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Monday, July 22, 2024


By 

A study, published in Environmental Science & Technology Letters and selected by Nature as a Research Highlight, quantifies and tracks the evolution of this massive methane emission, thanks to the potential of combining satellite data from several missions such as TROPOMI, GHGSat, PRISMA, EnMAP and EMIT, together with Sentinel-2 and Landsat multispectral radiometer.


The research led by the LARS group (IIAMA-UPV) indicates that this accident, which caused a 10-metre-high fire and the formation of a 15-metre-wide crater, has significantly outperformed previous events such as Aliso Canyon in 2015, Ohio in 2018 and Louisiana in 2019.

The leak started on 9 June 2023 and has released approximately 131.00 tonnes of methane into the atmosphere during the 205-day incident. Thousands of tonnes of water were injected to seal the well. Finally, the gas flow was stopped on 25 December 2023 by injecting drilling mud,” explains Luis Guanter, a researcher at IIAMA

.Importance of the work done

Researchers from the LARS-IIAMA group, such as Javier Roger, Adriana Valverde, Itziar Irakulis and Javier GorroƱo, have participated in the study, together with experts from several international institutions such as SRON Netherlands Institute for Space Research, Kayrros, Environmental Defense Fund and United Nations Environment Programme.

This research has developed new data processing methods to improve the reporting and handling of the large, concentrated methane plumes detected.

“These optimised methods include the implementation of a tailored filter to detect plumes and specific methane quantification models for hyperspectral instruments,” explain the researchers from the LARS group.

As such, they stress that advanced satellite-based technologies are crucial for detecting and quantifying methane emissions, especially in remote locations where these events often go unnoticed.

“Our work demonstrates how advanced space-based tools are essential for discovering and managing these super-emission events, enabling accurate reconstruction and robust emissions quantification,” state the LARS group members.

Finally, the IIAMA researchers highlight the need for continuous and accurate monitoring to mitigate the environmental impacts of industrial activities such as oil and gas extraction.

“Natural gas, in addition to being an important energy source, is also a greenhouse gas responsible for almost a third of global warming, as it contains more than 90% methane. The difference with CO2 is that it has a greater impact in the short term, so it is necessary to act at source and reduce emissions,” they conclude.


Cuban Missile Crisis 2.0?: US Measure To Battle Russia’s Space-Based N-Brinkmanship – Analysis




July 22, 2024

By Girish Linganna

House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Turner from Ohio cautioned that the US could encounter a scenario like the ‘Cuban Missile Crisis’—a tense 13-day confrontation in October 1962 between the US and the erstwhile Soviet Union over Soviet nuclear missiles placed in Cuba—but in space, if Russia deploys a satellite equipped with nuclear weapons, according to Spacenews.com.

Root of the Cuban Missile Crisis

The Cuban Missile Crisis had cast the shadow of a nuclear war over the world. The crisis ended when the Soviet Union agreed to remove the missiles in exchange for the US promise of not to invade Cuba and secretly removing American intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) placed in Turkey during the Cold War to deter Soviet aggression. Turkey’s proximity to the Soviet Union allowed the US to launch nuclear strikes more effectively, reducing warning times.

Balancing Space Tensions Wisely

Russia today is more anxious and desperate than the former Soviet Union was in 1962. In 2024, the US has more at stake and fewer ways to counter Russia’s actions. In this new ‘Cuban Missile Crisis in space’, the US must balance deterring a reckless Russia with avoiding actions that could lead to disastrous consequences.

Considering the differences between these situations, it is clear that the US has fewer good options and Russia is more dangerous.

Desperate Russian: Key Difference #1

May 1960: The Soviet Union, worried over prospects of the US invading Cuba and toppling Fidel Castro, stationed medium- and intermediate-range N-missiles in that country. In that decade, the Soviet Union was a world superpower and saw the US as an increasing threat to its clout. Stationing missiles in Cuba was a defensive strategy.

In 2024, Russia is a weakening power trying to alter the current balance. If Russia were to put a nuclear weapon in space, it would be an aggressive move aimed at targeting US satellites and challenging the US-led world order.

In 1962, Russia was like a bear protecting its territory and had reasons to safeguard its domain.

By 2024, this Russian bear is injured and desperate. With little left to lose, it is willing to do whatever it takes to survive.

