the first time on September 30, 2015, after the General Assembly voted earlier that month to allow the flags of Palestine and the Vatican -- who have observer status -- to be raised alongside those of member states.

The flag of the Holy See was raised for the first time five days earlier, on September 25, 2015 (archived link).

Google Street View imagery from May 2016, June 2019 and August 2021 shows the Palestinian flag continued to fly outside the UN headquarters.

"As a Permanent Observer State, Palestine’s flag does fly outside the UN Secretariat building in New York, although it is slightly separated from the UN Member State flags and is not part of the alphabetic line-up," read an article posted on the UN's official website on April 18, 2024 (archived link).

AFP has fact-checked other misinformation around the Israel-Hamas war here.

Buffalo shooter’s previous threat raises red-flag questions

ABOLISH THE SECOND AMENDMENT

GUNS DON' KILL PEOPLE

PEOPLE KILL PEOPLE USING GUNS

By LINDSAY WHITEHURST, MICHAEL TARM and JAMES ANDERSON

 In this July 20, 2012, photo, a row of different AR-15 style rifles are displayed for sale at the Firing-Line indoor range and gun shop in Aurora, Colo. A warning about possible violence last year involving the 18-year-old now being held in the Buffalo, New York, supermarket shooting is turning attention to New York's "red flag" law.

 (AP Photo/Alex Brandon, File)

Less than a year before he opened fire and killed 10 people in a racist attack at a Buffalo grocery store, 18-year-old Payton Gendron was investigated for making a threatening statement at his high school.

New York has a “red flag” law designed to keep firearms away from people who could harm themselves or others, but Gendron was still able to legally buy an AR-15-style rifle.

The “general” threat at Susquehanna Valley High School last June, when he was 17, resulted in state police being called and a mental health evaluation at a hospital. New York Gov. Kathy Hochul told Buffalo radio station WKSE-FM that Gendron had talked about murder and suicide when a teacher asked about his plans after school ended, and it was quickly reported but the threat wasn’t considered specific enough to do more. No request was made to remove any firearms from the suspect, New York State police said Monday.

The revelations are raising new questions about why the law wasn’t invoked and how the effectiveness of “red flag laws” passed in 19 states and the District of Columbia can differ based on how they’re implemented.

WHAT ARE RED FLAG LAWS?

Typically, red-flag laws, also known as extreme risk protection orders, are intended to temporarily remove guns from people with potentially violent behavior, usually up to a year. In many cases, family members or law enforcement must petition the court for an order, though New York is a rare state in which educators can also start the proces

Removing weapons for that long, however, requires a hearing in which prosecutors must convince a judge that the person poses a risk. Most states also block the person from buying more guns during that period.

Red-flag laws are often adopted after tragedies. Florida did so after the 2018 mass shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland that killed 17 students. Law enforcement officials had received numerous complaints about the 19-year-old gunman’s threatening statements.

“This is actually one of the very few policies we have available where it actually builds on this vanishingly small point of common ground between public health people who want to stop gun violence and gun owners and the gun industry,” said Jeffrey Swanson, a professor in psychiatry at Duke University who researches gun violence.

But, Swanson added: “The issue is it’s so easy for people to get guns anyway. ... It’s not a one-thing problem, and there’s not one solution to it either.”

WHAT DOES NEW YORK’S FLAG LAW SAY?

The 2019 law allows family members, prosecutors, police and school officials to ask courts to order the seizure of guns from someone who poses a danger to themselves or others. The subject of the court action is also prohibited from buying guns while the order is in effect.

An explanation of the law on a state government website says the law made New York the first state to give teachers and school administrators the ability “to prevent school shootings by pursuing court intervention.”

The online description, crafted before the Buffalo shooting, expresses optimism about the law’s impact, saying it would both safeguard gun rights “while ensuring that tragedies, like the school shooting in Parkland, Florida, are not repeated.”

The question is why one wasn’t used in Gendron’s case.

WHAT’S THE PROCESS OF REQUESTING AN ORDER?

Someone seeking an order files a simple, two-page application with the primary county court. It’s considered a civil case, with no criminal charge or penalties involved.

A judge decides whether to issue a temporary order on the same day the application is filed, according to a New York courts website. If it is issued, police take the guns.

A hearing, involving witnesses and evidence, is set within 10 days. If the judge decides to issue a permanent order, it would remain in effect for a year. The petitioner can ask for an extension.

HAS THERE BEEN PUSHBACK TO THE LEGISLATION?

Some opponents of the red-flag legislation in New York feared it could lead to false accusations by family members or others with a grudge against a gun owner.

Legislators in New York and elsewhere were aware of the potential legal pitfalls and drafted laws in such a way to avoid constitutional challenges, said Eric Ruben, a fellow at the Brennan Center for Justice who also teaches law at SMU Dedman School of Law in Dallas.

Among the safeguards in New York, he said, is a relatively high standard of proof — clear and convincing evidence — required to secure a final, yearlong order, he said. The law also includes penalties for false applications.

DO RED-FLAG LAWS SAVE LIVES?

The law, Ruben said, “poses significant obstacles” for someone under a red-flag order wanting to buy firearms because they are entered in the background check system as long as the order is in effect. “It wouldn’t stop someone from illegal purchases, however.”

Experts in red-flag laws contend that the laws have undoubtedly saved lives, be it in cases involving planned mass shootings, suicides or potentially deadly domestic violence cases.

“Certainly, red-flag laws are more than anything else aimed at trying to stop mass shootings,” said Dave Kopel, research director at the Colorado-based libertarian think tank Independence Institute, which supports gun rights. “But they can be and should be used for more than just that. A handful of killings or suicides is horrific enough.”

Swanson worked on a study that estimated Connecticut prevented one suicide for every 10 to 20 people subjected to gun seizures. A 2019 California study found it was used in mass-shooting threats 21 times. Maryland authorities granted more than 300 petitions in the three months after its law went into effect, including at least four threats of school violence.

That research shows the laws have worked, said Allison Anderman, senior counsel for the Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence, though absolute proof can be tough.

“It’s very hard to prove a law is effective based on things not happening,” she said. “We still have a problem where we have more guns than people in this country, and this patchwork system of laws and our overall weak laws.”

