Friday, January 14, 2022

The geopolitics of aiding the Taliban’s Afghanistan

CHAYANIKA SAXENA ROSHNI KAPUR

Humanitarian assistance must be disentangled from concepts of political legitimacy in the country’s unfolding crisis.


Almost 97 per cent of Afghans will live below the poverty line by the end of 2022. Kabul, Afghanistan, 8 January 2022
(Bilal Guler/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)
Published 13 Jan 2022

The world has turned a blind eye to the sheer human misery surrounding Afghanistan ever since the Taliban returned to power in August 2021. While several regional countries and institutions have held conferences to discuss ways to avert the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, these talks are yet to transform into pliable actions that can help Afghans deal with their deteriorating living conditions. According to the International Rescue Committee (IRC), there has been an increase of 73 per cent in internal displacement since June 2021. Currently, more than 3.5 million Afghans find themselves displaced from their home regions due to insecurity, war and conflict, while approximately 1.2 million have been pushed out of their locales owing to natural disasters including floods, earthquakes and droughts.

G20 leaders, who came to a consensus at the 2021 summit to involve the Taliban in distributing aid to avert a humanitarian crisis, are themselves reluctant to deal with the new regime that comprises proscribed entities and individuals.

As the financial crisis deepens, more than 23 million people are facing severe hunger, with 8 in 10 eating less or borrowing food.

Compounding the challenge, the Afghan economy, which relies heavily on international aid, is in tatters due to sanctions and embargoes. The suspension of financial assistance by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, combined with an American freeze on the disbursal of US$9.5 billion of reserves to the Afghan Central Bank, is expected to take a massive toll on the financial health of Afghanistan. For a country that previously met 80 per cent of its budgetary requirements via international aid, the sudden and prolonged cessation of financial assistance will only make the economic situation, and with it the looming humanitarian crises, even worse.

Afghanistan’s economy of US$20 billion is expected to shrink by US$4 billion or more if the international restrictions persist. This, combined with the limited availability of cash, has already compelled many Afghans to sell their household goods and engage in bartering to survive. As the financial crisis deepens, more than 23 million people are facing severe hunger, with 8 in 10 eating less or borrowing food. Apart from the social consequences of mass starvation, human exploitation and drug abuse that are compounding because of economic desperation, almost 97 per cent of Afghanistan’s total population will be pushed below the poverty line – earning less than US$1.90 per day – by the end of 2022 if international relief does not pour in immediately.

The Covid-19 pandemic has only made matters worse. Medical facilities in Afghanistan are on the brink of collapse in the absence of international aid that had hitherto covered 90 per cent of their operational costs. With more than 10,000 Covid cases reported in the last five months (numbers that are likely vastly underestimated), the onset of the Omicron wave will put more pressure on a healthcare system that is currently functioning without adequate medical supplies, including oxygen, and staff that has not been paid for months. In fact, such is the state of the medical infrastructure in Afghanistan that roughly half of 38 Covid-dedicated hospitals have been forced to shut across the country.
Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid addresses the first press conference in Kabul on 17 August 2021 following the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan
 (Hoshang Hashimi/AFP via Getty Images)

The Taliban is making concerted efforts to gain acceptance as a legitimate and responsible actor as the group transitions from an insurgency to de-facto government. Following the takeover of Kabul in a fast military campaign, the group worked with foreign governments on the safe evacuation of their citizens. The Taliban has been appealing to international airlines to resume flights to Kabul in efforts to bring commercial traffic and open up the country.

The Taliban is also convening regular meetings with international organisations to provide official recognition and allow humanitarian aid to flow. The group requested that their desired envoy Suhail Shaheen be allowed to represent Afghanistan at the annual UN General Assembly meeting in September 2021. This request, however, was denied.

Despite the Taliban’s history of disrupting polio vaccination efforts, the group gave permission to health officials to resume door-to-door polio vaccination in October 2021. The group also agreed to restart vaccination campaigns against Covid-19 and measles to demonstrate that it is taking the threat of infectious diseases seriously.

Despite its efforts to project a different image, the Taliban is unlikely to gain international recognition until the group can convince other nations it has truly changed character.

The Taliban is also playing the ISKP (Islamic State – Khorasan Province) card to exploit the security concerns of neighbouring countries. The Doha agreement was signed on the basis that the Taliban would not allow Afghan soil to be used as a launchpad for terrorist activities against the United States. Other countries may sign similar accords with the Taliban seeking similar security assurances – whether that be China or India, the latter having held its first formal diplomatic engagement with the group in August 2021, a departure from its previous approach when the Taliban was in power in the 1990s.

Despite its efforts to project a different image, the Taliban is unlikely to gain international recognition until the group can convince other nations it has truly changed character. The renewed exclusion of women from public life, including barring studying or teaching in secondary schools and banning women from taking solo and long-distance road trips without a male relative, has only reinforced the Taliban’s image as an anachronistic and boorish entity. Yet it is difficult to verify human rights abuses committed by the group, in part due to the suspension of mobile and internet services – and also as a consequence of the suspension of some international support.

Although no country has formally recognised the de-facto government run by the Taliban, it will be useful to use recognition as leverage to make the group more amenable to granting greater political, social and cultural freedom to the citizens of Afghanistan. In doing so, the regional and global powers might also be able to provide the desired humanitarian assistance to the country without running the risk of condoning Taliban’s puritanical ways.
RED FASCISM
Hong Kong police switch to goose-stepping 'to show patriotism'


Hong Kong police have used goose-stepping in ceremonies and parades, but it will become part of officers' daily routines from July 1 (AFP/Peter PARKS)

Thu, January 13, 2022, 9:49 PM·1 min read

Hong Kong's entire police force will switch from colonial-era British marching drills to the goose-stepping style seen on the Chinese mainland, the city's force said Friday, citing the need to show officers' "patriotism".