US Reliability : Key Difference #2

October 22, 1962: In a surprising 18-minute TV address, President John F Kennedy stunned Americans by sharing clear proof of a missile threat in Cuba. He was adamant that the Soviets remove their missiles, or else US would be compelled to blockade ships transporting weapons to Cuba.

In the 1960s, the US had more strategic missiles, giving Kennedy the confidence to challenge the Soviet Union in a high-stakes standoff. Today, the US has a strategic edge on Earth but not in space. Financial issues have weakened Russia’s space efforts, resulting in fewer launches, and allowed the US to take a lead in the space race. Given its greater assets to protect and fewer targets to strike, the US needs to carefully manage its actions to prevent a disastrous reaction from Russia.

US Strategic Choices: Key Difference #3

October 23, 1962: US Ambassador Adlai Stevenson briefed the UN Security Council while American ships took up positions around Cuba. President Kennedy created a blockade around Cuba and started talks with the Soviet Premier. They eventually agreed that the US would remove missiles from Turkey and promise not to invade Cuba, while the Soviet Union would take down its missiles in Cuba.

But unlike the Port of Havana—plays a crucial role in Cuba’s economy by facilitating trade, tourism, military and maritime operations—a spaceport cannot be blockaded. Unless there is a risky interception or an attack on the launch site, a nuclear satellite will reach its orbit.

Kennedy had evaluated various options, from taking no action (which could be ineffective or highly dangerous), to launching a full-scale invasion of Cuba (the riskiest choice), to implementing a naval blockade (the least unfavourable option). If Russia did launch nuclear-armed satellites, however, the US of today would have fewer alternatives to work on than it had in 1962.

Futility of Ignoring Soviet Missiles in Cuba

Do Nothing Option: Russia is a weakening country trying hard to reclaim its former glory. But its decline will not be fixed by threatening US space assets. If the US gives in to Russia, It will lead to a cycle of bad behaviour and giving in.

Summit Diplomacy: Due to the conflict in Ukraine and the forthcoming US presidential election in November, direct talks between presidents are probably not an option.

Economic Sanctions: Russia, possibly, considers sanctions to be a minor annoyance and perceives its geopolitical situation as a critical issue. Sanctions are unlikely to have a significant impact at best and, at worst, they could worsen Russia’s decline, possibly resulting in even more reckless actions.

The Most Dangerous Choice: Invasion of Cuba

Destroy the Satellite in Orbit: The US probably does not have the cyber abilities to disable the satellite in space. While a direct attack on the satellite is possible, it is very risky. Similar to how the Soviets might respond to a US invasion, Russia could choose to use the weapon rather than see it destroyed if they feel they have no other option.
The Least Harmful Choice: Naval Blockade

Low-Level Diplomacy: The US Administration is engaging with Moscow to find a solution before the satellite launch. Since Russia is a weakening power, the US has the advantage of time.

Global Diplomacy: China, India and the UK all have important satellites in the same orbit as Russia’s test satellite. By standing together, these countries might deter Russia more effectively than the US acting alone.

This is not the Cuban Missile Crisis of the past. Today’s Russia is a weaker, more anxious country and more likely to take risky actions that could affect global space assets. The US has fewer options now compared to the bold actions taken during the Cold War. Ultimately, it needs to prevent a disastrous escalation while keeping space safe and secure.



Girish Linganna
Girish Linganna is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru. He is also Director of ADD Engineering Components, India, Pvt. Ltd, a subsidiary of ADD Engineering GmbH, Germany. You can reach him at: girishlinganna@gmail.com

Friday, July 12, 2024

UNITED IN WAR ON KURDISTAN
A rapprochement between Syria and Turkey is on the table. Here’s what it might mean for the region

Syrians cross into their country from the Turkish crossing point of Cilvegozu, in Reyhanli, southeastern Turkey, on Feb. 18, 2023. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Syrian President Bashar Assad have recently signaled that they are interested in restoring diplomatic … more >

By Abby Sewell and Suzan Fraser - Associated Press - Friday, July 12, 2024

ANKARA (AP) — Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Syrian President Bashar Assad have recently signaled that they are interested in restoring diplomatic ties that have been ruptured for more than a decade.