India’s opposition leveraged caste and constitution to shock Modi in election

Shivangi Acharya and Krishn Kaushik
Thu, June 13, 2024 




 Awadhesh Prasad greets his supporters inside his house in Ayodhya


By Shivangi Acharya and Krishn Kaushik

AYODHYA/VARANASI, India (Reuters) - A seminal moment in Prime Minister Narendra Modi's unsuccessful campaign to retain his parliamentary majority occurred days before India's marathon election began in April.

Speaking in the constituency that includes the Hindu temple town of Ayodhya, lawmaker Lallu Singh said that his and Modi's Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was seeking a supermajority in parliament's lower chamber to make material changes to the constitution.

Opposition parties latched onto Singh's remark to assert, without evidence, that the BJP would amend modern India's founding document to strip Hindus at the bottom of the caste hierarchy of access to affirmative action policies.

The attack line hit a nerve - splitting the Hindu vote and ending the BJP's decade-long dominance in the country's most populous state.

Opinion polls had pointed to a landslide in Ayodhya's home state of Uttar Pradesh and nationally but when results came through on June 4, the BJP had lost 29 seats in the state - nearly half of all the party's losses nationwide.

"It hit the people like fire," said Awadhesh Prasad of the opposition Samajwadi Party (SP), whose base comprises Muslim and lower-caste voters in Uttar Pradesh. He successfully wrested the constituency anchored by Ayodhya from Singh, who had held it since 2014.

Despite the BJP's best efforts to debunk the emerging narrative, the damage was done.

"The prime minister and other leaders tried to explain to the people, but by then their mood was set," said Dileep Patel, a state BJP official in Varanasi. Singh declined to comment.

Reuters interviewed 29 party leaders and workers from the BJP and rival parties, four analysts and 50 voters for this story. They described how lower caste concerns about affirmative action, along with a shortage of jobs, and complacent BJP activists combined to tip the scales in Uttar Pradesh, which sends the most lawmakers to parliament.

After a decade of electoral near-invincibility that combined economic success with a narrative of Hindu supremacy, Modi's party was reduced to 240 seats nationwide. He was able to form a third government only with the help of allies, some of whom have a reputation for political fickleness.

It was a reminder that BJP cannot take Hindu votes for granted.

THE SUPERMAJORITY CALL

Ayodhya was supposed to be the safest of seats.

In January, Modi inaugurated a grand temple there to the deity Lord Ram in a ceremony that sparked national euphoria. It also fulfilled a decades' long pledge used by the BJP to rise from India's political margins into a major force.

Singh's speech made no mention of taking benefits from lower castes and Modi's aides have frequently downplayed concerns about changes to the constitution, which guarantees school and government job quotas to historically disadvantaged castes and tribal groups, both still among India's poorest.

But it quickly spread on social media, fuelling an opposition campaign.

SP chief Akhilesh Yadav wrote on social media that the BJP wanted to end the quota system and keep underprivileged segments of society "as their slaves."

At election rallies, Yadav's ally and the opposition's main figurehead, Rahul Gandhi of the Congress party, began whipping out a pocket-sized copy of the constitution, warning it was under threat.

The message was echoed in media advertisements and by the regional party's workers in Uttar Pradesh, which a SP spokesperson described as 600,000 strong.

India's castes have co-existed uneasily with each other for millennia.

The BJP was long considered a bastion of upper-caste Hindus, but Modi, who belongs to a lower caste, had previously made inroads with marginalised groups, according to analysis by the Delhi-based Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS).

He has sought to unite Hindus by shifting focus from traditional notions of caste, instead putting the spotlight on the poor, youths, farmers and women - which he calls the four biggest castes in modern India. In power, Modi successively backed a man from a lower caste and a woman from a tribal group for India's largely symbolic presidency.

A relatively united Hindu vote in the last two national elections allowed the BJP to sideline India's nearly 200 million Muslims and overcome longstanding concerns around unemployment, inflation and rural distress.

Sandeep Shastri, coordinator of a program on Indian elections at CSDS said the number of people voting primarily on Hindu ideology appeared to have plateaued in 2019.

This year, BJP won just 54 of the 131 seats reserved for candidates from underprivileged groups, down from 77 in 2019. It won eight of the 17 reserved seats in Uttar Pradesh, compared to 14 the last time.

Dharmendra Yadav, a 30-year-old in Varanasi constituency who comes from a lower caste, said he believed the BJP "would have ended the reservations."

"When the opposition raised the issue of the constitution, it just verified it for us," said Dharmendra, whose surname indicates a caste affiliation with the SP's Akhilesh, who he is not related to.

Dharmendra previously backed the BJP but went for the opposition this year.

"Caste politics still has a major influence in the Hindi belt," state BJP official Patel said, referring to states across central India that have been BJP's stronghold since 2014.

WHERE ARE THE JOBS?

Surveys suggest Modi remains the world's most popular elected leader.

But this year, Modi's personal majority in his seat, centred around the holy city of Varanasi, shrank by more than 300,000. He retained his constituency with the lowest margin of any sitting premier in over three decades.

"The BJP heavily relied on the prime minister's leadership to ... win votes and also maybe to camouflage problems that people are facing," said researcher Shastri.

Among those problems is a lack of jobs created over the past decade.

Young voters like Dharmendra had backed BJP in a landslide in 2014, when Modi promised to create 20 million jobs a year nationwide. The pledge has not been fulfilled.

Dharmendra said he had taken numerous exams for white-collar government jobs, highly prized for their security and benefits. In February, nearly 4.6 million people applied for 60,000 constable vacancies in Uttar Pradesh, only to have the BJP-run state government cancel the exam after the test was leaked online.

Banaras Hindu University political science professor Ashok Upadhyay said the exam leak, which was not the first and was repeated in March, gave young Indians, who have grown up in an increasingly unequal country, a sense that the job selection process was unfair.

Adding to the BJP's electoral missteps, some voters and BJP leaders said the party faltered because they had assumed another landslide victory and were dismissive of issues that were important to voters.

DON'T WANT VOTES?

The redevelopment of Ayodhya into a temple town was preceded by the demolition of thousands of homes and stores. Nearly two dozen locals, including BJP supporters, told Reuters they were dissatisfied with the compensation offered.

A SP voter who identified himself by his first name of Shakti said he was part of a group that had lobbied BJP leaders for support.

"They said they didn't want these 10,000 to 20,000 votes from local businessmen, they would win anyway," he said.

Another Ayodhya trader confirmed Shakti's account and local BJP leader Veerchand Manjhi said he had also found it difficult to get locals' issues addressed by authorities.

