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Thursday, September 12, 2024




BLA-TTP collaboration in Balochistan: alliance or anomaly?

Can the BLA, a secular nationalist militant group seeking complete separation from Pakistan, genuinely form an alliance with the TTP, which seeks the imposition of Sharia law in the country?
Published September 12, 2024 
DAWN


In a series of unprecedented and highly coordinated attacks across 11 districts of Balochistan, militants killed over 50 security personnel and civilians, particularly those hailing from Punjab in a single night.

The next day, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), a banned separatist outfit, claimed carrying out the attacks. While the militant outfit has long been waging a low-level separatist insurgency in Balochistan, the scale and coordination of the August 26 attacks mark a dramatic escalation in the two-decade-old conflict.

Why August 26?


During the series of attacks, the militants blocked highways, carried out a suicide bombing at a military camp, sabotaged a gas pipeline, damaged railway tracks, and killed several unarmed civilians hailing from Punjab. Some reports even suggest the death toll may have been as high as 70 people, making it one of the deadliest episodes of violence in the ongoing Baloch insurgency.

While Balochistan has previously experienced smaller bombings and hit-and-run assaults, this marked the first time that the BLA launched such a coordinated and deadly offensive, which also included a suicide bombing by a woman targeting the paramilitary Frontier Corps camp in Bela, district Lasbela.

But why did the BLA choose August 26? The day is particularly significant as it commemorates the 18th death anniversary of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, a former governor and chief minister, who was killed in a military operation in 2006 — an event that triggered the current wave of Baloch insurgency which has claimed thousands of lives.

Before Bugti’s death, the Baloch insurgency was largely restricted to the tribal areas of the Marri and Bugti regions. But a misadventure and a non-political decision to address Bugti’s grievances by force escalated the violence. His death acted as a catalyst, sparking an insurgency that has since expanded beyond these tribal areas to affect non-tribal regions, including the Makran belt.

Ever since, the month of August has seen heightened violence in Balochistan, with separatist insurgents frequently staging major attacks on August 14, Pakistan’s Independence Day, and again on August 26.
Alarming spike

The recent surge of violence in Balochistan has even extended to areas previously considered relatively stable. One of the most alarming attacks on August 26 occurred in Musakhail, near the Punjab border, where militants stopped buses, selectively offloaded passengers and shot them dead after checking their ID cards.

This was the first such attack by any Baloch militant group in Musakhail district, indicating the BLA’s capacity to extend the conflict towards or near Punjab.

The same day, the BLA also carried out a suicide bombing in Lasbela, a Baloch-dominated district that has traditionally remained relatively peaceful. In this case, the group employed a young female suicide bomber, a law student from the University of Turbat, which highlights a disturbing trend of educated youth, including women, joining the ranks of Baloch militant groups.

The nature and sophistication of these attacks have shocked both authorities and the public, sparking fresh debate about the group’s operational capabilities and how it managed to carry out such large-scale, synchronised assaults in a single day. The attacks have also exposed the failure on the part of security forces in Balochistan, where as many as seven law enforcement agencies and three intelligence agencies are actively engaged in maintaining law and order.

Various theories explain the BLA’s rising power, but one prominent factor drawing Baloch youth to armed groups is state policy. While militant groups often spend months, if not years, planning such coordinated attacks, of late, Balochistan has increasingly become a breeding ground for insurgency, particularly since 2018. This can partly be attributed to the downward spiral of the province’s political landscape in recent years. The formation of the Balochistan Awami Party (BAP), for example, and its rapid rise to power further destabilised the political environment of the province — courtesy of deteriorating governance marked by rampant corruption and nepotism in a province already plagued by militancy.

Moreover, heavy-handed state responses, including alleged extrajudicial killings, have fuelled further resentment among Baloch youth. These include the 2020 killing of Hayat Baloch, a university student, who was shot dead in front of his parents in Turbat. There was also the case of four-year-old Bramsh Baloch, a survivor of a death squad which took her mother’s life.

More recently, massive protests erupted across Balochistan after the reported killing of Balaach Mola Bakhsh, who died in the custody of the Counter Terrorism Department last November. Further aggravating tensions was the mistreatment of Baloch women protesters in Islamabad in December, which led to increased angst among the youth.
What government authorities say

For their part, authorities attribute the marked increase in the BLA’s operational capacity to foreign hostile agencies, particularly India’s RAW, as well as the shifting geopolitical landscape in the wake of the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in August 2021.

Following the attacks on Aug 26, the prime minister said that the terrorists aimed to disrupt the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and other development projects. The government, as well as the military, has on many an occasion accused hostile agencies of being behind the violence in Balochistan to undermine CPEC.

Government officials also suggest that the BLA has dramatically bolstered its operational capacity in recent years, allegedly through an alliance with the militant Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and access to a cache of advanced American weaponry from Afghanistan. In a press conference in Quetta on June 26, Balochistan Home Minister Ziaullah Langove announced the arrest of two key militant commanders, TTP’s Nasrullah, also known as Maulvi Mansoor, and Idrees, also known as Irshad.

Langove presented a pre-recorded statement from Nasrullah, who claimed he had served as an “emir” in the TTP’s defence commission since 2023. Nasrullah detailed a January 2024 plan, allegedly orchestrated with the BLA’s Majeed Brigade commander Bashir Zeb, to cross the Pak-Afghan border into southern Balochistan with the help of a guide.

While claims and statements of this nature by the government are not uncommon, reports of an alleged alliance between the two terror groups first emerged in August 2012 when Rehman Malik, the then interior minister, informed the Senate that the BLA, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), and the TTP were connected and allegedly acting on behalf of foreign hostile agencies exploiting Balochistan’s indigenous issues. Rehman Malik also made similar claims in 2014.