Erdogan has said that he hopes to arrange a meeting with Assad soon for the first time since the countries broke off relations in 2011 as mass anti-government protests and a brutal crackdown by security forces in Syria spiraled into a still-ongoing civil war.


Speaking at a NATO summit in Washington on Thursday, Erdogan said he had called on Assad two weeks ago to either come to Turkey for the meeting or to hold it in a third country, and that he had assigned Turkey’s foreign minister to follow up.

Turkey backed Syrian insurgent groups seeking to overthrow Assad and still maintains forces in the opposition-held northwest, a sore point for Damascus.

This is not the first time that there have been attempts to normalize relations between the two countries, but previous attempts failed to gain traction.

Here’s a look at what might happen this time around:

Russia, which is one of the strongest backers of Assad’s government but also has close ties with Turkey, has been pushing for a return to diplomatic relations.


In December 2022, the Turkish, Syrian and Russian defense ministers held talks in Moscow, the first ministerial level meeting between rivals Turkey and Syria since 2011. Russia also brokered meetings between Syrian and Turkish officials last year.

However, the talks fizzled, and Syrian officials publicly continued to blast Turkey’s presence in northwest Syria. Assad said in an interview with Sky News Arabia last August that the objective of Erdogan’s overtures was “to legitimize the Turkish occupation in Syria.”

Russia appears to once again be promoting the talks, but this time around, Iraq - which shares a border with both Turkey and Syria - has also offered to mediate, as it previously did between regional arch-rivals Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Aron Lund, a fellow with the Century International think tank, said Iraq may have taken the initiative as a way to deflect pressure from Turkey to crack down on the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, a Kurdish separatist group that has waged an insurgency against Turkey since the 1980s and has bases in northern Iraq.

By pushing rapprochement with Syria, Baghdad may be trying to “create some form of positive engagement with the Turks, kick the can down the road, and deflect the threat of an intervention,” Lund said.

The geopolitical situation in the region has also changed with the war in Gaza and fears of a wider regional conflict. Ozgur Unluhisarcikli, an analyst on Turkey and director of the German Marshall Fund in Ankara, said that both countries may be feeling insecure and seeking new alliances in the face of the war’s potential regional ripple effects.

From Erdogan’s side, Unluhisarcikli said, the attempt to engage is likely driven in part by the increasing anti-Syrian sentiment in Turkey. Erdogan is likely hoping for a deal that could pave the way for the return of many of the 3.6 million Syrian refugees living in his country.

From the Syrian side, a return to relations with Turkey would be another step toward ending Assad’s political isolation in the region after more than a decade as a pariah due to his government’s brutal crackdown on protesters in 2011 and alleged war crimes afterward.

And despite their differences over Turkey’s presence in northwest Syria, Damascus and Ankara both have an interest in curtailing the autonomy of Kurdish groups in northeast Syria.

Turkey may be concerned that the security situation in northeast Syria could deteriorate in the event that the U.S. withdraws troops it currently has stationed there as part of a coalition against the Islamic State militant group, Unluhisarcikli said. That could require Turkey to “cooperate or at least coordinate with Syria, to manage the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal,” he said.

Joseph Daher, a Swiss-Syrian researcher and visiting professor at the European University Institute in Florence, said the two governments likely hope for modest “economic gains” in a rapprochement. While trade never completely stopped, it currently goes through intermediaries, he said, while restoring diplomatic relations would allow official commerce to resume and make trade more fluid.

Analysts agreed that the talks are unlikely to bring about the full Turkish withdrawal from northwest Syria that Damascus has called for or any other major shift in conditions on the ground in the near term.

Although the two countries’ interests “actually overlap to a large degree,” Lund said, “there are also major disagreements” and “a lot of bad blood and bitterness” that could impede even “lower-level dealmaking.” Both Erdogan and Assad may also want to wait for the outcome of U.S. elections, which could determine the future American footprint in the region, before making a major deal, he said.

In the long run, Lund said, “The logic of the situation dictates Turkish-Syrian collaboration in some form. … They’re neighbors. They’re stuck with each other and the current stalemate does them no good.”

Unluhisarcikli agreed that a “grand bargain” is unlikely to come out of the present talks, but the increased dialogue could lead to “some confidence building measures,” he said.