District magistrate Nitish Kumar said in response to Reuters questions that the compensation process was fair.

Ratan Sharda, a senior leader of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the BJP's ideological parent, wrote in the June 16 issue of its "Organiser" magazine that the result was a "reality check."

BJP activists and leaders were "happy in their bubble, enjoying the glow reflected from Modiji’s aura, they were not listening to the voices on the streets," he wrote.

BJP RESILIENCE?

The BJP retains many strengths, including a leader with popular backing across the party, control of Uttar Pradesh's state government and the backing of the influential RSS, said Delhi University professor Chandrachur Singh.

Analysts such as CSDS's Sanjay Kumar noted that the BJP did well in states where there wasn't a strong local party like the SP in Uttar Pradesh, which was able to capitalise on regional discontent.

And while Congress tried to nationalise its message that the BJP posed a threat to affirmative action, caste-based messaging held less appeal in urbanising India's many cities. "In urban areas, caste is overridden by class identities," Singh said.

The BJP's Patel said that the party had launched a detailed review of the loss and was confident of winning state elections in Uttar Pradesh that are due by 2027.

"The BJP either wins, or it learns," a BJP worker in Ayodhya told Reuters.

(Reporting by Shivangi Acharya in Ayodhya and Krishn Kaushik in Varanasi; Additional reporting by Rupam Jain, Krishna N. Das and Saurabh Sharma; Editing by Katerina Ang)


Clip shared with false claim 'Pakistan flag hoisted' after opposition won in Indian mega-state

AFP India
Thu, June 13, 2024

A video of a religious flag atop a truck has been shared in posts that falsely claimed residents of Bareilly city in India's Uttar Pradesh state waved the flag of Muslim-majority Pakistan to celebrate the failure of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to secure a majority in the state after the country's general election. The flag in the video differs from Pakistan's national flag, and the video circulated online weeks before the results of India's marathon national polls were announced.

"Bareilly became Pakistan!!" read part of a Hindi-language post shared on social media platform X on June 5, 2024.

"As soon as Samajwadi Party won 37 seats in Uttar Pradesh, people from the peace loving community in Bareilly waved the flag of Pakistan," the post continued, using a phrase that Hindu hardliners sarcastically employ to refer to Muslims.

A video attached to the post shows people sitting atop a truck waving a green flag that bears the star and crescent moon symbol of Islam.

Superimposed on the video is an image of Pakistan's national flag, and a person speaking over the footage says: "The Pakistan flag is waving in Bareilly, policemen are also standing there."

Screenshot of the false X post, captured on June 6, 2024

The post surfaced after the results of India's marathon general election were announced, showing that the opposition Samajwadi Party had won more seats than Prime Minister Narendra Modi's BJP in Uttar Pradesh -- India's most populous state and a bellwether for national elections

It was the first time in 15 years that the BJP had failed to win the most seats in the state, the heartland of India's majority faith that had formed the bedrock of the BJP's parliamentary strength.

Modi will remain in office but with a substantially reduced mandate and needing to rely on coalition allies to govern.

The video was also shared with similar claims elsewhere on X and on Facebook.

But it does not show people in Bareilly waving Pakistan's national flag.
Not Pakistan's flag

The flag shown in the video is different to Pakistan's national flag; it does not have a vertical white stripe close to the hoist and the star and crescent symbol faces in the opposite direction.

Below is a screenshot comparison of the flag in the video (left) and a picture of Pakistan's national flag from AFP's archives (right):

Screenshot comparison of the flag in the video (left) and a picture of Pakistan's national flag from AFP's archives (right)

Moreover, a reverse image search of keyframes followed by keyword searches led to the same footage posted by an Instagram user on May 19 (archived link).

The Instagram post was shared more than two weeks before the results of India's weeks-long general election were announced on June 4.

A representative for Bareilly's police force told AFP the video "has no connection with the results" of the poll.

The officer said the video is from a religious procession that took place in 2023.

"The flag seen in the video is not the flag of Pakistan but is related to the religion of Islam."

AFP has debunked more misinformation around India's elections here.

The Curious Case of the Freedom Flotilla

By Craig Murray

May 2, 2024

Source: Craig Murray Blog



The departure of the spectacular “Freedom Flotilla” to Gaza carrying 5,500 tonnes of aid has been postponed (again), because the flag state of the major vessels, Guinea Bissau, has withdrawn their registration.

The key question is why the organisers were proceeding with such an unreliable flag state in the first place?

In the 2010 Freedom Flotilla, the vessel Mavi Marmara was boarded by Israeli troops and ten aid workers were executed in cold blood. Just days before sailing, the Mavi Marmara had changed its flag from Turkey to the Comoros Islands.

On a vessel at sea outside the twelve mile territorial limit of a state (as the Mavi Marmara was when boarded), the law that applies is that of the flag state. Had the vessel still been Turkish flagged, the murderers would have been within Turkish jurisdiction and subject to investigation by Turkey and prosecution in Turkish courts.

I flew to Izmir to investigate the case and I concluded that it was Turkish security services who had obliged the change of flag to the Comoros Islands, thus facilitating the Israeli murderous attack.

Plainly the Mavi Marmara incident should indicate to organisers of aid to Gaza the vital necessity of having a vessel registered to a flag state which would be able to react strongly to an attack by Israel on its ship, and indeed whose flag might deter Israel from such an attack.

So it makes no sense to me that the organisers intended to proceed under the flag of Guinea Bissau.

On 8 April I received a Whatsapp message from organisers asking me to publicise the flotilla. This was my reply.


Hi Irfan and thank you. May I ask what are the flag states of the four vessels?
This is extremely important.
The Mavi Marmara organisers made the literally fatal mistake of allowing the ship to reflag to the Comoros Islands before sailing. Outside the 12 mile territorial sea the vessels are under the law of and entitled to the protection of the flag state

After a holding reply I received


Sorry for the late reply. It is still to be confirmed sir

I reiterated


OK, I am very keen that people understand that it is crucially important.
I have always believed pro Israeli security services influenced the change of flag of the Mavi Marmara.
Any Israeli forces boarding the ships beyond the 12 mile territorial limit are subject to the law of the flag state of the vessel. I should be grateful if you confirm to me the organisers fully understand this.

The reply was simply


Thank you sir

I am therefore entirely perplexed that the organisers went with Guinea Bissau as the flag state rather than a state likely to stand up to Israel and the US. Of course it failed.