In recent years, Islamabad has repeatedly accused the de facto Afghan government of supporting the TTP and the BLA, claiming that these groups are collaborating and operating from Afghan territory. Kabul, for its part, has vehemently denied these allegations, insisting that its soil is not being used as a base for attacks on its neighbour.

In February 2022, following the BLA’s attacks on two military bases in the remote Panjgur and Naushki districts of Balochistan, then-interior minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmed claimed that the BLA was using advanced American weaponry during these assaults. He did not, however, provide details on how the BLA obtained the weapons, nor did he specify whether the Afghan Taliban were involved in supplying the arms or if the weapons were acquired through the black market.

Escalating tactics and troubling patterns

Even without a formal nexus, however, the BLA may have borrowed or learned new tactics from the TTP. Since July 2022, for example, the BLA has reportedly abducted law enforcers and a senior army officer on various occasions, offering prisoner swaps to the government — a tactic seemingly borrowed from the TTP. In June earlier this year, the militant outfit also kidnapped 10 picnickers from the outskirts of Quetta, subsequently proposing a prisoner swap with the government again.

Since August 2018, the BLA has also increasingly turned to suicide bombings, another signature tactic of the TTP, but which was previously avoided by Baloch armed groups.

In 2023, for instance, Pakistan saw the highest number of suicide bombings since 2014, with nearly half of these attacks targeting security forces. According to the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, an Islamabad-based think tank, Balochistan was the second most terrorism-affected province in 2023 after Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Baloch insurgent groups and religiously inspired militant groups carried out a total of 110 attacks in the province, compared to 79 in the previous year.

Can an alliance be formed?

This begs the question: can the BLA, which presents itself as a secular nationalist militant group seeking complete separation from Pakistan, genuinely form an alliance with a group like the TTP, which seeks the imposition of Sharia law in the country?

Baloch insurgents have long viewed the TTP as unreliable, given the group’s history of engaging in peace talks with the Pakistani government as early as May 2022. There are also longstanding concerns among Baloch nationalists about the potential Islamisation of their province, which they fear could undermine their separatist insurgency and secular values.

Considering the TTP’s past negotiations, its demand for Sharia law, and its lack of support for Balochistan’s independence, it is difficult to assess whether the BLA would ally with or trust the TTP.

Given that Balochistan borders Afghanistan, with many Pashtun areas adjoining the Afghan border, it is possible that the Taliban or their sympathisers could facilitate the movement of Baloch armed groups entering and exiting Afghanistan. In exchange, Baloch armed groups or their supporters may provide logistical support to the TTP in Baloch-dominated areas of Balochistan. However, experts remain sceptical about whether these interactions could constitute genuine collaboration.

Muhammad Amir Rana, an Islamabad-based security and political analyst, stressed that there is no concrete evidence of a direct collaboration between the BLA and the TTP.

“One primary reason is that their political and ideological backgrounds are quite different,” Rana explained.

“BLA’s main concern regarding the TTP is that the group has acted as a proxy of the state in the past. The BLA also fears that the TTP could reconcile with the state at any time, which might then be used against the Baloch people. While the TTP has attempted to exploit the issue of Baloch missing persons to gain sympathy, this does not provide a solid basis for closer ties with the BLA,” he added.

In recent years, the TTP has increasingly expressed an interest in Balochistan, using its mouthpiece, Umar Media, to call on the Baloch people to resist alleged state oppression.

Following the triple murders in Barkhan district in February 2023 — reportedly masterminded by former provincial minister Sardar Abdul Rehman Khetran — the TTP released a nine-minute video condemning the killings. The group also previously issued videos in the Balochi language in April and May 2022, urging the Baloch to support its war against the state.

More recently, several lesser-known or previously unknown shadow groups have announced their merger with the TTP from Balochistan.

Ihsanullah Tipu Mehsud, a journalist and co-founder of The Khorasan Diary, covering militancy, Jihadist movement and security issues in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, said that while there is no substantial evidence of direct operational collaboration between TTP and BLA leaderships, their media activities suggest a different perspective.

He noted that whenever the TTP launches an attack, Baloch separatists and their affiliated channels intensely share the news on social media. Similarly, he says TTP-linked accounts amplify reports of Baloch insurgent activities whenever they carry out any attacks in Balochistan.

According to Ihsanullah, TTP Emir Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud has repeatedly voiced support for militancy in Balochistan, urging the Baloch to ally with the TTP. This media-based support, he suggests, indicates a diminishing divide between secular nationalism and religious extremism, with the TTP leadership frequently addressing issues of Baloch oppression and nationalism.

“But as for rumours and reports circulating that the [TTP and BLA leadership] meet each other in Afghanistan and support each other at an operational level, I have no such evidence or information,” he said. A Dawn editorial from last year, however, pointed out that “the lack of conclusive evidence at this point does not preclude the possibility of some sort of ‘working arrangement’ between the TTP and the Baloch separatists in the future”.

“Since Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud took charge of the TTP in 2018, we’ve observed a clear shift, with the TTP repeatedly justifying the Baloch armed struggle against the state. Initially, Baloch secular nationalists were known to resist and even clash with Islamist jihadists in Balochistan, such as the Baloch chapter of Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, but that division has faded away now.

“Baloch militants no longer oppose jihadists, and similarly, the TTP leadership now openly justifies the Baloch armed struggle,” Tipu added.

He noted, however, that the support and collaboration between the two groups is, so far, only evident on the propaganda front.

Security analyst Rana, on the other hand, observed that while the BLA and TTP are ideologically distinct militant groups with differing ideologies, they have historically supported each other when their objectives are common. “This support might include trading and exchanging weapons or providing logistical aid, but such interactions among militants do not constitute high-level collaboration.”