Daher said the most probable outcome of the talks is some “security agreements” between the two sides, but not a full Turkish withdrawal from Syria in the short term, particularly since the Syrian government army is too weak to control northwest Syria by itself.

“On its own, it’s not able to take back the whole of the northwest - it needs to deal with Turkey,” he said.

In Turkey and in government-controlled Syria, many view the prospects of a rapprochement positively. In northwest Syria, on the other hand, protests have broken out against the prospect of a normalization of relations between Ankara - which had previously positioned itself as a protector of the Syrian opposition - and Damascus.

Kurds in Syria have also viewed the potential rapprochement with apprehension. The Kurdish-led authority in northeast Syria said in a statement that the prospective reconciliation would be a “conspiracy against the Syrian people” and a “clear legitimization of the Turkish occupation” of previously Kurdish-majority areas that were seized by Turkish-backed forces.

___

Sewell reported from Beirut.


Syrian armed groups divided over Turkey-Syria normalization push


Analysis
July 11, 2024
Bilal Samir


In recent days, widespread protests have erupted across many Turkish-controlled towns and cities in the countryside to the north of Aleppo and around Idlib. Some protests have escalated into violence, as clashes have broken out between local armed groups and Turkish forces, resulting in multiple casualties among both protesters and Turkish soldiers. The unrest followed racist attacks against Syrians that started in the Turkish city of Kayseri on June 30, destroying several Syrians’ properties.

While the racist attacks served as the catalyst for the protests in northern Syria, they were not the sole cause. In fact, these protests stem from growing public dissatisfaction over recent discussions about the potential normalization of relations between Turkey and the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad. On June 28, 2024, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan indicated his country's willingness to restore diplomatic ties with the Assad regime. For his part, the head of the main opposition Republican People’s Party, ƖzgĆ¼r Ɩzel, has said he is planning to travel to Damascus to meet Assad as well.

Statements by Turkish officials have coincided with what many Syrian activists view as preliminary and practical steps toward normalization. These steps include the opening by the local council of al-Bab in Aleppo's eastern countryside of the Abu al-Zandein crossing, which connects regime-controlled areas in Aleppo City with opposition-controlled areas, as a first step toward making it a permanent and official crossing. During this same period, Turkish immigration authorities launched a campaign to deport illegal Syrian refugees in Gaziantep and Kilis, resulting in the forced deportation of hundreds of refugees to northern Syria.

Despite their popular nature, the protests have exposed the rifts and divisions between various opposition factions. Some have showed support for Turkey's push toward normalization with the Assad regime, while others have adopted opposing and independent stances despite Turkish influence. This article aims to highlight the positions of the major military factions in Turkish-controlled areas during the protests and assess how closely they align with Turkey's policy.

Divided opposition

The map of military and security influence in northern Syria reveals six main Syrian National Army (SNA) factions operating in Aleppo’s northern countryside, while Idlib remains under the control of the Sunni Islamist group Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Despite sharing the same ideology, the SNA factions differ in their structure and roles, leading each to adopt a distinct stance during the recent protests.

One notable faction in this context is the "Eastern" Liberation and Construction Movement, led by Abu Hatem Shaqra. This group mainly comprises fighters displaced from Deir ez-Zor in eastern Syria and controls Jarablus and parts of al-Bab. It is one of the factions that actively participated in the protests. Its fighters stormed the administrative building of the Abu al-Zandein crossing and blocked commercial trucks from passing just days before the popular protests erupted. Members of the Liberation and Construction Movement also directly joined the protests in al-Bab and Jarablus, led a campaign of rioting and violence against government buildings, prevented Turkish employees from performing their duties, assaulted Turkish truck drivers, and shut down the Jarablus border crossing with Turkey.

The Sham Front, active in A’zaz, showed more restraint in its support for the protests. While it encouraged its base in A’zaz to join them, its armed members did not directly participate. Instead, they focused on protecting government buildings by establishing a security cordon and preventing protesters from breaching it. However, they were unable to fully control the crowds at the Bab al-Salamah crossing, where protesters stormed the building, resulting in numerous casualties. Eventually, the Sham Front managed to restore calm after local residents appealed to protesters to reduce tensions and avoid violence.