Is the problem incompetence, or is it again security service influence?

I should make plain that I absolutely support the aims and the strategy of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla. I have several friends on board, and I believe my good colleague Ann Wright is among the organisers. I am however intensely frustrated.

The Little Flotilla that Almost Could

by Craig Wood / May 1st, 2024

The flotilla cargo ship in Istanbul (Photo credit: Medea Benjamin)

Two gutsy activists from the Twin Cities flew to Istanbul, Turkey April 17 to join over three-hundred others from about 40 countries on an eleven-hundred mile voyage across the Mediterranean Sea to raise awareness and bring lifesaving aid to Gaza.

Vietnam Vet and member of Veterans For Peace (VFP) Barry Riesch was nervous about signing on with the Freedom Flotilla Coalition (FFC), but felt he should try to do something for the vast majority of Gazans lacking medical care and being deliberately starved. Apart from the mission’s goal of delivering over five-thousand tons of urgently needed food, water and medical supplies (including five ambulances, and an abundance of baby formula), Reisch said he wanted to do this for his grandkids in hopes “they won’t have to grow up in a world that would ignore such a tragedy.”

Riesch has good reasons to be nervous. Since the Free Gaza Movement began in 2006, only a handful of small ships have been allowed to bring humanitarian aid to Gazans. Retired U.S. Army Colonel and former diplomat Ann Wright is a member of the 2024 FFC Steering Committee. She was a participant (resistor) on five previous flotillas that never reached Gaza. In 2010 she watched Israeli troops rappelling from helicopters onto the deck of the Mavi Marmara from a nearby boat. Ten resistors were killed and 50 more wounded after some of them allegedly tried to fight back in international waters against the Israeli invaders who were using pressurized water hoses on them. In a video, Wright gave other accounts of Israeli troops harassing and beating resistors before confiscating their belongs and taking them against their will to Israeli jails until they could be deported.

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu contends that Israel has been unfairly targeted by resistors trying to break his country’s illegal navel blockade and bring humanitarian aid into Gaza. During a 2015 speech in Tel Aviv he told the Jewisih Agency Assembly “They send flotillas to Gaza, they don’t send flotillas to Syria. It’s amazing, this travesty of justice, this violation of the truth, the rape of truth.”

Former FBI agent and whistleblower Coleen Rowley is a member of VFP and Women Against Military Madness (WAMM) couldn’t disagree with Netanyahu more. She hopes that he and his cronies will be called to answer for their criminal behavior sooner than later. Rowley has been speaking at academic and other professional venues with an emphasis on ethical decision-making for twenty years. Before flying to Istanbul she talked over the phone with me about the “berserk Israelis” who have “shredded the law” — not only breaking the rules of the high seas for murder and kidnapping, but with their ongoing violations of international humanitarian law and war crimes on land. In a recent television interview she said “ I told people I can’t help seeing the faces of my own grandchildren (I have five grandchildren now) in the faces of these poor Gazan children who are being orphaned, starved and murdered.”

Riesch and Rowley attended intensive nonviolence training shortly after arriving in Istanbul. “The most frightening part of the training was a simulation replete with deafening booms of gunfire and exploding percussion grenades and masked soldiers screaming at us, hitting us with simulated rifles, dragging us across the floor, and arresting us” author/activist Medea Benjamin wrote in a Counterpunch article. During an April 19 Zoom meeting in Istanbul, resistors discussed their fears about the trip. One recalled a mock situation where three doctors from New Zealand laid on the floor during a seminar and instructed resistors on what to do if their heads are stepped on in the dark. Lawyers provided legal advice about separating “false authority” from “legitimate authority” along with tips for walking away from precarious situations. Despite their fears, resistors believe what they are doing not only has to be done, it is morally and legally justifiable, citing a recent ruling by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that it is “plausible” Israel has committed acts of genocide: The court further maintains, that it is now incumbent upon citizens and governments of the world to do what they can to stop the genocide.

The location of the launch was kept secret due to Israel’s history of sabotaging boats in port and the departure dates were pushed back repeatedly because of outside pressures — mostly from the Israeli and U.S. governments. Last week the Israelis made an announcement about intercepting the flotilla that prompted Huwaida Arraf, U.S. human rights attorney and FFC Steering Committee member to say “Governments must refuse to collaborate in maintaining Israel’s illegal siege on Gaza by obstructing the flotilla in any way. We call on the governments of the 40 countries represented on the Freedom Flotilla to uphold their obligations under international law and demand that Israel guarantee the flotilla safe passage to Gaza.” Soon after, UN experts reaffirmed Arraf’s demand  “As the Freedom Flotilla approaches Palestinian territorial waters off Gaza, Israel must adhere to international law, including recent orders from the International Court of Justice to insure unimpeded access for humanitarian aid.”

But on April 26, the doubts crept home. During a morning call, Riesch talked about his dwindling hopes that the flotilla would make it to Gaza “Now there’s a problem with ship flags” — this is the fourth delay.” According to Reuters, Guinea-Bissau made a decision to remove its flag from flotilla boats. Istanbul activists answered with this:  “The Guinea-Bissau International Ships Registry (GBISR), in a blatantly political move, informed the Freedom Flotilla Coalition that it had withdrawn the Guinea Bissau flag from two of the Freedom Flotilla’s ships, one of which is our cargo ship.”

Riesch mentioned that frustrated resistors were already drifting away and during last night’s FFC meeting, he found out numerous other boats loaded with activists were preparing to join the flotilla in a show of solidarity, even though Israelis planned to stop them with a blockade. So, it was decided the flotilla would meet up with the blockade and wait a few days before turning around. The earliest departure time he said would be Sunday April 28 — if they could clear customs. Later that evening he sent a text saying the trip was canceled.

During a follow-up Q&A TikTok post, Wright told Benjamin that Israel always uses delay tactics before flotilla launches and the State Department invariably issues travel warnings and cautions Americans about challenging the Israeli government — especially now since the U.S. has been so openly complicit with the ongoing ethnic cleansing in Gaza. While support for the flotilla remains high from Turkish nationals, Wright strongly believes the U.S. is using economic pressures including military aid, ito derail the project in Turkey.

If nothing else, those who traveled to Istanbul succeeded in bringing much-needed attention to the plight of captive and undernourished Palestinians waiting in refugee camps for the next bombing campaign. About 45% of the people living in Gaza are children under the age of 15. So far, well over one hundred fifteen thousand Palestinians have been killed or wounded — most were women and children. It may take decades to rebuild the parts of Gaza already destroyed but for now, resistors are packing their bags — some hope to return this summer.