Whether the recent spike in violence is a result of a marriage of convenience between militant outfits, the act of hostile foreign agencies or a natural progression of the decades-long insurgency, further fuelled by growing resentment towards the state, it is high time that all stakeholders sit together and chalk out a sustainable plan to contain the conflict, lest it engulfs the entire province.

Kiyya Baloch is a freelance Pakistani journalist currently based in Norway. He can be found on Twitter @KiyyaBaloch


LA REVUE GAUCHE - Left Comment: Search results for BALOCHISTAN 

Wednesday, September 11, 2024

Global repercussions of Sept. 11 terror attacks continue to reverberate 23 years later

Fallout of attacks continues to ripple across the globe after US wars in Afghanistan, Iraq led to further instability, return and creation of new extremist groups

Michael Gabriel Hernandez |11.09.2024 - TRT/AA




WASHINGTON

The chaos and terror that swept across the nation 23 years ago is increasingly becoming a distant memory for many Americans, even as the global shockwaves that followed the Sept. 11, 2001 terror attacks continue to be felt.

For those who lived through that terrifying and sobering morning, watching as scene after scene of carnage unfolded in New York City before spreading further, the horror lives on.

It all started when a passenger plane slammed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center at 8.46 a.m. on a busy Tuesday morning. Just 17 minutes later, another plane struck the South Tower.

The massive 110-story skyscrapers, burning and badly damaged by the plane strikes, would collapse within minutes of one another, sending a thick cloud of toxic dust and ash ripping through the streets of Manhattan as people desperately ran away in terror.

Amid the devastation in New York, another plane struck the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, just outside of Washington, D.C. at 9.37 a.m.

A national panic not seen since Pearl Harbor, some 60 years prior, had rapidly set in.

Just minutes after the Defense Department was struck, authorities closed all US airspace, but United Airlines Flight 93 had already been overrun.

Passengers and crew were rushing to the cockpit in an effort to wrest control of the plane from the four hijackers. About five minutes later, the plane would jackknife into an empty field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, killing all onboard.

The plane was about 20 minutes flying time from Washington, D.C., where authorities believe the hijackers sought to strike either the White House or the US Capitol.

It would take time, but Americans would eventually find out that 19 al-Qaeda terrorists were responsible for hijacking the four passenger planes in a plot orchestrated by the terror group’s longtime leader, Osama bin Laden.

A total of 2,977 people were killed on Sept. 11. Thousands more were injured that day. An estimated 400,000 other victims, including firefighters and police who worked tirelessly to rescue as many survivors as possible, were exposed to the carcinogenic dust cloud that swept through New York City when the World Trade Center collapsed.

The fallout has been nothing short of disastrous.

And so began the War on Terror

With the nation scrambling for answers, President George W. Bush would quickly go on the offensive, telling all nations worldwide that if they harbor al-Qaeda, its operatives or its leaders, the US would take action: “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”

“From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime,” Bush said during a joint address to Congress nine days after the attacks, putting the US squarely on a war footing.

“The only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows,” he added.

In just three weeks, Bush would begin what would become America’s longest war when he invaded Afghanistan, the country from which bin Laden and al-Qaeda planned and executed the devastating Sept. 11 attacks.

The Global War on Terror had officially begun.

The Taliban government would quickly collapse in the face of the vastly superior US military, but the militants would go on to stage a two-decade long insurgency against American and allied forces in Afghanistan, striking from the shadows.

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld declared an end to “major combat” operations in Afghanistan on May 1, 2003, but the US occupation of the Central Asian country would continue for 18 years until President Joe Biden withdrew all American forces in 2021.

The Taliban rapidly returned to power as US and international troops left Afghanistan, ousting the internationally-recognized government and reimposing their hardline grip on the impoverished nation.

US launches war on Iraq, but never finds alleged weapons of mass destruction

Just a year-and-a-half after Bush declared war on the Taliban, he began a second front in the War on Terror in far-away Iraq.

The pretext for this war was Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein’s alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction. But evidence of the program, detailed before the UN Security Council by then-Secretary of State Colin Powell, was never found.

“My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions,” Powell told the Council one month before the March 2003 invasion. “What we're giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence.”

No chemical or biological weapons were ever recovered, despite robust investigative efforts after Saddam and his military were eliminated. Powell later reflected that the Feb. 5, 2003 speech was his singular greatest regret during his decades of public service.

Like the Taliban, Saddam’s forces rapidly fell apart in the face of US military power, but like what happened in Afghanistan, an insurgency would form that would bring with it years of violence against coalition forces until the US withdrew in 2011.

Legacy of torture mars War on Terror

The kinetic wars in Afghanistan and Iraq dominated international and domestic headlines for years. But below the surface, US intelligence agencies were carrying out a far more secretive war that involved clandestine renditions of terror suspects, CIA black sites, and a program whose name would become a euphemism for torture.

The “Enhanced Interrogation Program,” as it would be known, was implemented worldwide with hundreds of detainees being subjected, most notably at the infamous US military prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

The interrogation program was publicly detailed in a damning 500-page Senate Intelligence Committee report that was released in redacted form in 2014.

“CIA personnel, aided by two outside contractors, decided to initiate a program of indefinite secret detention and the use of brutal interrogation techniques in violation of U.S. law, treaty obligations, and our values,” Committee Chairwoman Dianne Feinstein wrote in the report.

“It is my personal conclusion that, under any common meaning of the term, CIA detainees were tortured. I also believe that the conditions of confinement and the use of authorized and unauthorized interrogation and conditioning techniques were cruel, inhuman and degrading. I believe the evidence of this is overwhelming and incontrovertible,” she added.