Meanwhile, the stance of HTS, which controls Idlib and wields significant influence over security in Afrin, remains ambiguous. While it has banned large protests in Idlib and its affiliated media outlets have labeled the racist attacks against Syrians in Turkey as an effort to incite “strife” by those with bad intentions, the situation in Afrin tells a different story. Masked gunmen, likely linked to HTS, infiltrated protests in Afrin and Jindires, escalating the unrest into an armed confrontation with Turkish forces near the Serail building in Afrin.

In contrast to the roles of the previously mentioned groups, the Sultan Murad faction, led by Fahim Issa, the al-Hamzat faction, headed by Sayf Abu Bakr, and the Sultan Suleiman Shah faction, under the leadership of Mohammad al-Jassem, have maintained a neutral position while working to contain the protests. They have deployed forces to safeguard government buildings within their areas of influence and engaged in suppressing the protesters.

In reality, the divides among military factions and the varying degree to which they comply with Turkish orders and directives are not new, nor are they the consequence of the recent protests. Over the past few years, their relationship with Turkey has led them to refuse certain directives. For instance, in 2018, fighters originally from Deir ez-Zor, who are currently members of the Liberation and Construction Movement, raided the town of Tadif, controlled by Assad regime forces, despite Turkey’s objection. Similarly, the Liberation and Construction Movement and the Sham Front factions have refused to send fighters to countries like Azerbaijan, Libya, and Niger in recent years. As a result, Turkey has withheld support from these groups during certain periods.

By contrast, the Sultan Murad, al-Hamzat, and Sultan Suleiman Shah factions have so far demonstrated greater willingness to comply with Turkish directives. For example, they have sent fighters to Libya, Azerbaijan, and Niger at Turkey’s request. Additionally, Turkey has repeatedly opposed leadership changes in these groups or attempts to diminish their influence.

The factors driving the differences in approach

The varying levels and forms of compliance with Turkey's directives can be attributed to each faction’s history, leadership, the social background of its members, and the extent of its popular support. The Sultan Murad, Sultan Suleiman Shah, and al-Hamzat factions were effectively established by Turkey during the "Euphrates Shield" and "Olive Branch" military operations. Before that, they were small remnants of battalions within the Free Syrian Army (FSA). In contrast, Turkey had no role in the establishment of the Sham Front and the Liberation and Construction Movement. They are successors to larger groups, including the al-Tawhid Brigade, al-Fatah Brigade, the Eastern Sector of Ahrar al-Sham Movement, and some FSA factions founded in 2012.

Other factors contributing to the divide between groups include the ethnic backgrounds of their leaders and the makeup of their fighters. Fahim Issa, leader of the Sultan Murad faction, and Sayf Abu Bakr, leader of the al-Hamzat faction, are of Turkic origin. Meanwhile, the leaders of the Sham Front and the Liberation and Construction Movement are of Arab origin. The social and ethnic makeup of these two factions indicates that their fighters belong to the same ethnicity and hail from the same regions, primarily Aleppo's northern countryside and Deir ez-Zor. They also enjoy strong social support rooted in regional, family, and tribal ties, which is why their positions often align with those of their social support base and local community.

As for the Sultan Murad, Sultan Suleiman Shah, and al-Hamzat factions, they are not ethnically or regionally homogenous. They include both Turkic and Arab fighters, as well as those displaced from Homs, Hama, the Damascus countryside, and other regions in Syria. Lacking strong social support, they primarily recruit fighters by offering material and financial incentives. This is evident in their fighters' readiness to engage in operations abroad.

Despite its jihadist background, HTS has adhered to international agreements between Turkey and Russia since 2017 regarding the de-escalation zone in the Idlib countryside. Its ambiguous stance on the protests masks its efforts to expand its influence into areas controlled by the SNA to the north of Aleppo. To achieve this, HTS has pushed the narrative that it has successfully maintained security and managed protests in the areas under its control, while the SNA has struggled to contain the popular unrest in the areas surrounding Aleppo. Furthermore, HTS stands to lose significantly from any rapprochement between Turkey and the Assad regime, especially as it remains classified as a terrorist organization by both the international community and Turkey.