The stiff-legged marching technique was first publicly demonstrated by Hong Kong officers on April 15 during National Security Education Day -- designated to mark a Beijing-imposed law that has empowered a crackdown on dissent.

The force has "actively planned for the full rollout of Chinese-style foot drills in order to show patriotism and foster love for our motherland and Hong Kong", police told AFP in a statement Friday.

Staff from China's People's Liberation Army barracks in Hong Kong have been teaching the city's police officers the technique since February 2021.

Police have used goose-stepping in ceremonies and parades, but it will become part of officers' daily routines from July 1 -- the same day Hong Kong marks 25 years since the former British colony was handed back to China.

The Hong Kong Police College will also host workshops for frontline officers on goose-stepping and flag-raising in the second quarter of this year, according to the statement.

On Thursday, Hong Kong's firefighters announced in an annual report they will make a similar switch before the end of the month.

Officers from Hong Kong's customs and excise, immigration and correctional services departments have also demonstrated goose-stepping as part of ceremonies.

The goose-stepping marching style, where uniformed officers kick straight-legged in a robotic manner, was first used by Prussian soldiers and has become a hallmark of authoritarian regimes including Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

hol/dhc/jta/dva


SEE

Legitimacy and Nationalism: China’s Motivations and the Dangers of Assumptions

Lewis Eves

Jan 13 2022 

LONG READ

There is increasing anxiety in the West about China’s growing assertiveness on the international stage. This anxiety is evident in the policies of western states. The USA has described China as ‘a sustained challenge’ to the international system (The White House, 2021 p.8). Meanwhile, the UK is investing in its ‘China-facing capabilities’ and Australia is purchasing nuclear submarines to hedge against China’s presence in the South China Sea (HM Government, 2021 p.22; Masterson, 2021). Undoubtedly, China’s rise poses a challenge to the status quo. If for no other reason than that it represents an alternative to the western-centric international system (Turin, 2010). Nevertheless, representing an alternative to the status quo does not mean that Chinese foreign policy is inherently motivated by challenging the West.

Such anxious perspectives of Chinese foreign policy are rooted in realism, a theory of international relations which assumes actors to be inherently self-interested and motivated by the egoistic pursuit of power (Waltz 2001; Mearshimer 2003). According to this ontology, the potential power to be gained by acting assertively is enough to account for China’s foreign policy motivations. Social constructivism, on the other hand, posits that an actor’s motivations are rooted in the social interactions between groups within the state (Leira, 2019). Using this lens, China’s foreign policy motivations must be understood in relation to its domestic politics. Adopting a socially constructivist ontology, this article argues that Chinese foreign policy is motivated, at least in part, by domestic nationalist pressures and that, by way of the security paradox, western policies are fuelling Chinese assertiveness.

This article proceeds as follows. Firstly, by presenting the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) twin-pillar model of legitimacy and its increased reliance on nationalism to maintain its regime’s legitimacy. It then outlines China’s nationalist movement and its foreign policy agenda, using the 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute to show how nationalist pressure affects the CCP’s foreign policy decision-making. Consideration is then given to the CCP’s social controls, showing that the CCP is unable to mitigate nationalist pressure via its propaganda infrastructure. The final section then presents the security paradox concept and how the West’s realist assumptions and anxious policies are fuelling Chinese assertiveness.

Pillars of Legitimacy

After Mao’s death, the CCP could no longer rely upon a cult of personality to provide popular support for its regime (Coble, 2007). Rather, the CCP has since premised its regime legitimacy ‘upon the twin pillars of nationalism and economic prosperity (Reilly, 2004 p.283). This model of legitimacy predicates the CCP’s regime security upon its ability to improve the economic conditions of the Chinese people and its ability to protect and pursue China’s national interests.

Certainly, the CCP has closely associated itself with China’s economic success and national interests. The CCP-owned People’s Daily, for example, regularly praises the CCP for fostering China’s ‘thriving and diverse economy’ (Cai, 2021). It goes as far as to praise specific CCP economic policies such as the 13th Five Year Plan, which is credited with growing China’s digital economy by 16.6% from 2016-20 (People’s Daily Online, 2021a). Also published were calls to support the CCP in protecting national interests from foreign intervention. For example, by purchasing Xinjiang Cotton against the backdrop of international condemnation of China’s treatment of Xinjiang’s Uighur population (People’s Daily Online, 2021b).

Notably, Chinese president Xi Jinping invoked both pillars when speaking at the CCP’s 100th-anniversary celebrations. Stating that ‘only socialism with Chinese characteristics can develop China’ (BBC News, 2021) In this statement, the CCP and its specific brand of socialist ideology are presented as essential to China’s economic development. Meanwhile, Xi also made an overtly nationalistic pledge that the CCP will:

never allow anyone to bully, oppress or subjugate China. Anyone who tries to do that will have their heads bashed bloody against the Great Wall of Steel forged by over 1.4 billion Chinese people (Xi via BBC News, 2021).

Evidently, the CCP is eager to associate itself with economic development and protecting the Chinese nation. Doing so in accordance with the twin pillar model to maintain its regime legitimacy.