The report brought to light systemic, widespread abuses perpetrated by CIA officers, including the now infamous practice of waterboarding, placing detainees in extended periods of stress positions, sleep deprivation and punitive forced rectal feeding and rehydration.

It further said the CIA’s justifications for the program, based on its alleged effectiveness, were “inaccurate.” A review of 20 cases used by the agency to justify the enhanced interrogation techniques found that there was either no link between torture that was used and counterterrorism successes or found that the CIA falsely claimed a correlation between the intelligence it gained and the methods used.

The report determined that in such cases, the intelligence was either gained from a detainee prior to interrogation or was already available to the CIA from other sources.

Clandestine US operation kills bin Laden not in Afghanistan, but in neighboring Pakistan

It took a decade for the US to find and kill bin Laden. Ultimately, the al-Qaeda leader was not found in Afghanistan, where he had been holed up in the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001 terror attacks.

He was discovered across the border in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad, residing in a sprawling compound less than one mile from the country’s premier military academy.

On May 2, 2011, a pair of previously undisclosed modified Black Hawk stealth helicopters crossed the Pakistani border, flying fast and low as they closed in on bin Laden’s safe house. As soon as they reached their target, US special operations forces rapidly disembarked, entered the compound and killed the al-Qaeda leader, taking his body for confirmation.

Bin Laden was subsequently buried at sea after a positive identification was made in what marked the most significant US victory in the war on terror.


Rise of Daesh/ISIS poses far greater threat than al-Qaeda

The victory proved short-lived, however. Just three years later, a new terror group would rise from the remnants of Saddam’s Baathist military before spreading worldwide.

Daesh/ISIS gained global attention when it rapidly overran vast swathes of Syria and then Iraq as it announced the formation of its self-styled caliphate in 2014. Adherents from around the globe would flock to join the terror group’s ranks as its territorial grip grew.

At its height, Daesh/ISIS controlled one-third of Syria and 40% of Iraq amid widespread instability, claiming major cities including Mosul and Raqqa and bringing with it an iron-fisted fundamentalist rule. That was something al-Qaeda only ever aspired to.

While it no longer lays formal claim to any territory in either country following a years-long international military campaign led by the US, Daesh/ISIS maintains cells in the region and has grown to include affiliates as far afield as West Africa and Afghanistan.

It was, in fact, Daesh/ISIS's affiliate in the country that claimed a deadly 2021 suicide bombing on Kabul's international airport as US troops were withdrawing from Afghanistan, killing 13 US troops and nearly 170 civilians.

The terror group's Afghanistan branch has gone on to carry out a series of other attacks on the Taliban following the US exit.

US forces, meanwhile, continue to carry out operations around the world, including in Afghanistan, aimed at eliminating the group. There continues to be no end in sight.


Remembering the Costs of September 11


The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. changed not only the United States forever. They also had global consequences that are felt to this day.

September 11, 2024

1

At 8:46 AM, American Airlines flight 11 struck the north tower of the World Trade Center in New York. A second plane, United Airlines flight 175, struck the south tower 17 minutes later.

2

A third plane, American Airlines flight 77, struck the Pentagon at 9:37 AM. A fourth plane, United Airlines flight 93, crashed in Pennsylvania at 10:03 AM after its passengers attempted to overpower the hijackers.

3

The attacks were carried out by 19 terrorists associated with the Islamic extremist group al-Qaeda, and were — and remain — the deadliest terrorist attacks on U.S. soil in the country’s history.

4

The attacks were planned by members of the so-called “Hamburg Cell.” It was located in Hamburg, Germany, and included the ringleader, Mohamed Atta.

5

15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi citizens. Saudi Arabia was also the birthplace of al-Qaeda's leader, Osama bin Laden.

6

Some 2,753 people were killed in New York, 184 at the Pentagon and 40 in Pennsylvania. All 19 hijackers were also killed.

7

An estimated 400,000 people were exposed to toxic contaminants, risk of physical injury and physically and emotionally stressful conditions in the days and months following the attacks.

8

In response to the attacks, instead of pursuing targeted counter-terrorism operations, U.S. President George W. Bush announced the ill-fated Global War on Terror. The United States began military operations in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001.

9

The war in Afghanistan was the longest war in U.S. history. It lasted for 20 years and cost the lives of 2,443 U.S. soldiers.

10

Since the U.S. withdrawal, the Taliban, who had given al-Qaeda safe haven, are once again in control of the country.

11

On March 20, 2003, President George W. Bush announced that U.S. forces had begun military operation against Iraq. The goal was to topple dictator Saddam Hussein and confiscate his alleged stockpile of weapons of mass destruction.

12

No weapons of mass destruction were found, and the gradual U.S. withdrawal led to the rise of the Islamic State. Saddam Hussein was executed for crimes against humanity by the new Iraqi government on December 30, 2006.

13

The mastermind behind the attacks, Osama bin Laden, was killed in a raid on his hideout in Pakistan on May 2, 2011.

14

More than 7,000 U.S. troops were killed in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with more than 8,000 contractors. The financial cost of the War on Terror to the United States is estimated to be over $8 trillion.

15

Globally, it is estimated that over 940,000 people have died in the post-September 11 wars due to direct war violence. An estimated 3.6-3.8 million people died indirectly in post-September 11 war zones, bringing the total death toll to approximately 4.5-4.7 million.