The impact of normalization

The normalization of ties between Turkey and the Assad regime is expected to affect security and stability in different ways across various regions of northwestern Syria, as outlined below:

  1. Regions of high instability: The areas controlled by the Liberation and Construction Movement in Jarablus, as well as the regions where HTS exerts influence over security in Jindires and Afrin, may face significant instability and the potential resurgence of operations by the Assad regime and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

  2. Regions of moderate instability: A’zaz, al-Bab, and Idlib City, controlled by the Sham Front and HTS, fall into this category. In these regions, the two groups are more likely to incite popular unrest than to engage in direct military action.

  3. Regions of low instability: This category includes areas with a Turkic presence controlled by the Sultan Murad, Sultan Suleiman Shah, and al-Hamzat factions, such as the city of al-Rai and its surrounding towns and villages.

In conclusion, the protests in northern Syria highlight the transnational impact of the Syrian conflict. They also underscore the potential repercussions of events within Turkey on the political and security dynamics in northern Syria, and vice versa. Recent developments reveal that residents in Turkish-controlled areas of northern Syria are prepared to engage in an existential struggle if Ankara chooses to pursue normalization with the Assad regime. Furthermore, the existing divide among armed Syrian factions and their varying levels of compliance with Turkish directives raise questions about Turkey's ability to control these groups in future confrontations, restructure them, and remove dissenting members and leaders.

 

Bilal Samir is a Syrian researcher who closely follows developments in northern Syria. He is currently working on a master’s in international relations.

Photo by AAREF WATAD/AFP via Getty Images


The Middle East Institute (MEI) is an independent, non-partisan, non-for-profit, educational organization. It does not engage in advocacy and its scholars’ opinions are their own. MEI welcomes financial donations, but retains sole editorial control over its work and its publications reflect only the authors’ views. For a listing of MEI donors, please click here.

Thursday, July 04, 2024


Feds announce $11 million in funding for clean energy projects, mostly in Alberta

Natural Resources Minister Jonathan Wilkinson

Eleven clean energy projects, most of which are based in Alberta, have been selected to receive a total of $11 million in federal funding.

Natural Resources Minister Jonathan Wilkinson made the announcement in Calgary Wednesday where he was attending a conference with provincial and territorial ministers.

Of the funding, $2.5 million will go to small modular nuclear reactor research at the University of Alberta and University of Regina.

The remaining $8.5 million will be divided between seven Alberta companies doing work in the area of hydrogen.

Recipients of the funding will include Atco Gas, which is working to develop the first commercial 100 per cent hydrogen-heated building in Canada; Innovative Fuel Systems, which is developing a retrofit system to convert heavy-duty diesel truck engines to hydrogen engines; and New Wave Hydrogen, which aims to use shock-wave heating to produce clean hydrogen from natural gas without producing any carbon dioxide emissions in the process.

Interest in low-carbon hydrogen and other low-carbon fuels has increased significantly in recent years. 

There are now more than 80 low-carbon hydrogen production projects currently in various stages of development, according to the federal government. The government's own estimate pegs the economic opportunity of hydrogen development in Canada at over $100 billion. 

"Hydrogen presents a massive opportunity," said Wilkinson. "(It's) a clean energy source that can build on existing strengths, and simultaneously support energy security and climate objectives."

Both hydrogen and small modular nuclear reactors are areas of focus for the feds, as it works toward its goal of getting Canada to net-zero emissions by 2050.

A new report from clean energy think-tank the Pembina Institute and Simon Fraser University says Canada is on track to make significant progress toward that goal thanks to government policies that are accelerating the shift to clean energy.

"If all governments stay the course on the plans and policies that they have already implemented (or announced plans to implement), Canada would be on track to significantly reduce emissions by the end of this decade," the report's authors state.

The report gives high marks to the federal government as well as the governments of B.C. and Quebec for supporting the energy transition, but says Alberta and Saskatchewan are lagging behind.

This report by The Canadian Press was first published July 3, 2024.

Wednesday, July 03, 2024

 

New lab test to detect persistent HIV strains in Africa may aid search for cure



WEILL CORNELL MEDICINE
New Lab Test to Detect Persistent HIV Strains in Africa May Aid Search for Cure 

IMAGE: 

HIV PARTICLES (TINY YELLOW SPHERES) ARE ATTACKING A CD4+ T CELL SHOWN IN BLUE. THE VIRUS PREFERENTIALLY TARGETS T CELLS, WHICH PLAY A CRITICAL ROLE IN THE BODY'S IMMUNE RESPONSE AGAINST INVADERS LIKE BACTERIA AND VIRUSES.