However, an emerging issue with the twin pillar model is that the CCP increasingly struggles to ensure economic prosperity. Central to the economic pillar are Deng Xiaoping’s liberal economic reforms. Since their introduction in the early 1980s, per capita income has increased by 2500% and over 800 million Chinese have been saved from poverty, conferring popular support for the CCP’s economic stewardship (Denmark, 2018). Yet, structural economic challenges including a declining labour force, low per-capita productivity, and an over-reliance on manufacturing result in barriers to sustained growth (World Bank, n.d.). Consequentially, 373 million Chinese continue living in some degree of relative poverty (Ibid.).

As economic prosperity becomes harder to guarantee, the integrity of the economic pillar is weakened. This is an issue of which the CCP is aware. China’s growth rate in 2018 was 6.6% (Kuo, 2019), significantly below both China’s highs of over 10% growth in the 2000s, and the necessary rate needed to maintain high levels of employment (World Bank, n.d.). This led to concerns among CCP officials that rising unemployment might lead to social unrest (Kuo, 2019). This included Premier Li Keqiang, who publicly acknowledged ‘public dissatisfaction’ over China’s stagnating economic performance (Bradsher and Buckley, 2019).

Given the economic pillar’s weakness, the CCP must rely more upon the nationalist pillar to carry the burden of its regime legitimacy. Hence, the CCP has been less likely to constrain popular expressions of nationalist in recent years (Abbott, 2016). In 2005, tens-of-thousands of Chinese nationalists protested Japanese textbooks for their omission of atrocities committed against China during the Second Sino-Japanese War (Watts, 2005). Protesters attacked Japanese businesses and property, including Japan’s embassies and consulates (Yardley, 2005). Some local CCP branches and low-level officials encouraged the demonstrations, but the central CCP discouraged the nationalist demonstrations (Watts, 2005). These efforts included deploying riot police, shutting down public transport and the Minister of Public Security declaring the protests illegal and citing concern for Sino-Japanese relations as the reason for this crackdown (Yardley, 2005).

In stark contrast, the CCP did relatively little to stop anti-Japanese protests in 2012. This time, nationalists in over 180 Chinese cities gathered in the tens-of-thousands to protest Japan’s nationalisation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (Gries et al., 2016), an island chain in the East China Sea claimed by China but administered by Japan. Notably, senior CCP officials failed to comment on the protests while the dispute was ongoing (Buckley, 2012). Tensions in Sino-Japanese relations were higher in 2012 compared to 2005 (Gries et al., 2016), meaning it is challenging to isolate China’s economic performance as a variable accounting for the difference in the CCP’s response. However, it is notable that China’s economic growth rate slowed by roughly one-third from 11.39% in 2005 to 7.86% in 2012 (World Bank, n.d.). Accordingly, as per the twin-pillar model, the CCP’s reluctance to constrain the nationalistic anti-Japanese protests was to be expected, any anti-protest measures risking the nationalist credentials upon which the CCP increasingly relied as the economic pillar faltered.

Chinese Nationalism and the CCP’s Foreign Policy

The CCP’s reliance on the nationalist pillar confers considerable influence upon China’s nationalist movement. This in turn requires the CCP to acquiesce to the nationalist agenda in its foreign policy to maintain its legitimating nationalist credentials. Chinese nationalism is not a unified movement but consists of groups and organisations sharing a common Chinese nationalism sensitive to what it considers affronts to the Chinese nation and vocal in its activism against said affronts (Reilly, 2004; Coble, 2007; Johnston, 2017). Some of these groups and organisations have formal links with the CCP, for example, the Communist Youth League and nationalists working in local CCP branches (Watts, 2005; Kecheng, 2020). Others operate more independently of the CCP, such as nationalists among the Chinese diaspora and most of China’s online activist groups (Modongal, 2016; Fang and Repnikova, 2018).

These groups subscribe to a broad nationalist agenda and expect the CCP to use China’s growing economic and military strength to pursue China’s interests (Abbott, 2016). Specifically, they demand justice for historical repression, recognition of China commensurate with its newfound strength, that the CCP mobilise against threats to Chinese sovereignty, and that China’s sphere of influence be respected (Boylan et al., 2020). This agenda was evident in the recent US-China trade war. Nationalists called for sanctions in response to what they perceived as a US attempt to reject China’s status as a leading global economy, comparing US tariffs to the repressive economic restrictions imposed upon China by western imperialists in the 1800s (Ibid.).

Understanding the nationalist agenda and the CCP’s reliance on the nationalist pillar for regime legitimacy is significant. This is because the CCP must adhere to the nationalist agenda in its foreign policy to live up to its nationalist credentials (Coble, 2007). This is apparent in how, against the backdrop of China’s slowing economy, nationalist pressure has coincided with a hard-line stance from the CCP in China’s foreign relations. An example of this can be found as early as the 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute (also known as the Trawler Incident). This dispute began after a Chinese fishing trawler collided with two Japanese coastguard vessels in the territorial waters of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, after which Japan arrested the trawler’s crew. Initially the CCP responded relatively benignly, limited to Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Jiang Yu issuing a statement requesting that Japan ‘refrain from so-called law-enforcement activities in the East China Sea’ (Johnson 2010).

However, nationalistic anti-Japanese protests began in the days following the incident. The protesters called upon the CCP to take further action against Japan. One protester outside the Japanese embassy explained: ‘I want our government to be stronger. They shouldn’t let the Japanese bully us on our own soil!’ (Lim, 2010). Meanwhile, a protester in Shanghai summarised the protests as follows: ‘We came here to appeal for fairness and for the right to ask for our captain back. We regret the government’s weakness in diplomacy’ (Al Jazeera, 2010a).