First row — Coleen Rowley far left and Barry Riesch third from left

Ann Wright second from left, and Medea Benjamin second from back in Istanbul FacebookTwitter

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Craig Wood is a Minneapolis writer and member of Veterans For Peace. He can be reached at craig2mpls@yahoo.com. Read other articles by Craig.

Digital Deception: Disinformation’s Impact in the Israel-Hamas War

By Yusuf Can on October 20, 2023


Disinformation and even complete fabrications have spread rapidly after Hamas’ attack on Israel. The actions of social media giants like X have enabled disinformation to spread quickly. Regulations may help, but every false claim could potentially provoke a wider conflict.


IMAGE CREDIT


Hamas' unprecedented attack on Israel on October 7 and the ongoing Hamas-Israel war in Gaza have again denoted the overwhelming impact of disinformation and misinformation in the digital age. With over 5,000 lives lost, the dissemination of false information, often through social media platforms, has not only added to the chaos but has also exacerbated the emotions of millions across the planet.

While social media platforms offer immediate access to information, they also serve as fertile ground for spreading falsehoods, making it challenging for the public to distinguish fact from fiction. The role of platform owners, content moderation, and regulatory measures is now under scrutiny as we grapple with the implications of disinformation during a devastating conflict.


In the aftermath of the Hamas' attack, the digital landscape became the epicenter of a disinformation pandemic

False information in conflict

In the aftermath of the Hamas' attack, the digital landscape became the epicenter of a disinformation pandemic. While there are numerous instances, some garnered more attention than others. A recent case involved the distribution of videos supposedly portraying an Israeli air assault. However, it became evident upon closer scrutiny that these videos had been extracted from video games, notably Arma 3. The interesting twist is how swiftly this facade was unveiled. It wasn't just the game's developers who stepped forward but also a community of online users intimately familiar with the game. Nevertheless, the fabricated imagery continued to thrive.

Those with more insidious motivations went well and beyond and created a fake White House announcement. An image resembling a screenshot of a supposed White House document suggested that Israel was being provided with $8 billion in aid, implying that this would hinder aid for Ukraine. Although the White House denied issuing any such statement, the fabricated image continued to spread.

Mainstream media outlets also experienced their fair share of fake footage. A manufactured video claimed to show a BBC report declaring that weapons provided by NATO to Ukraine had been sold to Hamas. The circulation of the content continued to spread despite the BBC denying the existence of such a report. Last but not least, the US Embassy in Lebanon had to put out a statement denying that the embassy was being evacuated after false reports garnered attention online.

Even the US President is not immune to disinformation. The White House had to retract President Joe Biden's statement stating he saw images of children beheaded by Hamas during a meeting with Jewish leaders at the White House. However, the White House clarified that these images were based on reports from Israeli government officials and media, and they had not been independently verified. These unverified claims gained traction online, further intensifying the high emotional tensions.

In the recent al-Ahli hospital explosion in Gaza, a misleading video circulated online, falsely claiming that it showed a failed Hamas rocket hitting the hospital. This video, initially from 2022, had no direct connection to the recent hospital incident. This episode also highlights the danger of disinformation during crises, especially those involving civilian casualties and war crimes, as it can inflame emotions and lead to hasty judgments, fueling online debates and deepening divides.

Fueling the disinformation Fire on “X”

The role of Elon Musk and his platform X (formerly Twitter) in the increase of disinformation during the Israel-Hamas war merits particular attention. Musk has faced criticism for the platform's handling of disinformation since he purchased the company. Musk's declared commitment to freedom of expression and his platform's transformation into X have raised concerns about spreading conspiracy theories and antisemitism.

In fact, Musk and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met and discussed the issue of antisemitism on X only recently. Experts attribute the proliferation of disinformation on X during the conflict to Musk's changes over the past year, including the decision to disband the company’s Trust and Safety Council responsible for content moderation. The platform's focus has shifted from verifying facts to maximizing view counts, possibly incentivizing users to share information without considering its trustworthiness.

In addition, the algorithm on X has been modified to prioritize posts with the maximum engagement, encouraging insidious users to share disinformation since dramatic and shocking content often performs exceptionally well, therefore distorting reality. Engagement with conflict-related images and videos creates a strong incentive for individuals pushing specific narratives to share old footage from unrelated events. Posts from X users with premium subscriptions (marked by a blue checkmark) were boosted to the top of users' news feeds. While the blue checkmark was initially intended to foster a better user experience, it inadvertently led to the elevation of unverified and misleading content. Such content often garnered hundreds of thousands of views and engagements, spreading fabrications at an unparalleled pace.


While X has garnered significant attention, other platforms such as TikTok, YouTube, and Telegram have also struggled with false information regarding the Israel-Hamas war

While X has garnered significant attention, other platforms such as TikTok, YouTube, and Telegram have also struggled with false information regarding the Israel-Hamas war. Similar to previous crises, content from the conflict initially appeared on encrypted messaging platforms like Telegram. While Telegram can serve as a primary source for footage, the lack of vetting and fact-checking on such media means that information can and is often taken out of context when shared on platforms like X. This prevalent problem underlines the challenges of addressing disinformation, as it often gains prominence due to its ability to elicit strong reactions and go viral. Each of these platforms has the power to shape public perception beyond the digital realm, potentially influencing geopolitical outcomes.

The EU Crackdown on Social Media Giants

The European Union is cracking down on tech giants to curb the rampant spread of disinformation across social media platforms. Mark Zuckerberg's Meta, the conglomerate that owns Facebook and Instagram, has been served an injunction: comply with European law within 24 hours or face the consequences. X didn't escape the EU's crosshairs either. Thierry Breton, the EU's industry chief, has urged Meta and X to demonstrate "timely, diligent, and objective action" to combat the spread of disinformation. He had given them just one day to provide a detailed account of the "proportionate and effective" measures they had taken.

Breton has demanded that Meta uphold its end of the bargain. The company has responded by setting up a special operations center to monitor and counter the evolving situation. Still, the EU insists that the response must be comprehensive and swift. This isn't just a warning shot; it's part of a broader effort to enforce the EU's Digital Services Act (DSA), designed to protect users on these massive tech platforms. This law has already come into force, with firms being granted time to ensure their systems comply. But as of late August 2023, the strictest rules are now in play for platforms with over 45 million EU users, including X.