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CREDIT: SETH PINCUS, ELIZABETH FISCHER AND AUSTIN ATHMAN, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH




A multinational team led by Weill Cornell Medicine investigators developed a test that will help measure the persistence of HIV in people affected by viral strains found predominantly in Africa—a vital tool in the search for an HIV cure that will benefit patients around the world.

The study, published in Nature Communications on July 2, helps fill a major gap in human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) research. Most HIV studies have focused on strains circulating in Western countries, predominantly in men who have sex with men affected by subtype B. Few studies have examined strains circulating in Africa, where women are disproportionately affected.

“HIV cure research tends to focus on viral strains circulating in developed countries, but to achieve a cure that is globally applicable, we must study viral strains that are affecting other regions of the world,” said lead author Dr. Guinevere Lee, assistant professor of virology in medicine in the Division of Infectious Diseases and assistant professor of microbiology and immunology at Weill Cornell Medicine.

The findings show—like other studies in developed countries—that HIV strains circulating in Africa establish viral reservoirs in the human body. Although antiretroviral therapy can reduce the level of HIV in the blood to an undetectable level, these dormant reservoirs continue to survive. They contain a large number of defective proviral DNA genomes which can’t produce new infectious viruses, but a small number of genomes remain genetically intact and ready to produce active viruses if antiretroviral treatment is interrupted.

The large proportion of defective viral genomes obscures researchers’ attempts to accurately quantify the copies of intact proviruses. “We are looking for a needle in a haystack: To achieve an HIV cure, we need to first find out whether any genome-intact proviruses remain in the body during antiretroviral treatment. Our new assay allows us to do this. Then we need to target and eliminate the intact proviral DNA capable of producing new viruses,” Dr. Lee explained.

Broadening the Lens of HIV Research with a New Assay

Dr. Lee and her colleagues analyzed DNA from immune cells called CD4+ T cells, where viral DNA hides, of 16 women and 7 men receiving antiretroviral HIV treatment in Uganda. Genetic sequencing of the virus revealed two predominant HIV-1 subtypes: A1 and D (a notoriously aggressive strain). The study also identified viral hybrids of A1 and D.

The team then modified existing laboratory tests that identify HIV subtype B proviruses to detect proviruses that are subtypes A1 and D. “The new assay we’ve developed will help researchers home in on the intact proviral genomes relevant to HIV cure research for patients affected by these under studied strains,” Dr. Lee said.

Dr. Lee and her multinational, multi-institution collaborators are already using the new assay to study long-term viral persistence in Uganda. Their findings show that the composition of the HIV proviral genomic landscape is broadly comparable between subtypes A1, D and B suggesting that approaches to target intact HIV reservoirs in Africa will face similar “needle-in-a-haystack” challenges as in North America and Europe. Future studies will also need to evaluate differences in non-B subtypes to understand whether subtype-specific factors impact persistence, reactivation or clearance in viral reservoirs.

Senior authors on the paper include Dr. Andrew Redd, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases at the National Institutes of Health, and Dr. Jessica Prodger, assistant professor, Departments of Microbiology & Immunology and Epidemiology & Biostatistics at Western University, Canada.

Researchers from Simon Fraser University, Canada; British Columbia Centre for Excellence in HIV/AIDS, Canada; Rakai Health Sciences Program, Uganda; University of Cape Town, South Africa; and Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine also contributed to this study.

The National Institutes of Health is funding this work through the Research Enterprise to Advance a Cure for HIV (REACH) Martin Delaney Collaboratory, which is co-led by Dr. Brad Jones, associate professor of immunology in medicine and also associate professor of microbiology and immunology at Weill Cornell Medicine, and Dr. Marina Caskey,   professor of clinical investigation at Rockefeller University and an adjunct professor of medicine at Weill Cornell Medicine and attending infectious disease physician at NewYork-Presbyterian/Weill Cornell Medical Center. The REACH Collaboratory is one of 10 NIH-funded collaborative research groups worldwide focused on finding an HIV cure.

This work was supported in part by the Division of Intramural Research, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases and NIH grants R21AI150398, R01AI162221 and UM1AI164565.