Evidently, the China nationalist movement, in response to a perceived affront in the form of the trawler incident, sought to pressure the CCP into resolving the dispute in accordance with the nationalist agenda. The day after the protests started, and also only a day after their initial statement, Spokeswoman Jiang announced naval deployments to the East China Sea. This demarcated the first instance of regular Chinese patrols in the region since the normalisation of Sino-Japanese relations in the 1970s (Green et al., 2017). In the following weeks, as the nationalistic anti-Japanese protests continued, China also suspended diplomatic contacts with Japan and ceased rare earth exports essential to Japanese manufacturing (Hafeez, 2015). Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao also threatened Japan with retaliation while in New York for a UN conference (Al Jazeera, 2010b).

The fact that the CCP pivoted from a diplomatic response to naval deployments within one day, and that this pivot coincided with nationalist pressure upon the CCP, shows nationalism’s affect upon Chinese foreign policy in action. The rapid change in response to Japan resulting from the CCP wanting to uphold its nationalist credentials regardless of the implications for Sino-Japanese relations.

Of course, it is plausible that the CCP simply desired to take a strong stance against Japan and that anti-Japanese sentiment merely offered the pretext for the CCP to flex its newfound military strength. Taffer (2020), for example, presents the trawler incident as an attempt by the CCP to test the USA’s commitment to its Japanese ally. However, the CCP made efforts to repair Sino-Japanese relations after the flashpoint of the dispute passed. These included the resumption of rare earth exports and mild discouragement of anti-Japanese protests once nationalist pressure subsided in the following months (Green et al., 2017). This indicates that the CCP did not want to damage Sino-Japanese relations, but rather that nationalist pressure forced the CCP to act in accordance with the nationalist agenda. Thereby safeguarding its nationalist credentials as per its increasing reliance upon the nationalist pillar to secure its regime legitimacy.

The Limits of the CCP’s Control

Reilly (2011) argues that the CCP practices effective social control over its nationalist movement by leveraging China’s propaganda infrastructure to direct and disperse nationalist sentiment as needed. If true, this would mean that the CCP faces no pressure to adhere to the nationalist agenda. It could merely adapt its propaganda messaging to counter nationalist pressure without appeasing the nationalist agenda in its foreign policy decision-making.

Yet, the CCP has failed to restrict nationalist activism against foreign actors, illustrating the limits of the CCP’s control over China’s nationalist movement. For example, in 2020, against the backdrop of international condemnation of events in Hong Kong, the CCP struggled to crackdown on a nationalist anti-foreign smear campaign on social media (Lo, 2020). Notably, the Communist Youth League, a nationalistic youth movement affiliated with the CCP, provocatively endorsed a ‘social media crusade’ against foreign governments sympathetic towards Hong Kong (Kecheng, 2020). This shows that the CCP struggles to exert social control over nationalist organisations it has formal links with, let alone the broader Chinese nationalist movement.

The limitations of the CCP’s crackdown on the nationalist social media campaign, and thus limitations of the CCP’s social controls over China’s nationalist movement, were most prominent in May 2020. Chinese nationalist hacktivists hijacked the Twitter account of the Chinese embassy in Paris, posting a picture depicting the USA as the personification of death, trailing blood along a corridor and knocking at Hong Kong’s door with the caption ‘who’s next?’ (Lo, 2020). This is significant for two reasons. Firstly, the response from the Chinese embassy was to rapidly delete the post and issued formal apologies to France and the USA (Keyser, 2020). These actions are inconsistent with a CCP truly motivated to assert China’s national interests to the detriment of its foreign relations, but consistent with a CCP struggling to control China’s nationalist movement.

Secondly, and most importantly, this example shows Chinese nationalists to be hijacking the CCP’s propaganda infrastructure to pursue their foreign policy agenda. This points to a reality in which, rather than the CCP having social control of China’s nationalist movement through its propaganda infrastructure, Chinese nationalists find ways to escape the CCP’s social controls. It also shows that they are willing to respond independently of the CCP to perceived affronts to the Chinese nation if they feel the CCP fails to do so adequately.

Given the limitations of the CCP’s social controls, the CCP cannot merely adapt its propaganda messaging to offset nationalist pressure. Rather, it must contend with the dilemma of either acquiescing to the nationalist agenda, even to the detriment of China’s foreign relations, or risking its nationalist credentials and thus regime legitimacy. This demonstrates that domestic nationalist pressures are a significant factor in China’s foreign policy decision-making despite the CCP’s propaganda infrastructure.

Why Does it Matter?

Understanding the nationalist pressures on the CCP’s foreign policy decision-making is important for two reasons. Firstly, from an academic standpoint, it serves as a case study in working past initial assumptions about an actor’s motivations. Whereas western policymakers anxiously assume China’s motivations in accordance with realism, this article has presented an alternative explanation. By looking at an actor’s foreign policy as a product of its domestic politics, it is possible to provide a more meaningful explanation of their foreign policy motivations. In this case, that China is motivated, at least in part, by the CCP’s desire to uphold its legitimating nationalist credentials in the face of pressure to adhere to the foreign policy agenda of its nationalist movement.

Secondly, in terms of the practise of international relations, it shows how the realist assumptions of western policymakers and their respective China policies risk becoming self-fulfilling prophecies. This is in accordance with the security paradox concept. Also known as the security dilemma, the security paradox refers to a cycle in which two sides, through their efforts to mitigate their own uncertainty and insecurity, trigger uncertainty and insecurity in the other (Booth and Wheeler, 2007). As this cycle progresses tensions may escalate to the point that conflict emerges despite, paradoxically, neither side necessarily holding any ill-will towards the other at the start of the paradox (Ibid.). An example of a security paradox is the Anglo-German naval arms race during the prelude to World War I. In this, Germany’s maritime ambitions caused Britain to expand its navy, in turn lea ding Germany to accelerate its naval programme and thus Britain to develop larger battleships, and so on (Maurer, 1997).