Musk's X or Zuckerberg's Meta are not the only companies facing the EU's scrutiny. Breton has written warning letters to the CEOs of other companies, such as TikTok. However, no formal probes have been initiated yet except for announcing the investigation of X. The EU's stance underscores the global battle against disinformation, especially during critical conflicts like the Israel-Hamas war. Musk's response, demanding evidence of violations, echoes a growing debate about the balance between freedom of expression and the responsibility of tech companies to protect the public from false information and hate speech.


It is a well-known fact that false information has the potential to influence public opinion, create confusion and fear, and even shape government policies

Navigating the Disinformation Dilemma

It is a well-known fact that false information has the potential to influence public opinion, create confusion and fear, and even shape government policies. This confusion can hinder informed decision-making. Manipulative content often stokes strong emotions like anger, fear, or sympathy. These emotions can be redirected to serve a specific agenda, often by insidious actors. Yet even more daunting is that false information involving multiple nations can strain international relations.

As the EU pushes for transparency and accountability from tech giants, this serves as a stark reminder that the era of self-regulation in the tech world might be, and more importantly, should be coming to an end. The EU's enforcement of the DSA isn't just a regulatory maneuver, it's a battle to safeguard democracy and public discourse during times of crisis. In the era of instant information sharing, platforms must act swiftly and decisively to counter disinformation. As these examples show, there have never been more drastic consequences than with the Israel-Hamas war, where every post, claim, or video, even complete fabrications, could potentially widen the present conflict and inflict actual suffering.

The views expressed in these articles are those of the author and do not reflect an official position of the Wilson Center.

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YUSUF CAN
Program Coordinator

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How pernicious misinformation is shaping the Israel-Hamas war

That “hospital explosion” wasn’t really a hospital explosion.

Screenshot via PBS

The Editorial Board.
October 27, 2023 | 

Editor’s note: Thank you for reading to the Editorial Board, your place for politics in plain English for normal people and the common good. This humble newsletter is how I make a living. It’s how I pay for my daughter’s piano lessons and nature programs and all those things. Some have asked how they can support the EB without committing to a subscription. Here’s the tip jar! In any case, many thanks for reading the EB! –JS


I wanted to interview Nicholas Grossman regarding the role of misinformation in the Israel-Hamas war. I hoped to ask the professor of international relations at the University of Illinois, and senior editor of Arc Digital, about misinformation that arose from American reporting on an explosion at a hospital in Gaza.

You know what? I ended up repeating a bit of misinformation!

I asked him to lay out the facts about a “hospital explosion” that “killed hundreds,” and he said nuh-uh (not his words). In fact, Professor Grossman said, “there never were hundreds killed by an explosion at that hospital. Media reported that the hospital was destroyed by an Israeli airstrike killing 500, but that was based on something a Hamas-controlled agency said and was never supported by evidence.”

“This instance wasn’t normal. While there’s often partial and false info coming out of wars, it is not normal for major media outlets, such as the Times, to publish false information. But this time, many did.”


Professor Grossman went on to say “what apparently did happen is something hit a nearby parking lot and caused a smaller explosion, most likely a rocket fired from Gaza towards Israel that fell short (ie, not an Israeli projectile). People were camping in the parking lot, and the explosion killed some of them, but far less than the originally reported number. The estimates I’ve seen range from 10 to 50.”

My point isn’t to draw attention to my error, but to highlight the pernicious influence of misinformation on everyone, even those, like me, who are at least aware of that pernicious influence, and who are taking the time to ask knowledgeable people about it in times of war.

Now imagine the pernicious influence of misinformation on people who have no such awareness, or more importantly, on governments that are invested in misinformation being taken as fact. Scaled big enough, that misinformation could affect choices leaders make. As you will see in the rest of my interview, the misinformation that arose from American reporting on the “hospital explosion” could end up shaping the war.


JS: The Gaza hospital explosion story produced a lot of misinformation very quickly. Some say that was an inflection point in a potential widening of the conflict. But isn’t misinformation kinda normal?

NG: Misinformation is pretty normal, especially in war. Combatants try to spin news in their favor, and sometimes lie. They have trouble seeing through the chaos — known as the “fog of war” — to know exactly what’s happening, and it’s even harder for outside observers.

But this instance wasn’t normal. While there’s often partial and false info coming out of wars, it is not normal for major media outlets, such as the Times, to publish false information. But this time, many did. Politicians in various countries treated it as fact. Protestors surrounded US embassies. The King of Jordan canceled a planned meeting with President Biden. The news media error was big enough that the Times put out a long editor’s note explaining and apologizing.


JS: What challenge does Biden face given this misinformation? Just by stating the facts as known, he risks his “honest broker” position, no?

NG: If anyone still believes the false story, even though it’s been corrected, they would likely see that the president saying that it’s false as bias towards Israel. Some who acknowledge that it’s false still say that, because while Israel didn’t bomb that hospital or kill those people, they’re bombing many targets in Gaza and killing many people.

But those crowds are probably impossible to satisfy, and Biden isn’t about to say that false stories are true in an attempt to satisfy them.

Where it creates a serious challenge is in reactions from major players. If Hezbollah, Syria, Iran and others sympathetic to Hamas’ side believe that the hospital attack happened — or even if the leaders know it’s false but a lot of their people still believe it — they could become more likely to intervene and widen the war. If Arab leaders believe it, or feel a need to placate a public that believes it, they will be less likely to support diplomacy or work with the US to manage the crisis.


JS: Hussein Ibish has said the key to ending this is to stop dehumanizing both sides, in this case Israelis and Palestinians, and start “rehumanizing” them. I trust Hussein means well, but revenge has a powerful pull on the psyche. What can leaders of good faith do?

NG: There’s a lot of well-meaning commentary that offers hope and a vision for the future, but doesn’t give anyone anything actionable to do now. “Rehumanizing both sides” sounds wonderful, but I don’t know how to do it in the short-term, and it doesn’t answer questions like “how can Israel avoid a repeat of the deadly Hamas attacks?”

The best leaders may be able to do is frequently remind Israel that thinking strategically yields better outcomes than lashing out in vengeance. That’s apparently been a focus for the Biden administration, as they’ve held up post-9/11 America as a cautionary tale, stressed that if Israel is going to overthrow Hamas they need to plan for what comes after, and pushed Israel to allow more humanitarian aid into Gaza.