Sources: Britannica, George W. Bush Library, Washington Post, Politico, Al Jazeera, CIA, Watson Institute, World Trade Center Health Program, Reuters




LONG READ

Trump, Twitter, and truth judgments: The effects of “disputed” tags and political knowledge on the judged truthfulness of election misinformation

Misinformation has sown distrust in the legitimacy of American elections. Nowhere has this been more concerning than in the 2020 U.S. presidential election wherein Donald Trump falsely declared that it was stolen through fraud. Although social media platforms attempted to dispute Trump’s false claims by attaching soft moderation tags to his posts, little is known about the effectiveness of this strategy. We experimentally tested the use of “disputed” tags on Trump’s Twitter posts as a means of curbing election misinformation. Trump voters with high political knowledge judged election misinformation as more truthful when Trump’s claims included Twitter’s disputed tags compared to a control condition. Although Biden voters were largely unaffected by these soft moderation tags, third-party and non-voters were slightly less likely to judge election misinformation as true. Finally, little to no evidence was found for meaningful changes in beliefs about election fraud or fairness. These findings raise questions about the effectiveness of soft moderation tags in disputing highly prevalent or widely spread misinformation.


 September 11, 2024

Peer Reviewed

By John C. Blanchar

Department of Psychology, University of Minnesota Duluth, USA

By Catherine J. Norris

Department of Psychology, Swarthmore College, USA



image by mediamodifier on pixabay
Topics

Research Questions

  • Do soft moderation tags warning about “disputed” information influence the judged truthfulness of election misinformation alleged by Donald Trump following the 2020 U.S. presidential election?
  • Does the effectiveness of attaching “disputed” tags to Donald Trump’s election misinformation depend upon a person’s political knowledge or pre-existing belief about fraud?

Essay Summary

  • A sample of U.S. Americans (= 1,078) were presented with four social media posts from Donald Trump falsely alleging election fraud in the weeks following the 2020 election. Participants were randomly assigned to the disputed tag or control condition, with only the former including soft moderation tags attached to each of Trump’s false allegations. Participants rated the truthfulness of each allegation and answered questions about election fraud and fairness. Individual differences in political knowledge and verbal ability were measured before the election.
  • There was little to no evidence that Twitter’s disputed tags decreased the judged truthfulness of election misinformation or meaningfully changed pre-existing beliefs in election fraud or fairness.
  • Trump voters with high political knowledge were more likely to perceive election misinformation as truthful when Donald Trump’s posts included disputed tags versus not.
  • Trump voters that were initially skeptical of election fraud in the 2020 election were more likely to judge election misinformation as truthful when Donald Trump’s posts included disputed tags.

Implications

In recent years, misinformation has undermined trust in the legitimacy of American democratic elections. Nowhere has this been more concerning than in the 2020 U.S. presidential election, which saw the sitting president, Donald Trump, falsely declare that the election was stolen through widespread fraud (Timm, 2020). This culminated in many hundreds of Trump’s supporters storming the U.S. Capitol building to stop certification of challenger Joe Biden’s victory (Zengerle et al., 2021). This is not a fringe belief (Blanchar & Norris, 2021); national polls indicate that majorities of Republicans and conservatives endorse the belief that Trump probably or definitely won the election (Ipsos, 2020; Pew Research Center, 2021).

Although social media companies like Twitter (now X) and Facebook attempted to dispute Trump’s false claims of election fraud by attaching soft moderation tags to his posts (Graham & Rodriguez, 2020), little is known about the effectiveness of this strategy. The present experiment tests the effectiveness of attaching “disputed” tags to Trump’s Twitter posts as a means of curbing election misinformation about voter fraud among U.S. Americans. We assessed individual differences in political knowledge (i.e., basic facts about American politics) and verbal ability to examine whether misinformation susceptibility depends on domain knowledge (Lodge & Taber, 2013; Tappin et al., 2021).

Disputing misinformation

A wide array of interventions for curbing misinformation have been applied with varying results (Ziemer & Rothmund, 2024). Among these, fact-checking approaches are the most common; they attempt to refute or dispute misleading or false information through tagging (or flagging), social invalidation, or expert corrections. Tagging simply involves labeling a claim as false or disputed, in contrast to more elaborate fact checks like social invalidation through corrective comments below a social media post or expert-based corrections that provide detailed rebuttals from professional entities or scientific organizations. However, because tagging misinformation on social media platforms tends to be reactive rather than proactive, it typically addresses misinformation only after it has been identified and spread. This reactive nature mirrors the broader challenges of fact-checking, which often lags behind the rapid dissemination of false claims. A more natural test would involve assessing truth judgments of ongoing false claims that extend from recognizable or existing beliefs and narratives. The present research experimentally tests the efficacy of Twitter’s “disputed” tag as a form of soft moderation to reduce belief in timely, real-world, and widely propagated misinformation that aligns or conflicts with partisans’ beliefs. Specifically, we considered the special case of Donald Trump’s false claims about election fraud following the 2020 U.S. presidential election, where people very likely have strong pre-existing beliefs (Blanchar & Norris, 2021).

Evidence surrounding the use of misinformation tags on social media posts largely supports their efficacy in reducing belief and sharing (Koch et al., 2023; Martel & Rand, 2023; Mena, 2020). However, these effects are relatively small and depend on tag precision (Martel & Rand, 2023). For instance, Clayton et al. (2020) observed that, whereas tagging fake news headlines as “disputed” slightly reduced their perceived accuracy compared to a control condition, this approach was less effective than tagging fake headlines as “rated false.” Tagging posts as “false” is clearer than tagging them as “disputed,” with the latter possibly implying mixed evidence and/or legitimate disagreement. However, although Pennycook et al. (2020) reported similar findings, they also found that these tags slightly increased the perceived accuracy of other fake but non-tagged news headlines presented alongside tagged headlines. The presence of tagged warnings on some but not other information may lead people to guess that anything not tagged is probably accurate.