A similar mechanic can be observed today regarding the West and its policies towards China. Western states, anxious about China’s rise and growing assertiveness, are enacting policies in preparation of a Chinese challenge to the status quo. Purchasing nuclear submarines and investing in ‘China-facing capabilities’. While understandable given their anxiety and realist assumptions, these policies risk provoking Chinese nationalists. Thereby generating pressure on the CCP to enact the assertive foreign policy the West wants to avoid. Likely leading to further western policies that risk being interpreted as an affront by Chinese nationalists. If unchecked, this could lead to hostility despite both the West and the CCP merely attempting to mitigate their own insecurities.

That western policies are provoking Chinese nationalists is clear to see. Minister Yang Xiaoguang of the Chinese embassy in London has explained that the Chinese people have expressed ‘antipathy and opposition’ to the UK’s plans to China policy (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 2021). This indicates domestic nationalist pressure on the CCP to respond to the UK’s policy. Similarly, in response to American posturing and Australia’s acquisition of nuclear submarines, Chinese nationalists briefly began calls for the CCP to declare war on AUKUS (Davidson and Blair, 2021). These examples both highlight how, in response to western policy, China’s nationalist movement is pressuring the CCP to adhere to its foreign policy agenda. In doing so, making the case that the West is, by way of its China policies, creating the assertive China that fuels their own anxieties.

Conclusion

Evidently, China’s foreign policy motivations are influenced by domestic nationalist pressures and western policy. This is apparent considering the twin-pillar model. As economic prosperity has become harder for the CCP to guarantee, it has had to increasingly rely upon nationalism for legitimacy. This confers considerable influence upon China’s nationalist movement. China’s nationalist movement subscribes to a broad nationalist agenda, which it wants the CCP to adhere to in its foreign policy decision-making. This has affected China’s foreign policy in practise, apparent as early as 2010 when the CCP quickly pivoted to align more closely to the nationalist agenda during the 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. Some have argued that the CCP’s control over China propaganda infrastructure confers effective control over China’s nationalist movement. However, as discussed, the CCP’s social controls over Chinese nationalists are in fact limited. With nationalists even bypassing said propaganda infrastructure and directly pursuing their foreign policy agenda when they consider the CCP to failed to rectify affronts to the Chinese nation.

Understanding the domestic pressures motivating Chinese foreign policy showcases the importance of moving beyond realist assumptions and highlights how we can achieve a fuller understanding by considering the domestic when we study the international. It also shows that western foreign policies are, by way of the security paradox, generating the assertive China that western policy was intended to mitigate. As the West provokes Chinese nationalists, they are pressuring the CCP to enact more assertive foreign policies, in turn causing further anxiety in the West. Further study into how China’s domestic politics informs its foreign policy could offer additional insights motivations. It could also inform western policies towards China. Lessening the risk of provoking Chinese nationalists and thus better mitigating western anxieties.

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Waltz, K. 2001. Man, The Sate and War. USA: Columbia University Press.

Watts, J. 2005. “Violence Flares As the Chinese Rage at Japan”. Accessed 16/6/20. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/apr/17/china.japan.

World Bank. n.d. “The World Bank In China”. Accessed 21/3/21. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview.

Yardley, J. 2005. “China Moves to Crack Down on Protests Against Japan”. Accessed 24/4/21. https://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/23/world/asia/china-moves-to-crack-down-on-protests-against-japan.html.

Further Reading on E-International Relations

AI-POWERED DRONES FOR REPLANTING FORESTS
AirSeed’s AI-powered drone system analyses forests to design bespoke seed pods and determine the best places to drop the seeds | Photo source AirSeed Technology

SUSTAINABILITY
An Australian startup is scaling-up reforestation by using AI-powered analysis, drones, and custom-designed seed pods

Spotted: According to the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “The world has 10 years remaining to prevent a massive and destabilising climate change through combined rapid phase-out of fossil fuels, reforestation, and other natural climate solutions.” At the moment, deforestation causes a loss of 1.35 million tonnes of carbon sequestration each year. Australian startup AirSeed Technology is hoping to reverse this using AI and an army of seed-firing drones.

AirSeed’s tech uses specially-designed seed pods which can be fired into the ground from the drones. The seed pods are manufactured using waste biomass, which provides a nutrient-rich coating that protects the seeds and provides materials for boosting seed growth. The drones fly autonomously and can each plant more than 40,000 seed pods a day.

Before the airborne planting, AirSeed maps the terrain in order to identify site specific plant species and create an optimum planting pattern. Soil samples are analysed in order to develop a seed pod which contains all nutrients needed for that specific area. The data collected during the mapping is used to prepare flight plans and to set predefined GPS coordinates for dropping the seeds. On command, the drones fly autonomously along a pre-programmed route, resulting in a process that is 25 times faster and 80 per cent cheaper than manual planting methods.

The company also conducts post planting surveys to detect change over time, count tree canopies and calculate biomass. This helps to accurately monitor and report growth rates. Andrew Walker, CEO and co-founder of AirSeed Technologies, believes the system could be a game-changer in reforestation. “We’re being very mindful of the fact that we need to restore soil health, we need to restore microbial communities within the soil, and we need to restore primary habitat providers for animals.”