JS: Relatedly, what is the president doing right? Wrong? Some say he’s giving a free pass to Israel. Others say his left flank is going to be a problem for him. Others still are calling him a war president by proxy.

NG: It’s a really hard situation and I think he’s handled it well under the circumstances. In particular, supporting Israel in public has given him more leverage with the Israelis behind the scenes, which he’s used to delay an Israeli ground invasion, get humanitarian supplies into Gaza, and more. He’s also sent clear signals to Iran that the US does not want the war to widen, but is prepared to, which functions as deterrence.

As for something Biden did wrong? I thought his speech overdid the links between Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas, miscasting Israel as Ukraine and Russia as Hamas. The wars, the combatants, and the overall situations are too different in too many ways. Russia-Ukraine is pretty straightforward. Israel-Palestine is anything but.

On “free pass to Israel,” I’d say it’s clear that Biden is supporting Israel after the October 7 Hamas attacks, but not simply going along with whatever Israel wants. Some Americans (and others) want Biden to be more critical of Israel, to stop US military aid, to make America’s priority stopping the Israeli military, or take other steps. But “free pass” is more political hyperbole than objective analysis.

Regarding Biden’s “left flank,” it’s hard to say. For one, it’s impossible to know now what American voters will have at the front of their minds when voting in November 2024. Some criticism of Biden about Israel from the left is a genuine criticism by Biden voters, and some is by activists, commentators, podcasters, etc., who’d never vote Biden, and who guaranteed that Biden would lose in 2020 and Democrats would lose the 2022 midterms. How, or if, US policy towards today’s events in Israel and Gaza impacts the next American election — I don’t know.

And I don’t think others really know either.

“War president by proxy” is ridiculous. A lot of things happen in the world that are outside America’s control. Hamas killing 1,400 people in Israel was one of them, and Israel responding to that militarily is another. As a global leader, the US president plays a role in managing various crises. Israel and Hamas have fought many times, across many presidencies, and the US has been giving Israel aid throughout.


JS: Some say Trump’s “isolationist” tendencies are better than Biden’s “internationalist” tendencies. Is this a real debate or false binary?

NG: In general, it’s a false binary. There are degrees of isolationism and interventionism, and circumstances can change views. George W. Bush ran in 2000 as an anti-interventionist, and after Sept. 11 became the opposite. Specifically, it’s wrong. Trump deployed more US troops to Syria, authorized drone strikes, ordered the assassination of an Iranian general — the first foreign military commander targeted and killed by the US since World War II — and quite a bit more. Biden withdrew forces from Afghanistan and curtailed the drone program, then did a lot to help Ukraine after Russia’s invasion. It’s not cut and dry.

On Israel-Palestine, Trump wasn’t isolationist, taking various actions to shift US policy in favor of the Israeli government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. That didn’t cause the violence we’re seeing, but it did worsen the situation in ways that made violence more likely.




John Stoehr  is the editor of the Editorial Board. He writes the daily edition. Find him @johnastoehr

Israel-Hamas war and the impact of online disinformation


Inna Lazareva,Adam Smith,Avi Asher-Schapiro
Published: October 12, 2023

A dove flies over the debris of houses destroyed in Israeli strikes, in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip 

October 11, 2023. REUTERS/Ibraheem Abu Mustafa

What’s the context?

Israel-Hamas war sparks deluge of disinformation that spills over into the real world
Disinformation spreads worldwide after Hamas attack on Israel
Platforms struggle to moderate viral falsehoods
False narratives can manipulate opinion and hinder justice

TEL AVIV/LONDON/LOS ANGELES - False and misleading information has surged online since the militant Islamist group Hamas launched its surprise attack on Israel, manipulating world opinion, fomenting local confusion and bolstering calls for retribution, experts say.

Israel has since rained down retaliatory strikes on the Palestinian enclave of Gaza, leaving 180,000 homeless and 2.3 million without electricity or water.

At least 1,200 Israelis and 1,200 Palestinians have been killed in the conflict, according to reports.

Rights groups and researchers have warned against social media users sharing misleading or baseless claims, including miscaptioned imagery or altered documents, in an effort to shape public perception.

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European Union industry chief Thierry Breton this week urged social media leaders Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg to tackle the spread of disinformation on their respective platforms - X, Facebook, and Instagram - to comply with new EU online content rules.

Here's what you need to know about disinformation during the conflict and how it's spreading:
What disinformation is spreading?

There have been four main narratives that have spread across social media, according to Jack Brewster, an editor for news rating website and misinformation tracker NewsGuard.

These are the key fake story lines identified by Brewster:that the attack against Israel was a false flag, a campaign perpetrated expressly to lay blame on an opponent.

that Israel is staging footage of dead children killed by Hamas.

that the U.S. administration approved an $8 billion aid package for Israel.
and that Ukraine sold weapons to Hamas.

The Arab Center for Social Media Advancement, a non-profit known as 7amleh, also tracked some inaccurate accounts of Jewish babies being held captive in Gaza, as well as of sexual abuse.

For families in the Middle East, disinformation can have a personal toll.

On Monday, a video on Musk's X platform purported to show Yaffa Adar, an 85-year-old grandmother, who was kidnapped from her home in Kibbutz Nir Oz near the border with Gaza on Saturday.

It shows footage of an older woman, surrounded by soldiers. The woman is seen resting after exiting a black van as soldiers hand her a bottle of water.

The video spread widely online, but on verification with the family, it became apparent the woman shown is not Adar.

“It was absolutely heartbreaking (to see that video) – to think that maybe she’s back and then to find out that it’s not her,” her granddaughter Adva Adar told Context.
What has helped fuel disinformation?

Across social media, dis- and misinformation have been spread about the violence in an echo of the fake news unleashed in the early stages of the Russia-Ukraine war, Brewster said.

The most notable change in the social media space is how X, formerly Twitter, is being used to spread disinformation, tech and media experts said.

“Some users have passed off video game footage as real, while others have shared clips from other events or wars entirely,” Brewster said.

Other social media platforms, such as TikTok, have been used to share out-of-context videos.

NewsGuard highlighted two videos purporting to show Israeli senior officials captured by Hamas - the men were in fact in the hands of Azerbaijan’s security service - and Hamas militants paragliding into Israel in a clip that was filmed in Egypt.