Although major reviews indicate that corrections are generally effective at reducing misinformation (Chan et al., 2017; Porter & Wood, 2024), some scholars have suggested the possibility of “backfire effects,” where corrective information may arouse cognitive dissonance—an uncomfortable psychological tension from holding incompatible thoughts or beliefs—leading people to double-down on their initial beliefs instead of changing them (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010; Nyhan et al., 2013; see also Festinger et al., 1956). Nevertheless, these effects are quite rare, and many subsequent tests have yielded contradictory evidence (Haglin, 2017; Lewandowski et al., 2020; Nyhan et al., 2020; Wood & Porter, 2019). Even so, attempts to correct or dispute misinformation sometimes do fail. For instance, people’s beliefs tend to persevere despite being discredited by new information (Anderson, 1995; Ecker & Ang, 2019; Ecker et al., 2022; Ross et al., 1975; Thorson, 2016). Sharevski et al. (2022) reported evidence that tagging Twitter posts for vaccine misinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic failed to change people’s belief in the discredited information. However, using interstitial covers that obscure misleading tweets before they are clicked on effectively reduced the perceived accuracy of misinformation. People also dislike feeling that they are being told what to do, think, or say (Brehm, 1966), and thus attempts to dispute misinformation may spur reactance and paradoxically increase its exposure and prevalence (Ma et al., 2019; Wicklund, 1974). Oeldorf‐Hirsch and colleagues (2020) found that “disputed” tags did not influence the perceived credibility of inaccurate news articles and internet memes. Additionally, DeVerna et al. (2024) employed supervised machine-learning techniques to analyze over 430,000 tweets and found that after official corrections, the spread of false rumors decreased among political liberals but increased among political conservatives. Collectively, these findings suggest that although corrective measures can be effective, their success may depend on how they are implemented and the context in which they are received.

The role of political knowledge

An important factor that may moderate how people process or react to soft moderation tags attached to election misinformation is their level of political knowledge. Lodge and Taber (2013) argue that political knowledge affords partisans greater opportunity to effectively discount or counterargue against information that challenges their beliefs and to reach conclusions congenial to their political identity. Consistently, partisans that score higher in political knowledge demonstrate greater skepticism of counter-attitudinal information and more polarized attitudes following mixed evidence compared to their less knowledgeable peers (Taber et al., 2009; Taber & Lodge, 2006). Moreover, Nyhan et al. (2013) found that challenging Sarah Palin’s “death panel” claims was counterproductive, yielding stronger belief for Palin’s supporters with high political knowledge (for similar findings, see Wiliams Kirkpatrick, 2021).

Another possibility follows a Bayesian account. People may be updating their beliefs based on the strength and reliability of new information, but their prior beliefs, which tend to be associated with their politics or group membership, play a significant role in this process (Jern et al., 2014; Tappin et al., 2021). From this perspective, individuals with greater political knowledge may possess stronger pre-existing beliefs that are more resistant to change, or they may have pertinent prior beliefs that influence the way new corrective information is integrated with their existing beliefs. Cognitive sophistication, including political knowledge, has been shown to increase the effect of partisans’ pre-existing beliefs on their subsequent reasoning (Flynn et al., 2017; Tappin et al., 2021; see also Kahan, 2013). Pennycook and Rand (2021), for example, observed that false beliefs about election fraud and Trump as the winner of the 2020 U.S. presidential election were positively correlated with political knowledge among Trump voters and negatively correlated with political knowledge among Biden voters.

The totality of this work suggests that explicit attempts to dispute misinformation may be likely to fail for partisans higher in political knowledge. Hence, we explored whether political knowledge would moderate the effect of Twitter’s “disputed” tags on Trump voters’ judgments of election misinformation. Verbal ability was measured as a control variable to rule out political knowledge as general cognitive ability. We found that “disputed” tags were generally ineffective at curbing election misinformation among Trump voters. Ironically, these tags may have slightly increased belief in misinformation for those Trump voters with high political knowledge. Additionally, Trump voters who were initially skeptical of mass election fraud were more likely to perceive Donald Trump’s misinformation as truthful when exposed to the disputed tag compared to the control condition. Although Biden voters were unaffected by the inclusion of “disputed” tags, third-party and non-voters were marginally less likely to believe election misinformation in the “disputed” tag condition compared to the control. It is important to note that we did not anticipate that soft moderation “disputed” tags would be counterproductive, or “backfire,” for Trump voters with high political knowledge. Our expectation was that political knowledge would diminish or eliminate the effectiveness of “disputed” tags. We emphasize caution with this particular finding. Consequently, we are more confident in concluding that the effectiveness of “disputed” tags decreased as political knowledge increased among Trump voters.

Limitations and considerations

Our sample consisted of 1,078 adults living in the United States recruited via CloudResearch’s online platform. Although CloudResearch is known to attract highly attentive and engaged participants, its samples are less representative compared to other online participant-sourcing platforms (Stagnaro et al., 2024). It is conceivable that our sample of Trump voters high in political knowledge may possess distinct characteristics, potentially skewing the sample’s representation away from the broader population of similarly informed Trump supporters. This limitation warrants caution when generalizing our findings, as does the specific context of Trump’s false claims surrounding the 2020 U.S. presidential election. This was an unprecedented event in American history, marked by the sitting President’s refusal to concede and repeated assertions of widespread voter fraud. It remains unclear whether similar responses would occur in the context of other, less consequential, divisive, and pervasive instances of misinformation.

Additionally, our analyses focused on a relatively smaller number of Trump voters than Biden voters. Participants were recruited more than a month before the election for a larger longitudinal project, making it difficult to deliberately oversample Trump voters in hindsight. Experimental tests of the effectiveness of “disputed” tags among individuals with varying levels of political knowledge further sliced our sample size of Trump voters. We emphasize caution and reiterate that our finding is more robust regarding the ineffectiveness of “disputed” tags for Trump voters and the diminishing effectiveness of these tags as their political knowledge increases. There should be less confidence in the notion that these tags are counterproductive (or “backfire”) per se. Furthermore, we cannot definitively distinguish between potential mechanisms such as cognitive dissonance, psychological reactance, or Bayesian updating. These limitations highlight opportunities for confirmatory tests in future research.