AirSeed is not the only company working on seed dropping technology. Dendra Systems is working on a similar system. Springwise has also covered a number of companies working on other innovative methods for reforestation. These include a start-up working to develop repeatable ways to scale and accelerate the successful planting and nurturing of trees and a venture studio leveraging technology and data to support reforestation projects.

Written By: Lisa Magloff
14th January 2022

Website: airseedtech.com

Ocean heat is at record levels, with major consequences

January 13, 2022
A tropical storm’s rain overwhelmed a dam in Thailand and caused widespread flooding in late September. It was just one of 2021’s disasters. 
Chaiwat Subprasom/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images

The world witnessed record-breaking climate and weather disasters in 2021, from destructive flash floods that swept through mountain towns in Europe and inundated subway systems in China and the U.S., to heat waves and wildfires. Typhoon Rai killed over 400 people in the Philippines; Hurricane Ida caused an estimated US$74 billion in damage in the U.S.

Globally, it was the sixth hottest year on record for surface temperatures, according to data released by NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in their annual global climate report on Jan. 13, 2022. But under the surface, ocean temperatures set new heat records in 2021.

As climate scientist Kevin Trenberth explains, while the temperature at Earth’s surface is what people experience day to day, the temperature in the upper part of the ocean is a better indicator of how excess heat is accumulating on the planet.

The Conversation spoke with Trenberth, coauthor of a study published on Jan. 11, 2022, by 23 researchers at 14 institutes that tracked warming in the world’s oceans.

Hurricane Ida did $74 billion in damage from Louisiana to the northeastern U.S. in 2021. RAMMB/CIRA/Colorado State University

Your latest research shows ocean heat is at record highs. What does that tell us about global warming?

The world’s oceans are hotter than ever recorded, and their heat has increased each decade since the 1960s. This relentless increase is a primary indicator of human-induced climate change.

As oceans warm, their heat supercharges weather systems, creating more powerful storms and hurricanes, and more intense rainfall. That threatens human lives and livelihoods as well as marine life.

The oceans take up about 93% of the extra energy trapped by the increasing greenhouse gases from human activities, particularly burning fossil fuels. Because water holds more heat than land does and the volumes involved are immense, the upper oceans are a primary memory of global warming. I explain this in more detail in my new book “The Changing Flow of Energy Through the Climate System.”

Ocean heat content in the upper 2,000 meters of the world’s oceans since 1958, relative to the 1981-2010 average. The units are zettajoules. Lijing Cheng

Our study provided the first analysis of 2021’s ocean warming, and we were able to attribute the warming to human activities. Global warming is alive and well, unfortunately.

The global mean surface temperature was the fifth or sixth warmest on record in 2021 (the record depends on the dataset used), in part, because of the year-long La Niña conditions, in which cool conditions in the tropical Pacific influence weather patterns around the world.

There is a lot more natural variability in surface air temperatures than in ocean temperatures because of El Niño/La Niña and weather events. That natural variability on top of a warming ocean creates hot spots, sometimes called “marine heat waves,” that vary from year to year. Those hot spots have profound influences on marine life, from tiny plankton to fish, marine mammals and birds. Other hot spots are responsible for more activity in the atmosphere, such as hurricanes.

While surface temperatures are both a consequence and a cause, the main source of the phenomena causing extremes relates to ocean heat that energizes weather systems.

Scientists are concerned about the stability of Antarctica’s Thwaites Glacier, which holds back large amounts of land ice. NASA

We found that all oceans are warming, with the largest amounts of warming in the Atlantic Ocean and in the Southern Ocean surrounding Antarctica. That’s a concern for Antarctica’s ice – heat in the Southern Ocean can creep under Antarctica’s ice shelves, thinning them and resulting in calving off of huge icebergs. Warming oceans are also a concern for sea level rise.
In what ways does extra ocean heat affect air temperature and moisture on land?

The global heating increases evaporation and drying on land, as well as raising temperatures, increasing risk of heat waves and wildfires. We’ve seen the impact in 2021, especially in western North America, but also amid heat waves in Russia, Greece, Italy and Turkey.

The warmer oceans also supply atmospheric rivers of moisture to land areas, increasing the risk of flooding, like the U.S. West Coast has been experiencing.
2021 saw several destructive cyclones, including Hurricane Ida in the U.S. and Typhoon Rai in the Philippines. How does ocean temperature affect storms like those?

Warmer oceans provide extra moisture to the atmosphere. That extra moisture fuels storms, especially hurricanes. The result can be prodigious rainfall, as the U.S. saw from Ida, and widespread flooding as occurred in many places over the past year.

The storms may also become more intense, bigger and last longer. Several major flooding events have occurred in Australia this past year, and also in New Zealand. Bigger snowfalls can also occur in winter provided temperatures remain below about freezing because warmer air holds more moisture.

A resident in the Philippines looks at a vehicle swept away by flood water during Typhoon Rai. Cheryl Baldicantos/AFP via Getty Images

If greenhouse gas emissions slowed, would the ocean cool down?

In the oceans, warm water sits on top of cooler denser waters. However, the oceans warm from the top down, and consequently the ocean is becoming more stratified. This inhibits mixing between layers that otherwise allows the ocean to warm to deeper levels and to take up carbon dioxide and oxygen. Hence it impacts all marine life.

We found that the top 500 meters of the ocean has clearly been warming since 1980; the 500-1,000 meter depths have been warming since about 1990; the 1,000-1,500 meter depths since 1998; and below 1,500 meters since about 2005.

The slow penetration of heat downward means that oceans will continue to warm, and sea level will continue to rise even after greenhouse gases are stabilized.