These videos received hundreds of thousands of views before being taken down.

TikTok did not provide comment when contacted by Context.

X directed Context to statements made by CEO Linda Yaccarino that it had "redistributed resources and refocused internal teams ... to address this rapidly evolving situation."

Theodora Skeadas, a former public policy staffer at Twitter who worked on content moderation, said that staffing cuts had significantly undermined the platform's capacity to tackle the deluge of doctored posts and misleading videos and images.

"The work that Twitter would have done in the past is (to) elevate reliable information, remove misinformation and content that violates the terms of service (and) add labels to certain posts for more context," she said.
How are platforms tackling the problem?

X has said that more than 500 unique Community Notes, a feature that lets users add context to potentially misleading content, have been posted about the conflict.

But Skeadas said community notes "can't keep up with the volume of posts during a crisis".

YouTube has said that graphic content may be allowed on the platform if it provides sufficient news value, but is moderating for videos that violate its rules.

Snap says it is monitoring for misinformation and incitement of violence.

Meta, which owns Instagram and Facebook, said a team of experts including Hebrew and Arabic speakers were monitoring the "rapidly evolving situation in real-time".
What are the real-world consequences?

The main aim of false narratives is to manipulate public opinion and justify collective punishment, Nadim Nashif, executive director of 7amleh, told Context.

“These phenomena have a considerable impact on ... access to information, something quite worrying in a context in which Palestinian narratives are censored and/or unable to make it to the online realm," he said.

This can lead to further calls for violence and to actual harm, as well as obscuring human rights violations and preventing justice from being served, he said.

Adar, whose grandmother is still missing, is worried that disinformation could prevent her family getting help.

“We are really looking for the world to understand the situation here – and then something like this comes up and people think that things are better, where they are not.”

New to Context? We'd love for you to find out a little more about what we do. Click here for a selection of our best work.

(Writing by Adam Smith; reporting by Inna Lazareva in Tel Aviv, Adam Smith in London, Avi Asher-Schapiro in Los Angeles; editing by Lyndsay Griffiths and Zoe Tabary)

Analysis: Propaganda, deception, and fake news in the Israel-Hamas conflict

The last thing that matters in any propaganda operation is whether there is any truth in it.

Palestinians wounded in Israeli air raids on the Gaza Strip are brought to al-Aqsa hospital in Deir el-Balah, on October 14, 2023 [Adel Hana/AP Photo]

By Zoran Kusovac
Published On 14 Oct 2023

The Hamas Authority for Refugee Affairs has called Israel’s already notorious directive that all civilians should evacuate the northern part of the Gaza Strip “fake propaganda”.

Whoever wrote that is dead wrong, and was certainly not involved in the planning of last week’s armed incursion into Israel carried out by the Palestinian group’s armed wing, the Qassam Brigades. The last thing that matters in any propaganda operation is whether there is any truth in it.

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Multiple surprise breaches of Israel’s security barriers between it and Gaza were carried out in a very determined and efficient fashion, as were the executions and captures of members of Israeli armed forces and civilians in the settlements swarmed by Hamas’s fighters.

But the main purpose of the attack was not military, except possibly to the limited degree of taking hostages who can be used as human shields in case of (expected) Israeli armed retaliation on the ground. The real purpose of the action was Hamas’s desire to demonstrate what it is capable of, militarily and in terms of willingness to use extreme violence.

The action was planned as a message saying “This is what we can and will do” – and as such it falls under that important, even crucial, part of the art of war we call psychological warfare.



The term may be new – it was first used barely 80 years ago, at the beginning of World War II – but the actions it describes are as old as warfare itself, as old as humanity.

From time immemorial, military commanders knew that they stood a better chance of being victorious in battle if their enemy was weakened and demoralised by fear and uncertainty.

Ancient warrior chiefs knew that surprise is one of the most efficient military tactics. If you make your foes guess when and how you will attack, and especially if you make them expect you at a different place at a different time, you have already half won your battle. The other half of victory is achieved by striking your enemy when and where he did not expect you and overcoming his weakened resistance.

Many wars in the past have been won without ever waging or winning one decisive battle. US senator and former military officer in the Vietnam War, John McCain, stated that Vietnamese Commander-in-Chief General Vo Nguyen Giap beat the United States in war but never in battle. In that sense, Hamas beat Israel in last weekend’s battle, but it has not won the war. Yet it scored an important propaganda victory

.

Palestinians queue to fill containers with water in Khan Yunis in the southern Gaza Strip on October 14, 2023 [Mahmud Hams/AFP]

Scenes of Hamas machinegunning Israelis – soldiers and civilians – caused outrage in Israel and most of the Western world. But in the eyes of many Palestinians, most of the rest of the Arab world and many Third World countries, the armed fighters demonstrated determination, nerves of steel, skill in the use of modern military technologies and total disregard for their own lives in an action that proved that underdogs can successfully challenge the domination of the big and the mighty. In that vast part of the world, Hamas scored an important propaganda victory.

In Israel and in the West, it shot itself in the foot, giving additional proof to those who consider Hamas fighters cold-blooded murderers and “terrorists”. It also unified Israelis who rallied together regardless of differences in politics or opinions.

Was Hamas aware of the effect the raid would produce? Certainly, but it obviously calculated that it was worth it for them to show themselves in a new light and again raise awareness of the Palestinians’ plight.


The Israeli response was as expected: first came deliberate aerial bombing of Gaza with doubtful military effect, and then came an immediate psychological warfare campaign. Propaganda and guns – a classic military strategy

.

(Al Jazeera)

Israel’s call to civilians to evacuate northern Gaza in 24 hours is pure propaganda in the function of war. Every military planner knows that even under extreme threat, civilians, who cannot be disciplined the way armies can, who resist attempts to instil order, who try to take with them possessions that slow them down, and try to find alternative routes and means etc, may only cover 20-25km (12.5-15.5 miles) in a day.

But when their numbers swell, with even 10,000 being huge, not to mention a million, they will simply block every road, including ones needed by the military to manoeuvre, and create chaos, panic and demoralisation.

This is exactly what Israel intended to do, but it succeeded only partially. Why? We’ll examine it tomorrow.

Just to add that I was right about the Israeli land attack on Gaza not happening on Friday night. I believe it will not happen today, either.

But I will not say it might not happen next weekend. That might be a realistic time for the Israeli army to have achieved their desired level of operational readiness.


SOURCE: AL JAZEERA