Findings

Manipulation check and analysis strategy

Twelve participants reported conflicting voting decisions between survey waves and were excluded from all analyses. One-hundred four participants failed the attention manipulation check by incorrectly indicating that a disputed tag about misinformation was present in the control condition (n = 57) or not present in the disputed tag condition (n = 47). There was no difference in the pass/fail rate between conditions, Ï‡2(n = 1,078) = 0.79, p = .374, and our findings remained consistent irrespective of whether those failing the attention check were excluded from analyses. Hence, we report analyses with these participants included (= 1,078: 290 Trump voters, 673 Biden voters, and 115 third-party/non-voters) to better simulate the effectiveness of disputed tags on the judged truthfulness of election misinformation. Because distributions of truth judgments varied drastically by voter group (see Figure 1), we separated analyses by voting. We fit linear mixed models with random intercepts of participants and tweets to examine truth judgments of Trump’s false claims about election fraud (four observations per participant given four tweets) using the lme4 and lmerTest packages in R (Bates et al., 2015; Kuznetsova et al., 2017).1 That is, we used a statistical technique that allowed us to consider individual differences between participants and the specific tweets they rated, so we could see how people judged the truthfulness of the claims and ensure that any patterns we found weren’t simply due to one person or tweet being unusual. Voter-specific models included social media condition (-0.5 = control, 0.5 = disputed tag), political knowledge (mean-centered), and their interaction as fixed-effects predictors.

Figure 1. Density plot of truth judgments as a function of voter group.

Finding 1: Overall, “disputed” tags were ineffective at curbing misinformation among Trump voters. Trump voters with high political knowledge judged Donald Trump’s election misinformation as more truthful when his posts included disputed tags compared to the control condition.

Illustrated in Figure 2, the model with Trump voters yielded a significant interaction between moderation tag condition and political knowledge, b = 0.20, SE = .09, t = 2.18, p = .030, but no effects of condition, b = 0.16, SE = .19, t = 0.81, p = .420, or political knowledge, b = 0.04, SE = .04, t = 0.94, p = .347. Belief in election misinformation increased with political knowledge in the disputed tag condition, b = 0.14, SE = .06, t = 2.30, p = .022, 95% CI [0.02, 0.26], and it was unrelated to political knowledge in the control condition, b = -0.06, SE = .07, t = 0.85, p = .398, 95% CI [-0.18, 0.07]. Moreover, whereas Trump voters high in political knowledge (+1 SD) reported marginally stronger belief in Trump’s election fraud claims in the disputed tag condition relative to the control condition, b = 0.58, SE = .27, Bonferroni adjusted p = .069, 95% CI [0.04, 1.12], those with low political knowledge (-1 SD) were unaffected by social media condition, b = -0.27, SE = .27, Bonferroni adjusted p = .662, 95% CI [-0.81, 0.27]. In other words, Trump voters with high political knowledge (those in the top 18.1%, scoring above 9) found Trump’s election fraud misinformation to be somewhat more truthful when it had a disputed tag compared to when it didn’t. This difference (d = 0.32) is about one-third of the standard deviation in truthfulness ratings between the two conditions. Controlling for verbal ability did not change these results and the condition by political knowledge interaction remained significant, b = 0.19, SE = .09, t = 2.13, p = .034.

The models for Biden voters and third-party and non-voters revealed no significant interactions between condition and political knowledge, bs = 0.01 and -0.02, SEs = .04 and .13, ts = 0.29 and 0.14, ps = .771 and .888. However, we did observe a significant main effect of political knowledge for Biden voters, b = -0.11, SE = .02, t = 5.45, p < .001, and a marginal effect of social media condition for third-party and non-voters, b = -0.62, SE = .33, t = 1.89, p = .061. Biden voters were less likely to believe Trump’s fraud claims as their political knowledge increased, and third-party and non-voters tended to believe Trump’s fraud claims marginally less in the disputed tag condition relative to the control condition. No other effects emerged, ts < 0.78, ps > .440.

Figure 2. Judged truthfulness of Donald Trump’s election fraud claims as a function of voter group, political knowledge, and moderation tag condition, 95% CIs.

Finding 2: Trump voters that were initially skeptical of mass election fraud were more likely to perceive Donald Trump’s misinformation as truthful in the disputed tag condition compared to the control.

We considered pre-existing belief in voter fraud favoring Biden (vs. Trump) as a predictor in voter-specific models along with moderation tag condition. The model for Trump voters produced a main effect of pre-existing fraud belief, b = 0.70, SE = .07, t = 10.51, p < .001, with stronger belief predicting greater susceptibility to misinformation, and a significant interaction between pre-existing belief and social media condition, b = -0.34, SE = .13, t = 2.57, p = .011. Illustrated in Figure 3, Trump voters relatively skeptical of election fraud benefiting Biden (-1 SD) rated Trump’s claims as more truthful in the disputed tag condition compared to the control condition, b = 0.59, SE = .23, Bonferroni adjusted p = .024, 95% CI [0.13, 1.05]. Conversely, Trump voters that fully (max.) endorsed belief in election fraud were unaffected by the disputed tag manipulation, b = -0.12, SE =.20, Bonferroni adjusted p = 1.000, 95% CI [-0.50, 0.27]. Said differently, Trump voters with minimal to no belief in mass voter fraud benefitting Biden in the 2020 U.S. presidential election (those in the bottom 14.1% of pre-existing belief, scoring less than 1 on the response scale) rated Trump’s election fraud misinformation to be moderately more truthful when it included a “disputed” tag versus when it did not. This difference (d = 0.36) indicates that the increase in perceived truthfulness is roughly one-third of the standard deviation in truthfulness ratings between the two conditions.