The final area to pay attention to is the need to expand scientists’ ability to monitor changes in the oceans. One way we do this is through the Argo array – currently about 3,900 profiling floats that send back data on temperature and salinity from the surface to about 2,000 meters in depth, measured as they rise up and then sink back down, in ocean basins around the world. These robotic, diving and drifting instruments require constant replenishment and their observations are invaluable.

Argo floats keep tabs on ocean changes around the world. Howard Freeland, 2018, CC BY-ND


Author
Kevin Trenberth
Distinguished Scholar, NCAR; Affiliated Faculty, University of Auckland

'Indescribable' sighting of ultra-rare 'rainbow-like' octopus off Australian island

Alan Granville08:48, Jan 14 2022
The most striking feature of the Blanket Octopus is its vibrant and almost fluorescent ‘rainbow-like’ cape.

When marine biologist Jacinta Shackleton first saw the rainbow-coloured flicker out of the corner of her eye in a dive off Lady Elliot Island at the southern end of Australia’s Great Barrier Reef, she thought it was just a regular juvenile fish.

But on closer inspection she realised she was having what she believes is a once-in-a-lifetime experience –seeing an extremely rare female blanket octopus.

Shackleton admitted she couldn’t contain her emotions.

“I had this overwhelming sense of joy and excitement. I kept yelling through my snorkel, ‘it’s a Blanket Octopus!’ I was so excited I was finding it difficult to hold my breath to dive down and video it,” said Shackleton.


@JACINTASHACKLETON/SUPPLIED
The octopus mainly spends its lifecycle in the open ocean.


@JACINTASHACKLETON
A rare sighting of the Blanket Octopus.

Sightings of this particular octopus are rare. A male was first spotted 21 years ago further north on the Great Barrier Reef. Since then there’s been just three other sightings of the blanket octopus at Lady Elliot Island until this latest discovery.

The name “blanket octopus” comes from the webbed “cape” or “blanket” that trails behind the female, a feature the males do not display. One of the most unusual features of this marine mollusc is that the species has the largest gender size discrepancy in the marine world. A female blanket octopus can grow up to two metres in length, whereas the much smaller males grow to around 2.4cm.

@JACINTASHACKLETON
The name ‘Blanket Octopus’ comes from the webbed ‘cape’ or ‘blanket’ that trails behind the female, a feature the males do not display.

The octopus mainly spends its lifecycle in the open ocean and most of the images of it have come at night making this day-time reef appearance even more unusual.

“Seeing one in real life is indescribable, I was so captivated by its movements, it was as if it was dancing through the water with a flowing cape. The vibrant colours are just so incredible, you can’t take your eyes off it,” said Shackleton.

“I’ve truly never seen anything like it before and don’t think I ever will again in my life.”

For more details on Lady Elliot Island go to at queensland.com/greatbarrierreef.
60 Million Fish Nests in Antarctica Found in Single Largest Breeding Colony to Date


Icefish nests guarded by an adult, holding an average of 1,700 eggs. (AWI OFOBS team)
NATURE


CAMERON DUKE, LIVE SCIENCE
14 JANUARY 2022

Scientists onboard an icebreaker in Antarctica were blown away when they spied a trove of 60 million icefish nests dotting the floor of the Weddell Sea. The bonanza of nurseries – each guarded by a ghostly looking parent – represents the largest known breeding colony of fish.

Autun Purser of the Alfred Wegener Institute was on the bridge of the German icebreaker, called the RV Polarstern, keeping watch for whales when his graduate student, Lilian Böhringer, who was monitoring the camera feed called up to the bridge.

One of the ship's missions was to monitor the seafloor of the Weddell Sea, and specifically, Böhringer was watching a live video feed from the Ocean Floor Observation and Bathymetry System (OFOBS), which is a one-ton camera towed behind the ship.

On the video feed, Böhringer could see fish nests pockmarking the seafloor about every 10 inches (25 centimeters) in all directions and covering an area of 93 square miles (240 square kilometers).

"The camera was moving [across the seafloor] and it just didn't stop. They were everywhere," Böhringer told Live Science.

The nests were modest bowls carved in the mud on the seafloor by notothenioid icefish (Neopagetopsis ionah), which are native to the chilly southern oceans. They are the only known vertebrates to completely lack hemoglobin in their blood. Because of this, icefish are considered "white-blooded."

"We realized after ringing up the home institute the next day that we had found something spectacular," Purser said.

After the initial discovery, the team made subsequent passes over the site, towing the camera at a shallower depth to get a wider view of the colony.

Icefish tend to nest in groups, but "the most ever seen before was forty nests or something like that," said Purser. This nesting site, after extensive surveying, has an estimated 60 million nests. "We've never seen anything like this," Purser added.

Most of those nests were attended by one adult fish watching over an average of 1,700 eggs.

The researchers were in the general area because they were studying an upwelling of water that was 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit (2 degrees Celsius) warmer than the surrounding water. "Our aim was to see how carbon goes from the surface to the seafloor and what communities are in the water column," said Purser.

Intermixed with the nests were fish carcasses. (AWI OFOBS team)

Inside the upwelling column of water, they found microscopic zooplankton near the surface, where young icefish, after hatching, swim to feast on the floating buffet before returning to the seafloor to breed. Because of the food, the presence of icefish in the upwelling was to be expected. A breeding colony many orders of magnitude larger than ever seen before, however, was not.

In addition to living fish guarding nests, the team found that the area was littered with fish carcasses as well, suggesting that this massive icefish colony is an integral part of the local ecosystem, most likely serving as prey for Weddell seals.

The discovery of the colony has led to an effort to make it a Marine Protected Area under the international Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources.