The model for third-party and non-voters produced main effects of condition, b = -0.43, SE = .21, t = 2.06, p = .042, and existing fraud belief, b = 1.06, SE = .09, t = 11.86, p < .001, but no interaction, b = -0.15, SE = .18, t = 0.84, p = .403. Those in the disputed tag condition were less likely to judge Trump’s claims as true and pre-existing fraud belief positively predicted susceptibility to misinformation (see Figure 3). Conversely, no significant effects emerged in the model with Biden voters, ts < 1.54, ps > .125. The similar pattern observed among Trump voters and third-party/non-voters, where pre-existing belief in election fraud predicted perceived truthfulness of election misinformation, seems to stem from ample variance in the beliefs and judgments within these groups. In contrast, Biden voters nearly unanimously rejected the notion of election fraud and consistently judged Trump’s claims as false; this lack of variance among Biden voters prevented pre-existing beliefs from predicting their subsequent truth judgments.

Figure 3. Judged truthfulness of Donald Trump’s election fraud claims as a function of voter group, pre-existing belief in widespread election fraud, and moderation tag condition, 95% CIs.

Finding 3: Disputed tags failed to meaningfully change pre-existing beliefs about election fraud or fairness.

There was little to no evidence that attaching disputed tags to Trump’s tweets meaningfully changed participants’ pre-existing beliefs about election fraud or fairness, especially for the key target audience of Trump voters (see Appendices A and B).

Methods

A sample of American adults was recruited via CloudResearch’s participant-sourcing platform (Litman et al., 2017) for a longitudinal study on the 2020 U.S. presidential election. Our target sample was set to at least 1,500 participants for the first wave of data collection to achieve a large sample, with the expectation of attrition across three subsequent waves administered in three-week intervals. Totals of 1,556, 1,247, 1,163, and 1,131 respondents completed Wave 1 (October 6–10, 2020), Wave 2 (October 27–31, 2020), Wave 3 (November 17–21, 2020), and Wave 4 (December 8–12, 2020), respectively. Participants’ residences included 49 U.S. states and the District of Columbia (for sample demographics, see supplemental materials on Open Science Framework [OSF]). The present experiment was administered in Wave 4 but included individual difference measures from Wave 1. Measures in Waves 2 and 3 did not concern the present research. After data cleaning procedures to identify duplicate and non-U.S. IP addresses (n = 40; Waggoner et al., 2019) and low-quality data via responses to eight open-ended questions (n = 155; for details, see supplemental materials on OSF), our final sample for data analyses included 1,078 participants. All data cleaning was completed prior to any analyses.

Tweet stimuli, disputed tags, and truth judgments

Participants reported how they voted in the 2020 U.S. presidential election between Donald Trump, Joe Biden, Jo Jorgensen or other third-party candidates, and not voting. In Wave 4, they rated the truthfulness of four representative tweets from Donald Trump falsely claiming instances of election fraud. Trump’s tweets were selected as stimuli based on the following criteria: they made specific false claims about election fraud, covered distinct (supposed) events, and did not include images. Depicted in Figure 4, all four tweets included Twitter’s disputed tag (“This claim about election fraud is disputed”) or no additional information (control). Participants were told they would be presented with “actual Tweets made by President Trump” and instructed to “read each Tweet and indicate the extent to which you believe his statement is true or false.” Truth judgments (“Do you believe this statement to be true or false?”) were provided using 7-pt response scales (1 = extremely false, 7 = extremely true). An attentional manipulation check asked if participants recalled whether Trump’s tweets included a tag disputing his claims (“yes,” “no,” or “I can’t remember”). Before and after rating the truthfulness of Trump’s claims, they also indicated their perceptions of voter fraud (“To what extent do you think voter fraud contributed to the results of the 2020 U.S. presidential election?” [-3 = strongly benefited Donald Trump, +3 = strongly benefited Joe Biden]) and election fairness (“As far as you know, do you think the 2020 U.S. presidential election was a free and fair election?” [1 = definitely not, 5 = definitely yes]).

Figure 4. Example of Trump tweets claiming election fraud with a disputed tag or no additional information.

 Political knowledge and verbal ability

Adapted from Taber and Lodge (2006), political knowledge was measured using 10 factual questions about American politics (e.g., “Do you happen to know what job or political office is now held by John Roberts? What is it?”, “How much of a majority is required for the U.S. Senate and House to override a presidential veto?”). Political knowledge scores were computed by summing the number of correct responses. To measure verbal ability, participants completed the WordSum Test (Huang & Hauser, 1998). This 10-item vocabulary test is adapted from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale and strongly correlates with general factor intelligence (Wolfle, 1980). Verbal ability scores were computed by summing the number of correct responses. Both measures were administered before the experiment in Wave 1.

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Cite this Essay

Blanchar, J. C., & Norris, C. J. (2024). Trump, Twitter, and truth judgments: The effects of “disputed” tags and political knowledge on the judged truthfulness of election misinformation. Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) Misinformation Review. https://doi.org/10.37016/mr-2020-157

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Funding

This work was supported by the Eugene M. Lang Center for Civic and Social Responsibility at Swarthmore College.

Competing Interests

The authors declare no competing interests.

Ethics

This research received ethics approval from Swarthmore College’s Institutional Review Board.

Copyright

This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided that the original author and source are properly credited.

Data Availability

All materials needed to replicate this study are available via the Harvard Dataverse: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/YWYS42 and the Open Science Framework: https://osf.io/vnft5/?view_only=567fea549d6b49c2ab9cc6b68ed97b3a