Oddly, the icefish colony seems to have a distinct border. "[The colony] went from very, very dense to nothing, much like penguin colonies," said Purser. "It was like a line in the sand."

That "line in the sand," they found, was the outer edge of the warm upwelling. While more research is needed to determine whether this is coincidental, the upwelling seems to create a rare and ideal environment for the icefish to breed.

Before leaving the area, the crew of the Polarstern left two cameras to observe the inner workings of this rare ecosystem. Purser plans to return to the Weddell Sea in April 2022.

"There's certainly lots to be discovered," said Purser.

This study was published online January 13 in the journal Current Biology.

Related content:

Scientists uncover Antarctic sea creatures 'trapped under ice' for 50 years

Rare wispy ice formations streak across the sea near Antarctica

New expedition will search for Shackleton's Endurance deep below Antarctic waters

This article was originally published by Live Science. Read the original article here.

January 6 — a day that scarred US 'democracy'

By Xing Ping | chinadaily.com.cn | Updated: 2022-01-14 

A protester breaking into the US Capitol building is captured on a screenshot 
in a video feed from NBC news seen in Arlington, Virginia,
the United States, Jan 6, 2021.
 [Photo/Xinhua]

More than one year since the US Capitol riot on January 6, 2021, the country is still feeling the pain of political division. The attacks ripped off the Band-Aids on US democracy all at once, exposing its wounds and vulnerability. Indeed, the bomb threats, the storming and looting and the gunshots culminated in great skepticism about US democracy at home.

The latest poll by Quinnipiac University on the the first anniversary of the assault showed 58 percent of those surveyed believe the nation's democracy is in danger of collapse, and 53 percent said they expect political divisions in the country to worsen over their lifetime. The poll also brought bad news for President Joe Biden, whose approval rating has tumbled to 33 percent. That is a real wake-up call for many still obsessed with the supremacy of US democracy.

One year after the confirmation of his election, Biden is still looking over his shoulder, fearing someone from the Republican Party may take his seat in the Oval Office. His worries are well-founded. About 21 million Americans still believe Biden did not win the presidency, but stole it. Legal challenges to the election results are still filed from time to time. States have leveraged public distrust to enact laws that empower partisan legislatures to intervene in election processes.

The first anniversary turned out to be a platform for the US President to put one man and one party in the crosshairs. Biden came just short of directly calling Trump a loser when identifying him as "a defeated former president". He accused his predecessor of rallying and orchestrating the assault and watching all the violence happening on a TV screen. He labeled the mob as "insurrectionists" defying the will of the people.

Those rioters were designated as extremists, terrorists or militia affiliates, while in fact around 90 percent of the rioters have no link with militia or far-right organizations according to a professor at the University of Chicago. About 26 percent of those charged were business owners; an additional 28 percent were white-collar workers. In this incident, democracy is used more like a tool for political fighting.

America has been against America long before the Capitol riot and all the political drama unfolding in year since. Red and blue states have taken separate paths and denounced each other in the fight against COVID-19, with one based on science and confidence in masks and vaccines and the other riddled with conspiracy theories. The Build Back Better Act proposed by Democrats to upgrade essential infrastructure failed to pass in the Congress even after multiple attempts to reconcile with the GOP. While going to any lengths to win, the parties are also forcing Americans to think and act along party lines, leading to diametrical views on almost every major issue.

Americans have come to learn the progress in life touted by politicians is nothing but a walk on the treadmill. Almost $770 billion will be pumped into the defense industry of this unrivaled military power with the passing of the new National Defense Authorization Act, even as more than 7.5 million people are living without federal jobless benefits.

Cases of gun violence hit new highs year after year, taking more than 120 lives on a daily basis. Ordinary people vent their anger on other races and politicians. About 40 percent of Republicans now believe violent action against the government is sometimes justified.

The "City Upon a Hill" may find itself fighting an uphill battle. According to the Quinnipiac University poll, 53 percent of Americans think it is either very likely or somewhat likely there will be another attack like the one that happened at the US Capitol. If history teaches anything, there is simply no solution other than earning the trust of the people.

"They failed," Biden said during the anniversary event. But what really failed is US "democracy" itself.

  • US Congress should discuss Putin-Biden agreements instead of sanctions — Duma Speaker

    According to Vyacheslav Volodin, "sanctions don’t scare anyone, they only destroy relations"

    MOSCOW, January 14. /TASS/. US Congressmen should discuss and implement the agreements, achieved by Presidents Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin instead of threatening new sanctions against Russia, Russian State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin opined Friday.

    "Two weeks ago, Vladimir Putin and Joe Biden had a phone call," Volodin said in his Telegram channel adding that "the leaders of Russia and the US agreed to have a serious and substantial dialogue on the mentioned issues in order to achieve real results."

    "We all thought that common sense would prevail and Washington would make a sound decision. Instead, the US parliament is making hysterical statements about sanctions against our country," the speaker continued. "The presidents of our countries agreed to begin consultations on global security. In this regard, it is necessary to discuss and implements the presidents’ agreements instead of insulting, threatening and intimidating."

    The politician proposed to think about the consequences.

    "Your hysteria won’t lead to anything good. For the US, first and foremost," he believes. According to Volodin, "sanctions don’t scare anyone, they only destroy relations."

    "There is an abyss ahead. It would be better to stop before it’s too late. Don’t invent problems for yourselves," he added.

    The speaker underscored that, although Russia has weapons that no other state has, this advantage is not being used in the dialogue with NATO.

    "Russian citizens see outbursts against President Vladimir Putin as an insult against our country," he noted, calling on US lawmakers to use the opportunity for negotiations.